estate of his ward which is subject to a mortgage, with directions that the proceeds be put at interest and secured by mortgage on other real estate or otherwise well and safely invested, makes a sale of the equity of redemption and also of hay which is treated as a portion of the real estate and returned by him as such, and for a portion of the purchase-money takes security upon the equity of redemption which he has sold, and, the purchase-money not being paid, is obliged to take the same back and to expend money thereon in making repairs, and the mortgage is subsequently foreclosed, he cannot be allowed in his account either for that portion of the price of the real estate or hay which he has failed to collect, or for the sums expended for repairs. And the fact that the mortgagee is still willing that he should redeem the real estate from the mortgage is immaterial: Id.

The guardian of a spendthrift will be held responsible for all losses which arise in consequence of investments by him which appear to have been made without the exercise of reasonable care and prudence on his part. And it is not reasonable care and prudence to take notes for $400, payable at intervals of from one to three years, signed by two persons, each of whom is reputed to be good for $500; or to take a note for $240 signed by four persons, one of whom is reputed to be rich, if the others do not appear to have any property: Id.

Fornication and Bastardy-Evidence in.-The complainant in a bastardy process cannot be allowed to introduce in evidence the declarations of the attending physician, made to her during her travail, as to her condition and peril, for the purpose of corroborating her testimony; or to call witnesses to testify to a resemblance between the features of the child and the defendant: Eddy vs. Gray.

The presiding judge at a trial may call the attention of the jury to the evidence which is in the case, and state his recollection of what has or has not been testified to, submitting the whole matter to their consideration and judgment: Id.

Evidence that the complainant in a bastardy process had intercourse with other men than the defendant more than ten calendar months before the birth of the child is inadmissible, if there is no evidence that the period of her gestation was unusually protracted: Id.

Evidence that the complainant in a bastardy process was in the habit of associating with young men whose reputation for chastity was bad is inadmissible: Id.

If a witness for the complainant in a bastardy process has denied on cross-examination that he ever had intercourse with her, he cannot be

contradicted by proof of admissions by him to the contrary, unless suen admissions refer to a period of time when, if true, he might be the father of the child: Id.

Deed, when held to be a Mortgage-Executor, Suit against-Construction.--If it can be gathered from the whole of a deed that it was intended only as security for the performance of a particular duty, it will be considered as a mortgage, although there is no express provision that upon the fulfilment of the condition the deed shall be void: Steel vs. Steel.

A mortgagee who has not entered upon and taken possession of the mortgaged premises has no estate which can descend to his heirs: Id.

If it appears by the officer's return that an execution was levied upon the land of an intestate in the hands of his administrator, the levy 18 valid, although the appraisers misdescribed it as land of the administrator, and their certificate is referred to in the return: Id.

A provision in a deed that the grantor does not convey or intend to convey the premises described until his decease and the decease of his wife, is valid; and the grantee acquires no right to the possession of the premises until after the decease of the grantor and his wife: Id.

Dogs, Injury by-Infant, want of Care by-Arbitration.-The owner of a dog which has inflicted an injury on a child cannot exempt himself from the liability imposed by statute because it appears that the child did not act with the discretion and judgment of a person of mature years; but he is liable, if the child is bitten while using such care as is usual with children of its age, and there is no want of ordinary care in the person having the care of the child: Munn vs. Reed.

If, in an action to recover for an injury inflicted upon a child by a dog, the case is submitted to the jury under instructions requiring them to find that neither the fault of the child nor of the mother, who had the care of the child, contributed to the injury, a verdict for the plaintiff will not be set aside because the judge refused to instruct the jury, at the request of the defendant, that it is primâ facie evidence of want of care for a mother to allow her child to play with a strange dog: Id.

If the father and next friend of an infa t, who is plaintiff in an action to recover for an injury inflicted by the bite of a dog, enters into a submission reciting that there is a controversy in relation to damage sustained by his child, by a dog belonging to the defendant, and agreeing to refer the whole subject in dispute to arbitrators, and signs the same with his own name, an award of the arbitrators finding that the defendant shall pay a certain sum to the father and another sum to the child is no defence to the action: Id.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY. BY FRANCIS HILLIARD, Author of the Law of Torts, &c. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1863. The systems of law having for their twofold object the due protection of creditors from the frauds of dishonest debtors and the relief of honest debtors from the oppression of suspicious or vindictive creditors, which under the name of Bankrupt and Insolvent laws have grown up in all commercial communities, are entirely statutory. Yet in the long course of legislation some approximation may be discerned towards a general system, and it will be safe to say that no law can now be enacted upon these fruitful subjects that will not be capable of interpretation by the judicial decisions on points that have arisen under its predecessors.

