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here to it, and by so doing we shall, in the event of any necessity of abandoning that system, be the better able to enter with effect upon any other course which the policy of this country may require."

Few subjects have within the past year or two so much occupied the best minds of the legal profession in England, as the discipline of the Bar. The law-magazines have discussed it in various lights, and recently we have had an elaborate address upon it by Mr. G. Shaw Lefevre before a meeting of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law, to which we are much indebted for the facts mentioned in the remarks we are about to make.

The confidence of the English people and of the Bar itself, in its honorable character and reputation, the growth of centuries of faithful and arduous labor of its members, received a heavy blow when it became known that Mr. Edwin James, one of its leaders, a Queen's Counsel and a member of Parliament, had been disbarred and compelled to retire from the practice of his profession, and ultimately to leave the country. But the shock was still greater when, after a brief interval, Mr. James's case was followed by the trial of Mr. Digby Seymour, likewise a Queen's Counsel, by his Inn, and the various actions that arose out of it, so full of unseemly scandal, not only to Mr. Seymour but to the Society of the Middle Temple. Still more recently we have had the timehonored etiquette of the profession violated by a suit, by another barrister of distinguished abilities and position, against his client for compensation for professional services: Kennedy vs. Broun and Wife, 11 Am. Law Register 357.

As the case of Mr. Seymour is less known on this side of the Atlantic than the others, a few words about it may not be uninteresting.

The only mode of admission to the Bar in England has been for centuries a call by one of the four Inns of Court. These ancient and exclusive associations, whose aggregate income was stated in 1854 at 57,957 pounds sterling, have almost from time immemorial claimed and exercised the privilege not only of saying in the first place who shall be admitted to the practice of the law

before the superior Courts of the kingdom, but also of continuing a supervision over the professional conduct of their members after admission, and the authority, through their governing councils, called Benchers, to censure, suspend, and even to entirely dishar such of their members as they judge to have disqualified themselves by their character or conduct, for the practice of an honorable profession. From the decision of the Benchers upon the question of admission to the Inn as a student there is no redress, and upon a call to the Bar and subsequently a censure or disbarment, none but an appeal to the judges who by right of ancient custom, or, as is claimed by some writers, by virtue of their inherent powers as Courts of Justice, claim and exert the right of revision over the judgments of the Benchers, upon an appeal by the student or barrister who thinks himself aggrieved.

During the last winter the Benchers of the Middle Temple entered into an examination of charges against the integrity of their fellow-member, Mr. Digby Seymour, which lasted for a considerable time, and was followed by a severe vote of censure upon his professional conduct, which was published, or, as the phrase is, "screened" in the Hall of the Society. There were some circumstances attending the trial that were nct unfairly open to just animadversion. In the first place the charges related to events alleged to have taken place six or seven years before the trial, and which were known to many members of his circuit for the whole of that time, and yet no notice was taken of them, until shortly after the elevation of Mr. Seymour to the dignity of Queen's Counsel. Again, the trial was had in an exceedingly informal manner, and it was made an objection by Mr. Seymour that in the fifteen meetings which the trial occupied, the number of Benchers present varied from seven to eighteen, and that only two attended them all. It was very apparent, moreover, that the powers of the Court of Benchers were entirely inadequate to the necessities of such cases. They possessed no authority to compel the attendance of witnesses, or to have compulsory answer under oath to their questions.

For these, as well as for other reasons, this case produced great

excitement in the legal profession, and much discussion upon the exact nature and extent of the authority exercised by the Inns of Court, though the truth of the charges against Mr. Seymour are not formally denied, and there seems to be no dissatisfaction or cause for it, in the profession, with the verdict of the Benchers. But it was merely another spur to the conviction that had been for a long time forcing itself upon the minds of those who have had the best interests of the profession at heart, that the present organization of the Bar of England is not effectual in supporting the honor and dignity of the profession, and that the discipline of the Inns of Court and their mode of enforcing it, does not provide sufficient guarantees to the public or the Bar itself.

From this same conviction has arisen the movement so resolutely made during the last few years, for the establishment of more secure means of preventing the admission to the Bar of any but properly qualified persons. The Inns of Court require only that the student should have been admitted to his Inn for three years. during which he must have been present at a certain number of dinners in each term, and have attended a certain number of lectures, and even the latter may be dispensed with if he prefer to stand an examination before his call. With this exception there is no qualification in legal or even scholarly attainments, required for admission to the Bar.

