The following cost estimates have been developed by the Forest Service with full recognition that considerable hazard abatement work has been accomplished or is actively programmed. The funds estimated here are required to provide emergency protection and hazard abatement only. They do not envision treatment of all fuels on the affected area, nor do they include provision for tree removal on private lands except where such removal is clearly required for alleviation of a conflagration threat.

A long term solution to the East Bay's forest fire problem must include more vegetation management than merely removing dead eucalyptus. An integrated plan for hazardous fuel treatment has been needed in this area for over 30 years. Hopefully, the current crisis will spur efforts towards a total fuel reduction plan.

If the Forest Service is given the responsibility for conducting this emergency program, they would plan to accomplish the work through contracts to State and local agencies to the maximum degree possible. The State of California has already developed specific plans for much of this work, and the Forest Service would support the State effort.

Our estimate of emergency funding requirements for fire protection and hazard abatement in the Oakland-Berkeley hills is:

Fire suppression--

Fuel hazard abatement....

Reforestation

Total

$1,250,000 3, 100, 000 800, 000

$5, 150, 000

This information is provided at your request and does not constitute a request for funding.

Sincerely,

J. PHIL CAMPBELL,
Acting Secretary.

Senator CRANSTON. I want to thank you very much for that testimony. I would like to ask if you could remain until after we have heard from Ed Meese so that I can then ask you some questions. Mr. CHANDLER, I will be glad to.

Senator CRANSTON. I do have one question resulting from your testimony. Let me say that I think there is a great tragedy involved in what happened to the trees, quite apart from the threat that it posses for them. Eucalyptus trees are unique and wonderful, I think. I have lived around them all my life. I am aware of the fact that when they get frozen above the soil, they can come up again.

In your testimony, you referred to the fact that 90 percent are dead from the ground up. What about the other 10 percent in this area? Mr. CHANDLER. Our analysis, Senator Cranston, was confined to the fire hazard problem.

Senator CRANSTON. What were you referring to when you said 90 percent are dead from the ground up?

Mr. CHANDLER. They have dead spots in them which will carry spot fires this summer and probably next. There is a great degree of argument right now among the plant physiologists about what is going to sprout from the ground level, and what is going to sprout at the base of the limbs.

I am not a plant physiologist, and I don't think there is a good answer for you on that. From a fire standpoint, it is immaterial. Senator CRANSTON, What about the other 10 percent?

Mr. CHANDLER. They were showing a living cambium at trunk height, which means they were expected to resprout all along the trunk, at least up to limb level.

Senator CRANSTON. My own unprofessional experience with these trees is that if they are cut off, they will sprout.

Excuse me, Mr. Chandler.

Mr. TRENT. I will continue with my statement.

Based on the technical information provided by the Forest Service and our evaluation of the protective measures recommended by the California State Committee on Freeze Problems, I concluded that a major disaster was not imminent in this case.

At this time I would like to offer for the record a copy of a report prepared by the California State Committee on Freeze Problems which differs in some respects from the Interim Report of the Intra-agency Advisory Committee prepared by its chairman, W. H. Hildebrand, and published on April 10, 1973. This report, prepared by John H. Hastings, deputy State forester, Division of Forestry, California Department of Conservation, states in its Recommendations and Proposed Courses of Action, and I quote:

A high fire hazard exists in the area; however, it is the judgment of this team that a true state of emergency and disaster does not exist. Although the fuel hazard has increased about 50 percent because of the changed situation in the dead eucalyptus stands, in comparison with the situation as it existed last year, and in comparison with similar high fire hazard conditions in similar areas of California where life and property are exposed to the hazards of wildlife fires, this area cannot be declared a disaster.

It is the judgment of this team that the problem can be reduced to the degree of hazard which existed last year, and be further improved by a combination of efforts of private citizens, local and state government.

The following recommendations and courses of action are proposed to reduce this hazard.

Those will be set forth in the report that I would submit for the record.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Mr. TRENT. In reaching my decision, I considered this report together with all other information available to me. I also considered the fact that the eucalyptus stands constituted a fire hazard even before the December 1972 freeze. Admittedly, the hazard was increased by the freeze: but the potentially hazardous situation was not the result of a single occurrence or a sudden drastic change of events.

Based on all these facts and circumstances, I concluded that the necessary fire prevention measures do not exceed local and State capabilities and that a recommendation of a major disaster to the President was not warranted in this instance.

Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to take your questions. [The complete report follows:]

REPORT OF EAST BAY HILLS FIRE HAZARD EVALUATION TEAM ON DECEMBER 3-15, 1972, FREEZE DAMAGE TO EUCALYPTUS STANDS

INTRODUCTION

On March 1, 1973, the City Council of the City of Oakland adopted a Proclamation of Local Emergency, pursuant to Government Code Section 8550 et seq., expressing concern for the extreme peril to life and property because of the fire hazard resulting from the December freeze damage to eucalyptus trees and other trees and shrubs. Mayor Reading transmitted this proclamation to Governor Reagan on March 2. In addition, the following jurisdictions have adopted Proclamations of Local Emergency :

East Bay Regional Park District-Resolution No. 4241-February 27.
City of Berkeley-Resolution No. 45657-March 6.

