winding, dead-end streets. We have predictions that a fire could cause hundreds of deaths and property loss up to $200 million. Would you consider that a major disaster if that happened? Senator CRANSTON. Would you, Mr. Trent? Mr. TRENT. First, I should say that I think every disaster situation has to be considered on the basis of the actual facts that develop either before or after. I would point out that certainly under the statement that you have made, with that type of damage, there should be no question. Senator CRANSTON. There is no question that it would be a major disaster? Mr. TRENT. Yes. I would also point out that Mr. Chandler, as he stated earlier in his testimony, feels that there is a probability of between 5 and 10 percent that a disaster would occur that would cause damage to as many as 100 homes. He has further indicated in his testimony, the general probability is that if a disaster occurs in the area because of the configuration and location of the homes and trees involved, that there is a much greater likelihood that it could be limited to five or six homes at the most. Senator CRANSTON. You did say, Mr. Chandler, that the fire danger is what, three times the normal danger? Mr. CHANDLER. Yes, sir. Senator CRANSTON. By what form of logic do you arrive at the view that the risk is 5 to 10 percent, and that only 25 homes or some such small number, are threatened? Mr. CHANDLER. The probability of a major disaster, that is, of 100 homes or more burning in a single fire, in my judgment—and I believe in the judgment of the local fire authorities also-is one of an eastwind situation. Under the normal west-wind conditions, it is the opinion of most of the fire authorities that I have spoken with, and it is my own opinion, that the forces available would be able to hold losses to the neighborhood of a half dozen or a dozen homes in the event of a start. The probability of 5 to 10 percent is based entirely on the number of days on which strong east winds occur on the average year, and on the probability of a fire starting on those days. The probability of a fire burning a half dozen to a dozen homes is based on the probability of a fire starting any time during the fire season. Senator CRANSTON. That is a rather pleasant outlook to possess, but it seems to me that is rather speculative when you get down to theor risky, at least-when you get down to the consequences, if we let things go like they are, and then we have that disaster. Mr. Trent, was your decision final, or did the President review it? Mr. TRENT. In the recommendation that was made at that particular time, the decision in sending the turndown to the Governor was made on an assessment that I had made. The President's request that this be reopened on the basis of the letter sent to him by Governor Reagan Senator CRANSTON. It was not reviewed at the White House until this development? Mr. TRENT. It was coordinated with the White House but at the staff level. The reopening of the case will definitely involve further consideration by the President. Senator CRANSTON. Did cost considerations have any part in your decision? Mr. TRENT. No, sir, we have been very fortunate in the history of the disaster act to have had splendid cooperation from the Congress in providing every supplemental grant that we found necessary to deal with the major disaster. The discretion that we used in the past and which we use at present is geared entirely to our considerations of the extent of the law and what we can do within the extent of the law that has been granted by Congress through legislation to carry out the responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Senator CRANSTON. Was OMB ever involved in any way in the decision? Mr. TRENT. As we look at the individual disaster situations with various agencies, OMB is one that is involved. Senator CRANSTON. What was OMB's input? Mr. TRENT. I don't believe OMB took a position on this. Senator CRANSTON. How do you define imminent disaster? Mr. TRENT. Let me refer that to my general counsel, who has provided the answer as "virtually certain to occur or in the process of occurring." The interpretation is consistent with the Webster Dictionary definition "ready to take place, hanging over one's head," et cetera. Webster defines the following, "threatening to occur soon, impending approaching implies signs that keep one in suspense." Senator CRANSTON. The part that Webster produced for me is "ready to take place, near at hand, hanging, threateningly over one's head, menacingly near." Mr. Nicholson of your office quoted to my staff OEP's General Counsel to the effect that imminent means within a week; is that a sort of an in-house definition? Mr. TRENT. Not to my knowledge, sir. I will let the General Counsel's Office speak for itself. Mr. MCALEER. In a given situation, "imminent" might be within a week, but there has been no holding that a week constitutes the time. Response for the hearing record to Senator Cranston's question about who in OEP told Chandler that "imminent" meant "within a week.” Craig Chandler, witness from the Forest Service, agreed to examine his notes of that conversation and supply an answer to the Senator's question for the record. Chandler's response follows: "My notes made at the time show that on April 16th at 3:30 p.m. I was called by Mr. James Nicholson of OEP