Art. III, § 1 Legislative Power Generally the scope of civil remedies and fasten responsibility for injuries upon persons against whom the common law gives no remedy. Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B 156, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, reversing 140 App. Div. 921, 125 N. Y. S. 1125; Rhodes v. Sperry, etc., Co., (1908) 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, 127 A. S. R. 945, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1143, affirming 120 App. Div. 467, 104 N. Y. S. 1102; Lawton v Steele, (1890) 119 N. Y. 226, 23 N. E. 878, 16 A. S. R. 813, 7 L. R. A. 134, affirmed 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 U. S. (L. ed.) 385; People v. West, (1887) 106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. 610, 60 Am. Rep. 452; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (1878) 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323. See also People v. Bowen, (1905) 182 N. Y. 1, 74 N. E. 489, reversing 97 App. Div. 642, 90 N. Y. S. 1108. And see, generally, infra, p. 226, II, Police Power. Likewise it is competent for that body to attach a condition to the maintenance of a common-law action as well as one created by statute. Reining v. Buffalo, (1886) 102 N. Y. 308, 6 N. E. 792, overruling 34 Hun 1. Power of legislature over rules affecting remedies.—“All rules and regulations affecting remedies are, at all times, subject to modification and control by the legislature." Howard v. Moot, (1876) 64 N. Y. 262. Thus, rules of evidence may be prescribed, modified and controlled by the legislature. People v. Cannon, (1893) 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759, 36 A. S. R. 668; People v. Ryder, (1891) 124 N. Y. 500, 26 N. E. 1040, reversing 58 Hun. 407, 12 N. Y. S. 48; People v. Turner, (1899) 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022, 15 A. S. R. 498, affirming 48 Hun 466, 2 N. Y. S. 253; Board of Excise Com'rs v. Merchant, (1886) 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484, 57 Am. Rep. 705; Howard v. Moot, (1876) 64 N. Y. 262; Hand v. Ballou, (1855) 12 N. Y. 541; Rexford v. Knight, (1854) 11 N. Y. 308, affirming 15 Barb. 627. See also People v. Lyon, (1882) 27 Hun 180. And see art. 1, § 6. "The general power of the legislature to prescribe rules of evidence and methods of proof is undoubted. While the power has its constitutional limitations, it is not easy to define precisely what they are. A law which would practically shut out the evidence of a party and thus deny him the opportunity for a trial would substantially deprive him of due process of law. It would not be possible to uphold a law which made an act prima facie evidence of crime over which the party charged had no control and with which he had no connection, or which made that prima facie evidence of crime which had no relation to a criminal act and no tendency whatever by itself to prove a criminal act. But so long as the legislature, in prescribing rules of evidence, in either civil or criminal cases, leaves a party a fair opportunity to made his defense and to submit all the facts to the jury to be weighed by them, upon evidence legitimately bearing upon them, it is difficult to perceive how its Acts can be assailed upon constitutional grounds." Board of Excise Com'rs v. Merchant, (1886) 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484, 57 Am. Rep. 705. The legislature may “limit, change and vary existing rules for the limitation of actions." People v. Turner, (1889) 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022, 15 A. S. R. 498, affirming 49 Hun 466, 2 N. Y. S. 253. To the same effect, People v. Ryder, (1891) 124 N. Y. 500, 26 N. E. 1040, reversing 58 Hun 407, 12 N. Y. S. 48; Hand v. Ballou, (1854) (1855) 12 N. Y. 541; Rexford v. Knight, 1 N. Y. 308, affirming 15 Barb. 627. See art 1, § 6. But the legislature cannot, under the guise of a statute of limitations, annul a contract before its maturity. Adam v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., (1912) 204 N. Y. 357, 97 N. E. 740, affirming 140 App. Div. 922, 125 N. Y. S. 1111. Extraordinary terms of court.—By virtue of its plenary powers the legislature may empower the governor to call extraordinary terms of the Supreme Court, no inhibition of that course being implied in article 6, section 2, authorizing the Appellate Division to prescribe the times and places for holding terms of that court. People v. Young, (1897) 18 App. Div. 162, 45 N. Y. S. 772. Power of legislature over appeals. The right of appeal is not guaranteed by the constitution. It is but a privilege which the legislature may deny or Legislative Power' Generally Art. III, § 1 take away. Croveno v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., (1896) 150 N. Y. 225, 44 N. E. 968, dismissing appeal 5 App. Div. 623, 38 N. Y. S. 1142; Grover v. Coon, (1848) 1 N. Y. 536; Leach v. Auwell, (1912) 154 App. Div. 170, 138 N. Y. S. 975; People v. Dunn, (1898) 31 App. Div. 139, 52 N. Y. S. 968, affirmed (1899) 157 N. Y. 528, 52 N. E. 572. See also People v. Skinner, (1902) 74 App. Div. 58, 77 N. Y. S. 36, 43 L. R. A. 247. See art. 1, § 6. Designation of place of imprisonment in part of state other than county of offense and trial. There is "no doubt of the power of the legislature to designate a place of imprisonment in a part of the state other than the county jail of the county of the offence and trial; or of its power to use all the instrumentalities of the state in procuring such place, and in securing confinement in it." Accordingly, the Act of 1874 (ch. 209, Laws of 1874), which authorizes boards of supervisors to agree with any county having a penitentiary therein, to receive into it and keep any person sentenced to confinement for a term not less than sixty days, and makes it the duty of every court in a county so agreeing, to sentence to such penitentiary any person convicted of an offense not punishable with imprisonment in a state prison who is sentenced for a term not less than that specified, is a proper exercise of the legislative power. Brown v. People, (1878) 75 N. Y. 437. Power of legislature over public offices.