Legislative Power Generally Art. III, § 1 judicial belong to the legislature, and a statute is not necessarily void which involves judicial action on the part of either house. Where the statute relates to the proceedings of the legislative body itself and is necessary and appropriate to enable it to perform its constitutional functions, it is not such an invasion of the province of the judiciary as to bring it within any implied prohibition of the constitution. People v. Keeler, (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52 Am. Rep. 49, reversing 32 Hun 563. Thus, the power is inherent in the legislature of obtaining information for the purpose of framing laws and as incident to that end it may compel witnesses to attend and testify. People v. Keeler, (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52 Am. Rep. 49, reversing 32 Hun 563; People v. Sharp, (1887) 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319, 1 A. S. R. 851. See also People v. Charles Schweinler Press, (1915) 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639, affirming 163 App. Div. 620, 148 N. Y. S. 725; People v. Milliken, (1906) 185 N. Y. 35, 77 N. E. 872, affirming 110 App. Div. 579, 97 N. Y. S. 223. Wherefore, an act (title 2, ch. 7, part 81 of Revised Statutes), giving each house the power to punish as for contempt any one refusing to attend or testify before the house or a committee appointed to take testimony in legislative proceedings is constitutional. "It is difficult to conceive any constitutional objection which can be raised to the provision authorizing legislative committee to take testimony and to summon witnesses. In many cases it may be indispensable to intelligent and effectual legislation to ascertain the facts which are claimed to give rise to the necessity for such legislation, and the remedy required, and, irrespective of the question whether in the absence of a statute to that effect either house would have the power to imprison a recusant witness, I cannot yield to the claim that a statute authorizing it to enforce its process in that manner is in excess of the legislative power. To await the slow process of indictment and prosecution for a misdemeanor, might prove quite ineffectual, and necessary legislation might be obstructed, and perhaps defeated, if the legislative body had no other and more summary means of enforcing its right to obtain the required information. That the power may be abused, is no ground for denying its existence." People v. Keeler, (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52 Am. Rep. 49, reversing 32 Hun 563. The legislature may not, however, initiate investigations for political purposes solely on matters unconnected with intended legislation or matters on which it can act. People v. Keeler, (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52 Am. Rep. 49, reversing 32 Hun 563. Powers of legislature over judicial determinations and functions.- The legislature cannot set aside, annul or correct a judicial act or determination, and any act that hampers judicial action or interferes with the discharge of judicial functions is in conflict with the principles of the Constitution. In re Greene, (1901) 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183, affirming 55 App. Div. 475, 67 N. Y. S. 291; Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge, (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33, dismissing appeal 73 Hun 590, 26 N. Y. S. 98; People v. Keller, (1899) 158 N. Y. 187, 52 N. E. 1107, affirming 35 App. Div. 493, 54 N. Y. S. 1011; People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347; Gilman v. Tucker, (1891) 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 26 A. S. R. 464, 13 L. R. A. 304; Guilford v. Chenango County, (1855) 13 N. Y. 143; Roberts v. State, (1898) 30 App. Div. 106, 51 N. Y. S. 691, affirmed (1899) 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678. Thus, after an action or proceeding has been closed by a final judgment, the legislature cannot grant a new trial or appeal therein or in any way nullify the judgment of the court. In re Greene, (1901) 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183, affirming 55 App. Div. 475, 67 N. Y. S. 291; Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge, (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33, dismissing appeal 73 Hun 590, 26 N. Y. S. 98; Gilman v. Tucker, (1891) 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 26 A. S. R. 464, 13 L. R. A. 304; Roberts v. State, (1898) 30 App. Div. 106, 51 N. Y. S. 691, affirmed (1899) 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678. See art. 1, § 6. Accordingly, chapter 342, Laws of 1892, authorizing the board of claims to Art. III, § 1 Legislative Power Generally allow to a certain person who had been pardoned after having served a portion of his sentence, just compensation for his improper imprisonment is unconstitutional if viewed as a determination by the legislature that the imprisonment was improper and that therefore the sentence of conviction was illegal. Roberts v. State, (1898) 30 App. Div. 106, 51 N. Y. S. 691, affirmed in (1899) 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678. Power of legislature to deny relief in courts. The legislature has no power to deny, for any cause, to a party who has been illegally deprived of his rights or property, access to the courts of the state for relief. Thus, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (section 1440) relating to the title to real property sold on execution, as