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Art. III, § 17

Re-enactment of Existing Laws

and for supplying deficiencies in former appropriations," appropriating from the State treasury the sum of $10,000 for the construction of a bridge over the Cattaraugus creek at a particular locality, under the direction of certain commissioners named, and providing that the supervisors of the counties of Erie and Chautauqua shall assess upon their respective counties a moiety of such further sum, not exceeding $10,000, as the said commissioners shall certify to be necessary for the completion of the bridge, is invalid as containing both general and local subjects. People v. Chautauqua County, (1870) 43 N. Y. 10. A provision relative to the conferment upon the sheriff of the city and county of New York of the exclusive power "to conduct sales under the decrees of the courts of record," is a subject foreign to the subject expressed in an act (ch. 569, Laws 1869) entitled "An act in relation to the fees of the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and to the fees of referees in sales in partition cases." Gaskin v. Meek, (1870) 42 N. Y. 186. affirming 55 Barb. 259. Apparently, a provision for the “erection of ‘buildings, wharves and docks'" is not incidental to the subject expressed by an act (ch. 719, Laws 1894) entitled "An act to incorporate the Tidal Water Way Company and to define its rights, powers and privileges.” And, at all events, provisions relative to "the acquisition of a strip of land not exceeding 1,000 feet in width on either side of the canal, upon which buildings and warehouses may be erected," cannot be regarded as within the subject expressed, “since under another provision of the act authorizing the company to lease or sell real estate acquired by it' these may be disposed of to private individuals or corporations." Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159. A provision relative to the filing of mechanics' liens " is foreign to the subject embraced by an act entitled "An act to revise the charter of the city of Yonkers." bald, (1906) 114 App. Div. 838, 100 N. Y. S. 367.

66

Tommasi v. Archi

§ 17. Existing laws not applicable by reference.

No act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any existing law, or part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it in such act.

Amendment of 1874.

Rule of construction of section.- With specific reference to this section the court in People v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285, 31 N. E. 1011, said: "A constitutional provision intended to operate as a restraint upon the legislature, with respect to the language and forms of expression to be used in framing acts of legislation, is not to be so construed as to embrace cases not fairly within its general purpose or policy, or the evils which it was intended to correct, though they may be within its letter." A like rule was set out and followed in Choate v. Buffalo, (1899) 39 App. Div. 379, 57 N. Y. S. 383, affirmed in (1901) 167 N. Y. 597, 60 N. E. 1108; People v. Learned, (1875) 5 Hun 626.

Purpose of section.-"The evil which this provision of the constitution was designed to correct was the incorporating into legislative enactments by a mere reference to some existing statute a clause or provision affecting public or private interests to an extent or in a manner not disclosed upon the face of the acts itself, and of which the legislators might be utterly ignorant at the time of its enactment." People v. Banks, (1876) 67 N. Y. 568, affirming 1 Abb. N. Cas. 157; People v. Squire, (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820, 1 A. S. R. 893, affirmed in 145 U. S. 175, 12 S. Ct. 880, 36 U. S. (L. ed.) 666; People v. Lorillard, (1892) 135 N. Y. 285, 31 N. E. 1911; Choate v. Buffalo,

Re-enactment of Existing Laws

Art. III, § 17

(1899) 39 App. Div. 379, 57 N. Y. S. 383, affirmed in (1901) 167 N. Y. 597, 60 N. E. 1108.

