does not define any qualification which shall be allowed or required by either house. The power of each house of the legislature to judge of the qualifications of its own members, does not determine or illustrate what is, or is not a qualification; the statute to suppress dueling, does not propose to deprive, nor can any law deprive the several houses of the legislature of their exclusive jurisdiction; and this part of the constitution is therefore not infringed by the judgment of disqualification now in question.” § 11. Journals of each house. Open sessions. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the same, except such parts as may require secrecy. The doors of each house shall be kept open, except when the public welfare shall require secrecy. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days. Const. 1777, Art. XV; amended, Const. 1821, Art. I, § 4; continued without change in Const. 1846, Art. III, § 11. 8 12. Privileges of members. For any speech or debate in either house of the Legislature the members shall not be questioned in any other place. Const. 1846, Art. III, § 12. § 13. Bills may originate or be amended in either house. Any bill may originate in either house of the Legislature, and all bills passed by one house may be amended by the other. Const. 1821, Art. I, § 8; continued without change in Const. 1846, Art. III, § 13. Recall of bill. Though either the senate or assembly may freely amend bills passed by the other, neither house can recall a bill passed by both and sent to the governor for approval, and if the governor return such a bill on the request of either house, any further action taken thereon will be a nullity. People v. Devlin, (1865) 33 N. Y. 269, 88 Am. Dec. 377. 8 14. Enacting clause of bills. The enacting clause of all bills shall be "The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows," and no law shall be enacted except by bill. Const. 1777, Art. XXXI (omitted in Const. 1821); amended, Const. 1846, Art. III, § 14. "A concurrent resolution of the two houses is not a statute." Accordingly, the board to award the contract for legislative printing pursuant to sections 72 and 77 of the Legislative Law (ch. 682, L. 1892), wherein it is provided that the contract for legislative printing shall embrace certain" additional” copies of bills when ordered by "statute," and that it shall include “any extra number of copies" when ordered by "law," cannot adopt as a basis for computation, in determining the lowest bidder, extra copies of bills called for by the concurrent resolution of the senate and assembly. People v. Palmer, 12 Misc. 392, 33 N. Y. S. 1088, affirmed, 146 N. Y. 406, 42 N. E. 543. § 15. Manner of passing bills. No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and upon the desks of the members, in its final form, at least three calendar legislative days prior to its final passage, unless the Governor, or the acting Governor, shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate passage, under his hand and the seal of the State; nor shall any bill be passed or become a law, except by the assent of the majority of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature; and upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the journal. Const. 1846, Art. III, § 15; amended, Const. 1894, Art. III, § 15. The object of this provision "is to prevent hasty and careless legislation, to prohibit amendments at the last moment and to secure more publicity than had been required before." People v. Reardon, (1906) 184 N. Y. 431, 77 N. E. 970, 112 A. S. R. 628, 6 Ann. Cas. 515, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161, affirming 110 App. Div. 821, 97 N. Y. S. 535, affirmed 204 U. S. 152, 27 S. Ct. 188, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 415. It was 66 designed to insure the full attendance of both houses, when a bill is passed, and to cause the members to feel their individual responsibility." Per Willard, J., in Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506. The word "members," as used in this provision, means members of the legislature as an entity, not members of the senate and assembly merely as such. Accordingly, it is not necessary that members of the house in which a bill originates shall first have it on their desks for three days, and after its passage by them, that the members of the other house shall have it on their desks for three more days. The constitutional requirements are met when a bill has been upon the desks of the members of each house, in its final form, for at least three calendar legislative days, whether simultaneously or otherwise. People v. Reardon, (1906) 184 N. Y. 431, 77 N. E. 970, 112 A. S. R. 628, 6 Ann. Cas. 515, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161, affirming 110 N. Y. App Div. 821, 97 N. Y. S. 535, affirmed 204 U. S. 152, 27 S. Ct. 188, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 415. Yeas and nays.