NOVEMBER, 1803. Amendment to the Constitution. purposed intention to misrepresent could alone have given sentiments of the kind as uttered by him. He had not alluded to the States in their capacity as States; he had objected to elections by diets, and the small States having but few representatives, he stated as more exposed to corrupt attempts upon them, than States where the number was larger. In an election by the House of Representatives this would be the case: some States have but one, others two representatives, attempts would be made upon them, and though we have had virtue enough to resist temptation, our country must be like all others subject to the casual decay of virtue, and at a future day the representatives of small States may become as venal as those of the rotten boroughs of England; and no longer represent the feelings, the interests, or the freedom of their country. SENATE. amendment might be useful, yet it was not necessary. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. BUTLER) had argued on the necessity of adhering to the principles of the Constitution on a former day with great force; and though his arguments were used upon an amendment of another kind proposed by himself they applied in this case as closely as possible; the same arguments had been used by other gentlemen, on a suggestion of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. DAYTON) concerning the abolition of the office of Vice President. It is true that some gentlemen declared that they had no objection to the abolition, but disapproved of the time it was brought forward; he agreed and voted with the gentleman on that occasion. But the ground is now changed and we are told that the principle of designation is not so much the choice as to keep the election out of the House of Representatives, and in a variety of ingenious arguments we are referred back to antiquity to justify the injurious effect resulting from elections by diets. As a speculation upon the principles of government he admired the gentleman's information and eloquence, but he was not prepared to act upon the principle. We had been shown the great inconveniences of carrying the elections into the House of Representatives; make it a separate question, and let it be fairly and fully discussed and he would then prepare his mind to vote. But before he could act on it now, he would just observe, that if you do not pursue that course you pursue some other, and it would be necessary to provide a substitute before we abandon that we possess. This consideration he therefore thought had no concern with the subject before us. Mr. ADAMS in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid or seek for the yeas and nays on any question; on the present occasion, however, he would, when the question was taken, call for the yeas and nays. But his own vote on the final question would be governed by the decision of the number five, and he wished to have some record of his vote, that he might be hereafter able to defend himself against any charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated to produce more good than evil. He was not however influenced in this opinion by the instructions which had been read in a preceding debate from a former Legislature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he presumed these were not read by way of intimidation. To the instructions of those to whom he owed his On the third point, that it would essentially afseat in that House he would pay every respect fect the rights of the small States, he thought it that was due, but he did not think that the reso- the true object of discussion; and he saw it wholly lutions of a Legislature passed in March 1799 or as a federative question, and rejected all arguments 1800 ought to have the same weight. Since that of the popular kind. From the mode in which it time four total and complete changes had taken had been argued the question would seem to be a place, and probably not one third of those who dispute between sixteen small, and one large State. gave those instructions now remained. He held a The Constitution however was a combination of seat in the Legislature himself three years since, federative and popular principles. When you but did not perceive any particular anxiety on argue upon, or wish to change any of its federathe subject, and he did not think that the present tive principles, you must use analogies as arguLegislature would be extremely offended if he ments; popular arguments will not apply to fedewere to give a direct vote against what was re-rative principles. The House of Representatives commended four years ago. But as it seemed to be read to influence him he would state his reasons for his vote. Upon the alteration of the number from that agreed upon by the House of Representatives several arguments had been offered; they were of three descriptions. 1. That no alteration of the Constitution ought to take place unless it should be indispensably necessary, and that in altering the Constitution no departure should be made from its spirit. 2. That it ought not to be carried in the House was founded on popular principles; in this House the representation is federative, and not popular, it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio of representation is different in different States; the numbers in Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved, and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the elec SENATE. Amendment to the Constitution. NOVEMBER, 1803. the gentleman has not taken into view that this question of number has never been before the States, and that having had no opportunity to examine it, the arguments do not apply. It is by this principle his own vote should be regulated; if three were adopted, he should vote against the amendment. tion of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States? The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the Legislature-it was here a combined principle, But the gentleman (Mr. TAYLOR) had taken federative and popular. Virginia had in that another novel ground-that the smaller number House twenty-two popular representatives, in this was the most favorable to the small States. This, she has two federative; Delaware has one popu- however, he supported by a mode of argument to lar and two federative representatives. And even which he had himself objected. He had argued in the operation of election in the popular branch that if it was proposed to vest the election of Presof Congress, the federative principle is pursued, ident in the House of Representatives exclusiveand the State which has only one popular repre-ly, it would not be agreed to by the small States, sentative has an equal voice in that instance with because it was contrary to their interests. But the State that has twenty-two