Insertion by reference of matter of administrative detail.—“When a statute in itself and by its own language grants some power, confers some right, imposes some duty, or creates some burden or obligation, it is not in conflict with this constitutional provision because it refers to some other existing statute, general or local, for the purpose of pointing out the procedure, or some administrative detail, necessary for the execution of the power, the enforcement of the right, the proper performance of the duty, or the discharge of the burden or obligation." People v. Lorillard, (1892) 135 N. Y. 285, 31 N. E. 1011; In re Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 139, reversing 32 Hun 82; People v. Banks, (1876) 67 N. Y. 568; Matter of New York, (1904) 95 App. Div. 552, 89 N. Y. S. 6; Choate v. Buffalo, (1899) 39 App. Div. 379, 57 N. Y. S. 383, affirmed in (1901) 167 N. Y. 597, 60 N. E. 1108; Matter of Buffalo Traction Co., (1898) 25 App. Div. 447, 49 N. Y. S. 1052, affirmed in (1898) 155 N. Y. 700, 50 N. E. 1115; People v. Bruning, (1895) 89 Hun 124, 34 N. Y. S. 1048; Swinkehard v. Michels, (1894) 81 Hun 325, 29 N. Y. S. 777, 30 N. Y. S. 1135, affirmed in (1895) 144 N. Y. 684, 39 N. E. 859; Weinkie v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1891) 61 Hun 619, 15 N. Y. S. 689, affirmed, (1892) 133 N. Y. 656, 31 N. E. 625. See also Curtin v. Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093. Thus, an act (ch. 249, Laws 1890) providing for the acquisition and improvement by the city of New York of certain lands adjacent to Washington bridge is not invalid because it refers to another local act for the purpose of indicating the mode of procedure to be had to acquire title to the lands. People v. Lorillard, (1892) 135 N. Y. 285, 31 N. E. 1011. A like conclusion was reached in People v. Banks, (1876) 67 N. Y. 568, affirming 1 Abb. N. Cas. 157, with reference to a statute directing that assessments for expenses to be incurred thereunder should be made in accordance with general laws on that subject. The court made these remarks: "It is not necessary, in order to avoid a conflict with this article of the constitution, to re-enact general laws whenever it is necessary to resort to them to carry into effect a special statute. Such cases are not within the letter or spirit of the constitution, or the mischief intended to be remedied. By such a reference the general statute is not incorporated into or made a part of the special statute. The right is given, the duty declared, or burden imposed by the special statute, by the enforcement of the right or duty, and the final imposition of the burden are directed to be in the form, and by the procedure given by the other general laws of the state. Reference is made to such laws, not to affect or qualify the substance of the legislation or vary the terms of the act, but merely for the formal execution of the law. The evil in view in adopting this provision of the constitution was the incorporating into acts of the legislature by reference to other statutes, of clauses and provisions of which the legislators might be ignorant, and which affecting public or private interests in a manner and to an extent not disclosed upon the face of the act, a bill might become a law, which would not receive the sanction of the legislature if fully understood. There is no evil of this or of any nature to be apprehended by the mere reference to other acts and statutes for the forms of process and procedure, for giving effect to a statute otherwise perfect and complete. It would be a serious evil to compel the engrafting upon and embodying in every act of the legislature all the forms and details of practice which may be necessarily resorted to to carry any one statute into effect, when the same proceedings are provided for by the general statutes of the state, and are applicable to hundreds of other cases, and with which the legislators may be supposed to be reasonably familiar."

Reference in amendatory statute to existing law. This section does not require the incorporation into a statute of every law which it purports to amend or extend. "The object and intent of the constitutional provision was

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to prevent statute laws relating to one subject from being made applicable to laws passed upon another subject, through ignorance and misapprehension on the part of the legislature, and to require that all acts should contain within themselves such information as should be necessary to enable it to act upon them intelligently and discreetly. It is obvious that it does not apply to an act purporting to amend existing laws, for in such a case no intelligent legislation could be had at all without a knowledge of the law intended to be amended. It must be presumed that the legislature is informed of the condition of a law which it is called upon to amend. It could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution that any legislator would remain ignorant of the provisions of a law which it was proposed to change, or would require the provisions of such a law to be transcribed into the proposed legislation to enable him to act upon it judiciously and intelligently. Such a construction would lead to innumerable repetitions of laws in the statute books and render them not only bulky and cumbersome, but confused and unintelligible almost beyond conception.” People v. Squire, (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820, affirmed in 145 U. S. 175, 12 S. Ct. 880, 36 U. S. (L. ed.) 666; Wells v. Buffalo, (1878) 14 Hun 438, affirmed (1880) 80 N. Y. 253; People v. Learned, (1875) 5 Hun 626. See also Curtin v. Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093. Wherefore chapter 499, Laws of 1885, charging the commissioners of electrical subways with the duty of enforcing the provisions of the Act of 1884 and declaring that the latter act is amended so as to conform with that provision, is not unconstitutional. People v. Squires, (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820, affirmed in 145 U. S. 175, 12 S. Ct. 880, 36 U. S. (L. ed.) 666.

Exclusion of cases elsewhere treated.- A statute is not obnoxious to this section because excluding from its operation cases covered by other acts, since clearly, so far from attempting to make other acts applicable, the statute exempts from the force of its own independent provisions cases governed by other laws. People v. Stedeker, (1903) 175 N. Y. 57, 67 N. E. 132, reversing 75 App. Div. 449, 78 N. Y. S. 316; People v. Van De Carr, (1896) 150 N. Y. 439, 44 N. E. 1040, affirming 7 App. Div. 608, 39 N. Y. S. 581.

