Court. In re Droege, (1909) 197 N. Y. 44, 90 N. E. 340, dismissing appeal, 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375; Matter of Bolte, (1904) 97 App. Div. 551, 90 N. Y. S. 499; Matter of Deuel, (1906) 112 App. Div. 99, 98 N. Y. S. 297. See also Matter of Prescott, (1894) 77 Hun 518, 28 N. Y. S. 928. It follows that since the Appellate Division is vested with the power of removal "for cause," the Court of Appeals cannot assume jurisdiction of such a proceeding without substituting its judgment and discretion for that which the Constitution and the statutes have granted exclusively to the former court. In re Droege, (1909) 197 N. Y. 44, 90 N. E. 340, dismissing appeal 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375.

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"Cause" for removal of justice. This section provides that "justices of the peace and judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law." Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, however, have attempted to define what "" cause shall be. Matter of Droege, (1909) 197 N. Y. 44, 90 N. E. 340, dismissing appeal 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375; Matter of Deuel, (1908) 127 App. Div. 640, 111 N. Y. S. 969. Therefore, each case must depend upon the particular facts presented. Matter of Droege, (1909) 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375, appeal dismissed, 197 N. Y. 44, 90 N. E. 340. Still, it may be said that the acts charged against a justice whose removal is sought under this provision must be such as to justify a finding that a retention of office by him is inconsistent with the fair and proper administration of justice. Matter of Barlow, (1910) 141 App. Div. 640, 127 N. Y. S. 542; Matter of Droege, (1909) 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375, appeal dismissed (1909) 197 N. Y. 44, 90 N. E. 340; Matter of Bolte, (1904) 97 App. Div. 551, 90 N. Y. S. 499. See also Matter of Tighe, (1904) 97 App. Div. 28, 89 N. Y S. 719; Matter of Baker, (1904) 94 App. Div. 278, 87 N. Y. S. 1022; Matter of Du Mahaut, (1899) 43 App. Div. 56, 59 N. Y. S. 353; In Matter of Barlow, (1910) 141 App. Div. 640, 127 N. Y. S. 542, this was said: “The first requisite for a judicial officer is that his judicial acts should be the result of an honest attempt to administer the power conferred upon him uninfluenced by any other consideration. A charge of improper motives, whether it takes the form of a pecuniary or other advantage to the magistrate, or is the result of solicitation or influence of others, would require a searching investigation and, if such a charge was established, would require the removal of the magistrate. The 'cause' would also include such conduct as indicated a lack of the qualities necessary to properly perform the duties of his office. Good intentions would not save the magistrate, if the facts connected with the administration of his office were such as to show ignorance, a perverted character, or a lack of those intellectual and moral qualities which are necessary for the performance of the duties of his office. The statement of this latter ground of removal is sufficient to show that a single mistake or inadvertence, erroneous decision, or improper exercise of power, would not be a basis for such a charge, unless the facts disclosed such a perverted intellect or such a total disregard of established principles of justice or morality as established the main fact required for his removal. Of course, included within this latter definition would be a case where, in consequence of physical or mental decay or disease, a magistrate should become personally disqualified from the performance of his duties. The whole question may be briefly summed up by stating that the charges made against a judicial officer to justify his removal must be such as to at least tend to establish that the officer has so conducted himself in the performance of the duties of his office that he is an unfit and improper person to be continued in the discharge of the official duties connected with the office." In Matter of Droege, (1909) 129 App. Div. 866, 114 N. Y. S. 375, the court said: "To justify the removal of a judicial officer much more is required than erroneous rulings upon either cases decided before him or the extent of the

