Taking Private Property for Public Use Art. I, § 6 of a certain statutory penalty against corporations may be brought has been held reasonable. Davidson v. Witthaus, supra. Three months does not seem to be a reasonable period for the enforcement of existing claims. Parmenter v. State, (1892) 135 N. Y. 154, 31 N. E. 1035. A statute cutting down the right to commence an action upon a cause of action then existing, from a period without limitation to one of seven weeks and five days after the passage of the act, does not allow reasonable time for the commencement of suits on existing rights and is therefore unconstitutional. Parmenter v. State, (1892) 135 N. Y. 154, 31 N. E. 1035. Sufficiency of interval between passage and effectiveness of statute.— Where a statute made applicable to existing claims shortens the time in which they may be enforced, reasonable time for their enforcement must be allowed after the act has become effective. It is not sufficient that a period between the passage of the act and the date of its taking effect be left for the assertion of existing demands, and this rule is not affected by the duration or reasonableness of a period so allowed. "A statute has not, ex proprio vigore, any. force until it becomes the law of the land, and that is when, by its terms, it takes effect, and as up to that moment the party is allowed by the existing law a period for the commencement of his action, if at the instant that the new statute takes effect the period is cut off, and the remedy forever barred, then the act is unconstitutional." Thus, a statute (ch. 281, L. 1897) cutting the period for the enforcement of certain claims against corporations from six to three years and allowing no further opportunity, after it becomes effective, for the prosecution of demands then valid, is void although by its terms it does not become effective until four months and fourteen days after passage and during that interval existing claims may be enforced. Gilbert v. Ackerman, (1899) 159 N. Y. 118, 53 N. E. 753, 45 L. R. A. 118, affirming 33 App. Div. 371, 54 N. Y. S. 113. Necessity of notice of contingent event stating statute of limitations.A statute (L. 1895, ch. 1006) providing for the discontinuance of streets and highways in cities of the first class is unconstitutional and invalid in so far as it provides that the mere lapse of six years, following the filing of the map showing the discontinuance of any street or streets, shall, without any actual or constructive notice to the owners of the abutting land, bar their right to compensation for the easements affected by the discontinuance of such street or streets. "Before the citizen's right to compensation can be cut off by such a statute of limitation, notice of the event on which the right depends must be brought home to him by the state. He cannot be charged with the duty of hunting out the facts for himself. The state is appropriating his property by proceedings in invitum, and it cannot shift upon him the burden of ascertaining that the proceedings are in motion. It must give him notice reasonably adapted to bring their pendency to his attention." In re New York, (1914) 212 N. Y. 538, 106 N. E. 631, affirming 160 App. Div. 80, 145 N. Y. 254. VI. EMINENT DOMAIN. “Nor_shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." 1. Nature and extent of power to condemn, 150. 2. Public use, 154. a. Necessity, 154. b. Determination and nature of public use, 187. Art. I, § 6 Taking Private Property for Public Use 3. Taking of property, 160. a. Taking generally, 160. (1) Definition and illustrations, 160. (2) Taxing power; regulation of corporate and municipal property, 161. (3) Police regulation; consequential injury from public work, 163. b. Shore and water rights, 165. o. Fee; easement; franchise; lien; emolument of office; contractual right, 166. d. Rights in highway, 167. (1) Fee, 167. (2) Abutter's easements, 169. 4. Compensation, 174. a. In general, 174. b. Computation of compensation, 177. 1. Nature and Extent of Power to Condemn. Source of power of eminent domain.-"The right to take private property for public use is not dependent upon constitutional provision—it is inherent in the right to exercise sovereign power." People v. Priest, (1912) 206 N. Y. 274, 99 N. E. 547, affirming 150 App. Div. 19, 133 N. Y. S. 1087; People v. Fisher, (1908) 190 N. Y. 468, 83 N. E. 482, affirming 116 App. Div. 677, 101 N. Y. S. 1047; People v. Adirondack R. Co., (1899) 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689, affirmed in 176 U. S. 335, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 492, and reversing 39 App. Div. 34, 56 N. Y. S. 869; People v. Smith, (1860) 21 N. Y. 595; Heyward v. New York, (1852) 7 N. Y. 314; Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., (1898) 27 App. Div. 326, 50 N. Y. S. 245. right to take private property for public purposes does not depend upon any express provision in the charter of government, but is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, existing in every independent state. Private interest must yield to public necessity; this is what is meant by the right of eminent domain. Its existence with us has never depended upon our written constitutions, although by those of 1821 and 1846 its exercise is declared to be limited upon the condition of making just compensation." Heyward v. New York, supra. "The Property subject to condemnation.