may vote differently; if five or six States were in the same predicament, a case not very unreasonable to suppose, then there would not be a majority.

The question was then put, and Mr. BRADLEY'S motion carried.

Mr. BRADLEY then moved his amendment in the 16th line as above cited, to be inserted in the place of the words, "in the manner directed by the Constitution." He observed this amendment would render it necessary in order to avoid confusion to repeal the section which comes within its purview; if no manner of election is pointed out, it will be impossible to tell what construction to put upon it; and instruments of this important nature cannot be expressed in language too explicit. If a provision, such as is offered, should not be adopted, might not the House of Representatives consider themselves at liberty to choose by the numerical vote? It is true that any vote we may here give will not alter the principle, but it is proper that provision be now made that no mistaken interposition take place at a future time. Mr. ADAMS said, if he understood the state of the question, the principle relates in the most important degree to the numbers from which the choice should be made-as it now stood he could not say whether three or five was the number to be chosen from; he hoped the Senate would determine whether the choice was to be made from the highest numbers in all cases; or to make provision specially for either case of five or three; if the choice was to be fixed by the number five, then he conceived that the words from the whole number, if less than five, should be introduced. He was himself in favor of the number five, because by taking three you reduce the power of the small States, and their chances in the House of Representatives; for certainly it is a much higher power to elect from five than from three. He questioned whether the House of Representatives would part from that number, for in general popular bodies are very tenacious of power; it is in their nature, and so in a degree are Senates.

Mr. DAYTON said, the remarks of the gentleman (Mr. ADAMS) in favor of small States were too precious to be lost; but he wished they had been reserved for the proper place; with regard to number likewise, it was out of place, as there was no reference to numbers in the motion of the gentleman from Vermont.

The second amendment of Mr. BRADLEY was then put and carried.

Mr. COCKE called for a consideration of the vote of the preceding day on the number in the 15th line, which he moved to strike out, in order to afford gentlemen the opportunity they seemed to wish for to discuss the number.

The motion was carried, and a blank left for the number.

Mr. COCKE.-Gentlemen had now full latitude for discussion, and he wished it would be settled so far as concerned the number, this day; he could not but express his sorrow, however, to hear gentlemen making such a stir about supposed dangers to the small States; this kind of clamor is worn 8th CON.-4

SENATE.

thread-bare, and could not pass muster much longer; on all occasions we hear in one shape or another this opposition of States brought forward; lately it was the West was in danger; at other times the South is arrayed against the East; and now we are called upon to believe the large are going to swallow the small States; gentlemen must have a large swallow indeed who can take in these things. Another gentleman, from Connecticut, (Mr. HILLHOUSE,) presents us another horrid spectacle; he tells us that those States must be merged in blood, and truly the remedy by which all this bloodshed is to be prevented, he tells us, is the election of a Federal Vice President! He was not surprised at this kind of remedy being recommended, but he thought it little better than a quack medicine. He believed that if the remedy was accepted, the day would not be far distant when they would come forward with another, and tell us that a Federal President was necessary to our existence. He for one was not for taking the remedies of those who, when disorder prevailed, instead of curing them, created new ones. Gentlemen would not a few years ago listen to any advice or even complaints of a minority; they think now, as they said then, that there was no talents or virtue in the country but what they possess; and they now tell us that minorities should govern. While he stood in that House he would never submit to be governed by a minority, especially a minority which, when a part of the majority, declared the then minority deserved a dungeon. We shall not treat them in that way; they shall experience no persecution; we will even endeavor to make their situation comfortable for them; but they must not expect our aid to set aside majorities, or to depart from the principles of the Constitution.

Mr. HILLHOUSE.-If the gentleman alludes to me, he is mistaken.

Mr. COCKE.-No gentleman in this House can be a stranger to my meaning-he had proposed to insert the number five in the blank.

Mr. DAYTON Seconded the motion, but not for the reasons offered by the gentleman from Ten

nessee.