Viewed in this light therefore a new American treatise cannot fail to be of value to the profession, notwithstanding the irregular and shifting condition of that branch of our law, and the imminent peril of having the ground swept away from under us at any moment by a flood of new statutory

enactments.

So important was the subject deemed by the founders of our government, that the power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States," was, together with the rule of naturalization, placed only fourth in the list of expressly enumerated powers given by the Constitution to Congress: Const. U. S. Art. 1, Sect. 8 In pursuance of this power, Congress passed, as early as 1800, a general bankrupt law, founded upon the English acts, and limiting its operation to those persons considered "traders" by the harsh and stringent provisions of the British statutes. This law, never popular, and limited by its makers to an existence of only five years, was repealed in 1803, and shortly thereafter the idea previously entertained, that legislation by the states on this subject was forbidden by the Constitution, seems to have been very generally abandoned, and insolvent laws were passed by many of the states.

Since then, other acts have been passed and repealed, and many nice questions have arisen as to the exact boundary line between the jurisdiction of the national and state legislative powers.

In the work before us, these questions are carefully considered, and the results stated with commendable brevity. Indeed, not the least among the excellent qualities of Mr. Hilliard's book, is the brief and perspicuous statement of his conclusions, and the accurate analysis and arrangement of the whole subject. The body of the work comprises about four hundred pages, which, with a Table of Cases, an Appendix, containing the Bankrupt Laws of the United States, and the Insolvent Laws of Massachusetts, and an Alphabetical Index, make up the volume. In this connection we would

call attention to the unusually careful analysis of the difficult subject of Assignments in Chapter VI.

Mr. Hilliard's book is evidently the result of much intelligent labor, and as a complete, methodical and well digested summary of the present law, will be of great value to the profession-especially since the recent vote of the House of Representatives appears for the present at least to have settled the question of a new and permanent national law of bankruptcy. J. T. M.

COMMENTARIES On the Law of BAILMENTS, with Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law. By JOSEPH STORY, LL.D., one of the Justices of the Suprem Court of the United States, and Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University. Seventh Edition; Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged, by EDMUND H. BENNET1. Boston Little, Brown & Co., 1863.

Mr. Bennett has here presented us with the seventh edition of what the learned author calls "the first fruits of the Professorship founded" in the oldest of the American universities, "by the bounty of the Hon. Nathan Dane, whose name and fame have thus become indissolubly identified with American jurisprudence in all its departments; and with the interests and the success of juridical learning, throughout the world, even to the end of time." It is perhaps not too much to say, that if this book had been the only result of the founder's munificence, as it was not a tithe, perhaps, it would have rendered all after generations his debtors in a large and willing obligation.

This book was originally the most perfect of Judge Story's numerous and valuable treatises upon all the departments of the law which fell under his somewhat extensive and miscellaneous department; and we feel sure the work has not lost, either in the original symmetry of its proportions, or the thoroughness of its details, through the inattention or the haste of its editors, since the decease of the author. The present edition is considerably enlarged, especially in the important chapters upon Innkeepers and Common Carriers, since the last edition, by the same editor, in 1857.

This book is now almost the only one in use embracing the same field, and it contains all that could be expected in one volume upon so broad a subject; and so well arranged, and with so perfect an analysis, in the very full table of contents and index, as to make its contents more accessible than is common in books of that extent, and embracing so great a number of topics. The new matter is worth twice the cost of the volume to any practising lawyer. I. F. R.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

MARCH, 1863.

COVENANTS FOR TITLE RUNNING WITH THE LAND.

(CONCLUDED.)

II. OF THE PRACTICAL RULES WHICH REGULATE COVENANTS FOR IITLE IN RUNNING WITH THE LAND.—(Continued.)

2. Of the rights and remedies of the respective parties on a breach of covenants for title running with the land.

It is customary in this country for every grantor to covenant anew for the title to land, so that a series of covenants comes into the hands of the last grantor, with a right of action on any or all of them, which have been made since the occurrence of the defect which occasioned the breach. It is therefore reasonable that intermediate covenantors who have covenanted, relying on the validity of prior covenants, should in some way be protected. With a view to this, it was formerly understood that the mere prospective liability of any intermediate covenantor, was of itself sufficient to authorize him, when a breach happened for which he might be sued, to proceed at once against any prior covenantor who was also liable for the same breach. But the effect of this would be, that as soon as a breach happened, not only the last

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