-"Subject only to the restrictions of the constitution, the legislature may do what it thinks best with a public office or a public officer, by abolishing the office, shortening or lengthening the term thereof, increasing or diminishing the salary and the like." Kocn v. New York, (1897) 152 N. Y. 72, 46 N. E. 170, affirming 5 App. Div. 276, 39 N. Y. S. 164. See also Nichols v. McLean, (1886) 101 N. Y. 526, 5 N. E. 347, 54 Am. Rep. 730; Long v. New York, (1880) 81 N. Y. 425. Manner of determining an election.-"The legislature can provide for the manner in which the result of an election should be determined and declared, and their enactment is binding." People v. North, (1878) 72 N. Y. 124. Admission of attorneys.—The legislature has the unrestricted power to determine in what manner and by what evidence the qualifications for admission as an attorney should be ascertained. Thus, the act (ch. 202, Laws of 1860), making the diploma of the law school of Columbia College conclusive evidence of the learning and ability of its possessor, is constitutional and valid. In re Cooper, (1860) 22 N. Y. 67. Enlargement of time for filing claim against state. The legislature has the power to enlarge the time within which a claim against it may be filed, provided the claim as between citizens would not already be outlawed. Parmenter v. State, (1892) 135 N. Y. 154, 31 N. E. 1035. Legislature as parens patriæ over persons under disability. The legislature is the successor of the crown of England as parens patriæ in the case of persons under a disability. Matter of Thaw, (1910) 138 App. Div. 91, 122 N. Y. S. 970. See also Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, (1907) 192 N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406, affirming 119 App. Div. 172, 104 N. Y. S. 260. The legislature, in the exercise of its tutelary power over the persons and property of infants and others under disability, may provide, by public or private acts, for converting real estate, in which they have vested or contingent interests, into personal property or securities, when necessary for their benefit and may exercise this power as well in respect to the rights of persons in esse as to the contingent interest of persons yet to be born. Brevoort v. Grace, (1873) 53 N. Y. 245; Leggett v. Hunter, (1859) 19 N. Y. 445, affirming 25 Barb. 81; Jackson v. Babcock, (1857) 16 N. Y. 246; Cochran v. Van Surley, (1838) 20 Wend. 365, 32 Am. Dec. 570; Towle v. Forney, (1855) 4 Duer 164, affirmed 14 N. Y. 423. See also Powers v. Bergen, (1852) 6 N. Y. 358. Accordingly, an Act of the legislature (ch. 442, Laws of 1853), authorizing the Supreme Court, upon the petition of the cestuis que trust, to direct the sale of any part or parts of the trust estate from time to time, as might be judged calculated to promote the interests of the infants, whether yet in being or not and Art. III, § 1 Legislative Power Generally providing that the proceeds should be applied by the trustee in paying taxes and incumbrances upon the trust property, or in repairing and improving the unsold portions, or invested for the benefit of those who might become interested under the will and that all conveyances under the Act, if executed by the trustee, should vest in the grantee a fee simple absolute against all persons, whether in being or not, who might have or acquire any interest under the will is a valid exercise of legislative power. Leggett v. Hunter, (1859) 19 N. Y. 445, affirming 25 Barb. 81. The legislature has, however, no power arbitrarily to compel the sale for private purposes of property of those competent to act in their own behalf. Brevoort v. Grace, (1873) 53 N. Y. 245; Leggett v. Hunter, (1859) 19 N. Y. 445; Powers v. Bergen, (1852) 6 N. Y. 358. See also New York Protestant Episcopal Public School v. Davis, (1864) 31 N. Y. 574. Municipal corporation as within doctrine of parens patriæ.— While the state, as parens patriæ, may, and must care for and protect those who are incapable of caring for themselves, a corporation, such as a county, with full power to acquire and hold property, create debts, levy taxes, and sue and be sued, is, apparently, not within the class of incompetents in need of this nursing quality. People v. Ingersoll, (1874) 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178, affirming 67 Barb. 472. Power of legislature to grant lands under navigable waters. The title to lands under navigable or tidal water in this country, which, before the revolution, was vested in the king, became, upon the separation of the colonies, vested in the states within which they were situated; and the state legislatures may exercise the same powers which, previous to the revolution, could have been exercised by the king alone, or by him in conjunction with Parliament, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the constitution of the state and of the United States. Langdon v. New York, (1883) 93 N. Y. 129; People v. New York, etc., Ferry Co., (1877) 68 N. Y. 71, reversing 7 Hun 105; Lansing v. Smith, (1829) 4 Wend. 9, 21 Am. Dec. 89. See also Coxe v. State, (1895) 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400; Smith v. Levinus, (1853) 8 N. Y. 472. "The power of the legislature to grant land under navigable waters to private persons or corporations for beneficial enjoyment has been too long exercised and has been affirmed by this court too often to be open to serious question." Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, (1914) 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. 1915D 56, affirming 158 App. Div. 398, 143 N. Y. S. 454. To the same effect, Saunders v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1894) 144 N. Y. 75, 38 N. E. 992, 43 A. S. R. 729, 26 L. R. A. 378, modifying 71 Hun 153, 23 N. Y. S. 927; Coxe v. State, (1894) 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400; Langdon v. New York, (1883) 93 N. Y. 129; People v. New -York, etc., Ferry Co., (1877) 68 N. Y. 71, reversing 7 Hun 105. See also Lansing v. Smith, (1859) 4 Wend. 9, 21 Am. Dec. 89; Niagara County Irrigation, etc., Supply Co. v. College-Heights L. Co., (1906) 111 App. Div 770, 98 N. Y. S. 4. "The contemplated use, however, must be reasonable and one which can fairly be said to be for the public benefit or not injurious to the public." Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, (1914) 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. 1915D 56, affirming 158 App. Div. 398, 143 N. Y. S. 454. To same effect, Saunders v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1894) 144 N. Y. 75, 38 N. E. 992, 43 A. S. R. 729, 26 L. R. A. 378, modifying 71 Hun 153, 23 N. Y. S. 927; Coxe v. State, (1894) 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400; People v. New York, etc., Ferry Co., (1877) 68 N. Y. 71, reversing 7 Hun 105. Compare Langdon v. New York, (1883) 93 N. Y. 129. Thus, "the legislature cannot authorize the conveyance of a navigable portion of the St. Lawrence to a private company to maintain and control navigation thereon, thereby parting for all time with its own power to improve such navigation." Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, (1914) 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. 1915D 56, affirming 158 App. Div. 398, 143 N. Y. S. 454. So, an act (ch. 864, Laws of 1868 as amended by ch. 282, Laws of 1869), empowering Legislative Power Generally Art. III, § 1 a private corporation in the furtherance of private purposes to become vested with the title to certain portions of the land under the waters of the sea and the sound within the limits of the counties of Kings, Queens, Richmond and Suffolk, is unconstitutional. Coxe v. State, (1894) 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400, wherein the court said: "The title of the state to the seacoast and the shores of tidal rivers is different from the fee simple which an individual holds to an estate in lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign right, and it has been frequently said that a trust is engrafted upon this title for the benefit of the public of which the state is powerless to divest itself. . . . It would, no doubt, be difficult to reconcile all the numerous expressions of opinion to be found in the decisions on this question. In many of them general language is used which would seem to sanction the doctrine of absolute ownership and the unrestrained power of disposition by the sovereign, but this language must be read and understood with reference to the special facts of each case, and when thus read and interpreted, much of the apparent conflict disappears. It has often been said that the legislature of this state is clothed with all the powers of the British Parliament, except as restrained by the express or implied provisions of the constitution. When the general doctrines of the English courts on this subject are given full scope, the conclusion is inevitable that the Parliament and the Crown together were not competent to grant to a private corporation, for private purposes, the seacoast around the island below the shore line, without violating established principles of law. While I am not aware of any such restriction to be found in the constitution of this state, in terms, yet, from the very nature of the question, it must be deemed to be inherent in the title and power of disposition. The title which the state holds and the power of disposition is an incident and part of its sovereignty that cannot be surrendered, alienated or delegated, except for some public purpose, or some reasonable use which can fairly be said to be for the public benefit." Generally." The object of a written constitution is to regulate, define and limit the powers of government by assigning to the executive, legislative and judicial branches distinct and independent powers. The safety of free government rests upon the independence of each branch and the even balance of power between the three. Unite any two of them and they will absorb the third with absolute power as a result. Weaken any one of them by making it unduly dependent upon another and a tendency toward the same evil follows. It is not merely for convenience in the transaction of business that they are kept separate by the constitution, but for the preservation of liberty itself, which is ended by the union of the three functions in one man, or in one body of men. It is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department should be free from interference, in the discharge of its peculiar duties, by either of the others." People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347. To the same effect, People v. Hyatt, (1902) 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825; 92 A. S. R. 706, 60 L. R. A. 774, reversing 72 App. Div. 629, 76 N. Y. S. 1026, affirmed 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 U. S. (L. ed.) 657; In re Guden, (1902) 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 451, affirming 71 App. Div. 422, 75 N. Y. S. 794; In re Davies, (1901) 168 N. Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118, 56 L. R. A. 855, reversing 55 App. Div. 245, 67 N. Y. S. 492; People v. Morton, (1898) 156 N. Y. 136, 50 N. E. 791, 66 A. S. R. 547, 41 L. R. A. 231, reversing 24 App. Div. 563, 49 N. Y. S. 760; People v. Keeler, (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52 Am. Rep. 49, reversing 32 Hun 563; People v. Kennedy, (1913) 154 App. Div. 558, 139 N. Y. S. 896, affirmed (1913) 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas 1914C 616; Matter of Reynolds, (1911) 144 App. Div. 458, 129 Art. III, § 1 Legislative Power Generally N. Y. S. 629, affirmed in (1911) 202 N. Y. 430, 96 N. E. 87, 416; People v. Porter, (1882) 90 N. Y. 68, affirming 26 Hun 622; People v. Bowen, (1860) 21 N. Y. 517, affirming 30 Barb. 24. In People v. Morton, supra, the court said: "Under our constitution the executive power of the state answers to that of the king, and devolves upon the governor during the term for which he is elected. The legislative power is vested in the senate and assembly, which take the place of Parliament, and the judicial power in the courts established in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The three great branches of government are separate and distinct, but are coequal and co-ordinate; their powers have been carefully apportioned; one makes the laws, another construes and adjudges as to the rights of persons to life, liberty and property thereunder, and the third executes the laws enacted and the judgments decreed. While each department, in its sphere, is in a sense independent, each operates as a check or restraint upon the other. The acts of the legislature have to be presented to the executive for his approval. The courts may then construe the acts and determine their validity under the constitution; and the executive may, in criminal cases, modify the action of the courts by the interposition of his pardoning power. But in every case in which one department controls, modifies or influences the action of another, it acts strictly within its own sphere, thus giving no occasion for conflict and thus preserving the purpose of the original scheme of a division of power among the three co-ordinate branches of government, each operating as a restraint upon the other, but still in harmony." Progress in scope of legislative activities.-"We have only to refer to the history of legislation which has been sanctioned by the courts to establish the fact that its powers have been extended over a wide field covering all the departments of government, the administrative or executive branch, as well as that of the judicial. Not only has the legislature largely done away with the rules of the courts prescribing practice, by the adoption of a code of procedure, but it has assumed to direct the order in which cases pending in courts shall be determined, by providing from time to time that a certain class of cases shall be preferred. We thus have the legislature exercising functions which had theretofore been considered judicial and which devolved upon the courts the duty of determining the order in which they would hear the cases pending before them; so, also, has the legislature time and again, with the sanction of the courts, exercised administrative or executive functions. It has not only passed laws regulating the police powers of the state, but it has prescribed the duties which control the policemen in their action. It has not only regulated the sale of strong and spirituous liquors under the general police powers of the state, but it has provided that localities may, by popular vote, determine for themselves whether or not any license shall be granted in their respective localities. Not only has it authorized the laying out of highways, but it has itself laid out roads and specified their metes and bounds. It may not only give to boards of supervisors the power of legislation within certain limits, but it may create municipal corporations and confer upon them the right of local government and the power to make by-laws and ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the state. It may determine that gates shall be established upon streets wherever necessary at the place of railroad crossing at grade. It may fix the site of a court house, appoint a commission to construct it and issue the bonds of the county for the payment of the expenses." Stanton v. Essex County, (1908) 191 N. Y. 428, 84 N. E. 380, affirming 112 App. Div. 877, 98 N. Y. S. 1059. See also Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, etc., Power Co., (1908) 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 14 Ann. Cas. 606, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 713, reversing 122 App. Div. 203, 107 N. Y. S. 341. Exercise of judicial powers by legislature. Notwithstanding the division of powers between the co-ordinate branches of the state government, and the vesting of the judicial powers in the courts, certain powers in their nature |