Page images
PDF
EPUB

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

merce, but are bound to recognise the right of a belligerent engaged
in actual war, to use this mode of coercion for subduing the enemy.
Schooner Brilliant et al vs. United States,

[ocr errors]

.

2. To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the
high seas, a war must exist de facto, and the neutral must have a know-
ledge or notice of the intention of one of the belligerents to use this mode
of coercion against a port, city, or territory in possession of the other. Id.
3. War is that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force;
and it is not necessary that both parties should be acknowledged as
independent nations or sovereign states, nor that war should be solemnly
declared. Id.

4. As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine, against
insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in domestic history which the
Courts are bound to notice and know. Id.

5. Where the sovereign of a neutral state has acknowledged the exist-
ence of a war by his proclamation of neutrality, a citizen of that state is
estopped from denying the existence of the war, and the belligerent right
of blockade.

Id.

It

6. Whether property be liable to capture as "enemies' property" does
not in any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owner.
is the illegal traffic that stamps it as " enemies' property." Id.

II. Foreign Ministers.

7. The Court being informed by counsel that one of the defendants
was an ambassador duly accredited from a foreign Sovereign to the
British Court, will dismiss him from the suit; and will not, if he object,
oblige him to plead or take part in any proceedings. Gladstone vs.
Musurus Bey,

JOINT DEBTORS.

1. Part payment by one, not in satisfaction of the debt, but for his per-
sonal discharge, will not be a discharge as to the others. Winslow vs.
Brown,

2. Where such payment is made in another State, its effect must be
determined by the laws of that State. Id.

JOINT TRESPASS.

1. May be by persons acting separately and without concert.
Dickinson,

JUDGE OF PROBATE.

334

176

383

Stone vs.

444

1. Has no authority to revoke his own decree. Pettee vs. Wilmarth, . 558

JUDGMENT.

See EVIDENCE, 1.

LUNATIC, 1.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1-3.

STATE, 1.

1. Remedy for irregularity of decision. Pitt vs. Davison,

2. Against vendor in an executory contract for sale of land, is subject
to equitable rights of vendee, and is not a lien against the unpaid pur-
chase money in his hands until actual notice of the judgment. Smith vs.
Gage,

124

438

3. Where the existence of a valid judgment is in issue, any evidence
tending to show that it is illegal or void is competent. Kinsey vs. Ford, 441
4. Of inferior Court, on points necessary to give it jurisdiction, is final
until reversed by direct proceedings for that purpose. Colton vs. Beards-
Ley,.

. 560

JUDGMENT.

5. By confession-fraud-informality-requisite form under New York
Code. Miller vs. Earle, 57; Neusbaum vs. Keim, et al., 59.

6. Equitable restraint of collection of judgment—what is necessary to
the exercise of. Clute vs. Potter,

7. Form of authentication of judgment in another State. Morris et al
vs. Patchin,

JURY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IV.

JUSTICE OF PEACE.

1. Must be so de jure as well as de facto to justify an arrest by his
authority. Newman vs. Tiernan,

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. Lease.

See ASSIGNMENT, 1-3.

EJECTMENT, 3.

[ocr errors]

187

248

[ocr errors]

185

1. On a letting of house or land there is no implied warranty of its
fitness for use-the principle of caveat emptor applies. McGlashan vs.
Tallmadge,

2. An under lease, by lessee of his whole term, with right to re-enter,
is a sub-lease, not an assignment. People vs. Robertson,

3. Liability on covenant to repair after conveyance by the landlerd
and attornment to the purchaser by the tenant. Mirick vs. Bashford,

II. Rent.

4. Tenant is bound by his express covenant to pay rent, though he
assign his lease with landlord's consent, unless the latter expressly accept
a surrender. Frank vs. Maguire,

5. Insufficient averment of surrender. Id.

6. Tenant cannot refuse to pay rent and at same time retain possession,
although the landlord fail in his agreement to improve. People ex re
Ward et al. vs. Kelsey,

7. Lessee evicted from part of leased premises is entitled to an apper-
tionment of rent, but not to recover the value of the lease over the rent.
Carter vs. Burr,

[ocr errors]

LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND,

LEGACY, ALTERNATIVE.

1. If legacy given to A., and in event of his death to B., and A. die in
testator's lifetime, the legacy will take effect. May's Appeal,

LEGISLATURE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19, 29, 36.