powers conferred upon him by law. While the nature of his rulings may in certain cases indicate such a lack of professional knowledge or a lack of judicial temperament or appreciation of the duties of the office as will be sufficient cause for removal, the acts charged against the officer must be such as to justify the finding that his future retention of office is inconsistent with the fair and proper administration of justice which the law intrusts to him. It is quite impossible to formulate any distinct grounds upon which this power of removal should be exercised as each case must depend upon the particular facts presented, but it is not error of judgment; it is not error in the decision of particular cases; it is not mistakes in the construction of statutes or in the determination of the extent or limitation of his powers, standing alone, which would justify his removal; but such conduct as satisfies the court that the magistrate has been actuated by unworthy or illegal motives in the exercise of his judicial duties; or has committed such acts as to justify the inference that either from ignorance or from a perverted character, or from a lack of judicial qualities, he has so administered the power conferred upon him as to show that he should not be continued in office. A single decision or judicial action, correct or not, which is established to have been based upon improper motives and not upon a desire to do justice, or to properly perform the duties of his office, will justify a removal while many improper judicial determinations, or mistakes based merely upon errors of judgment, and without corrupt or improper motives, would not supply the cause contemplated by the constitution and the statutes." In Matter of Bolte, (1904) 97 App. Div. 551, 90 N. Y. S. 499, the court said: "A judicial officer may not be removed for merely making an erroneous decision or ruling, but he may be removed for wilfully making a wrong decision or an erroneous ruling or for a reckless exercise of his judicial functions without regard to the rights of litigants, or for manifesting friendship or favoritism toward one party or his attorney to the prejudice of another and to the destruction of his usefulness as a magistrate through the loss of public confidence in his fairness or integrity."

IV. STATUS AND JURISDICTIONAL RIGHTS OF JUSTICES OF PEACE.

History of office of justice of peace." The office of justice of the peace came down to us from remote times. It existed in England before the discovery of America, and it has existed here practically during our entire history, both colonial and state, at first with criminal jurisdiction only, but for more than two centuries past with civil jurisdiction also. It exists in every state of the Union and is regarded as of great importance to the people at large, as it opens the doors of justice near their own homes, and not only affords a cheap and speedy remedy for minor grievances as to rights of property, but also renders substantial aid in the prevention and punishment of crime. The office as it now exists in towns was established by the constitution, which does not in express terms say what a justice of the peace shall be. As, however, the office was well known when the constitution was adopted, it is presumed that the framers thereof and the people meant to establish it as an office with such civil and criminal jurisdiction, within the limitations of that instrument, as the legislature saw fit to confer upon it." People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347.

Abolition of office generally. So long as a town itself exists, it is beyond the power of the legislature to abolish the constitutional office of justice of the peace therein. People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347; Matter of Gertum, (1888) 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328. Nor can such abolition be accomplished by indirect methods. People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, affirming

"This

17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347; People v. Lane, (1909)) 53 Ap. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004. Thus, the power to establish "inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction," conferred on the legislature by section 18 of this article, cannot be exerted in the creation of courts or judicial offices in the place of, or as a substitute for, or in complete derogation of, the constitutional office of justice of the peace. People v. Howland, (1898)) 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347, affirmed (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775. See also People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004. So, a statute (§§ 19, 20, ch. 22, Laws 1896) which, while it does not directly deprive the justices of the peace in the town of Fort Edwards of the jurisdiction conferred by law upon such officers throughout the state, removes from them the duty of acting in criminal matters either as magistrates or courts, prohibits all peace officers from serving such justices' processes or executing their commitments, and denies the justices all compensation in criminal matters, is a violation of this section of the constitution. People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347. However, there is nothing in this section which requires the indefinite preservation and perpetuation of town organizations, to enable such officers to serve out their terms, or forbids a change of local government, if, in the judgment of the legislature, the welfare and prosperity of the community requires it. provision cannot be construed as a limitation upon the power of the legislature to create cities and villages. It is undoubtedly beyond the power of the legislature, by direct legislation, to abolish the office of justice of the peace in towns, or shorten their terms of office so long as the town exists, but they have an unquestioned right to alter and change the limits of their jurisdiction, or abolish the town organization altogether, provided it be done in good faith, and for proper constitutional objects. The whole force and effect of the provision in relation to justices is satisfied by enforcing it, so long as there is a town organization in existence authorized under the constitution to elect justices of the peace, and requiring the performance of their functions in the government of the town." Matter of Gertum, (1888) 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328. See also People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347. Accordingly, the Act of 1886 (ch. 335, Laws 1886) under which the town of New Lots became a part of the city of Brooklyn, is constitutional, although its effect was not only to deprive the territory of New Lots of the privilege of thereafter electing justices of the peace or other town officers, but, by destroying its independent corporate existence, to abrogate its right to have justices of the peace or other officers peculiar to town organizations. In re Gertum, (1888) 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328.

