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of a license for such an institution is to enable the public authorities to make proper sanitary regulations as to such institutions, so that inmates should not be exposed to infection or the dangers that arise from improper medical attention, and also to insure that it shall not be perverted to an improper use. While no attempt is made to regulate the confinement of persons wherever they happen to be living, the legislature has deemed it proper to regulate institutions or hospitals established or maintained for the treatment of such persons, and such a regulation comes clearly within the power of the legislature." People v. Hagen, (1900) 52 App. Div. 387, 65 N. Y. 120, affirmed, (1900) 165 N. Y. 607, 58 N. E. 1091.

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Protection of health of children generally. The state as parens patriæ may legislate for the protection of the health of minors. Thus, it may require a parent or person in loco parentis "to furnish food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance” to a child. People v. Pierson, (1903) 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243, 98 A. S. R. 666, 63 L. R. A. 187, reversing 80 App. Div. 415, 81 N. Y. S. 214.

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Regulation of exhibition of child in theatre. While it is the inalienable right of a child, even of inmature age, to pursue a trade, it must be not only one that is lawful, but which the state or sovereign, as parens patriæ recognizes as proper and safe. Thus, the provision of the Penal Code (§ 292) declaring a person guilty of a misdemeanor who exhibits a female child under fourteen years of age, or who, having the care of such a child as parent, etc., consents to her employment or exhibition as “a dancer or in a theatrical exhibition, or in any exhibition dangerous or injurious to the life, limb, health or morals of the child," is a valid exercise of the police power. The court said: "It is not, and cannot be disputed that the interest which the state has in the physical, moral and intellectual wellbeing of its members, warrants the implication, and the exercise, of every just power, which will result in preparing the child, in future life, to support itself, to serve the state and in all the relations and duties of adult life to perform well and capably its part." People v. Ewer, (1894) 141 N. Y. 129, 36 N. E. 4, 38 A. S. R. 788, 25 L. R. A. 794, affirming 70 Hun 239, 24 N. Y. S. 500.

3. Public Safety.

Generally. The legislature has the power to make any regulations that it may deem necessary for the protection of the lives and the safety of the citizen of the state. McIntosh v. Johnson, (1911) 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414, L. R. A. 1915D 603, affirming 160 App. Div. 563, 145 N. Y. S. 763; Buffalo v. Stevenson, (1913) 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798, dismissing appeal, 143 App. Div. 117, 127 N. Y. Supp. 607; People v. Erie R. Co., (1910) 198 N. Y. 369, 91 N. E. 849, 139 A. S. R. 828, 19 Ann. Cas. 811, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240, reversing 135 App. Div. 767, 119 N. Y. S. 873; People v. Murphy, (1909) 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735, affirming 129 App. Div. 260, 113 N. Y. S. 855; Rochester v. West, (1900) 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673, 79 A. S. R. 659, 53 L. R. A. 548, 29 App. Div. 125, 51 N. Y. S. 482; Health Department v. Trinity Church, (1895) 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 45 A. S. R. 579, 27 L. R. A. 710; People v. Miller, (1914) 161 App. Div. 138, 146 N. Y. S. 403; People v. City Prison, (1913) 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N. Y. S. 277; Matter of Whitten, (1912) 152 App. Div. 506, 137 N. Y. S. 360; Koch v. Fox, (1902) 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N. Y. S. 913; Matter of Boston, etc., R. Co., (1901) 64 App. Div. 257, 72 N. Y. S. 32, affirmed, (1902) 170 N. Y. 619, 63 N. E. 1115.

Grade crossing. The legislature may either directly or through the board of railroad commissioners exercise authority over railroad crossings in securing the public safety. Matter of Boston, etc., R. Co., (1901) 64 App. Div. 257, 72 N. Y. S. 32, affirmed (1902) 170 N. Y. 619, 63 N. E. 1115;

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Matter of New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1910) 136 App. Div. 760, 121 N. Y. S. 524. Thus, if desirable in securing this safety, the legislature may abolish such grade crossings. Matter of Boston, etc., R. Co., (1901) 64 App. Div. 257, 72 N. Y. S. 32, affirmed, (1902) 170 N. Y. 619, 63 N. E. 1115; Matter of New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1910) 136 App. Div. 760, 121 N. Y. S. 524.

