Art. I, 6

Taking Private Property for Public Use

affirmed 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 1165. See also infra, this page, 2, Public Use; a, Necessity.

Exercise of eminent domain by de facto corporation.-"There is no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition, that the right of eminent domain cannot be exercised by a corporation to deprive a citizen of his property, or property rights, except it be a corporation de jure." In re Union El. R. Co., (1889) 112 N. Y. 61, 19 N. E. 664, 2 L. R. A. 359. To the same effect, In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, affirming 35 Hun 220.

Discontinuance of proceeding looking to condemnation.-A public body, or public officers, to whom the right of eminent domain has been delegated by the legislature, may discontinue proceedings instituted by them, pursuant to the act delegating the power, to acquire title to lands, at any time before the title is acquired, and the rights resulting therefrom have become vested in the property holder. This rule obtains even though in practice it might enable the party exercising the right of eminent domain "to abuse the power intrusted to it, by repeatedly making and withdrawing applications until it should obtain an appraisal satisfactory to itself, and thus deprive the owners of that just compensation for their property which is guaranteed to them by the constitution of the state." In re Washington Park Com'rs, (1874) 56 N. Y. 144; In re Munson, (1883) 29 Hun 325.

2. Public Use.

6. NECESSITY.

Rule stated.— Private property can be appropriated under the power of eminent domain only to a public use. Any attempted appropriation for private use is absolutely unconstitutional and void. Hopper v. Britt, (1911) 203 N. Y. 144, 96 N. E. 371, Ann. Cas. 1913B 172, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, reversing 146 App. Div. 363, 131 N. Y. S. 135; Brewster v. J. & J. Rogers Co., (1901) 169 N. Y. 73, 62 N. E. 164, 58 L. R. A. 495, affirming 42 App. Div. 343, 59 N. Y. S. 32; In re Tuthill, (1900) 163 N. Y. 133, 57 N. E. 303, 79 A. S. R. 574, 49 L. R. A. 781, affirming 36 App. Div. 492, 55 N. Y. S. 657; People v. Adirondack R. Co., (1899) 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689, reversing 39 App. Div. 34, 56 N. Y. S. 869, affirmed in 176 U. S. 335, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 492; In re Brooklyn, (1894) 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirming 73 Hun 499, 26 N. Y. S. 198, affirmed 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 1165; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, (1891) 128 N. Y. 345, 28 N. E. 358, 14 L. R. A. 481; Gilman v. Tucker, (1891) 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 26 A. S. R. 464, 13 L. R. A. 304; In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Eureka Basin Warehouse, etc., Co., (1884) 96 N. Y. 42; In re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, (1876) 66 N. Y. 569, 23 Am. Rep. 86, reversing 5 Hun 482; Brevoort v. Grace, (1873) 53 N. Y. 245; In re Fowler, (1873) 53 N. Y. 60; Bellinger v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1861) 23 N. Y. 42; Leggett v. Hunter, (1859) 19 N. Y. 445; Heyward v. New York, (1852) 7 N. Y. 314; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., (1837) 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76; Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159; Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, (1911) 147 App. Div. 316, 131 N. Y. S. 918, affirmed (1912) 205 N. Y. 409, 98 N. E. 909; Rome v. Whitestown Water Works Co., (1906) 113 App. Div. 547, 100 N. Y. S. 357, affirmed (1907) 187 N. Y. 542, 80 N. E 1106; De Camp v. Thomson, (1899) 16 App. Div. 528, 44 N. Y. S. 1014, affirmed (1899) 159 N. Y. 436, 54 N. E. 63; Wormser v. Brown, (1893) 72

Taking Private Property for Public Use

Art. I, 6

Hun 93, 25 N. Y. S. 553, affirmed (1896) 149 N. Y. 163, 43 N. E. 524; People v. Henion, (1892) 64 Hun 471, 19 N. Y. S. 488; In re New Rochelle Water Co., (1887) 46 Hun 525, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 646; In re Cooper, (1882) 28 Hun 515. See also In re Protestant Episcopal Public School, (1864) 31 N. Y. 574; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Brainard, (1853) 9 N. Y. 100.

