Blackst. 400; 2 Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 37, s. 8, et seq. This has been held with great strictness. Thus the defendant was sentenced and afterwards a writ of error was allowed, which annulled the judgment; pending this a pardon was granted, and afterwards the judgment was affirmed in the superior court, held that the Governor being misinformed, there being no sentence in force at the time, the pardon was void and the court must sentence on the new judgment: State vs. McIntire, 1 Jones (Law) N. C. 1. In this case it was said that it appeared from the record and the pardon itself that the Governor was misinformed; and it has been contended that this is the proper general principle, that errors to avoid the pardon must appear on the face of it. In the case before us, however, this point is expressly decided to the contrary, upon the principles of the common law. 5. In regard to the manner in which pardons may be taken advantage of, it is said that a pardon by act of parliament is more beneficial than by the King's charter, for the court must take judicial notice of it: 4 Blackst. Com. 401. But this applies only to a general pardon, for a special pardon by act of parliament would still be only a private act, which must be pleaded. And it is presumed that the same law would obtain here in those cases where pardons are granted by the legislature, though the point does not appear to have arisen. In regard to other pardons, it is said that they should be brought "judicially before the court by plea, motion, or otherwise." U. S. vs. Wilson, 7 Pet. S. C. 150. In Pennsylvania a different practice has obtained, as appears by the principal case. Where a pardon, however, is offered in evidence, the charter itself or a certified copy must be produced, or its loss accounted for 1 Spalding vs. Saxton, 6 Watts 338; Cox vs. Cox, 2 Casey 375. 6. The effect of a pardon is to acquit the offender of the penalties annexed to his conviction, and to give him a new credit and capacity. It cannot, however, divest any person of any right or interest which the law had permitted to be acquired and vested in consequence of the judgment. Therefore, a pardon of one sentenced to imprisonment for life does not annul the second marriage of his wife nor the sale of his property by the persons appointed to administer his estate, nor divest his heirs of their interest in his estate: Denning's Case. 10 Johns. 232. But it does restore him to his relation of father, and there cannot be any intervening right to defeat it. Id. A pardon restores competency as a witness, but the conviction may be used to affect his credibility: Baum vs. Clause, 5 Hill 196. But whether a pardon of the "remainder" or "residue" of a sentence will restore competency, is not settled. The Supreme Court of Penusylvania holding that it will: Hoffman vs. Coster, 2 Whart. 453; and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that it will not: Perkins vs. Stevens, 24 Pick. 277. A pardon, however, is only for the offence named. Thus a pardon of an assault, which by subsequent death of the person assaulted becomes murder, will not be a pardon of the latter crime: SHAW, C. J., in Commonwealth vs. Roby, 12 Pick. 508; Hawkins vs. The State, 1 Porter (Ala.) 475. A discharge from prison under a pardon is a discharge "in due course of law," rendering the convict liable to an additional sentence under the Massachusetts statute of 1832, c. 73, if recommitted: Evans vs. Commonwealth, 3 Met. 453. J. T. M. In the Superior Court of Cincinnati. ANDREW M'MICKEN, TRUSTEE, ETC., vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE M'MICKEN UNIVERSITY.1 The term "household furniture," though not susceptible of strict definition, has acquired a definite meaning, by which it is understood to include everything which may contribute to the use or convenience of the householder, or the ornament of the house, such as plate, linen, china, pictures, &c. Where a testator by his will bequeathed to A. "all his library and household furniture of every description, and any other personal property not thereinafter specifically devised," and by a subsequent clause devised to B. "all his real estate and personal property, which he may acquire after the date of his will," and again to B. "all the rest and residue of his real and personal estate, not thereinbefore devised," Held, that a portrait of testator, painted after the making of the will, and at the time of his death still in possession of the artist in another city, passed to A. under the devise of "household furniture." By the law of Ohio "family pictures" are exempt from execution, but, per STORER, J., this exemption would not extend to the private gallery of a connoisseur nor to costly pictures the subjects of which are not connected with the family in whose possession they are found. W. B. Caldwell and M. H. Tilden, for plaintiff. T. C. Ware, for defendant. The opinion of the Court was delivered by STORER, J.-This action is brought to test the ownership of a portrait of Charles McMicken, deceased, the uncle of the plaintiff, and the founder of the McMicken University. The plaintiff claims the property as legatee of Charles McMicken, whose will was made in September, 1855. The testator died ir 1857, and his will was admitted to probate in April in the same year. Mr. McMicken was a resident of Cincinnati, but his will was executed in Philadelphia; between the making of which and his death, he had sat for his portrait to an artist of the latter city, who had finished it, though it was still in his possession at McMicken's death. It was sent afterwards to Cincinnati, and all the parties 1 We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of M. H. Tilden, Esq. concerned have submitted the case to us, to determine the owner ship of the property. The testator's family mansion, where he had long resided with one or both of the claimants, was in Cincinnati, and there was all his furniture and household ornaments, with the exception of his portrait. By the 8th clause of the 4th section of his will, he gave to the plaintiff "all his library and household furniture of every