"The paper that sums up the main trends does not pronounce on the degree of support which each of them had enlisted at the preparatory meetings and the Conference itself, but it is now easy for anyone who has followed our work closely to discern the outline of the future Convention.

"So far each State has put forward in general terms the position which would ideally satisfy its own range of interests in the seas and oceans. Once these positions are established, we have before us the opportunity of negotiating based on an objective and realistic evaluation of the relative strength of the different opinions.

"It is not my intention in this statement to present a complete picture of the situation as I see it personally, but I can offer some general evaluations and comments.

"The idea of a territorial sea of 12 miles and an exclusive economic zone beyond the territorial sea up to a total maximum distance of 200 miles is, at least at this time, the keystone of the compromise solution favoured by the majority of the States participating in the Conference, as is apparent from the General debate in the Plenary meetings and the discussions held in our Committee.

"Acceptance of this idea is, of course, dependent on the satisfactory solution of other issues, especially the issue of passage through straits used for international navigation, the outermost limit of the continental shelf and the actual retention of this concept and, last but not least, the aspirations of the land-locked countries and other countries which, for one reason or another, consider themselves geographically disadvantaged.

"There are, in addition, other problems to be studied and solved in connection with this idea, for example, those relating to archipelagos and the regime of islands in general.

"It is also necessary to go further into the matter of the nature and characteristics of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, a subject on which important differences of opinion still persist.

"On all these subjects substantial progress has been made which lays the foundations for negotiations during the intersessional period and at the next session of the Conference."

Madam Chairman, our experience during the Caracas session indicated that in the area of deep seabed mineral exploitation wider divergences exist between the U.S. and the majority of nations at the Conference than on any other issue. The United States took the position that the convention must "guarantee access on a nondiscriminatory basis" to deep seabed resources. During the conference we explained that our concept of "guaranteed access' " included a requirement that mining rights be granted automatically to any qualified applicant, that the whole system for granting rights be carefully structured in the treaty to insure that the system would be economically efficient and that exploitation occur under a set of detailed conditions written into the treaty that, taken together, guarantee the security of exploitation necessary to attract investments.

As in other areas of the law of the sea, the United States has sought in the deep seabed negotiation to protect its principal national interest in access to these mineral resources not by sweeping generalities written into treaty articles, but rather by setting out detailed provisions that explicitly prescribe how the system will work, what will be the rights and obligations of both the international machinery established to govern exploitation and the prospective ocean miners who will do business under the system and what kinds of safeguards will be provided for ensuring that these respective rights and obligations are protected and fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is clear that inclusion in the convention of a detailed mining code alone would not fully protect our interest in guaranteed access, and thus the United States position also depends on achieving an appropriate balance in decisionmaking organs that realistically reflect existing interests, as well as providing machinery for the compulsory settlement of disputes.

Inclusion in the treaty, or in an annex with equal legal status of the "basic conditions of exploration and exploitation" was widely accepted this summer. However, the Group of 77 approach to "basic conditions of exploitation" diers from our own concept of rules and regulations in major ways. This includes the amount of detail to be included in the treaty. The Group of 77 draft also leaves substantial discretion to the International Authority where our regulations leave little, if any. The Group of 77, and indeed some other countries like Norway and Sweden, have argued that it would be unwise to attempt to freeze in the treaty the precise terms and conditions to be imposed on an industry about which we have little knowledge. Moreover, many delegations expressed apprehension that a negotiation of detailed rules and regulations would be extremely technical and that, lacking technical experts on ocean mining in their own governments, they

would be placed at a considerable disadvantage in such a negotiation. Such a negotiation, they have also argued, could not be completed in 1975.

We believe many of these arguments reflect underlying political and economic differences. One such difference relates to the conceptual differences concernnig the nature and scope of the powers to be exercised by the International Seabed Authority. Another difference is that many countries in Committee I attach considerable importance to a widely ratified agreement that recognizes both the power of the Authority to engage in direct exploitation and its complete control over exploitation conducted by any other entity in the International Seabed Area. A third such difference is that several countries, some in leadership roles in the Committee, seek to use the power of the Authority to restrict seabed mineral production in order to protect their own land-based mineral resources. Inclusion of detailed rules and regulations in the convention, they argue, would create a "strait jacket" for the Authority and would jeopardize the ability of the Authority to exercise direct and effective control over all activities of exploration and exploitation.

