Art. XII, § 1 Organization of Cities and Villages Disbandment of militia company as constituting removal of officer.— A commissioned officer of the uniformed militia of the state, rendered supernumerary by the disbandment under and in accordance with the Military Code (§ 7, ch. 299, Laws of 1883) of the organization of which he was an officer, is not thereby removed from office within the meaning of this constitution. The officer does not, by the disbandment, lose his rank or commission; he is simply relieved from active service until again assigned to duty, or appointed, or elected to another command. An order, therefore, by the governor as commander-in-chief of the military forces of the state, disbanding a company, is not violative of this constitutional provision. People v. Hill, (1891) 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789. Military board of examination as judicial body.- A military board of examination, appointed pursuant to this section of the constitution and section 64 of the Military Code (Laws 1898, ch. 212; Laws 1899, ch. 240; Laws 1900, ch. 746), which was enacted hereunder, to examine into the moral character, capacity and general fitness for the service of a commissioned officer of the national guard, and upon the findings of which he may be removed from office, is not simply an agency to advise the governor, as commander-in-chief, of the officer's fitness to remain in the service, but is a judicial body, composed of officers acting as judges, whose action, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (§§ 2120 et seq.), is subject to review by the civil courts on a writ of certiorari; and, while the writ may be refused as a matter of discretion, it cannot be denied for the want of power. People v. Huffman, (1901) 166 N. Y. 462, 60 N. E. 187, 54 L. R. A. 597, reversing 55 App. Div. 260, 66. Y. S. 884. ARTICLE XII. § 1. Organization of cities and villages; legislature to restrict certain local powers. State, county and municipal employees; regulation by legislature. It shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and in contracting debt by such municipal corporations; and the Legislature may regulate and fix the wages or salaries, the hours of work or labor, and make provision for the protection, welfare and safety of persons employed by the State or by any county, city, town, village or other civil division of the State, or by any contractor or subcontractor performing work, labor or services for the State, or for any county, city, town, village or other civil division thereof. Const. 1846, Art. VIII, § 9; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. XII, § 1; amended in 1905. Relation to article 2, section 1.— - This section is to be construed with article 2, section 1, which defines the qualifications of electors of the state and Organization of Cities and Villages Art. XII, § 1 provides that such electors shall be entitled to vote “for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people; and upon all questions which may be submitted to the vote of the people." So construed, that provision is general and relates only to the general governmental affairs of the state, while this section is local and relates to the business or private affairs of the municipalities specified, and neither section is violated by a statute (Laws 1898, ch. 269, art. 2, § 5), defining the qualifications of voters in the village of Fulton and requiring that a voter, in order to vote upon a proposition that the village establish a system of water works and issue bonds for that purpose, "must be entitled to vote for an officer, and he or his wife must also be the owner of property in the village." Spitzer v. Fulton, 172 N. Y. 285, 64 N. E. 957, 92 A. S. R. 736, (1902) affirming 61 App. Div. 612. Relation to article 10, section 2.- The legislature is not competent, by virtue of the authority granted it by this section over cities and villages, to deprive those localities of the powers of self-government preserved to them by section 2 of article 10. Thus, it cannot deny an incorporated village the right to assess and collect taxes levied on the property of the village for village purposes. An act (ch. 510, Laws 1914) which in effect accomplishes such a result, is unconstitutional and void. People v. Pelham, (1915) 215 N. Y. 374, 109 N. E. 513, reversing 166 App. Div. 779, 152 N. Y. S. 428. Scope of legislative discretion generally.- Whether, in any instance, the power of a municipal corporation to tax, to borrow money, to contract debts or loan its credit, has been sufficiently restricted, is a question for the discretion of the legislature, not reviewable in the courts. Bank of Rome v. Rome, (1858) 18 N. Y. 38; Townsend v. New York, (1878) 16 Hun 362. See also Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (1863) 26 N. Y. 467; Tifft v. Buffalo, (1880) 82 N. Y. 204. Thus, as the language of this section clearly recognizes the right of the legislature to confer upon any city the right to determine what moneys should be raised for municipal purposes under such restrictions as the legislature may see fit to impose, that body may place the power of determining such amounts in the hands of such municipal officers as it sees fit. Accordingly chapter 779, Laws of 1873, which creates the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the board of aldermen, and the president of the department of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, a board of estimate and apportionment, to estimate and certify such amount as shall be necessary to be raised by taxation in the city of New York, for city and county purposes, is constitutional and valid. Townsend v. New York, (1878) 16 Hun 362, affirmed 77 N. Y. 542. See Art. 8, § 10. Legislative power over abuses in assessments. That part of this section which authorizes the legislature to restrict cities in their power of