Conferment of jurisdiction of justice of peace on other inferior court.As is shown in the preceding paragraph, the legislature can neither openly nor by indirection abolish the constitutional office of justice of the peace. It cannot, under its power to establish "inferior courts," create a court in the place of, or as a substitute for that office. However, such inferior courts may, when erected within the confines of a subordinate area (see Art. 6, § 18), as a city or village, be vested with a jurisdiction which is like in character with and partakes of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Curtin v. Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093; People v. Terry, (1888) 108 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. 815; Brandon v. Avery, (1860) 22 N. Y. 469; People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004; People v. Whitney, (1898) 4 App. Div. 144, 52 N. Y. S. 695; Ziegler v. Corwin, (1892) 12 App. Div. 60, 32 N. Y. S. 855; Bocock v. Cochran, (1884) 32 Hun 521; Deposit v. Vail, (1875) 5 Hun 310. See also Geraty v. Reid, (1879) 78 N. Y. 64; Sill v. Corning, (1857) 15 N. Y. 297; Gould v. Mahaney, (1899) 39 App. Div. 426, 57 N. Y. S. 363; Matter of Schultes, (1898) 33 App. Div. 524, 54 N. Y. S. 34; Baird v. Helfer, (1896) 12 App. Div. 23, 42 N. Y. S. 484; Petterson v. Welles, (1896) 1 App. Div. 8, 36 N. Y. S. 1009; People v. Duffy, (1888) 49

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Hun 276, 1 N. Y. S. 896. Thus, the legislature has power to clothe a police justice of a village with the exclusive right to issue criminal processes within the village limits. The grant of such a right is not unconstitutional as tantamount to an abolition of the functions of justices of peace. People v. Duffey, (1888) 49 Hun 276, 1 N. Y. S. 896. But no inferior local court can be constituted with a jurisdiction coextensive with that of the justice of peace in towns as provided for in this section of the Constitution. People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347; People v. Terry, (1888) 108 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. 815; Brandon v. Avery, (1860) 22 N. Y. 469; People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004; Ziegler v. Corwin, (1892) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. S. 1135; Bocock v. Cochran, (1884) 32 Hun 521; Deposit v. Vail, (1875) 5 Hun 310. See also Curtin v. Barton, (1895) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093; Geraty v. Reid, (1879) 78 N. Y. 64; Desmond v. Crane, (1899) 39 App. Div. 190, 57 N. Y. S. 266; Matter of Schultes, (1898) 33 App. Div. 524, 54 N. Y. S. 34; Baird v. Helfer, (1896) 12 App. Div. 23, 42 N. Y. S. 484; People v. Upson, 79 Hun 87, 29 N. Y. S. 615. In People v. Terry, (1888) 108 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. 815, this was said: Although the constitution does provide for electing justices of the peace in towns and cities, it does not prohibit their election in villages so long as the officer thus elected by a reduced constituency is not in reality a justice of the peace of the town and exercising in all respects the same jurisdiction." In People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004, the court said: "The office of justice of the peace is a constitutional one (N. Y. State Const., art. VI, § 17) and the legislature possesses no power to abridge the scope of that functionary or by indirection to supplant him by another officer. . . . That limitation, however, does not prevent the legislature in the exercise of its prerogative from establishing 'inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction' (N. Y. State Const., art. VI, § 18), even though in the execution of their duties such courts may act concurrently with the justices of the peace of the town and thus in effect lessen the duties and the emoluments which would otherwise belong to the latter officials. That results necessarily from the creation of an inferior court of like authority with that of the justice. The number of the justices is not prescribed by the constitution, but is left to the legislature to fix, and if that body should add to the number in each town the effect would be to abridge the revenues and duties of those already sitting. That result, however, does not impair the power of the legislature. The pith of the legislative control is that it cannot endow an inferior local court with exclusive dominion where its official functions are identical with those of the constitutional official. This would ipso facto oust the justice of the jurisdiction inseparably connected with his office, and thus be violative of the powers impliedly guaranteed him by the constitution. He would be superseded by another officer who would entrench upon his domain, not coincidently with him, but to his eviction."