The U.S. responded to these arguments in detail in the discussion in Committee I and indicated why rules and regulations are an important part of any deep seabed mining system.

Committee I, unlike the other committees, had before it a complete set of alternative treaty texts on the international regime and machinery assembled by the UN Seabed Committee. Thus, during the Caracas session, Committee I devoted almost all of its time to consideration of the three key issues under its mandate which have or will present the greatest difficulty. These isssue-the exploitation system, who may exploit the area, the conditions of exploitation and the economic aspects of exploitation-are at the very core of the successful resolution of the multitude of alternative treaty texts on the international regime and machinery prepared by the UN Seabed Committee. Moreover, they are subjects whcih had not previously received careful and thorough consideration during the course of the negotiation.

Early in the Caracas session, the Group of 77 negotiated among themselves and then introduced a new alternative text for the important Article 9, "Who May Exploit the Area." While this text is unacceptable to the U.S., it should be noted that in previous meetings the Group of 77 had been unable to agree that the Authority should be allowed to enter into various types of contractual arrangements with private entities. The new text, however, permits this practice as long as the Authority maintains "direct and effective control" over all activities. A trend could be discerned towards recognition that at least in the early years of its existence, the Authority would of necessity be required to deal with those private corporations from industrialized nations that have the financial and technical capacity to mine the seabeds. In order to attract these entities, the Authority will have to offer reasonable and secure conditions for their investments. The Group of 77 text does not contain any retreat from their position on direct exploitation by the Authority.

Madam Chairman, we believe that Committee I benefitted greatly from a shift in the focus of its deliberation from the question of who may exploit the area to the conditions of exploitation. In a negotiating effort to meet the expressed concerns of the United States and other industrialized countries, the Group of 77 agreed to elaborate in greater detail the extent of control which their proposal would grant the Authority, the basic conditions of exploitation that the Authority would be empowered to impose on ocean miners. The proposed basic conditions introduced by the Group 77 would grant the Authority far greater discretion in managing seabed operations than the United States could accept, but it includes several interesting elements which merit further discussion, such as security of tenure, a priority of right for the explorer to move to the exploitation phase and selection among applicants on a competitive basis. Moreover, the very introduction of "basic conditions of exploitation" represents a commitment to the concept that some such conditions will be included in the convention.

In comparison to the Group of 77 draft of basic conditions, the draft conditions of exploration submitted by the United States is detailed and designed to limit the power of the Authority to discriminate among various ocean miners and to impose arbitrary and unreasonable terms and conditions. The draft conditions submitted by Japan and those prepared by eight members of the European Community are generally similar in approach and in detail to the United States position. The drafts, however, contemplates licensing only to states rather than directly to private entities. They also include a limitation on the number of mine sites to be granted any single entity. Moreover, the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics publicly endorsed a similar type of quota system for states. The United States has not supported any limitation on the amount of area for which exploitation rights can be granted to any single state or natural or juridical person but has sought through requirements to ensure diligence that the area will be brought into commercial production within a specified period of time. Moreover, it is important to mention that the Soviet Union clearly endorsed exploitation by the Authority through service contracts and joint ventures as well as exploitation by states.

Madam Chairman, Committee I devoted several informal meetings to general debate on the proposals for basic conditions tabled at Caracas. There was little detailed discussion of the specifics of the rules and regulations proposed by the U.S. or other industrialized countries. The reaction of many countries to the industrialiized nations' drafts, were highly critical. They indicated their apprehension that these proposals unduly restricted the Authority's powers and thus were at variance with their concept of a strong international machinery. A view expressed by many was the need for protection of land-based production. In addition, in the view of many delegations, the available knowledge concerning ocean mining is at present too limited to allow agreement on detailed regulations that would have the same force as treaty law. In a statement to the Committee on August 19, the United States described what it believed to be the most essential elements to be contained in basic conditions of exploitation and elaborated the United States position that in those areas where it is not possible at this time to draft regulatory provisions, a detailed and carefully constructed system of rule making should be established by the convention.

