Contents § 2. Classification of cities.... General and special city laws.... Special city laws; how passed by legislature and accepted by PAGE 556 556 556 556 556 560 560 § 1. Oath of office.... 2. Acceptance of bribe by public officer a felony. § 3. Offer of bribe to public officer a felony.... 564 566 566 Person offering bribe not privileged from testifying; immunity... 566 § 4. Defendant in bribery case may testify in his own behalf....... 567 5. Discrimination in favor of public officers in transportation, telegraph and telephone rates, franking privileges, etc., prohibited; penalties. No privilege from testifying; immunity granted. 567 567 568 § 6. Removal of district attorney for failure to prosecute... County expense in bribery prosecution charge against state...... 568 ARTICLE XIV Submission to and ratification by people. 1. Constitutional amendments; passage in legislature.... Time of taking effect.... § 2. Submission to people of question of constitutional convention; Submission to and ratification by people of constitution or PREAMBLE WE, THE PEOPLE of the State of New York, grateful to Almighty God for our Freedom, in order to secure its blessings, DO ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION. Const. 1821; amended, Const. 1846. ARTICLE I. § 1. Persons not to be disfranchised. Security in rights and privileges. No member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. Const. 1777, Art. XIII; amended, Const. 1821, Art. VII, § 1; continued without change in Const. 1846, Art. I, § 1. 1. In general, 45. II. Elections; public officers, 48. III. Business, industrial and health regulations, 50. IV. Labor laws and regulations, 52. V. Matters relating to taxes and taxation, 53. I. IN GENERAL. "The law of the land."— The phrase "the law of the land" is not materially different in meaning from the phrase "due process of law" as used in article I, section 6, and in the Federal Constitution. People v. Priest, (1912) 206 N. Y. 274, 99 N. E. 547, affirming 150 App. Div. 19, 133 N. Y. S. 1087; People v. Essex County, 70 N. Y. 228; Barry v. Port Jervis, (1901) 64 App. Div 268, 72 N. Y. S. 104. See also Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B 156, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162. It means a general and public law, equally binding on every member of the community. People v. Folks, 89 App. Div. 171, 85 N. Y. S. 1100; Rosin v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., (1903) 89 App. Div. 245, 86 N. Y. S. 49; Orange County v. Ellsworth, (1904) 98 App. Div. 275, 90 N. Y. S. 576. See also Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B 156, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162. It is the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon the inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B 156, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162. It imports a suit, trial and judgment according to the course of the common law, or in the established and usual mode of contesting individual rights. Taylor v. Porter, (1859) 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140, 40 Am. Dec. 274. The "law of the land" does not mean the very act of legislation which takes away a right or a privilege. The true construction of the phrase is Art. I, § 1 Security of Suffrage and Privileges “hat where rights are accrued to the citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take them away; but where they are held contrary to existing law or are forfeited by its violation, these may be taken from him. never by an act of the legislature, but in the due administration of the law-before the judicial tribunals of the state." Williams v. Port Chester, (1902) 72 App. Div. 505, 76 N. Y. S. 631. Right of action for breach of municipal duty.—“In the distribution, through charters, to municipalities of governmental powers and of administrative duties within the described territory, there is no limitation upon the regulative power of the legislature. For the breach of a duty, imposed for the public benefit, it may grant, or deny, a remedy to an individual, who has sustained damage, and in granting a remedy impose conditions upon the right to enforce it. Where the charter of a municipal corporation is silent upon the subject, the legislature may be regarded as having left its liability to depend upon the general rule that, if the power conferred relates to the accomplishment of corporate purposes, for the corporate benefit, the corporation is as a private company and there attaches the same responsibility as there would to a legal individual, if possessing like powers and franchises. But where the charter voices the will of the legislature, upon the subject of the responsibility of the political agency of the state to answer to the complaint of a private individual, it announces a rule of conduct which is to govern the relations of the municipality with its citizens." MacMullen v. Middletown, (1907) 187 N. Y. 37, 79 N. E. 863, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391, reversing 112 App. Div. 81, 98 N. Y. S. 145. To the same effect Curry v. Buffalo, (1892) 135 N. Y. 366, 32 N. E. 80; Lawton v. New Rochelle, (1908) 123 App. Div. 832, 108 N. Y. S. 583; Thrall v. Cuba, (1903) 88 App Div. 410, 84 N. Y. S. 661, affirmed (1908) 193 N. Y. 656, 87 N. E. 1121; Patterson v. Brooklyn, (1896) 6 App. Div. 127, 40 N. Y. S. 581; Rider v. Mt. Vernon, (1895) 87 Hun 27, 33 N. Y. S. 745; compare Williams v. Port Chester, (1904) 97 App. Div. 84, 89 N. Y. S. 671, affirmed (1905) 183 N. Y. 550, 76 N. E. 1116; Williams v. Port Chester, (1902) 72 App. Div. 505, 76 N. Y. S. 631; Barry . Port Jervis, (1901) 64 App. Div. 268, 72 N. Y. S. 104. Thus, a municipality's liability for breach of a duty of caring for streets and sidewalks may be created or not as the legislature may see fit; if created, its enforcement may be surrounded with any restrictions or conditions deemed necessary. MacMullen v. Middletown, supra. Taking private property for private use. A statute authorizing a private road to be laid out over the lands of a person, without his consent, is unconstitutional and void under this section. Taylor v. Porter, (1859) 4 Hill 140, 40 Am. Dec. 274. Retaining attached property for costs. The legislature cannot provide (§ 709, Civ. Code) that property seized under an attachment may, after the discharge of the attachment, be applied or appropriated by the sheriff to the payment and satisfaction of the costs, charges and expenses incurred in the levy. "To apply and appropriate it in that manner is to take the property of one party against his or its consent and apply it to the payment or discharge of the obligations of another, and that has not been considered to be within the authority of the legislature." Bowe v. United States Reflector Co., (1885) 36 Hun (N. Y.) 407. Notice to employer in action for death. If the purpose of section 2 of chapter 600 of the Laws of 1902, which is entitled "An act to extend and regulate the liability of employer to make compensation for personal injuries suffered by employees," and which provides that "no action for recovery of compensation for injury or death under this act shall be maintained unless notice of the time, place and cause of the injury" shall be given to the employer within a prescribed period after the accident, was to extend to all Security of Suffrage and Privileges 66 Art. I, 1 cases arising under statutes and the common law where employees are concerned, and not to cases arising under this act," as the statute reads, then there is a fatal disagreement with the provisions of this section. Rosin v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., (1903) 89 App. Div. 245, 86 N. Y. S. 49. Fire department regulation.-Section 739 of the Greater New York charter (L. 1897, ch. 378, as amd. by L. 1901, ch. 466), which forbids any member of the uniformed force of the fire department to be or become a member of any club or association intended to affect legislation for or on behalf of the fire department, does not constitute an abridgment of the constitutional rights of a member of the fire department, as he may, at any time, emancipate himself therefrom by resigning his position. People v. Scannell, (1902) 74 App. Div. 406, 77 N. Y. S. 704, affirmed (1903) 173 N. Y. 606, 66 N. E. 1114. Race discrimination.— As no discrimination may be allowed against colored people in the use of public or quasi-public property, an enactment (Penal Code, 383) that it shall be a misdemeanor to exclude a person on account of race or color from his "rights to the equal enjoyment of such accommodations, facilities or privileges as are furnished by innkeepers or common carriers, or by owners of managers of theaters or other places of amusement" is not in violation of the property rights guaranteed by this provision. People v. King, (1886) 42 Hun 186, 5 N. Y. St. Rep. 138, affirmed (1888) 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245, 6 A. S. R. 389, 1 L. R. A. 293. 66 may Magistrate's jurisdiction to sentence prostitute.— Section 707a (L. 1905), ch. 610) of the charter of New York, authorizing the commitment of women between the ages of sixteen and thirty to the Bedford Reformatory on conviction of being common prostitutes and soliciting on public thoroughfares, etc., is not unconstitutional in that it authorizes such person to be restrained of liberty for a period of not exceeding three years without providing for a trial by a common-law jury. People v. Davis, (1911) 143 App. Div. 579, 127 N. Y. S. 1072. However, it would be a violation of this section to make such a commitment under section 146 of the State Charities Law (L. 1896, ch. 546, as amd. by L. 1899, ch. 632), which provides: 'A female, between the ages of fifteen and thirty years, convicted by any magistrate of petit larceny, habitual drunkenness, of being a common prostitute, of frequenting disorderly houses or houses of prostitution, or of a misdemeanor, be sentenced and committed" to certain institutions for a period of three years or until discharged by the board of managers of such institutions, as that section does not relate to disorderly conduct as defined in section 1458 of the Consolidation Act, but to matters which are either misdemeanors or special proceedings of a criminal nature fully provided for by the Penal Code and by the Code of Criminal Procedure. People v. Davis, (1903) 80 App. Div. 448, 80 N. Y. S. 872, affirmed (1903) 176 N. Y. 465, 68 N. E. 884. Measuring and photographing prisoner. Neither the police department of the city of New York nor any member of its police force has authority to deprive any person of his liberty of action or invade his right to personal immunity to the extent of requiring him to submit to having his photograph taken and measurements and impressions of his body made, for the purpose of preserving them in the criminal records of the police department, simply because such person has been indicted. People v. Bingham, (1907) 57 Misc. 66, 107 N. Y. S. 1011. 