Jurisdiction conferable on justice of peace in city.— Apparently, that part of this section which empowers the legislature to create courts of justices of the peace in cities was not designed to permit the creation of an inferior court whose jurisdiction should be confined to the city in which it existed. The power to provide inferior courts for the exclusive use of the city was already ample. Desmond v. Crane, (1899) 39 App. Div. 190, 57 N. Y. S. 266; Gould v. Mahaney, (1899) 39 App. Div. 426, 57 N. Y. S. 363. See also People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004. Hence, under this section, it is competent for the legislature to confer upon a justice of the peace in a city the same jurisdiction exercised by justices of the peace in towns. Desmond v. Crane, (1899) 39 App. Div. 190, 57 N. Y. S. 266; Gould v. Mahaney, (1899) 39 App. Div. 426, 57 N. Y. S. 363; Ostrander v. People, (1883) 29 Hun 513. Compare Ziegler v. Corwin, (1896) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. S. 855; Baird v. Hilfer, (1896) 12 App. Div. 23, 42 N. Y. S. 484.

Thus, jurisdiction to serve process upon persons outside the city may be placed within the power of a justice of the peace in a city. Desmond v. Crane, (1899) 39 App. Div. 190, 57 N. Y. S. 266. In the case last cited, the court said: "It seems to me plain that the court which the justice of the peace of the city of Auburn is authorized to hold is not a local court' within the constitution, and that its jurisdiction was not intended to be limited to persons who might be served with process in the city of Auburn, but extends to such persons as may be served with process within the county of Cayuga, and that the legislature intended to confer upon this officer the same jurisdiction that justices of the peace of towns have, except as to his jurisdiction over cases arising within the city is limited by the charter." In Gould v. Mahaney, supra, this was said: "In Baird v. Helfer, 12 App. Div. 23 and Ziegler v. Corwin, 12 App. Div. 60, recent decisions of this department, the question involved was as to the power to endow the municipal court of Rochester with jurisdiction over the entire county of Monroe. The act giving life to the court limited its jurisdiction in plain terms to the city of Rochester. There was no endeavor to abolish that court and create the court of justice of the peace in its stead; but there was a palpable attempt to enlarge the authority of this municipal court to embrace the county. There was no power in the legislature to make that extension. To carry that purpose into effect involved the commingling of a purely local court with one of general jurisdiction, and the constitution made these separate and distinct."

§ 18. Inferior local courts.

Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the Legislature, but no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record. The Legislature shall not hereafter confer upon any inferior or local court of its creation, any equity jurisdiction or any greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon County Courts by or under this article. Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the Legislature may direct.

Const. 1846, Art. VI, § 14; amended, Judiciary Article, 1869, Art. VI, § 19; amended, Const. 1894, Art. VI, § 18. See also Const. 1777, Art. XXIV, and Const. 1821, Art. V, § 6.

I. In general, 453.

II. Equity jurisdiction; jurisdiction of county courts, 456.

I. IN GENERAL.

Relation to article 12, section 3.- Where the legislature has created an inferior Municipal Court and has provided that the justices thereof shall be elected, the elections must be held in odd-numbered years according to the requirements of article 12, section 3. Trounstine v. Britt, (1914) 212 N. Y. 421, 106 N. E. 129, reversing 163 App. Div. 166, 147 N. Y. S. 875.

Essential feature of "local courts." The local courts which the legislature is authorized to create are courts exercising jurisdiction within their