— The requirement of this section that the yeas and nays shall be taken on a question, and entered upon the journal, is merely directory; it does not apply to a vote on receding from amendments which have been disagreed to by the other house. People v. Supervisors, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317. In that case, it was said: "The provision of the constitution requiring the question upon the final passage of a bill to be taken immediately upon its last reading, and the yeas and nays to be entered on the journal, is only directory to the legislature; there is no clause declaring the act to be void, if this direction be not followed. It does not stand on the same footing with the requirement of a certain number to form a quorum, or to pass a bill. In the latter case, there is a defect of power, if the requisite number be not present and voting." Art. III, § 16 Subject and Title of Statutes § 16. Private or local bills limited to one subject to be expressed in title. No private or local bill, which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. Const. 1846, Art. III, § 16. I. In general, 291. 1. History and purpose of section, 291. 2. Local and general bills distinguished, 293. II. Title and subject-matter, 296. 1. In general, 296. 2. Titles held sufficient, 304. 3. Titles held insufficient, 311. 4. Bills held not to embrace foreign subjects, 314. I. IN GENERAL. 1. History and Purpose of Section. History." It is now more than a hundred years since the attention of the people of this state was emphatically called to the abuse which this clause of the constitution was designed to correct. The Bank of New York, chartered in 1791, had a practical monopoly of the banking business in the city of New York, and its stockholders and directors were Federalists, with Alexander Hamilton at their head. By 1800 this bank had come to wield, or was supposed to wield, an important political influence, and Aaron Burr conceived it to be necessary to have a rival bank. The legislature was in the hands of the Federalists, and bank charters appear to have been granted in those days as political favors. In this condition of affairs Mr. Burr conceived the plan of taking advantage of the then recent yellow fever scourge to organize a company for the purpose of affording an abundant supply of pure and wholesome water, and the legislature were, with great plausibility, invoked to charter, on the most liberal terms, a company which professed its willingness to undertake so useful an enterprise. As it was uncertain what amount of capital would be required, and with a view to avoid any chance of failure on account of deficiency of capital, the company requested to be authorized to raise $2,000,000, but as it was possible, and, indeed, probable, that the construction of the water works would not absorb the whole of that sum, they asked for a provision that the 'surplus capital might be employed in any way not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States or of the State of New York,' and under the provisions of this water works act one of the strongest banking institutions of the city of New York was incorporated, and has continued to do business up to the present time, and it is to-day going through the form of maintaining a water plant. (1 Hammond's Polit. Hist. New York, 325.) This precedent was followed, or attempted to be followed, in various bank charters which were eagerly sought for in the periods of inflation which intervened between that time and the meeting of the Constitutional Convention in 1846, particularly in the great speculative era which reached its height in the decade preceding that event, and other branches of business felt the pernicious effects of this kind of legislation, giving no intimation of its real purpose Art. III, § 16 Subject and