66 Disqualification of physician.- Chapter 661 of the Laws of 1893, as amended by chapter 398 of the Laws of 1895, making it unlawful for persons previously convicted of a felony to practice medicine is a valid exercise of police power, as one of the conditions imposed upon persons who seek to practice medicine is that they shall possess a good moral character, and the presumption of bad character attaches to a person convicted of a felony." People v. Hawker, (1897) 152 N. Y. 234, 46 N. E 607. Art. I, § 1 Security of Suffrage and Privileges II. ELECTIONS; PUBLIC OFFICERS. Disfranchisement generally. The otherwise plenary power granted to the legislature to prescribe the method of conducting elections cannot be so exercised as to disfranchise constitutionally qualified electors, and any system of election that unnecessarily prevents the elector from voting, or from voting for the candidate of his choice, violates this section. Hopper v. Britt, (1911) 203 N. Y. 144, 96 N. E. 371, Ann. Cas. 1913B 172, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825; Burke v. Terry, (1911) 203 N. Y. 293, 96 N. E. 931; Hopper v. Britt, (1912) 204 N. Y. 524, 98 N. E. 86; People v. Smith, (1912) 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568. See also Matter of Callahan, (1910) 200 N. Y. 59, 93 N. E. 262, 140 A. S. R. 626, affirming 140 App. Div. 897, 125 N. Y. S. 1114; People v. Wintermute, (1909) 194 N. Y. 99, 86 N. E. 818, reversing (1908) 127 App. Div. 933, 111 N. Y. S. 1135; People v. Wappingers Falls, (1895) 144 N. Y. 616, 39 N. E. 641; People v. Shaw, (1892) 133 N. Y. 493, 31 N. E. 512, 16 L. R. A. 606; People v. Democratic General Committee, (1900) 164 N. Y. 335, 58 N. E. 124, 51 L. R. A. 674. The franchise of which no "member of this state 99 may be deprived embraces not only the right of citizens, who possess the constitutional qualifications, to vote for public officers at general and special elections, but also the right to participate in the several methods established by law for the selection of candidates to be voted for. In re Callahan, (1910) 200 N. Y. 59, 93 N. E. 262, 140 A. S. R. 626; Burke v. Terry, (1911) 203 N. Y. 293, 96 N. E. 931; Hopper v. Britt, (1912) 204 N. Y. 524, 98 N. E. 86; People v. Smith, (1912) 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568. See also People v. Shaw, (1892) 133 N. Y. 493, 31 N. E. 512, 16 L. R. A. 606; People v. Wappingers Falls, (1895) 144 N. Y. 616, 39 N. E. 641. Thus, the Election Law (now § 122; L. 1911, ch. 891, § 62), as enacted and amended from time to time, in so far as it requires independent nominations of candidates for public office, other than municipal candidates, to be voted for in a district less than the whole state but greater than a town or ward of a city, and for a candidate for member of assembly, to be signed by more than 500 voters qualified as prescribed by statute is, "in view of the total number of voters in some of the counties of the state," unreasonable and unconstitutional. People v. Smith, (1912) 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568. That part of section 58 of the Election Law (L. 1911, ch. 891) which provides that “the name of a candidate shall not appear more than once on the ballot as a candidate for the same public office or party position " is an unreasonable restriction upon freedom of voting and a violation of the fundamental law. Hopper v. Britt, (1912) 204 N. Y. 524, 98 N. E. 86. But the provision of section 123 (L. 1911, ch. 649, § 2) that no person signing an independent certificate of nomination shall be counted unless such person shall, on one of the days of registration in such year, be registered as a qualified elector, is valid as tending to prevent fraud and as making more certain the good faith of the persons seeking to present to the voters independent candidates for office. And the provision of section 123 which requires that in case a candidate nominated by an independent certificate of nomination be at the time of the filing of such certificate or afterwards a candidate of a political party for the same office, no person who is an enrolled member of such political party shall be counted, is not an unreasonable provision. Nor is the provision of section 123, that no person shall join in nominating more candidates for one office than there are persons to be elected thereto, when construed as only intended to prevent an elector from signing two independent nominating petitions for the same office, unreasonable. People v. Smith, (1912) 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568. 66 The provision under the same general law (Consol. Laws, ch. 17, as amended by L. 1911, ch. 649) that no separate sheet comprising an independent certificate of nomination, where such certificate consists of more than one sheet, |