hydrocarbons, burn 25 Americans to death, and injure 1,350 more. Forest fires are costly to prepare for and suppress. Expenditures for forest fire control activities average about $316 million each year. A single large fire may cost as much as $10 million to suppress. This does not include the cost of damages.

Our bill calls for $11 million for preventive measures.

Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that we must act to insure the President's responsiveness to this most serious and dangerous problem. Again, I stress the imminence of this fiery threat, and I ask your speedy and favorable action on this important legislation.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Congressman Stark?

STATEMENT OF FORTNEY H. STARK, REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. STARK. I will try to qualify myself in 30 seconds as an expert in statistics. When the die is cast, your chances are 50/50, no matter what previous statistics may show, and if the fire goes off in the hills, we are then dealing with the lives of adults and children who are citizens of our State and our districts.

We have a chance to prepare well ahead of time all of the political leaders in the State on both sides of the aisle. We have agreed this is necessary, and we wait only for the President to act. He has been willing to act in preventive measures before, as he says, to put out fires.

I submit that this is a very little one with respect to the world problems he is faced with, but I hope your S. 1697 will prevail, and that we can provide support on the House side. I want to thank you for all the hard work you have put in on behalf of the citizens in our district. I leave my statement as part of the record. Thank you.

[Complete statement of Congressman Fortney H. Stark follows:]

COMPLETE STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN FORTNEY H. STARK

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am appearing before you today to voice my unqualified support for S. 1697, requiring the President to declare the East Bay Hills a Disaster Area. The evidence and testimony you will be presented today by those local and state officials most directly involved will surely be powerful and moving. I do not believe that I can better state the case. The men and women here today representing all the people who stand to suffer so drastically in the event of a fire, and who must undergo serious economic hardship in preventive measures can best convey the enormous proportions of the impending tragedy.

I would like however to take this opportunity to convey to the Members of the Committee the history of attempts made to date by myself and my staff to alleviate the fire hazard. Perhaps it will then be apparent to you, as it has become to me, that Presidential action in the form of a designation of the area as one of "imminent disaster" is imperative. Without it there is little that can be done to compensate for the great financial hardships of so many. And naturally, without such a declaration the possibility and peril of impending fire disaster grows with each warm, dry spring day

Nearly all efforts to date to secure emergency relief funds have been futile. Money is traditionally available from various sources and government agencies. For many technical reasons, however, this situation in the Hills does not qualify. Money that might have been released by HUD, by the Department of Labor, the U.S. Forest Service, the State of California, the Department of Agriculture and

other smaller agencies has simply not been forthcoming. We have been forced into the realization that our disaster simply does not conform to the requirements now in the statutes for anything other than a "state of emergency." It is indeed a sad commentary that tragedy must occur before funds that would have been preventive can be released.

Beginning in late February, we initiated explorations into possible sources of aid for the area. Our first task was to build a conclusive case that the trees were indeed dead, and thus a grave threat. The only known precedent, the freeze of 1932, had caused initial damage and all the eucalyptus trees appeared dead. Within a number of years, however, they were revived so that many of those in question are demonstrated survivors of a serious frost.

We called on the Park Service and the Forest Service in this initial period for advice and evaluation. At that time we believed them to be a good potential source of aid in the event that the trees would have to be cleared. The Forest Service, of the Department of the Interior, claimed jurisdiction in the matter and began working with state and local officials on the scene. Aerial views and infra red photos were used as evidence, but proved to be disappointingly inconclusive. Portions of the trees, themselves, were analyzed in laboratory tests and determined to be alive but still dangerously inflammable. It became apparent that so many concerned parties with conflicting standards were involved that there would be no simple resolution. An unbiased judgment would have to be made by a single party.

My Washington staff, during this same time frame, was investigating every federal agency that had relief programs even remotely related to fire disaster. The Library of Congress, the Department of the Interior, and the Public Works Committee proposed various possibilities, but all were revealed to be unsuitable. Watershed programs seemed likely to be applicable but their overall budget had been so drastically cut in recent years that no substantial funds could be made available. We were speaking conservatively of $5 million in damages. The total budget of the Watershed programs amounted to very little more than that. Similar findings were made in all the other federal disaster relief programs.