and that I agreed to this statement: 'The Forest Service affirms that a fire hazard exists but not of such magnitude as to threaten a national disaster at this time.' [Italic was in Chandler's notes from the conversation.] "My notes make no reference to any specific time period. I now believe my recollection of the 'one week period' for determining 'imminent' came from a remark from Mr. Nicholson in response to a question at the May 1 meeting held by the Secretary of Agriculture.” Senator CRANSTON. We have a problem for a moment. There are two Congressmen who are here who have a vote. If it is all right with you, for a moment to interrupt, could each of you say what you have to say, and submit your full statements for the record? Congressman Dellums was here first. Excuse me, Mr. Trent, but they have to run back, and it takes a long time. STATEMENT OF RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I deeply appreciate the opportunity of coming before you today. Senator CRANSTON. I thank you for your presence and all your hard work on this matter. Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you. I will submit my formal statement. STATEMENT OF RONALD V. DELLUMS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to testify on behalf of S. 1697, the bill introduced by my distinguished colleagues from California. I come before you as the author of similar legislation in the House. Last December northern California experienced a rare and ruinous winter freeze; temperatures dropped so far below the normal range that snow fell in the East Bay instead of rain. Everywhere plant life suffered and died, and the statewide agricultural losses are estimated at over $210 million. Today I come before you to describe just one disastrous result of that bitter cold, and to request your interest and concern for a solution to this most serious situation. Millions of eucalyptus trees were planted in the East Bay area at the turn of the century in an unsuccessful lumber enterprise, and they remained to grace the hills in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, an estimated two million of these eucalyptus trees are dead. Now these trees must be removed because they have become a dangerous fire hazard to the one million people who live and work in the Bay area. I also see this as a grievous aesthetic loss. But because of the warm weather and impending summer we must not tolerate further delay in the unfortunate but necessary chopping down of the dead trees; everyday we hestiate to act the danger of a holocaust increases. So far, over one thousand highly concerned property owners and residents have contacted me seeking aid to rid their land of dead eucalyptus. In mid-February I asked Agriculture Secy. Earl L. Butz about Federal aid from his Department to facilitate the clearing of dead eucalyptus trees from the Berkeley-Oakland Hills. I was informed that no financial assistance was available from Agriculture for removal of dead trees. I then called on President Nixon to declare the affected areas a major disaster area, since only a Presidential declaration could release necessary funds. Simultaneously I called upon Gov. Ronald Reagan to take immediate action at the State level to relieve the growing fire danger. Gov. Reagan announced that he would take the following actions: 1. Declare a state of emergency throughout the affected areas. 2. Ask President Nixon to declare threatened portions of the Hills disaster areas. 3. Establish State ecology corps crews to cut 12 miles of fuel breaks to insure swift containment of any fires which might occur. 4. Detail National Guard units and equipment to assist in the hauling away of debris. 5. Establish a joint State-local operations center to coordinate local government and volunteer groups with State agencies in fire preventive and tree clearing efforts. However extensive, joint State-local efforts to eliminate this hazardous situation cannot remove the millions of dead trees adequately. Gov. Reagan requested a declaration of a disaster area from the President, and the San Francisco Regional Office of Emergency Preparedness recommended that the President declare the Berkeley-Oakland Hills a major disaster area. But on April 27th, the Washington Office of Emergency Preparedness called to inform me that President Nixon had decided that he could not claim the eucalyptus trees a major disaster. No reason for this action was given. Last week I met with the California Democratic congressional delegation to discuss the eucalyptus problem. We concurred in opposition to the President's decision against declaring the dead trees a disaster, and I wired the President urging him to reconsider his decision and declare the affected areas a major disaster. An assistant to the President responded with a brief letter promising that my request would be "called to the attention of the President and those who have the responsibility for advising him on this matter." Gentlemen, it is obvious that we must act to insure the President's responsiveness to this most serious and dangerous problem. Again, I stress the imminence of this fiery threat, and I ask your speedy and favorable action on this important legislation. [Pause.] CONTINUED STATEMENT OF RONALD V. DELLUMS, REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. DELLUMS. I am pleased to testify on behalf of S. 