County of Alameda-Resolution No. 147403-March 6.

East Bay Municipal Utility District-Resolution No. 26400–March 13.
U. C. Berkeley Regents-March 14.

Contra Costa County-March 20.

Additional resolutions have been passed by Alameda County (147405, March 6) and Contra Costa County (73/140, March 6) requesting State assistance, and specifically that of the State Forester. The resolutions of the East Bay Regional Park District and the University of California, Berkeley, also request assistance of the State Forester.

On March 9, Director Temple of the Office of Emergency Services requested Deputy State Forester John Hastings, of the Department of Conservation, Division of Forestry, to lead a team to evaluate the East Bay Hills fire hazard problem. The responsibilities of this team were outlined in Deputy Director Vickers' letter to Mr. Hastings of March 12 (copy attached). In addition to Mr. Hastings, team members appointed were:

Richard Barrows, Chief, Fire and Rescue Division, OES, Sacramento. Gil Richardson, OES Region II Fire and Rescue Coordinator, and Fire Warden and Coordinator, County of Solano.

Ross Dunwoody, State Forest Ranger, CDF, Morgan Hill.

Oliver L. Holmes, Branch Chief, Planning and Program Development, Division of Fire Management, USFS Region 5 Headquarters, San Francisco. Carl C. Wilson, Assistant Director, Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, USFS, Berkeley.

The team held its first meeting in Berkeley on March 14. All team members were in atendance. In addition, the following resource personnel provided assistance:

Dr. Carl E. Crisp, Plant Physiologist, PSW Station, USFS, Berkeley. Theodore G. Storey, Research Forester, Forest Fire Laboratory, PSW Station, USFS, Riverside.

Robert Irwin, Research Liaison Forester, Forest Fire Laboratory, PSW Station, USFS, Riverside.

The efforts of this meeting were devoted to accumulating background information, including efforts of existing committees, and viewing the situation on the ground. A meeting was also held in the field with Mayor Reading and staff and the news media.

(On February 16, representatives of the major local entities involved-City of Oakland, City of Berkeley, University of California, Berkeley, Alameda County, Contra Costa County, East Bay Regional Park District (EBRPD), East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)-met and formed the following organizational structure to take action on the problem: Intergovernmental Advisory Committee (steering committee); Fire Prevention and Suppression Subcommittee; Removal, Disposal and Marketing Subcommittee; Funding Subcommittee; and Vegetation Management Subcommittee. These local agencies are to be commended for this action and their accomplishments. Information accumulated by these groups was made available to the Evaluation Team and made its task much easier and shorter.)

The second meeting of the team was held in Berkeley on March 15. This day's efforts were devoted to meeting and discussions with representatives of agencies having the major protection and management responsibilities in the area. The following persons were contacted:

East Bay Regional Park District: Gary A. Tate, Assistant Resource Management, Land Acquisition and Management Department; C. R. "Rich" Aronson, Fire Chief.

East Bay Municipal Utility District: Gordon L. Lavery, Manager, Water Production and Distribution Division; Leroy Jorgensen, Manager Land Division; W. T. Hartman, Land Management and Recreation Superintendent. Oakland City Fire Department: Stephen L. Menietti, Chief; Edgar B. Haney, Fire Marshal; William L. Moore, Director of Training; Donald L. Matthews, Battalion Chief Battalion 6.

Berkeley City Fire Department: Milton E. Steele, Deputy Chief; Lloyd Gayer, Fire Marshal.

On March 16, Mr. Hastings contacted Russell Norman, Fire Marshal, U. C. Berkeley, and William Hildebrand, Alameda County Fire Warden, by telephone. (A list of written reports on the subject furnished by the above contacts is appended.)

The team held its third meeting in Berkeley on March 19 for the purpose of evaluating information received and developing a final response to the team's charter. All team members were present. Dr. Crisp also attended. Also on March 19 at Hastings' request, the following personnel met with Messrs. Tate and Aronson of East Bay Regional Park District to evaluate proposed fuelbreak systems:

Assistant Deputy Joe Griggs, State Forester's Headquarters, Sacramento Keith Schrader, State Forest Ranger, Pilot Rock Conservation Camp, Crestline

Ed Schuckert, State Forest Ranger, Washington Ridge Youth Conservation Camp, Nevada City Robert Yohr, Assistant Director, Calaveras Ecology Center, Angels Camp

FIRE PROTECTION PROBLEM

Because of its unique combination of vegetation, topography, weather and people, California has one of the most difficult wildland fire protection problems in the world. Three-fourths of the state is in rolling hills, foothills and rugged mountains. Heavy concentrations of highly flammable natural growth occur on much of these lands. Planted landscape materials add additional fuel. Summer periods are hot and dry, frequently with low humidities:

Ninety percent of the eucalyptus trees within the damaged area are blue gum (eucalpytus globulus), and 10 percent are red gum (eucalyptus camaldulensis). (EBRPD estimates that there are 80 percent blue gum and 20 percent red gum damaged on their lands.) Maximum age of the stands is 85 years, with trees 100-150 feet tall. Average diameter is estimated to be 10 inches, but some are 24-36 inches. Total number of stems per acre average 450 for blue gum and 200 for red gum. Highest density groves may contain 1,000 trees per acre.