Regulation of hours of labor of block systems operators. The legislature may "protect the safety of the public by limiting the hours of labor of those who are in control of dangerous agencies lest by excessive periods of duty they become fatigued and indifferent and cause accidents leading to injuries and destruction of life." Wherefore, section 7a of the Labor Law (now Cons. Laws, ch. 31, § 8), making it unlawful for an employee of a railroad engaged in moving interstate as well as intrastate commerce, who is in charge of one of its block signal towers, to be on duty more than eight hours in twenty-four, is free from constitutional objection. "It is not at all inconceivable that such an employee subjected to too long hours of duty and confinement might become physically fatigued and mentally inert and make mistakes which would lead to the destruction of life. This being so, it was permissible for the legislature to pass a statute limiting the hours of labor, and it cannot be said that there is no reason or argument to support its judgment that eight hours was a proper limit." People v. Erie R. Co., (1910) 198 N. Y. 369, 91 N. E. 849, 139 A. S. R. 828, 19 Ann. Cas. 811, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240, reversing 135 App. Div. 767, 119 N. Y. S. 873.

Regulation of speed of railroad trains. A regulation which requires railroad trains to cross the streets of a populous city at a rate of speed not to exceed six miles per hour is a reasonable one on its face. Buffalo v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., (1897) 152 N. Y. 276, 46 N. E. 496, affirming 6 Misc. 630, 27 N. Y. S. . 297.

Regulation of speed of street cars. The legislature, in the interest of the public safety, may make regulations concerning the rate of speed at which cars may be operated in streets and highways. Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Co., (1897) 20 App. Div. 31, 46 N. Y. S. 651.

Limitation on height of buildings. The legislature is competent to enact a statute (ch. 454, Laws of 1885), providing that the "height of all dwellinghouses and of all houses used, or intended to be used as dwellings for more than one family, thereafter to be erected in the city of New York,

shall not exceed eighty feet upon all streets and avenues exceeding sixty feet in width." People v. D'Oench, (1888) 111 N. Y. 359, 18 N. E. 862.

Advertising signs and billboards.— An ordinance prohibiting the erection of a billboard exceeding six feet in height, except with the permission of the common council, after notice in writing of the application for a permit, to the owners, occupants or agents of all houses and lots within a distance of 200 feet from where such billboard is to be erected, is a valid exercise of the police power. Rochester v. West, (1900) 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673, 79 A. S. R. 659, 53 L. R. A. 548, 29 App. Div. 125, 51 N. Y. S. 482. The provision of the Building Code of the city of New York restricting the height of signboards erected within the fire limits to eighteen feet six inches, when constructed entirely of metal, or of wood covered on all sides with sheet metal, is a valid exercise of the police power. So too, that part of the provision requiring a signboard constructed of wood to be completely sheathed with metal is a valid exercise of the police power. People v. Miller, (1914) 161 App. Div. 138, 146 N. Y. S. 403. However, a municipal ordinance limiting the height of billboards or 'sky signs," erected on the roofs of buildings upon private property for the display of advertisements, to nine feet above the front wall of the building and prohibiting the erection of higher signs, no matter how well secured, is arbitrary and unauthorized where it appears from the ordinance itself that it was not enacted in the interest of public health, morals or safety, or for any other purpose within the police power,

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but simply to prevent or restrict the display of advertisements. v. Murphy, (1909) 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735, affirming 129 App. Div. 260, 113 N. Y. S. 855. In that case the court said: "An ordinance drawn to protect the public from physical danger should in terms bear some evidence of such purpose. So far as the ordinance in question relates to sky signs, it is general in its terms and it is as prohibitive in remote parts of the city as in the congested parts thereof, and to a structure erected at a safe distance from any street or public place as one erected upon the front wall or cornice of a building situated upon the building line of a public way. The prohibited height is also based upon an arbitrary measurement above the front wall or cornice of the building, notwithstanding the height of the building at the place where it is proposed to erect the structure may be much less or more than at such front wall or cornice of the building. The prohibition is, therefore, not dependent upon the dangerous location of the structure nor is it based upon the height or safety of the particular thing constructed."

Protection from fire in tenements. A regulation which tends to secure protection from fire to the occupants of crowded tenement houses is a proper exercise of the police power. Thus, the provision of the New York Consolidation Act (§ 663, ch. 410, Laws of 1882, amended by ch. 84, Laws of 1887), declaring that tenement houses previously erected in the city shall be furnished by the owners with water, "when they shall be directed so to do by the board of health, in sufficient quantity at one or more places on each floor occupied or intended to be occupied by one or more families," is valid. Health Department v. Trinity Church, (1895) 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 45 A. S. R. 579, 27 L. R. A. 710.