Mr. COCKE.-As I cannot pocket that gentleman's superior reason, I must be content to make use of that plain reason God has given me. He had heard it said on that floor, that the object of our amendment was to prevent a Federal Vice President being elected. For his personal feeling on that subject he could account; he entered into no examination of other gentlemen's feelings, but for himself he would avow that he was actuated by a strenuous wish to prevent a Federal Vice President being elected to that Chair; he could not subdue his memory, and he would not wish to see any man chosen whose attachment to Republican Government he doubted; he was against the election of any man who differed from the majority; he was as adverse to persecution as any men; he could not persecute, but he would, while he had breath, guard against all men and all parties that countenance or practise persecution for opinion's sake. He would assert the right of the

majority, and entertained no sort of apprehensions from those spectres and hobgoblins, those denunciations of blood, and such declamations as were thrown out by some gentlemen, and which betrays the rancor which rankles in some gentlemen's breasts, who judge of others by themselves, and furnish the strongest argument against trusting to them. He disdained persecution, but he would guard against it. He would follow the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, which excluded the choice of minorities; which was advantageous to the minority, if it was not their own fault. We are called upon to make a choice or we are not. Will gentlemen tell us that we make a choice, if we admit what is contrary to our sentiments of right and wrong. What is the object of the amendment? To put it in the power of the people to choose those whom they think most entitled to confidence and respect. If we furnish an amendment which they do not approve they will send it back to us.

Mr. TAYLOR.-This appears to be a subject of much importance, and the matter introduced into the debate had given it a more serious air than it at first assumed. To estimate a measure of a public kind we must look to the consequences which it is intended, or may incidentally produce. If the measure had the tendencies, or would produce such effects as some gentlemen surmise, it would be very serious indeed. But he would be bold to say that it was never contemplated to countenance or encourage a classification of States. No man he believed who advocated the amendment would submit to a classification of States any more than a classification of men, or the establishment of patrician and plebeian orders. Are gentlemen who hold forth these delusions conscious that the course they pursue is the only mode to excite that jealousy and distraction which they say they deprecate? Do gentlemen wish to excite an hostility of this kind, to inculcate the idea of discriminating the States into patrician and plebeian? Are they regardless of the consequences, or have they ever considered them?

How, he would ask, is this amendment to favor the large at the expense of the small States? Gentlemen have not shown. Have they considered that nothing is so fatal to freedom as the existence of orders and distinctions in society? Could the effect be less pernicious if you attempt with any effect to stir up rivalry of States? Are you prepared to estimate the consequences of violence and the conflict of weakness against strength? Can any gentleman reflect on it without horror? Is it to be presumed that if you set the furious passions in agitation, that the large States will sit patiently and bear unmerited reproach and outrage? Do you not perceive that these menaces and clamors proceed exclusively from those who affect so much concern for the small States? Are gentlemen aware of the responsibility which they attach to themselves-that of exciting resentment and animosity, and that kind of animosity which a weak man injured always feels towards the strong; for it is of no consequence whether the

NOVEMBER, 1803.

weak man is deceived and insulted by the imposition put upon him, if he is really deceived into the pernicious belief?

He had persuaded himself a mode of argument so pernicious could not be employed on this occasion; he had expected that the question would be examined and decided upon its true grounds. But beside this we find an attempt to defeat the amendment by its form. Let us examine this amendment. By filling up the blank with five, you carry the election into the House of Representatives; and why do we wish to keep the election out of the House of Representatives? Because experience teaches us to avoid the danger of diets, which are always exposed to intrigue and corruption, as we avoid elections by mobs, from their liability to be misled by the sudden impulse of passion and violence. We wish to avoid both, because each by different paths leads to the same consequence. One or two elections by a diet would repay the small States-with what? with monarchy. Elections by diets always lead to monarchy. It is for this reason, then, that we wish to keep the elections where they should be, in the hands of the people, where, from very obvious cause, neither intrigue nor corruption can operate. It is by diets that Great Britain has been ruined in her prosperity and liberties. By placing the election in the House of Representatives, you expose the small States to the evils which Great Britain has suffered through her rotten boroughs. The small number of Representatives in the small States will expose them to the allurements against which humanity is not always fortified. The danger of temptation must be guarded against, else the minority may be through corruption made to govern. The small boroughs where there are few electors have given the rule over the majority in England for more than a century; corruption has been the Prime Minister, and the Parliament has been in fact the mere registers of the monarchical edicts.

