8. For the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.

9. For the recovery of personal property distrained for any cause.

10. Against a public officer or person specially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him in virtue of, or under color of his office; or against a person who, by his command or in his aid, does any thing touching the duties of the office.

§ 10. The said court shall have jurisdiction, also, in all other civil actions, whether the cause of action arise or the subject of the action be situate in the city of Buffalo or not.

1. In an action arising on contract, when the defendant, or when one or more of several defendants reside, or are personally served with the summons, or occupy a tenement for the transaction of his or her ordinary business in that city, or when the contract was made in that city.

2. In an action for any other cause, when the defendant or defendants proceeded against reside in that city, or occupy a tenement therein for the transaction of their ordinary business, or are personally served with summons in that city.

3. In an action arising on contract, or against common carriers, upon the custom or duty, when all the defendants reside out of the state, but one or more of them has property in the city.

4. When the defendant is a corporation, created under the laws of this state, and transacts its general business, or keeps an office, or has an agency established for the transaction of business in that city, or is established therein by law.

5. When the defendant is a corporation, created by or under the laws of another state, government, or country, and has property in said city, or an agency established therein.

6. When the action or proceeding is against the city of Buffalo or its offi

cers.

§ 11. The said court shall also have the care and custody of all idiots, lunatics, persons of unsound mind, and habitual drunkards, residing in said city of Buffalo, and of their real and personal estate.

§ 12. The said court shall, within said city, have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court, of writs of prohibition, of mandamus, of habeas corpus, of certiorari, of ad quod damnum, of ne exeat, and of all other common-law and statutory writs; of the remedies heretofore obtained by any writ now abolished, which may now be obtained by civil action, and of all special proceedings whatsoever; and shall have power to hear, adjudge, and determine the same.

The said court shall also have exclusive jurisdiction in every case in which the title to real estate shall come in question, in an action commenced in a justices' court in said city, where such action shall be discontinued and another action shall be commenced for the same cause, as provided by sections 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Code of Procedure; in every case the condition of the undertaking required by the said fifty-sixth section shall

be, that the defendant shall give an admission in writing of the service of a summons and complaint in the said Superior Court, if the plaintiff shall deposit such summons and complaint with the justice, as provided in said section; all the provisions of the said sections applicable to County Courts shall, in such actions, apply to the said Superior Court.

N. B. The first clause of the above section was inserted on the amendment of this statute in 1857. The second clause constituted the section as it stood in 1854.

§ 13. In all cases where, by the provisions of this act, the jurisdiction of the said court is not made to depend upon the personal service of the summons in the said city, the summons may be served in the same place and in the same manner as it could be, if the action or proceeding were pending in the Supreme Court of this state.

§ 14. Writs of subpoena, attachments for contempts, precepts for the collection of interlocutory costs, and all writs and process awarded by said court, or any judge thereof, may be issued to and executed in any county of the state; and the said court shall have the same powers as the Supreme Court to enforce all its process, orders, and judgments, and to grant new trials and rehearings.

This section as it stands dates from 1857. In 1854, the first clause of the section was confiued to writs of subpoena only, and the words, "and rehearings," were omitted from the second.

By sections 15 to 18, powers are given for the removal into the Supreme Court of transitory actions, for the purpose of changing the venue into another county, and also of any action by consent of the parties, analogous to those previously noticed under the heads of the New York Superior Court and Common Pleas.

By section 19, exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Court of Appeals to review the judgments of this court, and provision is made for appeals from the special to the general terms of the court itself, in all cases where a similar appeal could be taken in the Supreme Court, in an action or proceeding therein.

The former appeal, as in that tribunal, lies only from the decision of the general term, and the Court of Appeals will not review a final judgment rendered by the special term only, though consequent on a previous decision on a demurrer reviewed by the full bench of the court. Hollister Bank of Buffalo vs. Vail, 15 N. Y., 593.

The above section was amended in its phraseology in 1857. Its purview was the same in 1854.

By section 20, this court is constituted as the final appellate tribunal for review of judgments rendered by a justice of the peace of the city of Buffalo, instead of the Supreme Court. See Burgart vs. Stork, 12 How., 559; see also, Code, § 352, amendment of 1862. But this clause

does not extend to judgments in cases arising in justices' courts in the county of Erie, out of the city.

By section 21, the judgments of this court, when docketed in any county of this state, become liens, and are enforceable against the property or person of the judgment debtor, precisely as judgments of the Supreme Court. The remedy here given against the person, dates from the amendment of 1857; the other portions of the section, from 1854. Section 22 provides for the holding and adjournment of general and special terms. The former, under section 23, may be held by two justices, and all issues at law are to be tried thereat. The concurrence of two justices shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment at a general term, and if two do not concur, the cause shall be reheard. The special terms are to be held by a single justice, at which issues of fact are to be tried.

By sections 24 and 25, provisions are made for the continual transaction of chamber business by one of the justices; and to each of such justices there are given the powers of the former recorder of Buffalo, and also, all the powers possessed by a justice of the Supreme Court out of court, or at chambers. Full provisions are also made for the hearing or continuance, before any of the justices, of any notice or proceeding noticed or commenced before another.

N. B.-These sections, as they stand, date from the amendment of 1857. The amendment of section 24 is merely formal; that of section 25 radical and substantial. In 1854, it merely gave to each of the justices the powers of a county judge in Supreme Court proceedings.