1697, the bill introduced by my distinguished colleagues from California. I come before you as the author of similar legislation in the House. Last December northern California experienced a rare and ruinous winter freeze; temperatures dropped so far below the normal range that snow fell in the East Bay instead of rain. Everywhere plant life suffered and died, and the statewide agricultural losses are estimated at over $210 million. Today I come before you to describe just one disastrous result of that bitter cold, and to request your interest and concern for a solution to this most serious situation. Millions of eucalyptus trees were planted in the East Bay area at the turn of the century in an unsuccessful lumber enterprise, and they remained to grace the hills in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. An estimated 2 million of these eucalyptus trees are dead. Now these trees must be removed because they have become a dangerous fire hazard to the 1 million people who live and work in the Bay Area. I also see this as a grievous esthetic loss. But because of the warm weather and impending summer we must not tolerate further delay in the unfortunate but necessary chopping down of the dead trees; every day we hesitate to act the danger of a holocaust increases. So far, over 1,000 highly concerned propertyowners and residents have contacted me seeking aid to rid their land of dead eucalyptus. It is important to remember that the weather conditions and the fire danger are in direct proportion; as the weather conditions change, so does the danger. Critical conditions include: dryness, low humidity, heat, and wind-factors over which we have no control. In addition, the dead trees shed more bark and leaves than trees, and eucalyptus trees shed more than the average. Eucalyptus oil saturates both the leaves and bark, making the debris highly flammable. If it were possible to clear all the debris, estimated at 50 tons per acre, with 3,000 acres of dead trees, the fire danger would be significantly reduced. But the trees shed continually, and it is reported that debris is 1 to 2 feet deep throughout the area. I might also add, Mr. Chairman, that I was a member of the Berkeley City Council for 31⁄2 years, and we discussed on numerous occasions the lack of accessibility of fire equipment into the Berkeley-Oakland hills. The streets are winding, narrow, and crowded in the hills. A small fire could easily become a major holocaust before the necessary equipment could get into the area, as there is no access road into the Berkeley-Oakland hills. In mid-February I asked Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz about Federal aid from his department to facilitate the clearing of dead eucalyptus trees from the Berkeley-Oakland hills. I was informed that no financial assistance was available from Agriculture for removal of dead trees. I then called on President Nixon to declare the affected areas a major disaster area, since only a Presidential declaration could release necessary funds. Simultaneously I called upon Gov. Ronald Reagan to take immediate action at the State level to relieve the growing fire danger. Governor Reagan announced that he would take the following actions: 1. Declare a state of emergency throughout the affected areas. 2. Ask President Nixon to declare threatened portions of the hills disaster areas. 3. Establish State ecology corps crews to cut 12 miles of fuel breaks to insure swift containment of any fires which might occur. 4. Detail National Guard units and equipment to assist in the hauling away of debris. 5. Establish a joint State-local operations center to coordinate local government and volunteer groups with State agencies in fire preventive and tree clearing efforts. However extensive, joint State-local efforts to eliminate this hazardous situation cannot remove the millions of dead trees adequately. Governor Reagan requested a declaration of a disaster area from the President. On April 27, the Washington Office of Emergency Preparedness called to inform me that President Nixon had decided that he could not claim the eucalyptus trees a major disaster. No reason for this action was given. Last week I met with the California Democratic congressional delegation to discuss the eucalyptus problem. We concurred in opposition to the President's decision against declaring the dead trees a disaster, and I wired the President urging him to reconsider his decision and declare the affected areas a major disaster. Just today we learn that the President has decided to reconsider his decision. While I am pleased with this new opportunity, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the real problem lies in the definition of "imminent" in the predisaster assistance section of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970. We have worked very hard, Mr. Chairman. And I would be more than pleased, as one Member of the House, to work with you in amending the Disaster Relief Act so that the Congress can be involved in the process of determining imminent danger prior to a disaster. Forest fires have become a tremendous problem throughout the country. In an average year in the United States, forest fires start in 125,000 places, burn 5 million acres, consume 113 million tons of wood, put out 165 cubic miles of smoke, emit 364,000 tons of smog-producing |