The advocates of reform, however, have proposed two restrictions upon this looseness of discipline-the demand of a university education as preliminary to admission to the Inn as a student, or the passage of a public examination before a call to the Bar. The advocates of these two reforms have as usual fallen into almost greater hostility to each other than to the present system, and perhaps with much greater reason. For precisely at this point do two great contending forces meet, the aristocratic conservatism of the ancient bar, and the free, democratic tendencies of the present commercial age; and upon the adoption of one or other of these qualifications will depend very greatly the character of the English Bar for the future.

To the Bar of America this cannot be an uninteresting question

The profession of the law in this country, though from its inherent arduous character, and perhaps even yet somewhat from its traditional conservatism, more difficult of access than business of other kinds, is nevertheless practically free and open to all comers. So far there is perhaps no reason to complain of the results of the experiment, for the tone of the American Bar is still as high and as honorable as that of the English, and whether that were so or not, it would be neither possible nor desirable to give it those exclusive features which have always been its distinctive character in England. Moreover, the examination which is most strenuously advocated there, has in more or less public manner, and with greater or less stringency, long obtained in all the States of the Union; and it is perhaps to this, as much as to anything else, that we owe the learning and character of our Bar.

But it is matter of grave thought whether a more definite organization of the Bar, both State and National, could not be devised, which, without interfering with individual liberty of action, might yet be of service in increasing and perpetuating its reputation and character as an honorable profession. In this view the experience of our brethren in England is worthy of careful observation and discussion. J. T. M.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.1

Release of Mortgaged Premises by Holder of first Incumbrance-Notice of subsequent Incumbrance.—Where a mortgagee, with knowledge of a subsequent mortgage on a part of the premises mortgaged to him, releases a part or the whole of the premises not covered by the subsequent mortgage, and the remaining property is not sufficient to pay both, equity will postpone the payment of the first mortgage out of the proceeds of a sale of the remaining property to the extent of the injury done the subsequent mortgagee by the release: James vs. Brown.

But the rule of notice in such case is different from the rule equity

1 From Hon. T. M. Cooley, Reporter, to appear in 11 Michigan Reports.

acts on to protect bona file purchasers. Where one purchases property which was subject to an equity in the seller's hands, it is enough that he have knowledge of such facts and circumstances indicating the equity as would have led a prudent man to inquire in regard to it, and that he omitted to do so; while in the case of mortgages, the existence of the second mortgage should be clearly brought home to the knowledge of the first mortgagee, in such a way that any act injuriously affecting the interests of the subsequent mortgagee will show an intentional disregard of the interests of such subsequent mortgagee: Id.

Assignment for benefit of Creditors.—A clause in a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, empowering the assignee to sell the assigned property on credit, renders it void: Sutton vs. Cleveland.

Constitutional Law-" Due Process of Law."-The provision in the Constitution that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," as applied to proceedings of a judicial character, was intended to secure to the citizen the right to a trial, according to the forms of law, of the questions of his liability and responsibility before his person or his property shall be condemned: Parsons vs. Russell. The trial must be by an impartial tribunal, and judgment must precede the deprivation of property: Id.

Under the Boat and Vessel Law of this State, a vessel may be seized and sold upon the mere assertion of a debt or demand, without any proof to substantiate the claim being made before a judicial tribunal, and without any judgment or decree of any such tribunal allowing the sale. It is therefore in conflict with the constitutional provision above quoted, and void: Id.

Statute of Frauds-Promise to answer for the Debt, &c., of another. —A written undertaking to answer for the debt or default of another must show the terms of the contract without a resort to parol evidence, or it is invalid: Hall vs. Soule.

A parol promise to pay the debt of another, being void, cannot constitute a legal consideration for a subsequent promise in writing: Id.

False Assertion of Value may be the Subject of a Suit-Bill of Sale does not exclude Parol Evidence.-A mere assertion of value made by the seller, when no warranty is intended, is no ground of relief to a purchaser, because the assertion is a matter of opinion which does not imply knowledge, and in which men differ. Every person reposes at his peril in the

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