popular represen- this was an extreme case, and the gentleman well tatives. It was therefore evident that the attempt knew that, so far from its being consistent with to alter the number from five to three, is an attack sound logic, to argue from extreme cases, they are upon the federative principle, and not upon the not admitted into argument at all. small States. In answer to the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. DAYTON,) the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) had said he was not surprised to hear him who was a member of the old Confederation talk of the jealousy of States, and expressed much exultation that those State jealousies had been long laid asleep; that he had been ten years in the Government and had heard nothing of them; hoped never to hear of them again. He was equally happy that they had been so long laid asleep; but why was it that they had not complained? For very different reasons from those which had been inferred. It was because the excellent provisions of the Constitution had guarded against all cause of complaint. The States had no reason to murmur, and they had not been stirred up; but is it to be therefore inferred that if you now give them cause, that they will be equally silent, and that it may not tend to civil discord? He knew of nothing more likely to stir them up than an attempt to reform your federative institutions upon popular principles. The gentleman from Virginia, as he understood hin the other day, had intimated that the smaller States ought to be cautious how they excited the indignation of the large States; on this account he had complained that the gentleman from New Jersey had misrepresented him. From the illustration of his statements now given he was persuaded that no threat was intended on that occasion; but as that impression was made, it surely was incumbent on those who felt it to notice it. Was it unnatural for a gentleman coming from a comparatively small State to feel indignant under such a circumstance? The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TAYLOR) is so ingenious, that, like all ingenious men, his sentiments are not at once accessible to plain minds, and to this cause misapprehension ought to be attributed. Another gentleman from Virginia (Mr. NICHO LAS) had said that the amendment had originated with the small States; that the small States having a majority in this House and a majority of the Legislatures, may defeat it if they choose; and these are with him decisive as to safety. But Mr. S. SMITH, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with three, did it after the most deliberate consideration of the theory and the principles of the Constitution; which, if he understood it right, intended that the election of the Executive should be in the people, or as nearly as was possible, consistent with public order and security to the right of suffrage. The provision admitting the choice by the House of Representatives, was itself intended only for an extreme case, where great inconvenience might result from sending a defective election back to the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, where, if the majority is deficient, a new election is requir ed. Our object in the amendment is or should be to make the election more certain by the people. This was to be done most effectually by leaving it to them to designate the persons whom they preferred for each office. As under the present form there was an extreme case, so there might be when the change of number should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives, yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three, would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the election should go to the House of Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentle. men contended for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce on the large States? It was not the interest of the small States to combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large States should combine-and a combination of the small States alone could produce such an effect-nine States in the Union have but thirtytwo votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election? At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States might use their efforts to accomplish. Notwithstanding what had been said concerning the jealousy of States, he could see nothing in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown in to work up feelings that had been long still. It was the forlorn hope, the last stratagem of party; and he was the more disposed to think so, when he saw gentlemen from the large States coming forward as the champions of the small-this might to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment did not deceive him, it was a stratagem to divide the friends of the amendment. Why was not the same jealousy entertained of the power of thirteen out of seventeen combining and giving absolute law to the other four? Why have gentlemen paid no regard to the experience which they have had from the last election, when less than one third of the members harassed the public mind, kept the Union in agitation, and Congress engrossed to the exclusion of nearly all other business for two weeks? Suppose that the House had been as accessible to corruption as the diets of other nations have been, and that three men, having in their power the votes of three States, had been seized upon, and the election made contrary to the wishes of the people. What would be the effect on the minds of the people-on the administration of the Government-and on the attachment which the people feel for the Constitution itself? He need not attempt to describe the effects. But it is our duty to prevent the return of such dangers, by keeping the election out of that House. And the most effectual mode is to fix the selection from the number three. SENATE. the present question on the narrow ground of a selfish, jealous, and illiberal policy, but upon great national principles. It was the practice of that gentleman to act; it was his practice to discharge his duty with fidelity to his State and to his country at large, and such conduct reflected honor on him. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. ADAMS) says we had forgot the main object; that we changed our ground; and that having first claimed the designating principle, we abandoned it in order to keep the election of President out of the House of Representatives. The gentleman had misconceived the subject entirely; if he would only consider the subject again, he would find that nothing had been abandoned, nor anything new assumed; he would find that the principles correspond so exactly as to support and enforce each other. It is to place the election in the hands of the people we wish to designate; it is for the same purpose we wish to keep the election out of the House of Representatives; it is to prevent intrigues we wish to designate; it is to prevent intrigues we wish to keep the choice out of the House of Representatives; it is to conform the election, out of three instead of five, to the spirit of the Constitution, that we wish to adopt that number, and the wish to keep it out of the House of Representatives is already sanctioned by the Constitution. Where, then, is this contradiction-this abandonment of one principle and adoption of another? When he referred to one part of the gentleman's speech and compared it with another, he felt some concern when he considered the gentleman as the champion of the small States. Mr. ADAMS said he did not professs to be the champion of the small States. Mr. SMITH.-When the gentleman first rose he said he was the representative of a large, and he did call for the champions of the small States to come forth, in their defence; upon the failure of an answer to this challenge he had boldly entered The gentleman from New Jersey had affected the lists himself in their defence, and carried his to consider a comparison of the effects of combi- chivalry so far as to marshal the contending parnations of States, as a threat against the small ties, contrary to all former order, into sixteen small States. He had listened as he always did to the and one large State! What was the intention of ingenious arguments of the gentleman from Vir- this mode of distinction; to what end was it directginia (Mr. TAYLOR;) he thought he had attended to ed? Was it not to excite envy and jealousy, the his arguments with particular attention on that worst of all passions which affect man? Was it occasion, because they carried to his mind that consistent with professions of regard for the public conviction which truth always carries couched in good to encourage this rivalry of States-the comthe language of sincerity. To him, the gentle-mercial against the agricultural-the East against man's observations on that day conveyed the same ideas and convictions which his explanations conveyed this day in a more copious way, but to him it appeared impossible; and if he had not heard the gentleman from New Jersey, (he confessed with astonishment,) he could not have believed it practicable to give any coloring of menace to his arguments. The gentleman from New Jersey had censured the gentleman from Georgia for his attention to the State which he represented; but what bearing had the gentleman's discharge of his duty to his State on the present question? The gentleman from Georgia had not taken up the South-the small against the large? There was something in this besides liberality. He says he is not the champion of the small States, yet he tells you how they could be stirred up and what would be the consequence if they were roused; he tells you of the distinction between federative and popular principles; and has employed all his ingenuity to induce the belief that we wish to undo the federative principle, to sacrifice it to the popular principle, which is, he has told you, the thing above all others which would stir up the small States and no doubt arm this classification of sixteen against the one State. But the people SENATE. Amendment to the Constitution. were not to be stirred up by such argument; they would know the value of national union and unanimity to their prosperity and liberty too well to be led away by anything we may say or do on this floor. NOVEMBER, 1803. the newspapers, or in private society; in truth he believed it never had been fairly expressed on the subject. We have seen an amendment brought forward from New York, but was that an expression of the public opinion? if it was, it was a very remarkable one, for it contained an absurdityvisible to every one. He wished to avoid innovations on the Constitution, and to preserve the combined operation of federative and popular principles upon which it rested unimpaired. Mr. WORTHINGTON hoped the number three would be adopted in preference to five. Nevertheless be approved so much of the principle of designation in the election of the President and Vice President, that rather than lose it he would vote for it with either number. The yeas and nays being called for on filling up the blank with the largest number according to order; the votes were-yeas 12, nays 19, as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, White, and Wright. While he was up he would offer an observation or two on what had fallen from the gentleman from South Carolina. He had said that the object of the amendment was to prevent the election of a Federal Vice President. Undoubtedly such would be the effect of the amendment. The real effect of the amendment was two-fold-to guard against the dangers of intrigue and corruption, and to place the choice in the power of the people. Could that gentleman who was a member of the Convention object to render one of its fairest and best principles more safe and secure? Was it an objectionable principle to secure to the majority of the people the right of choosing their chief officers? This was intended by keeping the election out of the other House, and by limiting the number to three to leave as little room for corruption as possible, should it ever devolve by any accident on that House to make the choice. For if NAYS-Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, ever the right should again devolve on that House, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan Mache not only saw reason to apprehend corruption lay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John among ourselves but dread it from foreign nations. Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, and Worthington. Had our people been as corrupt as European na- The question on the number three being inserted tions generally are, there was a facility for it at was then put, and the yeas and nays being deour late election; but the members were incor-manded by one fifth of the members present; they ruptible and we were saved. It is to guard were, yeas 21, nays 10, as follows: against the danger we look for this amendment. That gentleman being a member of the Convention who formed the Constitution deems it sacrilege to touch that instrument, yet in an early state of discussion he had found that sacred as it was to him there was a part which he wished to change, and had brought forward an amendment for the purpose. The merits of that gentleman's amendment he was not now called upon to discuss, but with the lights which he at present possessed, it was probable he might give it his approbation; and it surely could not be deemed so extraordinary if other gentlemen should wish to amend certain parts, when one of the framers of the Constitution had thought it susceptible of amendment. Mr. PICKERING had not intended to have spoken on this question so far as it concerned the numbers; but as he should probably vote differently from his colleague, he conceived it proper to give his motives for his vote. His wishes for the entire preservation of the Constitution were so strong, that he regretted any change was contemplated to be made in it, and he wished if an alteration was made to keep as near as possible to the spirit of the Constitution as it now is, and it appeared to him that the number three conformed more to that spirit than the number five. He believed it to be the intention of the Constitution, that the people should elect. As to what gentlemen said concerning the will of the people, he paid but little regard to it. The will of the people! he did not know how the will of the people could be known-how gentlemen came by it; it would not be asserted that it was to be found in YEAS-Messrs. Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright. NAYS-Messrs. Adams, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy Wells, and White. The House then adjourned. WEDNESDAY, November 30. Mr. JOHN SMITH presented the petition of William Gahagan and others, settlers at Dayton and Mercer's Station, in the State of Ohio, praying a deduction from the price of certain lands stipulated for, on the 15th of November, 1795, for reasons stated in the petition; and the petition was read. Ordered, That it be referred to the committee appointed on the 1st instant, on the petition of John Crouse and others, to consider and report thereon to the Senate. On motion, it was agreed that the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act to repeal an act, entitled 'An act to establish an uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," the order of the day, be postponed. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate resumed the consideration of the report on the amendment to the Constitution as amended yesterday, which was read, as follows: Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following amendment be proposed to the Legisla DECEMBER, 1803. Amendment to the Constitution. tures of the several States, as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the said Constitu tion, viz: In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President; and if no person have such majority, then, from the three highest on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote: a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person Constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of the Vice President of the United States. an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The Mr. BRADLEY thought some provision should be made against the difficulties which might arise upon an equality of votes between several candidates. For example, though the amendment as it stands contemplates a choice from the three highest, there may be four who have equal numbers. Mr. WRIGHT said it was not possible, under the designating principle, for four persons to have an equal number, and have a majority of the whole of the votes likewise. Mr. ADAMS thought that some explanation should be given of the principle upon which the votes were to be counted; and if it were to go to the House of Representatives, whether the choice was to be made from the three highest numbers, even if three were unequal, or if only two were equal, in numbers, and the third being one of the highest, were still less in number than the other two. SENATE. prospect of arriving at any useful conclusion. Yesterday we had heard of objections to extreme cases, and yet all the arguments used were drawn from extreme cases. If they were data then, they must be data now. But it was very clear that the real object was to take away from a portion of society every share of participation in the choice of Vice President. If the people could but have heard their representatives, they could not but smile at them. Notwithstanding the respect which he personally bore for the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. TAYLOR,) he did not completely explain, to his satisfaction, the menace against the smaller States. As to those arguments which were employed against the election devolving on the other House, he thought it was paying the people a poor compliment to say they make a selection of Representatives for that House in whom trust cannot be placed, and that their delegates resemble the representatives of rotten English boroughs: this he thought an extreme case-an extremely hard case. We had been told, also, that the people wished for the number three. He should like to have some other evidence than the bare opinion of gentlemen. The PRESIDENT called to order. Mr. BUTLER was willing to reserve what he had to say to a future time. The PRESIDENT observed the House was now ready to receive amendments proposed by gentle men. Mr. BUTLER thought the amendment of the member from Vermont should have the preference, as it was first offered. Mr. BRADLEY's amendment was called up, read, and lost-ayes 10, noes 20. A desultory presentation of amendments, without going into detailed argument, now took place, in which Messrs. JACKSON, TAYLOR, NICHOLAS, WRIGHT, and TRACY, took part; when Mr. ADAMS observed, from the multitude of amendments, it now became difficult to comprehend it. He suggested the propriety of adjourning, so that the amendments might be all printed, which was agreed to. THURSDAY, December 1. Mr. BRADLEY said that, under the amendment Simons, lieutenant in Colonel Washington's regiMr. BUTLER presented the petition of James as it now stood, a candidate with one vote may ment, and brigade major in the corps of light troops be chosen, (for there had been single votes.) and of General Greene's army, during the late Revothere being two candidates equal in votes, then the lutionary war, praying to be allowed the commuHouse of Representatives would have the power tation as paid to other officers of similar grade, for to choose the third. He would offer an amend-reasons stated at large in the petition; and the pe ment. Mr. SMITH wished the gentleman would let his amendment lie over for the present, or it might be printed. Mr. TAYLOR thought that the word "highest," in the eighteenth line, should be changed. Mr. BUTLER. It is evident gentlemen cannot agree among themselves. Now, if one side proposes one measure, and another a second measure, and so on to a third and a fourth, (all of which appeared to him objectionable,) there was little tition was read, and referred to Messrs. BUTLER, JACKSON, and BRADLEY, to consider and report thereon to the Senate. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate took up the amended report, as amended the preceding day, which was as follows: "Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That |