the difficult problems of international lawmaking in this kind of a forum.

Third, I think the tone of the general debate which we had at the outset of the session was very moderate. Only two or three delegations resorted to polemics. Many delegations indicated a considerable movement and made constructive efforts to try to reach some agreement.

I think finally in terms of evidencing this commitment to these negotiations I should point out that, unlike some of the earlier sessions of the Seabeds Committee, at this Conference practically every day there were three or four simultaneous committee meetings including some night meetings and I think all delegations worked very hard.

I think it is also important to note that for the first time this summer we had upward of 50 new countries participating in the Conference itself that had not been members of the preparatory committee that ultimately reached 90. The new participants included a significant number of newly independent countries that had not participated before. I think the job of bringing them on board was effectively accomplished this summer.

Well, turning from basically procedural and organizational developments to substance, what was accomplished?

Well, it is clear, as some press reports have stressed that no specific treaty text were adopted. However, there was a good deal of substantive progress.

I think if I were to single out any one development I would say that the very broad support that was publicly stated for a 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile economic zone was by all odds the most significant development.

I think well over 100 countries indicated their support for this, either in the general debate or in committee. So much so that the Chairman of Committee II said that in his view this package was the keystone of the compromise solution favored by the majority of states participating in the conference.

An effort by one or two of the 200-mile territorial sea states to oppose the inclusion of this Chairman's statement as a conference document was withdrawn after a vote was threatened.

In this connection I think it is significant that this summer for the first time, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all endorsed expressly the concept of a 200-mile economic zone as part of an overall treaty package including satisfactory provisions on other vital matters such as transit through international straits, the balance of coastal states' rights and duties within this economic zone, and a satisfactory deep seabed regime.

In order to advance the negotiations on the 200-mile economic zone, the United States submitted draft treaty articles.

I will not go into detail because they are reviewed in my written statement but let me just say very briefly that this set of articles does provide for exclusive coastal state management of resources within the 200-mile economic zone and in the case of seabed mineral resources to the edge of the Continental Shelf margin where that extends beyond 200 miles.

This coastal state resource jurisdiction in this area would be subject to specified international standards: In the case of the seabed an obligation to share a modest portion of the revenues from exploitation

of seabed resources with the international community, particularly developing countries and landlocked and geographically disadvantaged countries and a further commitment to observe contractual commitments freely entered into.

The international obligations with respect to coastal state fisheries management would be an obligation to conserve and fully utilize the fishery resources and, in the case of highly migratory species such as tuna, to manage in accordance with standards recommended by the appropriate international or regional fisheries organization.

Furthermore, there was a provision for a ban on fishing for salmon beyond the territorial sea.

I think this set of articles, and I would be glad to discuss any of the details later, clearly put the United States in the mainstream of the negotiations on the 200-mile economic zone which is really one of the most critical negotiations in which we are engaged.

The articles themselves were, by and large, favorably received. However, we were somewhat disappointed that a group of African states the very last week of the conference put in their own economic zone proposal in which there was not only plenary coastal state jurisdiction over resources but also over scientific research and vessel source pollution within the economic zone.

Furthermore, there were no international guarantees limiting coastal state resources and other jurisdiction in this zone except minimal guarantees for navigation, overflight and to protect pipelines and cables but nothing, for example, indicating the coastal state's duty to conserve or to fully utilize the resources and no revenue sharing. A number of these same countries incidentally were indicating that if instead of continuing the negotiations which I think were very effectively initiated at Caracas, the tendency is towards unilateral action they would not limit themselves to unilaterally declaring an economic zone but rather would move to a 200-mile territorial sea in which navigational rights would be limited to innocent passage.

Also in Čommittee II, which is really the committee dealing with the critical Law of the Sea issues in the area of the territorial sea and coastal state jurisdiction, for the first time actual working documents were prepared, listing in an orderly fashion the specific treaty text alternatives.

We fortunately had a very strong and effective chairman who basically disciplined this committee to the extent that they were able to reduce a vast number of separate national proposals into some working documents so really for the first time in these critical areas, we do have basic text to deal with.

This was a very significant preparatory job. Obviously, it would have been much better if it had been completed earlier. However, in view of the political sensitivity of many of these issues, it may well have been that it took the impact of the actual Conference beginning to get this job done.

Turning now to another area that I know is of particular interest to this committee; namely, the deep seabed, the first committee which is charged with developing a regime, particularly with reference to mining of manganese nodules for the production of nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese, and other metals, the committee really took the first step toward real negotiations on the very critical questions of exploitation and to the conditions of that exploitation.

Now, I think it is only fair to say that it is in this area that you have the sharpest differences between the position of the United States together with some of the other industrialized countries with ocean technology and the developing countries as well as some of the other developed countries, such as Norway, Canada, and Australia.

I think that the basic difference in approach is in the degree of discretion that would be given to the seabed authority both with respect to the question of access to these resources and second, with respect to the regulation of exploitation once access has been achieved. The basic U.S. position, of course, has been to seek an automatic grant of exclusive rights to applicants meeting certain objective standards set forth in the treaty.

The developing countries position has been to urge and support a much stronger authority with much more discretion in determining access and regulation.

From a technical standpoint this committee prior to last summer had done more in terms of preparing treaty texts than any other committee. There were alternate treaty texts on all important issues, so basically this committee this summer concentrated on three questions: Who should exploit this area, how should they exploit it, and what would be the economic consequences of exploiting it.

Now, for the first time this summer the developing nations accepted the proposition that the treaty itself should include the conditions of exploitation rather than leaving that entirely to the discretion of the the authority.