Regulation of storage of inflammables.- The Code of Ordinances of the 'city of New York, authorized by chapter 899, Laws of 1911, is not unconstitutional in providing that "no garbage permit allowing the storage of volatile inflammable oil shall be issued for any building, shed or inclosure which is situated within fifty (50) feet of the nearest wall of a building occupied as a school." That regulation is a fair and reasonable measure, promotive of the public safety, and must be sustained even though it lessens the value of properties that had been used, prior to its enactment, for garage purposes. McIntosh v. Johnson, (1911) 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414, L. R. A. 1915D 603, affirming 160 App. Div. 563, 145 N. Y. S. 763.

Fireproof booth for moving picture machines.— The provisions of the General Business Law (ch. 756, Laws of 1911), requiring a fireproof booth for moving picture machines are constitutional and a proper exercise of the police power. Matter of Whitten, (1912) 152 App. Div. 506, 137 N. Y. S.

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Regulation of hoistways.— The ordinance of the common council of New York, requiring hoistways in stores and other buildings to be inclosed by a railing, and closed by a trapdoor upon the completion of the business of each day, is a reasonable police regulation, and within the legitimate powers of the corporation. New York v. Williams, (1857) 15 N. Y. 502, affirming 4 E. D. Smith 516.

Requirement of fee for permit to open pavement of street. The grant of power in a city charter to regulate the use of the streets implies the power to impose all such reasonable conditions, in relation to their use, as will tend to the accomplishment of the municipal duty to provide for the general welfare and safety of the community, in that respect. Accordingly, a provision in the charter of the city of Buffalo (Laws of 1891, ch. 105, § 17, subd. 9), giving to the common council authority to enact ordinances "to regulate the use of the streets and to declare in what manner and for what purposes they shall not be used," is sufficient to authorize an ordinance requiring the payment to the city of a fee for a permit to open the pavement of a street, and the imposition of a penalty for making an opening without a permit. The fee thus charged is not to be regarded as in the nature of a

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tax, but as a means of regulating the use of the streets under the police power granted by the state, and the ordinance is a valid exercise of power under the charter. Buffalo v. Stevenson, (1913) 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798, dismissing appeal 145 App. Div. 117, 127 N. Y. S. 607.

Possession of concealable firearm.- Section 1897 of the Penal Law, as amended by chapter 195 of the Laws of 1911, making it a misdemeanor for any person over the age of sixteen years to have in his "possession" in any city, village or town any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person without a written license, is a valid exercise of the police power. People v. City Prison, (1913) 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N. Y. S. 277.

4. Public Morals and Peace.

Intoxicating liquors. The legislature, having control of the subject of the traffic in, and use of, intoxicating liquors, may make such regulations to prevent the public evils and private injuries resulting from intoxication as, in its judgment, are calculated to accomplish that end. People v. Murray, (1896) 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146, 32 L. R. A. 344, affirming 4 App. Div. 185, 38 N. Y. S. 909; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (1878) 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323, affirming 8 Hun 16; Volans v. Owen, (1878) 74 N. Y. 526, 30 Am. Rep. 337, reversing 9 Hun 558; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, (1866) 34 N. Y. 657; People v. City Prison, (1896) 6 App. Div. 520, 39 N. Y. S. 582; Franklin v. Schermerhorn, (1876) 8 Hun 112; Baker v. Pope, (1874) 2 Hun 556. Compare Wynehamer v. People, (1856) 13 N. Y. 378, affirming 20 Barb. 567, reversing 20 Barb. 168. Thus, "the legislature has the power to create a cause of action for damages, in favor of a person injured in person or property by the act of an intoxicated person, against the owner of real property, whose only connection with the injury is that he leased the premises where the liquor causing the intoxication was sold or given away, with knowledge that intoxicating liquors were to be sold thereon." Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (1878) 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323, affirming 8 Hun 16. The court said: "The right of the state to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors, within its limits, has been exercised from the foundation of the government, and is not open to question. The state may prescribe the persons by whom and the conditions under which the traffic may be carried on. It may impose upon those who act under its license such liabilities and penalties as in its judg ment are proper to secure society against the dangers of the traffic and individuals against injuries committed by intoxicated persons under the influence of or resulting from their intoxication."