taxation and assessment, and to correct abuses in assessments, does not prevent the legislature from restricting, by provision in a city charter, the power of the courts to disturb assessments. Thus, the provision of the amendment of 1875 to the charter of the city of Brooklyn (§ 13, ch. 663, Laws of 1875) which prohibits the courts from vacating or reducing any assessment for a local improvement in said city, otherwise than to reduce it to the extent that it has been increased by fraud or irregularity, and prohibiting in any event the disturbance of that proportion of an assessment which is equivalent to the fair value of the improvement, is valid. In re Mead, (1878) 74 N. Y. 216. Section as grant of power. The legislature possesses the whole legislative power of the people, except so far as limited by the constitution. See Art. 3, § 1. Therefore, the provision of this section that the legislature "shall provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages," is merely a direction for the exercise of an authority which had been restricted under former constitutions, and is not a grant of power. Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (1863) 26 N. Y. 467. Section as limitation. This section "is not a limitation upon the legislature, in the exercise of the legislative discretion and power to tax and Art. XII, § 2 Classification of Cities, Etc. 66 assess; it is a limitation only upon its power to delegate authority to cities and villages to tax and assess." Accordingly, the act (ch. 2, Laws 1875), which ratifies and confirms the proceedings of the common council of the city of Buffalo in the matter of the repairs of the Hamburgh Turnpike," is not violative of this section, as the power of assessment created by that act is not a power exercised by the city, but by the legislature. Tifft v. Buffalo, (1880) 82 N. Y. 204. Limitation of hours of labor on state and municipal work. This section expressly intrusts the legislature with the power to fix and regulate the hours of labor upon public work. Accordingly, a statute (Laws 1906, ch. 506, § 3) which enacts that no workman employed on state or municipal work or by a contractor or subcontractor doing work for the state or a civil division thereof "shall be permitted or required to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day," except in certain specified emergencies, is constitutional. People v. Metz, (1908) 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201, reversing 126 App. Div. 912, 110 N. Y. S. 1141. See further as to this point, Art. 1, §§ 1, 6. The court said: "The power to fix and regulate the hours of labor upon public work was intrusted to the legislature by the amendment which took effect on the first of January, 1906. Prior to that date the power did not exist and, hence, certain decisions made under the constitution before it was thus amended do not now apply. The constitution, as construed by these decisions and others, was amended because it did not confer power upon the legislature to fix and regulate the hours of labor in doing public work or the wages to be paid therefor. When, therefore, the constitution as it stood before it was amended is read in connection with the amendment and in the light of the judicial decisions which led thereto, it is clear that the people intended to authorize such legislation as the provision relating to hours of labor now under consideration.” § 2. Classification of cities. General and special city laws. Special city laws; how passed by legislature and accepted by cities. Passage without city's acceptance. Title of special city laws. All cities are classified according to the latest state enumeration, as from time to time made, as follows: The first class includes all cities having a population of one hundred and seventyfive thousand or more; the second class, all cities having a population of fifty thousand and less than one hundred and seventy-five thousand; the third class, all other cities. Laws relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, and the several departments thereof, are divided into general and special city laws; general city laws are those which relate to all the cities of one or more classes; special city laws are those which relate to a single city, or to less than all the cities of a class. Special city laws shall not be passed except in conformity with the provisions of this section. After any bill for a special city law, relating to a Classification of Cities, Etc. Art. XII, § 2 city, has been passed by both branches of the Legislature, the house in which it originated shall immediately transmit a certified copy thereof to the mayor of such city, and within fifteen days there after the mayor shall return such bill to the house from which it was sent, or if the session of the Legislature at which such bill was passed has terminated, to the Governor, with the mayor's certificate thereon, stating whether the city has or has not accepted the same. In every city of the first class, the mayor, and in every other city, the mayor and the legislative body thereof concurrently, shall act for such city as to such bill; but the Legislature may provide for the concurrence of the legislative body in cities of the first class. The Legislature shall provide for a public notice and opportunity for a public hearing concerning any such bill in every city to which it relates, before action thereon. Such a bill, if it relates to more than one city, shall be transmitted to the mayor of each city to which it relates, and shall not be deemed accepted unless accepted as herein provided, by every such city. Whenever any such bill is accepted as herein provided, it shall be subject as are other bills, to the action of the Governor. Whenever, during the session at which it was passed, any such bill is returned without the acceptance of the city or cities to which it relates, or within such fifteen days is not returned, it may nevertheless again be passed by both branches of the Legislature, and it shall then be subject as are other bills, to the action of the Governor. In every special city law which has been accepted by the city or cities to which it relates, the title shall be followed by the words "accepted by the city," or "cities," as the case may be; in every such law which is passed without such acceptance, by the words "passed without the acceptance of the city," or "cities," as the case may be. Const. 