However, the developing countries' view is that only the basic conditions of exploitation, not detailed conditions, should be set forth in the treaty and that those conditions should allow the authority considerable discretion.

They also argued that at this point in time we do not yet have enough information to determine the conditions of exploitation in detail and they also indicated concern about dealing with what they viewed as a technical area where, because of their lack of knowledge and technology they would be at a negotiating disadvantage.

A second area in which there was certain movement was that for the first time the developing countries in a formal proposal indicated that the authority could enter into contractual arrangements with others for production of deep seabed minerals.

Their initial position has been that the authority itself should conduct exploitation but this summer they introduced a text indicating that in addition to exploiting itself, the authority could enter veto contracts with others to do so. There was no retreat from maintenance of the position that the authority should itself have the right of direct exploitation.

But in addition to that, the authority could enter into contractual arrangements governing exploitation with private enterprise and other producers providing the authority maintained direct and effective control at all times.

With respect to the third area with which this committee dealt this summer; namely, the question of economic implications, I think for the first time there was an informed discussion of the different points of view as a result of the different reports and statements presented on this question of the effect on existing land-based production of increasing seabed production of the same metals in the future.

While there was by no means agreement on these consequences I do think that there is an increasing awareness, although not always admitted publicly, by many developing countries of the uncertainty of any estimates of the effect of seabed production on present landbased production.

I think also for the first time you heard some statements by developing countries that are not producers of these metals of their interest as consumers, an interest which separates their basic interest from that of the smaller number of land-based producers.

Having said that, however, I think it is only fair to report that the land-based producers among the developing countries continued to maintain a leadership position and because of this and because of the solidarity among developing countries in this area, there is still strong support for price and production controls as a way of avoiding injury to these land-based producers.

I think as a result of the discussions this summer however, we can look forward to somewhat more informed and pragmatic discussions of this rather than the strictly ideological type of approach that we have had in the past.

Summing up on Committee I in this area of the deep seabed, I think that despite these evidences of movement this summer there does remain a large gap in the positions.

To some extent this is based on a conceptual difference. The developing countries tend to approach the negotiations from their own conceptual view of a seabed authority with broad general powers, including the power to itself engage in exploitation and to control prices and production, while the United States and other industrialized countries have favored elaborating in detail both the powers and the limitations on those powers of the seabed authority.

I also think that as a result of the discussion this summer other nations are clearly aware of the very serious importance that the United States attaches to its interests in access to these seabed minerals.

On the procedural front toward the end of the formal sessions the committee did establish an informal negotiating group and it is to be hoped that this group as well as certain intrasessional informal meetings that have been set up or planned will continue the pragmatic type of negotiations that emerged at the end.

I think in terms of achieving agreement, a good deal of conceptual flexibility and imagination, while maintaining the heart of substantive U.S. position will be required.

With respect to the third committee dealing with scientific research and pollution there was only a modest amount of progress in the area marine pollution with very little public discussion of the most controversial issue; namely, the question of coastal State jurisdiction in the economic zone to enforce standards, and in some cases, to set those standards, with respect to pollution from vessels.

There did develop a rather sharp difference on the question of whether developing countries should be required to observe the same standards as developed countries in meeting pollution concerns.

With respect to scientific research, there was a very interesting development. A group of countries, including some developing countries supported a proposal which is basically similar to the U.S. proposal to maintain freedom of scientific research within the coastal States eco

nomic zone, conditioned on foreign countries and their nationals carrying on that research being subject to certain obligations to notify and to invite the participation of and to share the results with the coastal States.

I think that with respect to Committee III, it is important to point out that the most critical issues, namely, the question of marine pollution and scientific research in the economic zone do deal with a subject matter that is also being dealt with in the Committee II negotiations on the economic zone.

While we have always felt that more progress would be made by dealing with these two subjects separately in Committee III, a number of delegations have been unwilling to proceed too far in this committee until the basic nature of the economic zone had been negotiated more completely in Committee II.

Finally, I might mention that in addition to the committee discussions, whether in working groups or public sessions, there was a very marked increase this summer in the number of informal sessions where delegations could negotiate and exchange views obviously going beyond their stated public positions.

I think we also had an interesting development which was the organization completely outside the formal committee structure of groups to deal with certain issues of particular interest to a number of different countries.

I think the notable example of this was a group interested in compulsory settlement of disputes which met for the last month of the conference and the final day introduced a working paper which was cosponsored by countries from different regions including developing countries containing alternate treaty text on the most important issues. in this area.

Well, so much for the results.

Now, why was not more achieved in terms of the adoption of actual treaty texts?

I think there are at least three explanations. I think most important. was the lack of sufficient political will to make some of the hard negotiating decisions that would have been required.

Now, this was partially because all countries were convinced that there was going to be another session of this conference in 1975 and therefore, they were not prepared to make some of the necessary accommodations and did not want to vote on alternatives last summer.

I think a second reason for lack of progress was that in some areas, notably Committee II's area, we did not have properly organized alternative text before the conclusion of last summer's session.

Finally, I would like to mention the package deal concept. I think it has been generally felt by a large number of countries that an oceans treaty will have to deal with a number of interrelated critical issues and there was a considerable reluctance to deal partially with some of those issues unless the conference was prepared to deal with all of them.

One example of this philosophy was that the Chairman suggested at one point in the conference that if we could not achieve final agreement on treaty text that we should have a declaration of principles. After all as I pointed out earlier, there was very general agreement on the 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile economic zone. However, the conference decided against this and I think they did so basically