description, and any other personal property not thereinafter specifically devised, to be equally divided with his niece, Lizzie McMicken." Other bequests are made to the same parties, as well as to other relatives and friends; but the great mass of his estate is given to the city of Cincinnati, "for the purpose of building, establishing. and maintaining two colleges for white boys and girls." This devise is in section 31, and the different classes of property given are particularly stated. For this purpose, by the 5th clause, “all his real estate and personal property which he may acquire after the date of his will," and, by the 9th clause, "all the rest and residue of his real and personal estate, not thereinbefore devised,” is given to the city. These several clauses are those under which the parties severally claim. The plaintiff regards the bequest of "the household furniture of every decription" as broad enough to include the testator's portrait. The defendants, who represent the city, place their right upon the 5th and 9th clauses of the 31st section, already referred to. The words "household furniture," or, as some of the older writers use the term, "household stuff," have now, we suppose, a definite meaning, and are understood by the profession to include a class of personal chattels very readily distinguished from the more general description, by which movable property may pass to a devisee or a vendee. One of the earliest cases in the books where the question is discussed is that of Kelly vs. Powlet, Ambler 605. The point there made to the Master of the Rolls, Sir THOMAS CLARK, was this: did plate pass to the legatee of the "household furniture?" In considering the question, he says, "the word household furniture has as general a meaning as possible. It is incapable of a definition. It comprises everything that contributes to the use or convenience of the householder or the ornament of the house." The term was held to be large enough to include plate, whether in use or not, provided it was in the possession of the devisor, and not intended for any other purpose than that of household use; the quantity and value to be measured by the condition and rank of the family. It was admitted by the plaintiff in this case, who is reported to have been present in Court, that "pictures, whether hung up or in cases, would pass by the devise," as well as plate. This case is also reported in Dickens 359. Bef re this decision, it was held, in Bridgman vs. Darr, 3 Atk. 202, that a library of books did not pass by the words household furniture, giving, as a reason, that "they were for the entertainment of the mind, and not furniture for use or ornament." The rule has also been, in some one of its phases, discussed in Franklin vs. Earl of Burlington, Prec. in Ch. 251, Nichols vs. Osborne, 2 Peere Williams 400, Le Farrant vs. Spencer, 1 Vesey Sr., 97, and Gayre vs. Gayre, 2 Vernon 538. In Pratt vs. Jackson, 2 Peere Williams 302, the construction given by the Lord Chancellor was deemed too liberal, and on appeal to the House of Lords his decision was reversed: 3 Bro. Pa. Cas. 194. The doctrine to be deduced from all these cases is summed up by Mr. Roper thus: "By the term household furniture, everything is included which may contribute to the use or convenience of the householder or the ornament of the house, as plate, linen, china, both useful and ornamental, and pictures:" Law of Legacies 141. The English Courts have been consistent in their construction of the words we have alluded to. We discover no exception to the principle in any of the cases, from the report in Ambler to the present time. On the contrary, we find the law stated without any reservation in Cole vs. Fitzgerald, 1 Sim. & Stu. 189, which was affirmed in 3 Russell 320. The question was again discussed in Cremorin vs. Antrobus, 5 Russell 320, where Lord LYNDHURST expressly held these words would pass to the devisee "ornamental pictures." Mr. Williams, in his elaborate work on Executors, Vol. 2, 1021, accepts the construction without any dissent on his part; and Jarman, in Vol. 1, 699, admits the doctrine in his text without reservation, though in a note he quotes from the report in Ambler, that "pictures hung up will pass;" while in the case to which he refers, reported both in Ambler and Dickens, it is expressly stated that the admission included "pictures not only hanging up, but those found in cases." The meaning thus given to these devisory words is quoted with approbation by Chancellor KENT, in Bann et al. vs. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. Cas. 329, and by the Court of Appeals in Virginia, in Carnagy vs. Woodcock, 2 Munford 234. In Ohio, we have no judicial construction of these words in any reported case, but our Legislature, by several important statutory provisions, has informed us what its understanding has been of this class of personal property. By the section 43 "of the Act to provide for the settlement of the estates of decedents," 1 Swan 574, the personal representative is, in all cases, expressly required to leave with the widow, to be kept by her for life, and after her decease to be the absolute property of her children, all "family pictures." And by the 3d clause of the 1st section of an amendment to the law regulating judgments and executions, "family pictures are exempted from levy and sale." We ought not to extend the exemption in these clauses to the private gallery of a connoisseur, nor yet to costly pictures, the subjects of which are not connected with the family in whose possession they are found. As the family Bible is specially excepted which preserves the names, the births, the marriages, and the burial of the parents and the children, so the portrait of a father or a mother may well be preserved as a living memory to a son or a daughter, alike consecrated by human sympathy, and vindicated by the law. By the terms of the bequest in the 8th clause of the 4th section of the testator's will, the property described, which is defined to be household furniture of every description, must necessarily embrace all similar chattels owned by the devisor at the time of his |