Title of Statutes until it was in the process of being carried out. It was to meet this condition of affairs that the provision of the Constitution now under consideration was brought forward and adopted, and that it has served a useful purpose is abundantly evidenced by the cases in which the courts have intervened." Matter of Clinton Ave., (1901) 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. S. 196. Purpose. The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it was designed to prevent "log-rolling – that is, to prevent the uniting of various objects, having no necessary or natural connection with each other, in one bill, for the purpose of combining various interests in support of the whole. Economic Power, etc., Co. v. Buffalo, (1909) 195 N. Y. 286, 88 N. E. 389, reversing 128 App. Div. 883, mem., 112 N. Y. S. 1127; Clinton v. Dwight, (1885) 101 N. Y. 9, 3 N. E. 782; Neuendorff v. Duryea, (1877) 69 N. Y. 557, 25 Am. Rep. 235; People v. Brinkerhoff, (1877) 68 N. Y. 259; Devlin v. New York, (1875) 63 N. Y. 8, modifying 48 How. Pr. 457; Harris v. People, (1875) 59 N. Y. 599; People v. Briggs, (1872) 50 N. Y. 553; Huber v. People, (1872) 49 N. Y. 132; People v. Chautauqua County, (1870) 43 N. Y. 10; Conner v. New York, (1851) 5 N. Y. 285, affirming 2 Sandf. 355; Gubner v. McClellan, (1909) 130 App. Div. 716, 115 N. Y. S. 755; Tommasi v. Archibald, (1906) 114 App. Div. 838, 100 N. Y. S. 367; Dunton v. Hume (1897) 15 App. Div. 122, 44 N. Y. S. 305; Dyker Meadow Land, etc., Co. v. Cook, (1896) 3 App. Div. 164, 38 N. Y. S. 222, affirmed (1899) 159 N. Y. 6, 53 N. E. 690; Freeman v. Panama R. Co., (1876) 7 Hun 122. See also People v. Hills, (1866) 35 N. Y. 449, reversing 46 Barb. 340; People v. Coleman, (1889) 51 Hun 640, 4 N. Y. S. 417. Second, it was intended to advise the public in general, and the members of the legislature in particular, by the title of the bill, as to what interests are likely to be affected by its becoming a law. Economic Power, etc., Co. v. Buffalo, (1909) 195 N. Y. 286, 88 N. E. 389, reversing 128 App. Div. 883, mem., 112 N. Y. S. 1127; People v. Howe, (1904) 117 N. Y. 499, 69 N. E. 1114, affirming 88 App. Div. 617, 84 N. Y. S. 604, and reversing Corscadden v. Haswell, 88 App. Div. 158, 84 N. Y. S. 597; People v. Coler, (1903) 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. E. 956, affirming 71 App. Div. 584, 76 N. Y. S. 205; New York v. Manhattan R. Co., (1894) 143 N. Y. 1, 37 N. £. 494; Sweet v. Syracuse, (1891) 129 N. Y. 316, 27 N. E. 1081, 29 N. E. 289, reversing 60 Hun 28, 14 N. Y. S. 421; Wrought-Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, (1890) 119 N. Y. 204, 23 N. E. 542, affirming (1888) 49 Hun 513, 2 N. Y. S. 359; Astor v. New York Arcade Co., (1889) 113 N. Y. 93, 20 N. E. 594, 2 L. R. A. 789, affirming 48 Hun 562, 1 N. Y. S. 174; Johnston v. Spicer, (1887) 107 N. Y. 185, 13 N. E. 753; Clinton v. Dwight, (1885) 101 N. Y. 9, 3 N. E. 782; In re Paul, (1884) 94 N. Y. 497; Neuendorff v. Duryea, (1877) 69 N. Y. 557, 25 Am. Rep. 235; People v. Brinkerhoff, (1877) 68 N. Y. 259; Devlin v. New York, (1875) 63 N. Y. 8, modifying (1874) 48 How. Pr. 457; Harris v. People, (1875) 59 N. Y. 599; In re Van Antwerp, (1874) 56 N. Y. 261, affirming 1 T. & C. 423; People v. Briggs, (1872) 50 N. Y. 553; People v. Chautauqua County, (1870) 43 N. Y. 10; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York, (1853) 8 N. Y. 241, affirming 5 Sandf. 101, 8 Barb. 450; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76; Gubner v. McClellan, (1909) 130 App. Div. 716, 115 N. Y. S. 755; Tommasi v. Archibald, (1906) 114 App. Div. 838, 100 N. Y. S. 367; Elmira v. Seymour, (1906) 111 App. Div. 199, 97 N. Y. S. 623; Matter of Clinton Avenue, (1901) 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. S. 196; Dunton v. Hume, (1897) 15 App. Div. 122, 44 N. Y. S. 305; Dyker Meadow Land, etc., Co. v. Cook, (1896) 3 App. Div. 164, 38 N. Y. S. 222, affirmed (1899) 159 N. Y. 6, 53 N. E. 690; McCabe v. Kenny, (1889) 52 Hun 514, 5 N. Y. S. 678; People v. Coleman, (1889) 51 Hun 640, 4 N. Y. S. 417. See also People v. Hennessy, (1912) 206 N. Y. 33, 99 (1876) 7 Hun 122. Thus in People v. Chautauqua County, supra, the court said: "We gather that in the convention which proposed the constitution of 1846, the habit of the legislature was assumed to have been, or it was feared it might be, to place