Eucalyptus are generally regarded as a dirty species because of falling bark, leaves, twigs and seed pods, which require constant cleanup. They present a unique fire problem because of the oil content, stringy bark and ground debris buildup. Because of the exfoliating bark, ground fires can become rapidly extended into the tree crowns. Because of the oil content and bark, crown fires with a wide distribution of firebrands may occur at lower fire danger ratings than in other fuels.

It is expected that blue gum species will retain the major quantity of their leaves and that the leaves will rot on the trees. Red gum appear to be rapidly losing the majority of their leaves. It appears that the oil content of the trees will not be materially reduced in the dead condition. Under a dead condition, bark separates from the trunk. Although above-ground tree parts are dead, eucalyptus will sprout profusely from the stumps. These sprouts break easily and will not develop another firm trunk.

In an effort to quantify the changed fire hazard of the dead trees in comparison with their living condition, the following information has been developed:

Note. The above data represents the evaluation as of Mar. 15 by Crisp, Storey, and Irwin, recognizing that the ratio o air to ground material will be changing.

Présuming a straight line relationship between fuel volume, rate of spread and fire intensity, the fire problem is 51 percent greater in the dead eucalyptus stands than existed in the live stands. For comparison purposes, the fuel volume of stands of heaviest mixed brush equals 48 tons per acre.

Additional factors which increase the hazard are:

1. With the loss of the tree canopy, increased temperatures and wind movement may be expected at the ground level, resulting in a reduction in moisture content in the ground fuels and an increase in ignition potential. 2. Separation of bark from the trunk will increase both aerial and ground fuels.

3. Bark separation into larger pieces will increase spotting potential because of larger firebrands. Leaves remaining on the trees will contribute to spotting.

4. More flammable ground fuels increase the potential for ignition from aerial firebrands.

CAUSE

During the period December 3-15, unusually low temperatures were experienced throughout all of northern California. Temperatures of 20 degrees in the East Bay Hills, combined with sustained north and easterly winds for three to five days within this period, produced a chill factor equivalent to 6 degrees to -15 degrees. These unusually low temperatures killed or severely damaged a high percentage of the eucalyptus trees within the area. (A review of low temperature damage to vegetation in other areas of the state by the Division of Forestry, and summarized on February 22, has revealed substantial damage throughout all of northern California. However, this damage appears to have minimal fire protection impact.)

AREA AND DEGREE OF DAMAGE

The affected area includes a strip in the East Bay Hills approximately 18 miles in length and three miles in width, extending from Lake Chabot on the south to Richmond on the north. Little or no damage exists east of the road extending from El Sobrante to Orinda-Moraga. The western boundary of the damage is generally the 500-foot elevation. Mortality appears to be highest in those trees which are on the exposed ridges on the east, with damage variable from the crest west to the 500-foot elevation. Criteria established for determining tree condition, developed by Plant Physiologist Dr. Carl Crisp of the PWS Station, and applied on a sampling basis by the East Bay Regional Park District, public utilities, fire departments and others, have determined that approximately 90 percent of the eucalyptus trees within subject area are dead. It has been estimated that there may be two million dead trees. Total area of damaged trees is approximately 2,700 acres, based upon information supplied by responsible agencies, an analysis of damage on the ground, and a study of aerial photography flown by the PSW Station in Berkeley on February 15. Areas of damage by jurisdictions are as follows:

The steep topography makes road construction difficult and slows response of fire apparatus. Heavy concentrations of flammable fuels present high resistance to fire control and high risk to life and property exposures. These fuels ignite easily, burning with great intensity under hot, dry summer conditions. Fall offshore wind conditions increases the problem.

People who live within and use this area are frequently unaware of or disregard their hazardous environment, and give little concern to the needs for adequate access and egress, water supply, vegetation clearance, street and building identification and building construction standards which, in addition to fire protection forces, provide adequate fire protection.

The East Bay Hills contain all of the above ingredients of a difficult fire protection problem with the unique hazard presented by eucalyptus stands. In the surrounding area, similar difficult fire protection problems exist in the Santa Cruz Mountains, on the slopes of Mt. Tamalpais, the Russian River area of Sonoma County, etc.

(NOTE.-Damages which can be experienced from wildland fires in this environment have been documented in the report, "California Aflame. September 22October 4, 1970," published by the Division of Forestry. Courses of action to meet this problem have been documented in the publication, "Recommendations to Solve California's Wildland Fire Problems" submitted by the Task Force on California's Wildland Fire Problem to the Resources Agency Secretary in June 1972.)