The only conclusion to this exhaustive study was that money would have to be made available through the Office of Emergency Preparedness. This necessitated a Presidential designation of the area as an "imminent disaster." I conveyed this message to the President by letter on April 4. After a length review, Governor Reagan arrived at the same conclusion on the first week of April. He declared a "state of emergency" in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, and requested President Nixon to "declare the counties major disaster areas due to the extreme fire hazard presented by the dead trees." In this same statement he directed that a Fire Prevention Center at the East Bay Regional Park Headquarters would be established to begin fire abatement procedures. In conclusion, though, he too appealed for the availability of Small Business Administration Disaster Loans. It seemed the only recourse for private property and homeowners.

The Governor has made a limited amount of funds available for land clearance, and the California Ecology Corps may be enlisted in the land clearing effort. While an earnest beginning, this is still pitifully insufficient. Estimates of damage, and of expenses to the property owners now range upwards of $5 million, and $20 million is no longer considered a liberal figure. Very few private citizens have such resources available to them. A homeowner with several dead trees on his property is faced with an extremely expensive operation, but a family living on a fixed income with even just a few trees in the yard may encounter serious financial hardships. These people must be compensated, or reimbursed. And all those who have not yet made large expenditures must be assisted before that should become necessary. Time is running out. William Hildebrand, the Fire Marshal of Alameda, has set June 1 as the deadline. At that date all dead trees must be cleared from private land. Estimates range upward of $300 per tree. As a last resort, the manpower element was explored. It was thought that the Department of Labor might have sufficient funds to deploy large groups of previously unemployed men and women into land-clearing operations. Public Service Employment has in the past given jobs to hundreds of people in projects similar to this one. This year's drastic shortage of funds in the program, however, rendered this impossible. The City of Oakland could not afford to hire anyone. Public funds might have been provided for the immediate future, but under the same laws it is stipulated that no one may be hired temporarily unless

the city can guarantee him continued employment when the project is completed. No such money for salaries could be found in the Oakland city government. The Neighborhood Youth Corps was then briefly considered. This possibility was even more quickly rejected-NYC's funding expires on June 30, 1973. Revenue sharing, as we are all aware, is not committed to the continuance of any program. There are no guarantees.

I am pleased to be able to report to the members of this Committee, though, that we have been able to make one small step in the area of compensation to property owners. No final decision has yet been reached but preliminary reports from the Internal Revenue Service confirm that some relief through tax deduction may be forthcoming. We do not know how much, if any, of the cost of tree removal will be deductible. But we do know that the IRS will permit any property owner to claim the difference in his property value before and after tree clearance as a single deduction. This is small consolation, but surely a beginning.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we have explored every existing avenue. Congressman Dellums, Congressman Waldie, Senator Tunney and yourself, Mr. Chairman, have done all within our power and authority to provide relief to this endangered area. The local governments, the mayors of many towns, county supervisors, state officials and innumerable citizens have worked tirelessly to avert disaster. The Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, intervened on behalf of all these people and declared the area one of "imminent disaster."

We have all answered our constituencies. We have lived up to our responsibilities as elected officials. The President has let us down. He has refused to live up to his obligations. The President turned his back on East Bay Hills residents whose homes and property are threatened by the worst Bay Area disaster since the 1906 earthquake and fire.

We now must turn to you, the members of this Committee, and to the Congress to compel the President to respond. There are no other sources of relief. Only he can make the authorization for the release of Federal Disaster Relief funds. Small Business Administration loans, provided through the Office of Emergency Preparedness, cannot be made available unless the President so directs. On behalf of all those who are undergoing such hardship now, and who stand to be so severely afflicted in the event of fire, I cannot urge you too strongly to consider this bill favorably and work for its rapid adoption.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. If I may impose on Mr. Trent's patience very briefly and call on Mr. Meese, because he has a 3:30 engagement. I am afraid I am going to have to take off for about 5 minutes for a vote.

STATEMENT OF EDWIN MEESE III, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO RONALD REAGAN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. MEESE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the chance to testify and your courtesy in allowing me to testify out of order at this time.

I might say by way of a personal note that I also have a great interest in this problem, not only from having lived in the city of Oakland, but also my first job in gainful employment was cutting down some of these same eucalyptus trees.

We do appreciate the efforts that you are making here in assisting in alleviating the fire hazard in the East Bay Hills. It is clear that you, Congressmen, local officials, and now the White House are jointly engaged in an effort on a nonpartisan basis to solve this problem.

Mr. Trent testified as to our meeting this morning and the request to the President to reopen this matter as well as the decision of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to reconsider the entire problem of the

fire hazard which exists in the Berkeley Hills which resulted from the freeze of last December.