Thus, the legislature has no power arbitrarily to compel the sale for private purposes of the property of those competent to act for themselves. Brevoort v. Grace, (1873) 53 N. Y. 245; People v. Batchellor, (1873) 53 N. Y. 128, 13 Am. Rep. 480; Leggett v. Hunter, (1859) 19 N. Y. 445; Powers v. Bergen, (1852) 6 N. Y. 358. See also In re Protestant Episcopal Public School, (1864) 31 N. Y. 574. "If the legislature should pass an act to take private property for a purpose not of a public nature, or if it should provide, through certain forms to be observed, to take the property of one and give it or sell it, which is the same thing in principle, to another; or, if it should vacate a grant of property under the pretext of some public use, such cases would be gross abuses of the discretion of the legislature and fraudulent attacks on private rights, and the law would be clearly unconstitutional and void. . . . If the power exists to take the property of one without his consent and transfer it to another, it may as well be exercised without making compensation as with it, for there is no provision in the Constitution that just compensation shall be made to the owner when his property shall be taken for private use." Brevoort v. Grace, supra; Powers v. Bergen, supra.

Appropriation for general public use. The legislature is competent to authorize a municipality to condemn property for the public use generally and need not specify for what particular use the condemnation shall be made. In re Brooklyn, (1894) 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirming 73 Hun 499, 26 N. Y. S. 198, affirmed 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 1165. However, a power of eminent domain delegated for particular purposes can be used only in furtherance thereof and may not be made an instrument to acquire property for general public use. Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159. See supra, p. 153, Exercise for General Public Use of Delegated Power.

Necessity of particular appropriation for use.- - Private property, it would seem, cannot be taken for public use unless it is necessary therefor. If unnecessary, the property is obviously not taken for public use. People v. Fisher, (1908) 190 N. Y. 468, 83 N. E. 482, affirming 116 App. Div. 677, 101 N. Y. S. 1047; In re New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1879) 77 N. Y. 248; In re New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kip, (1871) 46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep. 385, affirming 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 90; Buffalo, etc., R. Co., v. Brainard, (1853) 9 N. Y. 100; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76; Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, (1911) 147 App. Div. 316, 131 N. Y. S. 918, affirmed (1912) 205 N. Y. 409, 98 N. E. 909; Rome v. Whitestown Water Works Co., (1906) 113 App. Div. 547, 100 N. Y. S. 357, affirmed (1907) 187 N. Y. 542, 80 N. E. 1106. The necessity need not be absolute, however. The courts will not interfere with a reasonable determination of a board, officers or corporation vested with the power of eminent domain that an appropriation is necessary. People v. Fisher, (1908) 190 N. Y. 468, 83 N. E. 482, affirming 116 App. Div. 677, 101 N. Y. S. 1047; In re New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1879) 77 N. Y. 248; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76; Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, 1911) 147 App. Div. 316, 131 N. Y. S. 918. affirmed (1912) 205 N. Y. 409, 98 N. E. 909; Rome v. Whitestown Water Works Co., (1906) 113 App. Div. 547, 100 N. Y. S. 357, affirmed (1907) 187 N. Y. 542, 80 N. E. 1106. Moreover, the particular property needed may be pointed out by the legislature, and the courts cannot review its determination in this respect." In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 139,

Art. I, § 6

Taking Private Property for Public Use

reversing 32 Hun 82; In re Fowler, (1873) 53 N. Y. 60; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, (1870) 43 N. Y. 137; In re Cooper, (1883) 28 Hun 515, appeal dismissed (1883) 93 N. Y. 507.

Condemnation by lessor railroad. The fact that a railroad corporation has leased its road to another corporation for the full period of its corporate life does not deprive it of the right to acquire title to land for its corporate uses by proceedings in invitum on the theory that, having parted with the entire control of its road, it cannot longer be said to require lands and that, therefore, lands by it appropriated would not be taken for public use. In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, affirming 35 Hun 220; Kip v. New York, etc., R. Co., (1876) 67 N. Y. 227, affirming 6 Hun 24. In justification of the foregoing rule it has been said "that by its lease the lessor company in no respect escapes from or lessens its corporate duty to the State, but is continuing the performance of that duty through the agency of its lessee, and may at any time, through the failure of the latter to perform its covenant obligations or by its absolute loss of corporate life and existence, become re-possessed of its line and property and bound to operate it for itself, and that to the proper performance of its duty by itself or through its lessee the acquisition of lands or terminal facilities may be necessary and essential." In re New York, etc., R. Co., supra.