In addition to the exploitation system and the conditions of exploitation, Committee I considered the question of economic effects of seabed production on the economies of developing country producers of the metals contained in manganese nodules. As we have testified several times before this Committee, the United States is opposed to granting the International Seabed Authority the right to impose, either directly or indirectly, price and production controls on seabed operations. The question of economic implications, however, has always been a highly politicized issue in the law of the sea negotiations. We believe appreciation in the course of discussions on the economic implications of deep seabed mining of the uncertainty surrounding estimates that seabed production will damage the economies of developing country producers of copper, cobalt, nickel and manganese. Moreover, for the first time we heard public statements by representatives of developing countries that recognizes the need to protect consumers from artificially high prices for these metals. While this new awareness has by no means eliminated support for price and production controls within the Committee or an Authority with strong regulatory powers, we are hopeful that future discussion of the economic implications issue can be conducted in a more knowledgeable and pragmatic context.

Madam Chairman, the nations participating in the deliberations of Committee I are now more aware than ever before of the serious importance which the United States attaches to its interests in the deep seabed negotiation. Our insistence that the convention must spell out the conditions of exploitation in order for us to be certain that guaranteed access on a nondiscriminatory basis is fully protected has helped to produce agreement to negotiate basic conditions. Though this agreement does not meet our concerns as to the conditions which must be included in the treaty, we are hopeful that such a negotiation, coupled with further consideration of the article on the exploitation system, can serve to facilitate agreement on the rights and duties of both the Authority and ocean miners.

The Caracas session did not see any major negotiating breakthrough or fundamental change in any position. However, during the last few weeks of the Conference real negotiations began on the basic conditions for exploitation when the First Committee agreed to establish a small, informal negotiating group. This group will resume its work at the next session of the Conference and we hope that negotiations in this context and during the intersessional period will lead to a narrowing of differences and a realistic approach that will promote access by industrialized consumer countries and the development of the mineral resources of the deep seabeds. The differences between what we call regulation and what others call control may be narrowed if we can agree on the conditions of exploitation, including measures to ensure that exploitation on a nondiscriminatory basis will take place, and if agreement can be reached on protecting relevant interests in the decision-making process. We cannot overlook, however, the fact that the positions of the industrialized countries and the Group of 77 are widely separated on the question of the basic conditions of exploitation. The underlying reason for

this divergence on all aspects of the Committee I negotiation is that the developing countries as a rule tend to approach the negotiation from a conceptual perspective that envisions an international machinery with broad, general powers, including the power of direct exploitation. The United States, however, favors elaborating in detail both the powers of the Authority and the safeguards to prevent abuse of this power and does not support the power of direct exploitation. Committee I is perhaps our most difficult negotiation, rooted as it is in widely differing political and economic interests.

In the Third Committee of the Conference, there were mixed results on formulating treaty texts for protection of the marine environment and oceanographic scientific research. We were pleased that texts concerning the preservation of the marine environment were prepared on several points including basic obligations, particular obligations, global and regional cooperation and technical assistance. But basic political issues remain to be resolved on the jurisdiction of port and coastal states with respect to vessel-source pollution and on whether there will be different obligations for states depending upon their stage of economic development-the so-called double standard. We believe that the Caracas session broadened the basis of understanding of the complex problems involved in drafting new legal obligations to protect the marine environment, and there were indications that all states were analyzing their environmental policies in detail. On the scientific research issue, the various proposals were reduced to four principal alternatives regarding scientific research within the areas of national jurisdiction. Some states advocated a regime requiring coastal state consent for all research. Others supported a modified consent regime. The United States supported a regime which places obligations on the state conducting the research to notify the coastal state, provide for its participation and ensure sharing of the data, and assistance in interpreting such data. Other states proposed complete freedom of scientific research.

We were encouraged by the fact that for the first time states appeared to be moving toward serious negotiations on this subject, including serious consideration of our proposal.

