Certain regulations, quite new and broad in their scope, were also adopted as to their employment and wages. A state may employ its prisoners of war as laborers, according to their military rank and natural aptitude; but the tasks set them shall not be excessive, and shall have nothing to do with the operations of the war. They may be authorized to work for the state itself, for private persons, or on their own account. The work they do for the state shall be paid for according to the wages in force for soldiers of the national army employed on similar tasks; the work they do for the non-military departments of the public service or for private persons shall be arranged and paid for by agreement with the military authorities. Their wages shall be used for the betterment of their condition, and the balance shall be paid them at the time of their release, after the cost of their maintenance is deducted (Article 6).

The proposition was made, but rejected, that officers taken prisoner should be permitted to retain their swords. It was provided, on the other hand, that they may be paid their full salary by their captors, if circumstances demanded, and that their own government should repay the sum (Article 17). M. Beernaert, of Belgium, proposed that this action should be taken on the mediation of a neutral power; but Colonel von Schwarzhoff, of Germany, opposed this mediation as being a probable source of international difficulties, and M. Beernaert withdrew the proposition.

The desirability of extending charitable aid and comfort to prisoners of war was recognized, and such activity was regulated by a few simple rules. Relief societies organized for the purpose of serving as the medium of

such charitable aid, and regularly constituted in accordance with the laws of their country, shall receive from belligerents, for themselves and their duly authorized agents, every facility compatible with military necessities and administrative regulations, for the effective accomplishment of their humane task. Delegates of these societies may be permitted to distribute relief within places of detention, as well as within the halting places of prisoners being sent back to their own country, if furnished with a personal permit by the military authorities, and on giving a written promise to comply with all the regulations for order and police (Article 15).

The Conference of 1899 made a notable advance beyond that of 1874 in providing for the establishment of such bureaus of information relative to prisoners of war as had been in partial operation during the wars of 1866 and 1870. Such bureau must be established, on the commencement of hostilities, in each of the belligerent states and in the neutral countries on whose territory belligerents have been received. Its duty is to reply to all inquiries about prisoners of war; and it must be supplied from all competent sources with the information necessary to enable it to keep an individual record of each prisoner of war. It must be kept informed of internments and transfers, as well as of admissions into hospitals and of deaths (Article 14, paragraph 1).

The rule that every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare his true name and rank (Article 9) was originally intended to aid in according him proper treatment; but it will be of much initial service also to the new bureau of information.

The new bureau is also charged with the collection of

all articles of personal use, all valuables, letters, etc., found on the battlefields or left by prisoners who have died in hospital or ambulance; and it must transmit such things to those to whom they belong (Article 14, paragraph 2).

The rule in regard to the punishment of prisoners who attempt to escape gave rise to considerable difference of opinion. The Brussels rule permitted prisoners in flight to be fired upon, after they had been summoned to halt; but the Hague rule does not expressly give this per

mission.

The Brussels rule permitted disciplinary punishment or a more strict confinement for prisoners recaptured in an attempt to escape; the Hague rule permits only disciplinary punishment in such cases (Article 8, paragraph 3). Professor Lammasch, of Austria, argued that in view of the conflict of duties which exists for a prisoner of war, he should be subjected to no punishment whatever, even disciplinary punishment, for an attempt to escape. Colonel Gilinsky, of Russia, on the other hand, argued that disciplinary punishment would not be sufficient to repress attempts to escape; that strong guards can not be spared from the army to watch prisoners of war; that with weak guards it would always be easy for skillful prisoners to escape, and if this could be done with impunity, or with slight punishment, such individuals would make a practice of getting captured and then of escaping with information for their own army. He therefore advocated the recognition of an attempt to escape as an offense, to be tried and punished by court martial. The conference took the middle ground between these two contentions, and retained disciplinary punishment, while

rejecting closer confinement and trial and punishment by court martial.

General Order No. 100 of the United States regulations provided for severe penalty, even for death, for conspiracy among prisoners of war to effect a united or general escape, or to revolt against the authority of the captors. But neither the Brussels nor the Hague rules provide expressly for such an offense, although the Hague Conference gave informal assent to the statement made by M. Rolin, of Siam, that crimes associated with attempts to escape, such as the assassination of guards, etc., are recognized and may be punished in accordance with the rule subjecting prisoners of war to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the state into whose power they have fallen (Article 8, paragraph 1).

The Brussels rule provided that prisoners who have succeeded in escaping and are again taken prisoner are not liable to any punishment for their previous flight. Colonel Khuepach, of Austria, said that by permitting no punishment for successful flight, and by permitting disciplinary punishment for unsuccessful flight, the rule would set a premium on cleverness. But the Hague Conference adopted the Brussels rule (Article 8, paragraph 4).

Finally, certain rules were adopted regarding the release of prisoners on parole. Prisoners of war may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of their own country authorize it, and, in such case, they are bound, on their personal honor, scrupulously to fulfill the promises they have made both to their own government and to the government by whom they were made prisoners. Their own government is bound to require or accept of them no service

incompatible with the parole given (Article 10). Any prisoner of war, who is liberated on parole and recaptured bearing arms against the government to whom he had pledged his honor, or against the allies of that government, forfeits his right to be treated as a prisoner of war, and may be brought before the courts for trial (Article 12). General Order No. 100, of the United States, prescribed the death penalty for this offense; the Hague rule, following that of Brussels, merely provides that the offender shall be subjected to trial; but here, again, the injured belligerent's laws are evidently supposed to operate.

The rules regarding prisoners of war end, appropriately, with the requirement (adopted for the first time in the Hague convention) that after the conclusion of peace, prisoners of war shall be sent back to their own country with the shortest possible delay (Article 20).

b. The Conference of 1907

The Japanese delegation proposed to define still further the term "prisoners of war," by adding to Article 13 the rule that "the subjects of a belligerent state, residing within the territory of their country's enemy, can not be confined in one place (internés) unless the exigencies of the war impose the necessity of such action." Count Tornielli, of Italy, supported this proposition, but demanded that the prohibition should apply to the expulsion of such people as well. The Japanese delegation accepted Count Tornielli's amendment, and explained that its own proposition was due to a desire to protect from adverse local laws the persons, goods, and business of subjects of a belligerent state residing within the enemy's territory;