amended in 1881 (ch. 681, Laws of 1881), which provides that if the title of the sheriff's " grantee or his assignees is adjudged for any reason or cause whatever to be null and void in any action for that purpose brought by the judgment debtor or his assignees, such judgment shall have no force or effect unless within twenty days after the entry or in case of pending appeal, within twenty days after final judgment "the plaintiff shall pay to such grantee or his assignees the money time of the sale, defending the action, paid on the sale, with interest from the including the costs and expenses of defendant in and in the event of the plaintiff's failure to pay such purchase-money and expenses within the time aforesaid, said title shall be valid in said grantee," is unconstitutional and void, as it violates the constitutional prohibition against depriving the owner of his property without due process of law, and it assumes to nullify a final and unimpeachable judgment. Gilman v. Tucker, (1891) 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 26 A. S. R. 464, 13 L. R. A. 304. Power of court to provide for appeal. It is not the function of a court to provide for an appeal. The courts must be guided by the law as it is, and cannot give an appeal where none is given by statute. To do so would be to trench upon the legislative branch of the government. People v. Trezza, (1891) 128 N. Y. 529, 28 N. E. 533; Leach v. Auwell, (1912) 154 App. Div. 170, 138 N. Y. S. 975. Governor as branch of legislature. It would not be correct language to say that the governor forms a branch of the legislature, for the Constitution has limited that designation to the senate and assembly; but it would be equally incorrect to affirm, that the sanction which he is by article 4, section 9, required to give to or withhold from bills, before they can become operative, does not render him a participator in the function of making law. People v. Bowen, (1860) 21 N. Y. 517, affirming 30 Barb. 24. In that case this was said: "Though it is declared that the whole legislative authority shall be vested in the senate and assembly, still no law can be enacted which has not been submitted to the judgment of the governor. His agency cannot, therefore, be considered as merely a power to refer back bills for further consideration by the legislature; his approval is regarded as generally essential to the enactment of laws, though his disapproval is not necessarily fatal to them, but may be overcome, where the legislature, upon a consideration of his objections, shall repass them by an extraordinary majority.” 3. Delegation of Power. General rule.— "The proposition that by our Constitution general powers of legislation are conferred exclusively upon the legislature and that this body may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating such legislative powers to the people at large, must be regarded as so thoroughly established that it needs no discussion." People v. Kennedy, (1913) 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914C 616, affirming 154 App. Div. 558, 139 N. Y. S. 896; Stanton v. Essex County. (1908) 191 N. Y. 428, 84 N. E. Legislative Power Generally Art. III, § 1 380, affirming 112 App. Div. 877, 98 N. Y. S. 1059; Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506. See also People v. Coler, (1903) 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. E. 956, affirming 71 App. Div. 584, 76 N. Y. S. 205; People v. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n, (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380, affirmed in 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct. 108, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 342. Thus, an act (ch. 140, Laws of 1849) for the purpose of establishing free schools throughout the state, which provides that the electors of the whole state shall say whether the act is to become a law or not, is void. Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506. In Stanton v. Essex County, (1908) 191 N. Y. 428, 84 N. E. 380, affirming 112 App. Div. 877, 98 N. Y. S. 1059, the court said: "Article III, section 1, of the Constitution provides that 'The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a senate and assembly.' The government, as organized under the constitution, was designed to be that of a representative republic. Under the clause of the constitution referred to the legislature is prohibited from converting it into a pure democracy, under which the people frame and enact their own laws. The organization of the law-making power is one of the principal purposes of a constitutional charter, and this is effected by means of a system of representation by which the people at stated periods delegate to citizens chosen by them the power of enacting laws by which all are to be governed. The senators and assemblymen are selected by the electors of their respective districts to represent them in the legislature of the state and to enact such laws as shall be requisite and advisable. The people, who have intrusted them with the legislative power, have the right to demand the exercise of their knowledge, judgment and discretion in the framing and in the enactment of laws, and in so far as their duties are strictly legislative, have prohibited them from delegating that power to others." In Barto v. Himrod, supra, it was said: "All legislative power is derived from the people; but when the people adopted the constitution, they surrendered the power of making laws to the legislature, and imposed it upon that body as a duty; they did not reserve to themselves the power of ratifying or adopting laws proposed by the legislature, except in the single case of contracting public debt. (Art. 7, § 4)." tion order Qualifications to rule.