NAVIGABLE RIVER, 3.

LETTER.

See EVIDENCE, 4.

1. Proof of mailing letter affords no presumption of its due receipt, but
is evidence for the jury as to that fact. Greenfield Bank vs. Crafts,
LIBEL.

1. Libellous letter not justified by the relation of friend and pastor
between the writer and the recipient. Count Joannes vs. Bennett,

815

700

502

701

.688

378

LIMITATION.

See INSURANCE, 9.
MORTGAGE, 8, 17.
TROVER, 3.

1. Mortgage barred by twenty years' adverse possession. Reynolds vs.
Green,

2. Averment that land had not been adversely occupied for such period,
defective. Id.

[ocr errors]

3. Note is not barred by lapse of time of limitation, if maker has lived
out of the State since it was due. Lawrence vs. Bassett, .
LUNATIC.

1. A judgment recovered on default, against a person admitted to
have been non compos mentis at the time of the proceedings in the case,
will be reversed on a writ of error brought by his administrator. Leach
vs. Marsh,

2. Actions brought against persons non compos for necessaries, it seems,
constitute an exception; but, in such case, the defendant in error should
plead the fact in bar of the suit. Id

3. Contracts not binding in general. Note to Leach vs. Marsh,
4. Exceptions to the general rule, and proceedings against persons non
compotes mentis. Id.

MANDAMUS.

See CONTESTED ELECTIONS, 1-3.
COURTS, 6.

1. In proceedings by mandamus, it is not indispensable that the petition
should state that the relator is without any other adequate and sufficient
remedy. If that appear to the Court to be the fact, the alternative writ
will not be quashed. People ex rel. Fuller vs. Hilliard et al.,

MASTER AND SERVANT.

See NEGLIGENCE, 15.

*MECHANICS' LIEN.

1. Identity of building-necessary description. Kennedy et al. vs.
House et al.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

2. MORTGAGES TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES,

3. OF THE CHANGE OF THE SECURITY AS AFFECTING THE Lien,

126

[ocr errors]

557

22

30

274

187

4. Mortgage to secure existing debts, not specifying their amount, is
valid against purchasers with notice. Michigan Ins. Co. vs. Brown,
5. Though mortgage cannot be continued as security for new indebted-
ness by oral agreement, yet equity will not aid mortgagor to obtain a
release from mortgagee. Joslyn vs. Wyman,

[ocr errors]

571

510

6. Omission of mortgagee's name not cured by delivery to a person to
hold as security for money advanced. Chauncey vs. Arnold,

317

II. Rights and Duties of Mortgagees.

7. Estate of the mortgagee. Steel vs. Steel,

254

8. Title in mortgagee by holding property as absolute owner for twenty
years. Reynolds vs. Green,

126

MORTGAGE.

9. Mortgagee may have personal action agrainst grantee who assumes
to pay it. Burr vs Beers,

[ocr errors]

10. Of land subject to homestead right conveys the reversionary inte-
rest of mortgagor though the wife does not join. Smith vs. Provin,
11. Mortgagee of reversionary interest may maintain a bill to redeem
a prior mortgage. Id.

313

378

12. Estoppel of mortgagee from denial of title. Brown vs. Combs et al.
13. Right of mortgagee in trust to hold the mortgage for compensation
for his "just allowances." Allen vs. Robbins,

14. Holder of second mortgage may compel holder of first, who has
taken possession, to account for all rents, &c., he might have received
by due diligence. Richardson vs. Wallis,

15. Duty of first mortgagee to protect second. James vs. Brown,

III. Remedy on Mortgage.

53

442

510
694

See LIMITATION, 1.