Continuance of public use.- A person whose property has been absolutely appropriated for public use has no right to the perpetual devotion thereof to that use and sustains no legal injury by reason of its discontinuance. He acquires no right in the property on such discontinuance. In re New York, (1907) 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 13 Ann. Cas. 598, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, modifying 120 App. Div. 849, 105 N. Y. S. 750; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; People v. Kerr, (1863) 27 N. Y. 188, affirming 37 Barb. 357; Rexford v. Knight, (1854) 11 N. Y. 308, affirming 15 Barb. 627; Heyward v. New York, (1852) 7 N. Y. 314. However, when a bare use in land is "condemned for a special purpose on the score of public utility, the sequestration is limited to that particular use." Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong. (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70. To the same effect, Heard v. Brooklyn, (1875) 60 N. Y. 242. Thus, where a railroad corporation is authorized to acquire by legal proceedings only the use of lands for the purpose of operating its road, the fee remains in the owner, subject to that use, and on the discontinuance thereof the owner is entitled to resume possession. Heard v. Brooklyn, supra.

Simultaneous statutory authorization of condemnation and discontinuance of public use.— A statute authorizing the condemnation of property for public use is not unconstitutional in providing for the sale of the property when it is no longer necessary for the use for which it is condemned. In re Rochester, (1893) 137 N. Y. 243, 33 N. E. 320. In that case, with respect to such a provision contained in a statute (ch. 193, Laws of 1888) authorizing the city of Rochester to acquire lands in invitum for a public park, the court said: "Of course, the city could not take private property for the purpose of selling it or dealing in it; but having once acquired it for a park, and it becoming, in the course of time, unnecessary or useless for that purpose, by the growth of the city or other changes in the situation, a sale in the manner prescribed by the statute would be within the legitimate functions of the city as a municipal corporation, and power to that end, conferred by the legislature at any time, or in the act authorizing the taking, cannot invalidate the delegated right to exercise the power of eminent domain."

Waiver. The limitation on the power of eminent domain, that it can be exercised only for a public use, may, like other purely personal constitutional rights, be waived by the party entitled to assert it. In re Cooper, (1883) 93 N. Y. 507, dismissing appeal 28 Hun 515; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; Sherman v. McKeon, (1868)

Taking Private Property for Public Use

Art. I, §

38 N. Y. 266; Embury v. Conner, (1850) 3 N. Y. 511, 53 Am. Dec. 325, reversing 2 Sandf. 98. Thus, an act (2 R. L. 416, § 179) authorizing a city to appropriate private property for certain enumerated public purposes, and where a portion of any plot or parcel of land is so taken, to include the residue thereof in the appropriation if that is deemed advisable, clearly sanctions the taking of property for other than public uses and is hence unconstitutional if construed to permit the inclusion of that residue against the consent of its owner. But if such inclusion is allowed only by consent of the owner the act is constitutional, since any party may waive a constitutional right created for his benefit. Embury v. Conner, (1850) 3 N. Y. 511, 53 Am. Dec. 325, reversing 2 Sandf. 98.

b. DETERMINATION AND NATURE OF PUBLIC USE.

Judicial inquiry into nature of use. Whether a use to which private prop erty is sought to be devoted is in fact public or private must be determined by the courts, and the declaration of the legislature is not conclusive as to its nature. In re Brooklyn, (1894) 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirming 73 Hun 499, 26 N. Y. S. 198, affirmed 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 1165; In re New York, (1892) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825; Pocantico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, (1891) 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, (1891) 128 N. Y. 345, 28 N. E. 358, 14 L. R. A. 481; In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 139, reversing 32 Hun 82; In re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, (1876) 66 N. Y. 569, 23 Am. Rep. 86, reversing 5 Hun 482; Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159; Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, (1911) 147 App. Div. 316, 131 N. Y. S. 918, affirmed (1912) 205 N. Y. 409, 98 N. E. 909. See also In re Townsend, (1868) 39 N. Y. 171; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76. "Whether the use to which private property may be devoted by legislative power is in fact public or private, is a judicial question, and the courts are not concluded by any declaration of the law-making power as to the nature of the use." Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, (1891) 128 N. Y. 345, 28 N. E. 358, 14 L. R. A. 481. The character of the purpose for which private property is sought to be appropriated must be determined, however, from the face of the act making the appropriation, not from matters aliunde, and the judiciary cannot institute an inquiry into the motives of the legislature in order to attribute to it other purposes than those clearly expressed or fairly implied in its enactment. Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, (1891) 128 N. Y. 345, 28 N. E. 358, 14 L. R. A. 481.