Disclaimer of intent to repeal. The disclaimer by the legislature in a statute of any intent to have it repeal or abrogate existing laws or disturb the condition of things any more than is necessary does not render the statute obnoxious to this section. Such a provision has no effect whatever to continue any law. People v. Hayt, (1876) 7 Hun 39, reversed on other grounds, (1876) 66 N. Y. 606.

The sanitary code is not an "existing law" within the meaning of that term as used in this section and statutes declaring that code to be binding and in force in the city of New York are not invalid because failing to set it out in full. People v. Davis, (1903) 78 App. Div. 570, 79 N. Y. S. 747.

§ 18. Cases in which private or local bills shall not be passed. General laws to provide for enumerated cases. Restrictions on laws governing street railroads.

The Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any the following cases:

Changing the names of persons.

of

Laying out, opening, altering, working or discontinuing roads, highways or alleys, or for draining swamps or other low lands.

Private or Local Bills

Locating or changing county seats.

Art. III, § 18

Providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases.
Incorporating villages.

Providing for election of members of boards of supervisors. Selecting, drawing, summoning or impaneling grand or petit jurors.

Regulating the rate of interest on money.

The opening and conducting of elections or designating places of voting.

Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages of allowances of public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.

Granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks.

Granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.

Granting to any person, association, firm or corporation, an exemption from taxation on real or personal property.

Providing for building bridges, and chartering companies for such purposes, except on the Hudson river below Waterford, and on the East river, or over the waters forming a part of the boundaries of the State.

The Legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which in its judgment, may be provided for by general laws. But no law shall authorize the construction or operation of a street railroad except upon the condition that the consent of the owners of one-half in value of the property bounded on, and the consent also of the local authorities having the control of, that portion of a street or highway upon which it is proposed to construct or operate such railroad be first obtained, or in case the consent of such property owners cannot be obtained, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in the department in which it is proposed to be constructed, may, upon application, appoint three commissioners who shall determine, after a hearing of all parties interested, whether such railroad ought to be constructed or operated, and their determination, confirmed by the court, may be taken in lieu of the consent of the property owners.

Amendment of 1874; amended in 1901.

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III. Roads, highways or alleys; swamps or lowlands, 331.
IV. County seats, 334.

V. Change of venue, 334.

VI. Incorporation of villages, 335.

VII. Election of supervisors, 335.

VIII. Jurors, 336.

IX. Regulation of rate of interest, 336.

X. Elections; places of voting, 337.

XI. Fees, percentage, or allowances of public officers, 337.
XII. Right to lay down railroad tracks, 338.
XIII. Exclusive privilege, immunity, or monopoly, 340.

1. Generally, 340.

2. Grants held exclusive, 341.

3. Grants held not exclusive, 342.
XIV. Exemption from taxation, 344.
XV. Bridges; bridge companies, 344.
XVI. Street railroads, 344.

1. Generally, 345.

2. Consent of abutting owners, 348.

3. Consent of local authorities, 349.

4. Appointment and report of commissioners; confirmation by court, 351.

I. IN GENERAL.

Relation to article 3, section 23.— Article 3, section 23, stipulates that the provisions of sections 17 and 18 "shall not apply to any bill, or to the amendments of any bill, which shall be reported to the legislature by commissioners who have been appointed pursuant to law to revise the statutes." In accordance with the general presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes, an act otherwise invalid as a violation of the provisions of this section will be presumed to have been reported by a commission appointed as provided in article 3, section 23. People v. Petrea, (1883) 92 N. Y. 128. See also People v. Ebelt, (1905) 180 N. Y. 470, 73 N. E. 235. It may be shown, however, by matters aliunde that the act was not so reported. For that purpose reference may be made to the journals of the legislature and the original act. People v. Petrea, (1883) 92 N. Y. 128.

General purpose of section." The objects of these prohibitions in the constitution were doubtless to prevent the cumbering of the statute books with a mass of private and local bills, to relieve the legislature from the labor of considering and passing upon such bills, and to remove from the legislature the corrupting influences which surrounded and were brought to bear upon it, as to such bills, by persons having personal and selfish interests intensely awakened, at stake. And it was doubtless also one of the objects of the present constitutional restraints to secure the same ends sought by private or local bills, so far as needful, by general laws, in which the whole people would be interested, and which would therefore receive more careful attention from their legislative representatives." Per Earl, J., Matter of New York El. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 327.

Rule of construction.-"This series of amendments designed to restrict the powers of the legislature in matters of detail under general phrases and undefined words is experimental in this state. They must be sustained and applied by a rational and practical construction, so as to subserve the purposes intended and prevent the evils designed to be remedied, but not by an

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