16. Statutory foreclosure in Michigan. Lee vs. Mason,

126

17. Right to foreclose is not lost by the debt becoming barred by lapse
of time. Mich. Ins. Co. vs. Brown,

571

18. But in such case equity will not make a personal decree against
the mortgagor. Id.

19. Statute prohibiting actions of ejectment on mortgages is inopera-
tive as to those made prior to its passage. Blackwood vs. Van Vliet,
20. Conveyance subject to usurious mortgage-release of personal
liability. Hartley vs. Harrison et al.,

21. Condition that principal shall become due on default of payment
of interest. Valentine vs. Van Wagner,

IV. Chattel Mortgages.

22. Parol evidence of its intention. McKinster vs. Babcock et al.,
23. Where goods left in hands of mortgagor to sell, the question of
good faith is for the jury. Ford et al. vs. Williams,

571

57

61

248

249

24. Interest of mortgagor cannot be levied on unless he has an abso-
lute right of possession for a definite period when the levy is made.
Farrell vs. Hildreth,

507

25. Mortgagor may redeem at any time before actual foreclosure.
Van Brunt vs. Wakelee,

. 570

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

1. Remedy to enforce payment. People ex rel. Fiedler vs. Mead et al, 249
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See COURTS, 6.

DRAFT, 4.

EJECTMENT, 1.

NEGLIGENCE, 8-10.

ROADS, 6.

STREETS, 1.

I. Taxation to pay Debts.

1. An agreement to levy a special tax cannot be implied from an ordi-
nance making it the duty of the City Council "to provide means to meet
the payment" of a designated debt when the same may become due
United States ex rel. Learned vs. Burlington,

2. A City Council has no power to levy taxes not expressly authorized
by its charter or the law. Hence, where by the charter of a city it is
provided that no greater tax than one per centum shall be levied for any
one year, and this maximum rate is actually levied, a mandamus will be
refused even to a judgment-creditor to compel the city to levy a greater
tax, or even to levy a specific tax to pay his judgment. Id.

394

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

3. Powers to levy taxes to pay judgments discussed, and herein of
special taxes and of the rights of judgment-creditors. Note to United
States vs. Burlington, 398, and remarks on same case,

II. General Duties and Liabilities.

4. Is responsible for damages resulting from the manner of perform-
ing a ministerial duty, but not if the duty is of a judicial nature.
Kavanagh vs. Brooklyn,

[ocr errors]

5. Hence it is not liable for injuries resulting from the improvement

of streets. Id.

[ocr errors]

498

630

559

6. Plaintiff may recover for value of work done, although his contract
has not been fully performed. Reed vs. Scituate,
7. Assessments for improvements. The State vs. Mayor, &c., of Hudson, 55
8. Duties and liabilities in respect to sewers.
Barton vs. Syracuse, 314
9. Liability of town under the statutes of Massachusetts for injury to
person on the sidewalk. Day vs. Milford,

10. The grading, paving, &c., of a street by the city is not evidence of
a claim of title, but only of a right of way. Cowenhoven vs. Brooklyn,

MUNICIPAL LIEN.

1. Pennsylvania statute relating to. Alleghany City's Appeal,

NAVIGABLE RIVER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 34.

NUISANCE, 3.
RAILROAD, 6.

1. General power to erect bridges includes power to put piers in the
river and protects the company from liability for damages to navigation,
unless the right is wantonly or carelessly used. Clarke vs. Birmingham,
&c., Bridge Co.,

2. The remedy for such wanton or careless use of right is through suit
by the State, not by a private person. Id.

3. A general law that no bridge shall be built so as to hinder naviga
tion, does not take away from a subsequent Legislature the power to
grant right to erect such bridges in particular places. Id.

509

[ocr errors]

506

312

188

4. What are navigable streams and the extent of grant to riparian
owners. Flanagan vs. Philadelphia,

504

[blocks in formation]

6. Riparian owner on a navigable stream who raises and reclaims the
land has a full fee-simple in such land. People vs. Kelsey,

631

NEGLIGENCE.

See INSURANCE, 2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4, 5, 9.

RAILROAD, 15-17.

1. In an action for negligence plaintiff cannot recover unless he was
free from any degree of negligence which contributed directly towards
the injury. Wilds vs. The Hudson River Railroad Co.,

2. Negligence is a question for the jury where the fact is fairly doubt-
ful. In other cases it is a question of law. Id.

3. At a railroad crossing it is carelessness in any one approaching
with a team, not to stop and listen, before attempting to cross. Per
GOULD, J.

Id.

4. A request on the part of defendant for an instruction to the jury,
"That if the negligence of the deceased" (plaintiff) "in any way con
tributed to cause the collision, which resulted in his death, plaintiff can-
not recover," contains a legal proposition, "the true legal rule of the
case, and he was entitled to have it given to the jury, substantially as he

76

« PreviousContinue »