— Within the boundaries marked out by this provision and section 7 of article 1, the legislative power to appropriate private property to public use is unrestrained and extends to all property both tangible and intangible. People v. Adirondacks R. Co., (1899) 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689, reversing 39 App. Div. 34, 56 N. Y. S. 869, affirmed in 176 U. S. 335, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 492; Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Kerr, (1878) 72 N. Y. 330; Matter of Rochester, (1897) 24 App. Div. 383, 48 N. Y. S. 764. "It is not a valid objection to proceedings taken by a railroad company to acquire land for the purposes of its incorporation that it is under the waters of a navigable stream, and the titles which individuals may have acquired therein by grant from the state may be taken by the exercise of the power of eminent domain equally with the upland.” Kerr v. West Shore R. Co., (1891) 127 N. Y. 269, 27 N. E. 833; In re New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1879) 77 N. Y. 248; In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1882) 27 Hun 57, reversed on other grounds (1882) 89 N. Y. 453. Extent of estate acquirable. The extent and nature of the estate to be acquired in condemnation proceedings rests in the discretion of the legislatu e. In re New York (1907) 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 13 Ann. Cas. 598, 16 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 335, modifying 120 App. Div. 849, 105 N. Y. S. 750; In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) Taking Private Property for Public Use Art. I, § 6 98 N. Y. 139, reversing 32 Hun 82; Sweet v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., (1879) 79 N. Y. 293; Washington Cemetery v. Prospect Park, etc., R. Co., (1877) 68 N. Y. 591, affirming 7 Hun 655; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, (1870) 43 N. Y. 137; Heyward v. New York, (1852) 7 N. Y. 314; Matter of Rochester, (1897) 24 App. Div. 383, 48 N. Y. S. 764. Thus, a fee in lands may be taken although the use for which they are appropriated is special and not of necessity permanent or perpetual. Sweet v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., (1879) 79 N. Y. 293; Rexford v. Knight, (1854) 11 N. Y. 308, affirming 15 Barb. 627. "It is well settled that it is within the competency of the legislature in authorizing land to be condemned for a public use which may be permanent, to determine what estate shall be taken, and to authorize the taking of a fee or any lesser estate in its discretion, and that a fee may be taken although the public use for which the land is to be taken is special and not of necessity permanent or perpetual." Sweet v. Buffalo, supra. Expediency of exercising power of eminent domain. The expediency of exercising the power of eminent domain in any particular case is a matter resting entirely within the legislative discretion and not open to judicial review. In re Brooklyn, (1894) 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirming 73 Hun 499, 26 N. Y. S. 198, affirmed 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 1165; In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 139, reversing 32 Hun 82; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, (1870) 43 N. Y. 137; In re Townsend, (1868) 39 N. Y. 171; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Brainard, (1853) 9 N. Y. 100; Stamford Water Co. v. Stanley, (1886) 39 Hun 424. See also Oneonta Light, etc., Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. S. 76. The legislature, in delegating the right of eminent domain, may also grant the power of determining the expediency of exercising that right. In re Niagara Falls, etc., R. Co., (1888) 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, affirming 46 Hun 94, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 632; In re Fowler, (1873) 53 N. Y. 60; In re New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kip, (1871) 46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep. 385, affirming 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 90; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Brainard, (1853) 9 N. Y. 100. necessity, for an appropriation of lands by the legislature in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, may not be questioned by the courts. And as the legislature may delegate the exercise of this power to municipalities, to boards of officers and to public agents, the necessity for an appropriation by them may not be inquired into by the courts. If the use to which the lands are to be put is public, the legislature, or the instrumentality which it employs, is the sole judge of the necessity, unless there is provision otherwise in the enactment." In re Fowler, (1873) 53 N. Y. 60. وو "The Recondemnation.