Pursuant to our meeting this morning, the State of California is initiating an updated reassessment of this hazard along with local officials, and we will present this up-to-date information to the Office of Emergency Preparedness officials next week. We will also be meeting with Mr. Trent and the other officials from that agency and related agencies when they come to California next week for an actual on-the-scene view of this particular hazard.

I would like to present to the committee the basis on which Governor Reagan has made his request for a state of disaster to be declared and for Federal assistance under the appropriate public law, and also for his particular letter to the President today requesting the matter be reopened with the view toward achieving such assistance. First of all, the Governor himself declared a state of emergency based upon the recommendation of the top public safety officials of our State.

Second, he has based his request upon the unanimous conclusions of the local officials who represent several cities, two counties, and several special districts, all of whom are concerned that the hazard continues to exist and actually is becoming more critical as the fire season approaches.

Third, the Governor has based his request upon the commitment of the maximum resources of the State and local governments to lessen the hazard and provide for the protection of life and property. I think reviewing the efforts that have been made at the State level, this has been done with the recognition that the State has other responsibilities in fire areas in other parts of California.

Others following me will testify more fully as to the data on the existing damage, the potential damage and the existing danger from fire. They will also tell you about the local efforts that are being made. They will also describe to you the impact on the homeowners in the area, which cannot be ignored. The tremendous apprehension of many who have gone through a very serious fire 3 years ago, which destroyed numerous homes and threatened life and property. Many of these people do not have eucalyptus trees on their own property, but live in proximity to public and private lands on which the eucalyptus trees exist, and the feeling of danger in these areas is extremely severe, as I am sure other witnesses will later testify.

I would like to outline, Mr. Chairman, the steps that have been taken to date so that you and the Senate will know of the extent to which the State regards this as an emergency situation.

Senator CRANSTON. Before you proceed to do that, may I interrupt for a moment? I regret that I have to go to make a rollcall, but, because you have to leave at 3:30, I am going to ask an assistant of mine to carry on. There are a few questions I want her to have time to ask you before you leave. I will get back as soon as I can.

I want to thank you, and through you the Governor for the very effective teamwork that we have had going on this problem.

Mrs. FARIN. Would you proceed?

Mr. MEESE. An operation center has been established involving all the agencies of local and State government to coordinate fire preven

tion activities and to insure a maximum response in order to control any fires that may occur.

Second, the State of California, particularly through the division of forestry, has increased its firefighting ability throughout the hazard

area.

Third, the State has established a special fire prevention headquarters in the hazard area and has assigned several ecology corps crews with full equipment to build a series of fuel breaks throughout the higher hazard area.

Fourth, voluntary efforts at the local level have been organized to provide as much manpower as is possible to alleviate the danger and to help those who are unable because of physical disability or other reason to clear the debris from their properties.

Fifth, the State has detailed National Guard units as well as crews from our department of public works and other agencies with this type of capability to augment the work of local agencies and volunteers in transporting away debris, brush and other ground fuel which has gathered on both public and private property.

Next, all fire prevention ordinances of the various agencies that are affected, cities and counties, have been specially enforced within the fire area. In addition, the State is implementing strong fire prevention regulations on all State-owned property within the fire hazard area, which takes up a good portion of the particular area that is part of the hazard.

Finally, local, and State agencies have assigned to this particular project a top priority, and have made special considerations which you will hear testified to by other witnesses, but particularly in the area of maximum use of local resources and State resources, the provision, for example, of additional water supply for fire supression, the control of access to critical area, and special fire prevention patrols.

We will continue our discussion with the Office of Emergency Preparedness and other Federal officials to seek administrative action to afford the necessary assistance to the private landowners and to the local governmental agencies.

However, we appreciate this parallel legislative action to back up such efforts.

The most important element, of course, is achieving our common objective in protecting the lives and property of the East Bay citizens from what is and will continue to be a serious and increasingly imminent fire hazard.

Thank you.

Mrs. FARIN. Thank you, Mr. Meese. There seems to be a little confusion on what was in the Governor's message to the President. Did the Governor's message in fact say that the job could be done locally without any Federal aid? What was in his message?

Mr. MEESE. NO. The Governor indicated in his message to the President that having devoted maximum resources of State and local government, that it was clear to us that additional assistance from the Federal Government would be necessary in order to accomplish the objective of clearing the debris and reducing the hazard both from fire and from the trees themselves.

Mrs. FARIN. What explanation was given to the Governor-for the denial of his request for Federal aid?