Prevention of fraud.- The legislature may, under its police power, enact reasonable laws for the prevention of fraud generally and for the protection of creditors. People v. Luhrs, (1909) 195 N. Y. 377, 89 N. E. 171, 25 L. R. A (N. S.) 473, affirming 127 App. Div. 634, 111 N. Y. S. 749; Wright v. Hart, (1905) 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404, 3 Ann. Cas. 263, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 232, reversing 103 App. Div. 218, 93 N. Y. S. 60; People v. Arensberg, (1887) 105 N. Y. 123, 11 N. E. 277, 59 Am. Rep. 483; People v. Jenkins, (1910) 140 App. Div. 7es, 125 N. Y. S. 817, reversed on other grounds, 202 N. Y. 53. Thus, an enactment (Penal Code, § 264, subd. 6) which prohibits the sale of goods represented to have been made by the owner of a trademark, except as contained in the original package and as put up by him under his label, is a proper exercise of the police power. People v. Luhrs, (1909) 195 N. Y. 377, 89 N. E. 171, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 473, affirming 127 App. Div. 634, 111 N. Y. S. 749. So, the provision of the Act of 1885) (§ 7, ch. 183, Laws of 1885) to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products," which prohibits the manufacture or sale of any product not made from unadulterated milk or cream, but made "in imitation or semblance " of dairy butter, is constitutional. The producers of butter from animal fats or oils, although the product may be wholesome, nutritious and suitable for food, and so the manufacture and sale thereof may not be prohibited, have

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no constitutional right to resort to devices for the purpose of making their product resemble dairy butter, and the legislature has power to enact such laws as it may deem necessary to prevent the simulated article being put upon the market in such form or manner as to be calculated to deceive. People v. Arensberg, (1887) 105 N. Y. 123, 11 N. E. 277, 59 Am. Rep. 483. However, section 85 of the General Municipal Law, prohibiting persons conducting a transient retail business in certain municipal corporations from advertising a sale of bankrupt or fire-damaged stock, without first obtaining a license from the municipal officers, is unconstitutional. People v. Jenkins, (1911) 202 N. Y. 53, reversing 140 App. Div. 786, 125 N. Y. S. 817.

But chapter 528 of Laws of 1902, making the sale of merchandise in bulk fraudulent and void as against creditors of the seller unless certain arbitrary conditions prescribed therein are complied with, violates those clauses of the federal and state constitutions providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of its laws, in that the statute affects the liberty and property of a limited class of citizens, arbitrarily and unnecessarily denies them the right to contract for, bargain and sell a particular kind of property, whether the sale is honest or dishonest, except upon conditions that are harsh, drastic, unreasonable and unnecessary in so far as they do not tend to effect the objects for which such a statute may properly be enacted, and so restricts the right of contract as to deprive property of its characteristics as such. Wright v. Hart, (1905) 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404, 3 Ann. Cas. 263, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 232, reversing 103 App. Div. 218, 93 N. Y. S. 60. The value of this case (Wright v. Hart) as an authority is "impaired by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which upheld a statute of another state similar in all respects to the one overthrown by us, except that some of its provisions were less stringent (Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489)." People v. Luhrs, (1909) 195 N. Y. 383.

Regulation of employment agencies. The statute regulating the keeping of employment agencies in cities of the first and second class by prohibiting their conduct without a license, having for its purpose the prevention of frauds and probably the suppression of immorality, is not in conflict with the constitutional right to carry on a lawful business without legislative interference, since legislation which has for its object the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, convenience and general welfare or the prevention of fraud or immorality is within the police power of the legislature and valid. People v. City Prison, (1905) 183 N. Y. 223, 76 N. E. 11, 5 Ann. Cas. 325, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 859, affirming 107 App. Div. 617, 95 N. Y. S. 1152. The court said: "The legislature had the right to take notice of the fact that such agencies are places where emigrants and ignorant people frequently resort to obtain employment and to procure information. The relations of a person so consulting an agency of this character with the managers or persons conducting it are such as to afford great opportunities for fraud and oppression, and the statute in question was for the purpose of preventing such frauds and, probably, for the suppression of immorality."

Use of name or picture of person in advertising.—“The power of the legislature in the absence of any constitutional restriction to declare that a particular act shall constitute a crime or be actionable as a tort cannot be questioned, where the right established or recognized and sought to be protected is based upon an ethical sanction." Rhodes v. Sperry, etc., Co., (1908) 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, affirming 120 App. Div. 467, 104 N. Y. S. 1102 and affirmed 220 U. S. 502. Such is the character of the right of privacy prescribed by legislation (ch. 132, Laws of 1903) protecting persons against the unauthorized use of their names or portraits in the form of advertisements or trade notices. Rhodes v. Sperry, etc., Co., (1908) 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, affirming 120 App. Div. 467, 104 N. Y. S. 1102, and affirmed 220 U. S. 502; Wyatt v. McCreery, (1908) 126 App.

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