- Property that has been appropriated to public use under eminent domain proceedings may undoubtedly, despite that appropriation, be again condemned for public use by the state or by some agency under its authority. Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Kerr, (1878) 72 N. Y. 330; Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., (1898) 27 App. Div. 326, 50 N. Y. S. 245. Thus, the section of the act of 1869 providing for the construction of a railroad (ch. 513, L. 1860), which authorizes the persons named to " run upon, intersect and use any portion of other railroad tracks, should they deem it necessary, is constitutional. Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Kerr, (1878) 72 N. Y. 330. However, property once condemned and impressed with a public use cannot be recondemned, during the continuance of that use, except by express legislative authority. In re New York, (1892) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825; In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, affirming 35 Hun 220; In re New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (1879) 77 N. Y. 248; Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., (1898) 27 App. Div. 326, 50 N. Y. S. 245. See also People v. Adirondack R. Co., (1899) 160 N. Y Art. I, § 6 Taking Private Property for Public Use 225, 54 N. E. 689, reversing 39 App. Div. 34, 56 N. Y. S. 869, and affirmed in 176 U. S. 335, 20 S. Ct. 460, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 492. Thus, this has been said: "Because it could not be intended that the state, having authorized one taking, whereby the lands became impressed under authority of the sovereign with a public use, meant to nullify its own grant by authority to another corporation to take them again for another public use unless it so specifically decreed, it has been ruled that lands so held and impressed with a public trust were not embraced in words of general authority. Were the rule otherwise this evil would result: a corporation, number one, having the right of eminent domain, takes land from a similar corporation, number two, having the same right; number two thereupon proceeds again to condemn it for its own use and number one retaliates, and so the absurd process goes on. It is clear that the legislature never meant any such result, and hence, from any general grant containing in its terms no word of exception, there is necessarily excepted property already held upon a public trust by the authority and under the ward and control of the state." Matter of Petition of New York, etc., R. Co., supra. However this rule does not prohibit the acquisition without express authority of a right to use streets and avenues and piers at the end thereof included within land sought to be condemned for railroad purposes. In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1879) 77 N. Y. 248. Nor is it necessary that the authority to condemn property devoted to public use be in terms conferred. "A necessary implication arising from language used is quite sufficient in this as in other cases for the purpose of an enactment.” In re New York, (1892) 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 A. S. R. 825. Moreover express authority for recondemnation is essential only in cases wherein a delegated power to condemn is sought to be exercised. It is not necessary where the state is the party seeking to condemn. Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., (1898) 27 App. Div. 326, 50 N. Y. S. 245. Condemnation of property devoted to public use.- Property is not rendered immune from appropriation by reason of the circumstance that it is held for public use and convenience if it has not been acquired by condemnation for that use and hence is not impressed therewith. Thus, lands owned by a steamship company carrying on the business of a common carrier, used by it as a wharf or dock and therefore in a sense devoted to public use, are subject to condemnation where it appears that the company is a private corporation under its charter, and that its property is impressed with no public trust. In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, affirming 35 Hun 220. In that case, with reference to the steamship company mentioned above, this was said: "If the law of its existence does not prevent it from being a mere private corporation, from disregarding if it pleases all public uses; if it may abandon its business at any moment and refuse to run its propellers and sell its lands by an absolute title without responsibility to the sovereign, which is permitted by its charter (§ 2); in short, if under that charter it may be a purely private corporation, its property is not so held as to be exempt from a taking under the law of eminent domain. Any other rule would be surrounded with difficulties. If the test should be made that of the actual use, of the character of the business done and the benefit to the public realized, we shall never know where to draw the line, and must equally exempt