Madam Chairman, we know there will be disputes with respect to the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty. The willingness of the United States and many others to agree to a particular balance of the rights and duties of states and the International Authority is predicated upon reasonable confidence that the balance will be fairly maintained. Accordingly, the establishment of an impartial system of peaceful and compulsory third party dispute settlement is critical. We were encouraged to find at the Caracas session that there were states from all Regional Groups that support the need for comprehensive dispute settlement provisions. At the end of the session, the United States co-sponsored, with eight other states from different regions, a working paper containing alternative texts of draft treaty articles. This document was prepared, and is in general supported, by a broader informal Group chaired by the Representatives of Australia and El Salvador, for which Professor Louis Sohn of the Harvard Law School served as Rapporteur. We hope this document will facilitate the drafting of treaty articles on this important element of the Convention. With your permission, Madam Chairman, I will submit for the Record a copy of the Report transmitted by the Delegation to the Department of State on August 30, and copies of all draft articles sponsored or cosponsored by the United States. The consolidated Treaty texts in Committee II and other documents will be transmitted to the Committee as soon as we receive them from the UN Secretariat. Madam Chairman, it is my firm conviction that a comprehensive treaty is obtainable by the end of 1975 as contemplated in last year's United Nations General Assembly Resolution. To do so, however, governments must begin serious negotiation the first day at Geneva, and to prepare for that, they must during the intersessional period appraise the alternatives, meet informally to explore possible accommodations that go beyond stated positions, and supply their delegates with instructions that permit a successful negotiation.

A multilateral convention of unparalleled complexity affecting some of our nation's most vital economic and strategic interests is within our reach. We cannot and will not sign just any Treaty; but in my judgment we would be terribly remiss in our responsibilities to the United States and to the international community as a whole if we were now to overlook broader and longer-range perspectives. In the year ahead we intend to work diligently and carefully for a Convention that will protect our interests in the broadest sense of that term. In this endeavor, Madam Chairman, we trust that we shall have the guidance and support of the Congress and of your Committee.

Through our mutual cooperative efforts I am certain that we can take the necessary steps and develop constructive initiatives so that all will agree that the United States has done all it could to foster a successful outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on schedule in 1975.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I will cover orally the highlights of that written statement, Madam Chairman.

Let me say how much I appreciate the opportunity to report directly to this committee on what was the first substantive session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

We regretted that you, Madam Chairman, and others who had planned to come could not be with us again this summer as you have been in the past, but we were very pleased to have Mr. de la Garza and members of your staff-Ernest Corrado, Ned Everett, and Capt. Pete Heyward-with us this summer.

We have always appreciated working closely with this committee in this negotiation and in our efforts to achieve general agreement on an oceans treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. May I just say, Mr. Ambassador, a number of the members had planned to be there and wanted very badly to be there and listen in and the work on the floor and in our committee just prevented it so we sent as many of the staff as we could to keep it covered.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, we appreciated having them there and I hope we will continue in the very critical year ahead to work very closely with this committee and its able staff in achieving a generally acceptable treaty which will protect U.S. interests.

Turning now to the results of the conference let me say that in general the results obviously were not all that many of us hoped for at that session.

On the other hand I think the session was clearly not a failure.

I would like to review briefly what in my view were the principal accomplishments of this session and then indicate why in my view it did not accomplish more.

I think I might mention first as an accomplishment the expressed or implicit agreement of most, but not all, of the countries that were participating, that their best interest in this area would be served by a timely and generally acceptable treaty.

Now, what evidence was there of this view?

Well, I think in the first place the efforts of a small group of countries to schedule for next summer a single 6-week session putting off until the following year final determinations in this area was defeated and the conference agreed to have an 8-week session beginning next March and provided for returning to Caracas to sign a treaty.

I think this was done in the expectation on the part of many delegations of completing these negotiations on schedule which means they must be completed next year.

By having the substantive sessions in the spring this does leave the possibility if substantive work needs to be done to complete the treaty to do that in the summer.

Second, I think it was very significant that despite many apprehensions and dire predictions the Conference did adopt on schedule in the first 2 weeks rules of procedure including a number of provisions which were relatively new and designed to deal with some of