But it will be asked, do we lessen the chance by lessening the number? Yes, sir; the greater the scope is which you give the House of Representatives, your chance is the greater for a number of candidates; if you fill the blank with twenty, you will have twenty; if with five, you will have five within the scope of that power; and the greater numbers the electors may have to nominate, the greater division of sentiment, and more numerous will be the inducements to corruption.

Limit the number to three and you reduce the danger, and by condensing public sentiment, you will then have the watchfulness of ambition on one side and of virtue on the other, directed without distraction to the limited number; he would, therefore, prefer three to five.

Mr. DAYTON believed it would come to this, that when the question came to be discussed, and the rights of the small States maintained, the large States would threaten us with their power. The same threats had been heard in the old Congress, but they were laughed at, for the votes of the States were equal; they were heard in the convention, but they were spurned at, for the votes

of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed, because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle.

Mr. NICHOLAS.-Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the Constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to the Constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the Constitution than from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people hold the sovereign power, and it was intended by the Constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean anything disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that Constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important, in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal to the Constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent. Gentlemen, who pretended to feel, for he would not enter into their conceptions, if they had any real apprehensions on the subject of the danger of the smaller States, forget that this is not a project of the large States; they ought to have considered that it has originated with the small States; and that, in the House of Repre

NOVEMBER, 1803.

sentatives, two-thirds of the representation is that of the smaller States. Have gentlemen forgotten that the amendment has been twice recommended from South Carolina, afterwards by Vermont, then by New Hampshire, and finally by Tennessee? Are these large or small States? Away with such groundless pretences! The attempt to excite jealousy in the small States cannot succeed. The people know that it is calculated to prevent a crisis which was long apprehended, and which the experience of the last election proved to be well founded.

Mr. MACLAY said, he believed that, as it concerned one more than another State, it was perfectly immaterial whether the number five or three were chosen. He conceived that it involved no question but what was common to all the States; and he wished this clannish spirit could be laid aside on occasions of this important nature; and that the general interest of the whole should be considered. In this point of view, the present amendment cannot affect the political rights of any State, for, being on a perfect equality, in the choice of one from three as well as one from five, no danger of rights can exist, though other dangers may be apprehended. If any rights can be at all affected, they must be civil rights. But here he found it difficult to convey, with the clearness he could wish, his ideas on the application of the amendment to civil rights; he would, therefore, endeavor to do that by comparison, which was not so easily explained by itself. He would compare the States of the Union, in their collective capacity, to individuals in society; wealth, in society, is power; and he who has wealth possesses a more extensive influence than he who is poor; in this respect, perhaps it may be said, they are not upon a perfect equality, because one man possesses an equal direct power with the poor man, and an overplus of indirect power, which the poor man does not possess. But the same men, in their civil capacity as citizens, are upon complete terms of equality, possessing equal rights and power, as in the right of suffrage, and in the sight of the law, they are equally units in the mass of society.

Extent of territory, occupied by a numerous population, is, in a State, what wealth is to the private individual. The State of small extent, or of comparatively small population, stands in the same relation to society as the poor man. Notwithstanding this disparity of political or physical power, the rich and the poor man, the large and the small State, are equally interested in supporting their actual or personal rights. But they may be considered as equally interested in supporting those personal rights which connect themselves with the security of their wealth, in which they have but unequal interest. The wealthy have, besides their civil rights, their property at stake, and may therefore be supposed more vigilant and watchful of innovations which might weaken or destroy that security by which they hold their rights and privileges. If this reasoning be correct, let us apply it to the case under consideration; why attempt to alarm and raise jealousies in the