1894, Art. XII, § 2; amended in 1907. Relation to article 3, section 16.- The language of this section is to be understood in the light of the provisions of article 3, section 16, that " no private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Thus, if chapter 705 of the Laws of 1901, entitled "An act to make the office of sheriff of the county of Kings a salaried office and regulating the management of said office," which provides that on and after January 1, 1902, the sheriff of the county of Kings shall receive a fixed salary to be paid by the city of New York, and that the fees collected by such officer after that date shall be paid to the city for its benefit, was designed to regulate the affairs of the comptroller's office of the city of New York, this fact would by virtue of article 3, section 16, have to appear as the subject of the bill in its title, and, as the act would relate to the subject, it would be a special city law, Art. XII, § 2 66 Classification of Cities, Etc. and, as such, would have to be enacted in the manner specially pointed out by this section. “This meets all of the practical requirements, and avoids the impracticable necessity of examining minutely every private or local bill to determine whether it in fact relates, however remotely, to the 'property, affairs or government of cities.'" McGrath v. Grout, (1902) 69 App. Div. 314, 74 N. Y. S. 782, affirmed 171 N. Y. 7, 63 N. E. 547. However, the act referred to and chapters 704 and 706, Laws of 1901, containing similar provisions in respect to the clerk and register of Kings county, are not special city laws," subject to the requirements of this section as to enactment, since their titles express no subject connected with the government or affairs of the city of New York, but relate only to the regulation of a county office. McGrath v. Grout, (1902) 171 N. Y. 7, 63 N. E. 547, affirming 69 App. Div. 314, 74 N. Y. S. 782. The court said: "It seems to us very clear that the legislative enactements, which are now complained of, related distinctly, and only, to county affairs and cannot be regarded as 'special city laws,' which came within the purview of the constitutional provision in question." Purpose and construction of section. This section emphasizes the right of local self-government. Rathbone v. Wirth, (1896) 6 App. Div. 277, 40 N. Y. S. 535, affirmed 150 N. Y. 459, 45 N. E. 15, 34 L. R. A. 408. Its purpose "is to give some measure of protection to cities against the evils of special city legislation." People v. Murray, (1896) 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146, 32 L. R. A. 344, affirming 4 App. Div. 185, 38 N. Y. S. 909. See also Chrystal v. New York, (1901) 63 App. Div. 93, 71 N. Y. S. 352; Sun Printing Ass'n v. New York, (1896) 8 App. Div. 230, 40 N. Y. S. 607, affirmed 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788. "These constitutional provisions are remedial in their nature for the protection of the cities of the state, and there is no reason why they should not receive a broad and liberal construction which carry out the beneficial intention of the people in providing that these special city acts should not be passed without giving to the municipalities an opportunity to present such objections as exist to their passage." Chrystal v. New York, (1901) 63 App. Div. 93, 71 N. Y. S. 352. Scope of section generally. This section relates to city laws, either general or special, and not to general laws for the government of the state. A law looking to the government of the state generally is not a "city law because by reason of its generality it affects cities as well as other localities in the state. People v. Prendergast, (1911) 202 N. Y. 188, 95 N. E. 715, affirming 143 App. Div. 935, 128 N. Y. S. 1139; People v. Murray, (1896) 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146, 32 L. R. A. 344, affirming 4 App. Div. 185, 38 N. Y. S. 909. See also Gubner v. McClellan, (1909) 130 App. Div. 716, 115 N. Y. S. 755. Accordingly, chapter 701 of the Laws of 1910, adding section 59a to the Highway Law (Consol. Laws, ch. 25), providing for interest on awards for damages sustained by reason of change of grade of a street or highway, without limitation as to locality, is "neither a 'general city law,' which relates to all the cities of one or more classes,' nor a 'special city law,' which relates to a single city or to less than all the cities of a class.'" People v. Prendergast, (1911) 202 N. Y. 188, 95 N. E. 715, affirming 143 App. Div. 935, 128 N. Y. S. 1139. So, the Liquor Tax Law of 1896 (ch. 112), being a general state excise law, with such special provisions and adaptions to localities as to the legislature seemed proper, is neither a general or special "city law," and hence is not invalidated by the fact that, in fixing the excise taxes upon the business of trafficking in liquors, it (§ 11) graduates them in cities according to population, not following the classification of cities fixed by this section. “The granting of licenses for the liquor traffic has never been a corporate function or duty of a city, as such. It is a function which the state in its aggregate capacity has administered. It has made use of local machinery as has been shown, and it has permitted the cities to use excise moneys for local purposes. But excise laws do not relate to the affairs |