By section 26, all the provisions of the Code, except title IV., of part II., applicable to the Supreme Court, and not in conflict with the provisions of that act, are made applicable to the court in question.

Ñ. B.—The title referred to, is that which relates to the fixing and change of venue.

Under section 27, the practice of this tribunal is to be that of the Supreme Court, subject always to such changes not inconsistent with any statute, as may be made therein, by rules of the court in question.

The section goes on to provide for the recovery of the ordinary double costs by public officers, or persons acting under them, on succeeding in any action.

The 29th and 30th sections, both amended in 1857, provide for the summoning and empannelling of jurors, and the furnishing suitable places for transaction of the business of the court.

Sections 31 to 36, inclusive, relate to its criminal jurisdiction.

By section 37, all the provisions of law relating to the late Recorder's Court, not inconsistent with that act, are made applicable to the Superior Court.

:

The act of 1854 took effect from the 1st of May, 1854; the amendments of 1857 immediately, i. e., the 10th of April, 1857.

By the latter statute, the following section, before noticed in chapter III., was added to the original act:

§ 39. If any action or proceeding is pending in said court before the general term, and two of the justices of said court, from any cause, shall be disqualified to hear or decide the same, the court shall, by order, transfer the same to the Supreme Court, which last court shall, upon a certified copy of such order being filed with its clerk, become fully possessed of such aetion or proceeding.

It will be observed, that the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court is of the very highest nature, consistent with its peculiar attributes as a local tribunal. In all essential respects it is equivalent to that, of the Superior Court and Court of Common Pleas of the city and county of New York. In some, its attributes are even superior and its cognizance of wider scope. See section 12, first clause, and compare section 10 and its different subdivisions with section 33 of the Code. See likewise the power to make rules changing the practice of the Supreme Court, which seems virtually to exempt this tribunal.from the liability to be governed by the Supreme Court rules from time to time, imposed upon the similar jurisdictions in New York by section 470 of the Code.

In the International Bank vs. Bradley, 19 N. Y., 245, the following points are decided in favor of the jurisdiction of this court:

That the mode of its organization, as above stated, is constitutional; And that, in support of its jurisdiction, it is to be presumed, after judgment, that a non-resident indorser of a note dated at Buffalo, made his indorsement within that city.

(j) MAYORS' AND RECORDERS' COURTS.

The following special disqualification, in addition to those before noticed in chapter III., is, by section 50 of the amended judiciary act, chapter 470 of 1847, imposed upon persons filling the office of recorder:

in

§ 50. No recorder shall practise as an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor, any court of which he shall be, or shall be entitled to act as a member, or in any cause or proceeding originating in any such court; nor shall any partner of, or person connected in law business with any recorder, practise as an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor in any court of which such recorder, shall be, or shall be entitled to act as a member, or in any cause or proceed-, ing originating in any such court.

The three courts first below mentioned were organized prior to the revision of the statutes in 1828. The others are of subsequent institution, as below referred to.

VOL, I.-6

(k.) MAYOR'S COURT OF ALBANY.

The original powers of this tribunal were to hear, try, and determine according to law, all local actions arising within the city of Albany, and also all transitory actions, although the same might not have arisen therein. It was to be held by the mayor, recorder, and aldermen of the city of Albany, or the mayor and recorder jointly, or each of them singly, with or without the presence of any of the aldermen. But any alderman might sit as a judge, and in case of the absence of the mayor and recorder, or of their offices being vacant, any three aldermen were empowered to hold a court. In its records the words "judges of the said court," were to be a sufficient description.

By chapter 328-of 1830, it was made the special duty of the recorder to preside in and hold the court. Under chapter 275 of 1842, section 14, no judge of the court, other than the recorder, is competent to make orders in vacation, unless in case of his absence, death, or inability.

By chapter 86 of 1842, it was further provided that no action shall be removed from this court on account of the amount of debt or damages claimed therein. Chapter 24 of 1848 also relates to it, but does not interfere with or alter its jurisdiction. Under chapter 386 of 1840, its judgments were directed to be docketed with the clerk of the court before they became a lien.

(1.) MAYOR'S COURT OF HUDSON.

The original organization of this court, so far as regards the judges who constitute it, and their powers, was, in all respects, similar to that of the Mayor's Court of Albany. Its original jurisdiction was to hear, try, and determine, according to law, all actions, real, personal, and mixed, arising within that city and not elsewhere. By chapter 101 of 1829, that jurisdiction was extended to all causes of action wherever arising, but limited, as to appeals, to those from the judgment of a justice in that city. By chapter 189 of 1844, it was empowered to try all local actions arising within the city of Hudson, and all transitory actions, although the same may not have arisen therein; and, by the same statute, its judgments, when docketed, were enforceable by fieri facias in any county of the state. Before that, they were governed by chapter 386 of 1840 above noticed.

By chapter 320 of 1848, the powers and duties of a justice of the Supreme Court at chambers, are conferred upon the recorder of this city. (m.) MAYOR'S COURT OF TROY.

The organization of this court was similar, in all respects, to that of the two last noticed, and its judgments stood upon the same footing as those of the Mayor's Court of Albany above noticed. Its jurisdiction