individuals whose property is thus used; and in every case an uncertain and shifting question of fact would dominate the decision to be rendered." Delegation of power. The legislature is competent to delegate the power of eminent domain to individuals or corporations. People v. New York, (1910) 198 N. Y. 439, 92 N. E. 18, affirming 134 App. Div. 75, 118 N. Y. S. 742; Pocantico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, (1891) 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246; In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y 139, reversing 32 Taking Private Property for Public Use Art. I, 6 Hun 82; In re New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kip, (1871) 46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep. 385, affirming 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 90; Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, (1870) 43 N. Y. 137; In re Townsend, (1868) 39 N. Y. 171; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., (1837) 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159; Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., (1898) 27 App. Div. 326, 50 N. Y. S. 245; In re New Rochelle Water Co., (1887) 46 Hun 525, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 646; Stamford Water Co. v. Stanley, (1886) 39 Hun 424. See also Matter of Thomson, (1895) 86 Hun 405, 33 N. Y. S. 467, affirmed (1895) 147 N. Y. 701, 42 N. E. 726. "It is . . . well settled, that the state may exercise the right to take private property for public use through agents constituted for that purpose, whether individuals or corporations, and that it is a legitimate exercise of the right, though the title to the property taken is vested in a private corporation, provided the purposes for which the corporation is to take are in any sense public, and concern the public welfare." Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, (1870) 43 N. Y. 137. The right of eminent domain may be delegated to a foreign corporation. Stating that proposition, the Court of Appeals has said: "There is no constitutional inhibition which restrains our legislature from exercising the right of eminent domain, and condemning land to the public use, and employing, as an instrument to carry the appropriation to the public use into effect, an individual or a copartnership of individuals residing in this or in another state, nor from, in like manner, employing a corporation created by another state, for the like purpose." In re Townsend, (1868) 39 N. Y. 171. To the same effect, In re New York, etc., R. Co., (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, affirming 35 Hun 220. Moreover, a delegation of the right to condemn property is not a grant of an "exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise" within the meaning of article 3, section 18, prohibiting such grants by private or local act, and consequently, though made by a private or local act, is not objectionable to that section. In re Brooklyn Union Ferry Co., (1885) 98 N. Y. 139, reversing 32 Hun 82. Having the power to delegate the right of eminent domain, the legislature is also competent to annex such conditions as it sees fit to the exercise of that right so long as no requirement of this provision is violated. People v. New York, (1910) 198 N. Y. 439, 92 N. E. 18, affirming 134 App. Div. 75, 118 N. Y. S. 742; In re New York, (1907) 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 13 Ann. Cas. 598, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, modifying 120 App. Div. 849, 105 N. Y. S. 750. Exercise for general public use of delegated power. It is not sufficient that a condemnor exercising a delegated power of condemnation intends to devote property by him condemned to some general public purpose. The property must be devoted to the specific use, or a part thereof, for which the power to condemn was given. Thus, the Tidal Water Way Company, incorporated by the Laws of 1894, chapter 719, and given power to condemn lands to build a canal connecting tidewaters, and to condemn lands on either side of the canal for a distance of 1,000 feet, having contracted with another corporation to transfer all its rights over the canal when constructed so as to relieve it from any duty respecting the same, and the other corporation having in its turn agreed to convey the canal to the town of Hempstead, which has made no agreement to maintain it as a public waterway and has no statutory authority to construct or maintain canals or to exercise the power of eminent domain for that purpose, has departed from the specific use for which it was invested with power of eminent domain, and, therefore, has no right to condemn the lands as authorized by statute. Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, (1911) 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. S. 159. However, the legislature is competent to vest a municipality with the power to condemn property for general public use. In re Brooklyn, (1894) 143 N. Y. 596 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirming 73 Hun 499, 26 N. Y. S. 198, and |