— While the question of the expediency of an act, or of the expediency of its operation in a given case cannot be delegated, the legislature may pass an act the operation of which in particular instances is dependent on or affected by a future contingency. People v. Long Island R. Co., (1892) 134 N. Y. 506, 31 N. E. 873, affirming 58 Hun 412, 12 N. Y. S. 41; People v. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n, (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380, affirmed in 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct. 108, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 342. Thus, the provision of the Act of 1884 (§ 3, ch. 439, Laws of 1884), that: "At a point where a street or traveled way is crossed at the same level by a railroad the Supreme Court or County Court may, upon applicathat gates shall be erected across such street and that a person be stationed to open and close such gates when an engine or train passes ", is constitutional. People v. Long Island R. Co., (1892) 134 N. Y. 506, 31 N. E. 873, affirming 58 Hun 412, 12 N. Y. S. 41. It is competent for the legislature to make the vesting of rights under a valid statute contingent on the consent of some private body or organization. The consent of the private body or organization in such a case does not give any validity to the statute, but is a mere term thereof and its requirement is in no sense a delegation of legislative power. Thus, the provision of the "Street Surface Railway Act" (§ 14, ch. 252, Laws of 1884), imposing as a condition to the construction, extension or operation of a street railroad in a street or highway in which another street railway has been lawfully constructed, that the consent of the company owning and maintaining such other road shall be obtained, is not a delegation of legislative power to the company whose consent is required. In re Thirty-fourth St. R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 343, 7 N. E. 172, reversing 37 Hun 442. The legislature may leave Art. III, § 1 Legislative Power Generally matters of detail attendant on the operation of a statute to be controlled by local authorities. Thus, the Rapid Transit Act (ch. 606, Laws of 1875) is not objectionable as delegating legislative powers in imposing on county commissioners the duty of designating the routes for the elevated roads which it authorized, of determining the form of the elevated structure, and of making rules for the running of trains. Matter of Gilbert El. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 361, affirming 9 Hun 303; In re New York El. R. Co., (1877) 70 N. Y. 327. The legislature may, in certain cases, permit the electors of a restricted locality to determine whether a completed enactment passed by the legis lature shall become operative or shall be taken advantage of. People v. Kennedy, (1913) 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914C 616, affirming 154 App. Div. 558, 139 N. Y. S. 896; Stanton v. Essex County, (1908) 191 N. Y. 428, 84 N. E. 380, affirming 112 App. Div. 877, 98 N. Y. S. 1059; Gloversville v. Howell, (1877) 70 N. Y. 287, affirming 7 Hun 345; Clarke v. Rochester, (1864) 28 N. Y. 605, affirming 24 Barb. 446; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (1863) 26 N. Y. 467; Starin v. Genoa, (1861) 23 N. Y. 439, reversing 29 Barb. 442; Bank of Rome v. Rome, (1858) 18 N. Y. 38; Sun Printing, etc., Ass'n v. New York, (1896) 8 App. Div. 230, 40 N. Y. S. 607, affirmed (1897) 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788. See also Blauvelt v. Nyack, (1876) 9 Hun 153. Thus, the legislature may by statute intended to be complete and taking effect at once provide for the future erection of a new county and then permit the voters within the proposed territory, before the date of actual creation, to decide by vote whether the provisions of said statute shall be carried out and become operative. Accordingly, the statute (ch. 548 of the Laws of 1912) entitled "An act to erect the county of Bronx," etc., which may be fairly construed as defining the boundaries of a proposed county, providing for the substantial and real organization of the county at a future date, giving to the voters of the territory defined the right before that date to indicate whether they desire to have the county created, and enacting that if the vote is adverse it shall not be operative, and its provisions for organization and creation shall not be carried out, is valid, and a contention that by the terms thereof the legislature in violation of the Constitution attempted to delegate to the people of the territory with the proposed new county the right by popular vote to determine whether said act should become or remain a law cannot be upheld. People v. Kennedy, (1913) 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914C 616, affirming 154 App. Div. 558, 139 N. Y. S. 896. So, the provision of the County Law (Laws of 1892, ch. 686, §§ 31, 32, 33), relating to the changing of the site of county buildings and offices from one part of a county to another, and providing that, after such change has been approved by the board of supervisors of the county by a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members elected thereto, the question of the proposed removal shall "be submitted to the electors of the county at the ensuing general election" to "be voted on by such electors at such election “by ballot,” and “if a majority of the ballots cast shall be in favor of such removal, the proceedings of such board of supervisors shall be deemed ratified by the electors, and the change of the site of such buildings, or the removal of such offices, shall be made accordingly," is not such a delegation of legislative power to the people that it constitutes a violation of this section. Stanton v. Essex County, (1908) 191 N. Y. 428, 84 N. E. 380, affirming 112 App. Div. 877, 98 N. Y. S. 1059. 