in bills largely of a general nature, and having titles Subject and Title of Statutes Art. III, § 16 expressive only of such nature, provisions bearing upon private interests, or affecting portions only of the state, or its people; or to mass such provisions in bills with vague or narrowed and deceptive titles; or in bills, seeming from their titles to be local or private, to include important provisions of a general or public nature. So that the titles of the bills gave no notice to the public or the citizen without, or to the legislature within, what provisions, diverse and faulty in subject, might be hidden in their numerous sections. And that it was believed that in this way laws were enacted unjustly benefiting or harming the individual, or seriously affecting more or less circumscribed portions of the state; or that general or public laws were adopted, with no notice to the public, the individual, or the locality, of the legislative purpose; indeed, with no notice from the title, to legislators not in the secret, of what the bill contained on which they were called to vote. This was the evil to be remedied. The design was, then, that no individual or knot of individuals, should be especially helped or harmed by a bill, unless that bill was confined to one subject, and its title expressed the subject. The design was, that no segregated portion of the state, or of its people, should be made the subject of legislative action, unless the bill, effective thereof, in its title gave notice to it and its representatives of such purpose. The design was, that no enactment of general or public nature, should pass unchallenged, under the guise of a private or local purpose; and that there should be no combination, in one bill, of several private or local subjects.” 2. Local and General Bills Distinguished. Distinction generally. The courts have not established a "definite rule by which to solve the question whether a law is local or general, and it has been found expedient to leave the matter to a considerable extent open, to be determined upon the special circumstances of each case." Ferguson v. Ross, (1891) 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954; People v. Newburgh, etc., Plank Road Co., (1881) 86 N. Y. 1. There are, however, certain general principles to be deduced from the decisions. Thus, one rule deducible therefrom is that a statute may be public and still local, and, therefore, within the purview of this constitutional provision. People v. Coler, (1903) 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. E. 956, affirming 71 App. Div. 584, 76 N. Y. S. 205; Ferguson v. Ross, (1891) 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954, affirming 59 Hun 207, 13 N. Y. S. 398; Kerrigan v. Force, (1877) 68 N. Y. 381, affirming 9 Hun 185; Huber v. People, (1872) 49 N. Y. 132; Board of Fire Underwriters v. Whipple, (1896) 2 App. Div. 361, 37 N. Y. S. 712. See also Clinton v. Dwight, (1885) 101 N. Y. 9, 3 N. E. 782. "In accordance with this view it has been held that acts constituting or defining the jurisdiction of the local courts, amending charters of municipal corporations, regulating the appointment and election of local officers in a particular city, providing for the laying out of streets or highways or the construction of bridges in a specified locality, and for local taxation to pay the expense of the work, regulating the fees of officers in a particular county or the expenses of judicial sales therein, although public acts are nevertheless local and to be valid the subject of the enactment must be expressed in the title." Ferguson v. Ross, (1891) 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954, affirming 59 Hun 207, 13 N. Y. S. 398. Another rule is that "the word 'local' as applied to a bill, act, or law, means such a bill, act, or law, as touches but a portion of the territory of the state or part of its people, a fraction of the property of its citizens." Kerrigan v. Force, (1877) 68 N. Y. 381, affirming 9 Hun 185. To the same effect, see Economic Power, etc., Co. v. Buffalo, (1909) 195 N. Y. 286, 88 N. E. 389, reversing 128 App. Div. $33, mem., 112 N. Y. S. 1127; Cahill v. Hogan, (1905) 180 N. Y. 304, 73 N. E. 39, affirming 99 App. Div. 619, mem., 90 N. Y. S. 1091; Ferguson v. Ross, (1891) 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954; Clinton v. Dwight, (1885) 101 |