General definition of public use.- - Speaking generally, if lands or property are to be said to be devoted to a public use, "the public must, under proper police regulations, have the right to resort to the land or property for the use for which it was acquired, independently of the mere will or caprice of any private person or corporation in whom the title to the property would vest upon condemnation." Again, a public use might generally be defined as the use which each individual might of right demand upon the same general terms and for the same general purposes as any other individual." In re New York, (1892) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825. cededly, however, those definitions do not adequately cover every case. Necessity of benefit to whole state. It is not necessary that a use to be public should directly benefit the people of the whole state, but the direct public benefit may be confined to a particular community. Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, (1891) 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246; Stamford Water Co. v. Stanley, (1886) 39 Hun 424.

Con.

Art. I, § 6

Taking Private Property for Public Use

Incidental benefit to public. The fact that the use to which property sought to be condemned is to be put will tend incidentally to benefit the public by affording additional accommodations for business, commerce, or manufactures, and by stimulating the economic life of a community, does not justify its condemnation if it is to remain under private ownership and control and the public are given no rights therein. In re New York, (1890) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825; In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Eureka Basin Warehouse, etc., Co., (1884) 96 N. Y. 42; Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159 “There is . . . unquestionably a distinction between the use which is public and an interest which is public, and where there is simply a public interest, as distinguished from a public use, the right of eminent domain cannot be exercised. The interest may be of a public nature when the use may tend incidentally to benefit the public in some collateral way. In such case the right to take property in invitum does not exist.” In re New York, (1892) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825. Thus, an act (ch. 637, Laws of 1881), purporting to authorize the Eureka Basin Warehouse and Manufacturing Company to condemn lands for the purpose of excavating a basin adjoining East river and erecting wharves thereon, is unconstitutional, it appearing that the basin and wharves are to remain under private control and management. In re Eureka Basin Warehouse, etc., Co., (1884) 96 N. Y. 42. Possible use by few.—“A possible limited use by a few, and not then as a right but by way of permission or favor, is not sufficient to authorize the taking of private property against the will of the owner.” In re Split Rock Cable-Road Co., (1891) 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 506, affirming 58 Hun 351, 12 N. Y. S. 116; Queen Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159. Thus, property may not be taken in invitum for the construction of a road to be devoted primarily and, if necessary, exclusively to the purpose of a private manufacturing corporation, and to be used by the public only on conditions convenient to the road. In re Split Rock CableRoad Co., (1891) 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 506, affirming 58 Hun 351, 12 N. Y. S. 116.

Effect of consequential benefit to private parties.—It is no sufficient objection to an exercise of the power of eminent domain that private individuals or corporations will derive benefit therefrom, provided the use for which the property is appropriated is public. In re Ryers, (1878) 72 N. Y. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88; In re Townsend, (1868) 39 N. Y. 171; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., (1837) 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76; Stanford Water Co. v. Stanley, (1886) 39 Hun 424. Nor is it objectionable that a grant of the right of eminent domain originated in and was designed to subserve private interests, so long as the use is public. Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, (1914) 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76.

6. PARTICULAR USES.

Park.— The creation of a park for the use of the public is a public undertaking in aid of which property may be condemned. People v. Adirondack R. Co., (1899) 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689, reversing 39 App. Div. 34, 56 N. Y. S. 869, affirmed in 176 U. S. 335, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 492; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; Matter of Rochester, (1897) 24 App. Div. 383, 48 N. Y. S. 764.

Market.― Private property may properly be taken under the power of eminent domain for use as a market. In re Cooper, (1882) 28 Hun 515.

appeal dismissed (1883) 93 N. Y. 507.