29 In Bank of Rome v. Rome, (1858) 18 N. Y. 38, the court had before it for consideration and affirmed the constitutionality of an act which authorized the president and trustees of the village of Rome to subscribe for and take stock in a railroad corporation, but provided that they should have no power to make such subscription until it had been previously approved by two-thirds of all the electors of a certain class. In thus deciding the court said: "The case is, therefore, in substance, only a submission to a vote of the parties Legislative Power Generally Art. III, § 1 interested, of the question whether or not they chose that the municipal corporation should subscribe to the railroad. In other words, the legislature did not compel the village to subscribe but, by creating by law the necessary machinery, left it to the tax-payers to determine that matter." In Starin v. Genoa, (1861) 23 N. Y. 439, reversing 29 Barb. 442, the act considered was one authorizing the town officers to borrow money and invest it in the stock of a proposed railroad corporation, with the provision that the officers appointed to do this should have no power to do it unless the written consent of two-thirds of the taxpayers had been obtained. In upholding the constitutionality of the act, the court said: "The act by its terms took effect immediately; but parties to be affected by it were at liberty to accept the privileges granted, and incur the burdens and obligations it would impose as their interest or will should dictate; and any one or more of the towns, referred to therein, could take the benefit of it, and make it effective as to themselves. It was in all its material characteristics entirely different from the school law (involved in the Barto case)." In Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (1863) 26 N. Y. 467, the court makes it plain that the doctrine of the Barto case is not to be extended and distinctly differentiates between the question there discussed and the one which arises where the legislature creates a municipal charter for a certain territory and then permits the people of that territory to determine whether the act shall take effect, and which latter provision it holds to be constitutional. Judge Emott, writing for the court, after referring to acts of the latter character, said: "I perceive no difference whether the statute submits an entirely new charter, or amendments to an existing one, to the constituency to be affected. Either way the legislative action is complete and final, and the vote of the municipality is simply a determination of the expediency of their accepting the result of that action." In Clarke v. Rochester, (1864) 28 N. Y. 605, affirming 24 Barb. 446, the statute authorized the city of Rochester to subscribe for and become the purchaser of stock in a railroad corporation which was to terminate in the city, but contained the provision that the provisions of the act should not take effect until they should have been submitted to the electors at a special election, and, distinguishing such a statute from the enactment involved in the Barto case, it was held that the legislature might thus confer upon the representatives of the municipality the power to make subscription upon condition that the act should be submitted to and meet the approbation of the electors. Legalizing of municipal bonds by Supreme Court.- Section 26 of article 2a of the General Municipal Law (Laws of 1909, ch. 29, and Laws of 1911, ch. 769), empowering the Supreme Court to determine the validity of proceeding taken by a municipal corporation prior to the issue of certain bonds and providing that this proceeding shall be deemed legalized and confirmed if the court determines that they are valid, confers no legislative powers on the court and is not in violation of this section. The determination of the validity of the proceedings is a judicial function and obviously the bonds derive validity from the legislative enactment, not from the conclusion of the court. Matter of Lackawanna, (1913) 158 App. Div. 263, 143 N. Y. S. 198. Municipal ordinances generally. The legislature may confer upon municipal corporations the authority to enact and enforce ordinances. That does not constitute an improper delegation of the police power. Buffalo v. Stevenson, (1913) 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798, dismissing appeal, 145 App. Div. 117, 129 N. Y. S. 125; Rochester v. West, (1900) 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673, 79 A. S. R. 659, 53 L. R. A. 548, 29 App. Div. 125, 51 N. Y. S. 482; Rochester v. Simpson, (1892) 134 N. Y. 414, 31 N. E. 871, reversing 57 Hun 36, 10 N. Y. S. 499; New York v. Dry-Dock, etc., R. Co., (1892) 133 N. Y. 104, 30 N. E. 563, 28 A. S. R. 609; Carthage v. Frederick, (1890) 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. E. 480, 19 A. S. R. 490, 10 L. R. A. 178; People v. Pratt, (1891) 129 N. Y. 68, 29 N. E. 7; People v. Squire, (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, |