impact in the urban centers, where the government was continually and directly represented.

In the villages far from direct government contact, the regulations concerning dress were enforced, but other aspects of religious reforms were ignored. The destruction of the formal Ottoman religious institutions did not significantly affect the ordering role which Islam had played within these communities for centuries, and popular religion continued to permeate the lives of the villagers. Moreover, the nation was closely identified with Islam and the history of combat against the infidels (non-Moslems), which made it difficult to spread the idea of a purely secular nationalism. Thus the religious revival which accompanied political liberalization represented a recognition by the government of the place which Islam continued to occupy in the lives of the people. Many of the concessions, such as the reintroduction of religion into the schools, were a response to popular feeling (see ch. 11, Religion). Religion is still a political issue, especially in the competition of elites for votes and political power.

THE NATION

The Turkish nation was created in the wake of World War I. Prior to that time, the very name "Turk," which connoted a peasant, was considered an insult by the Ottomans (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The War of Independence and the efforts of Atatürk sparked a sense of national identity. In its fullest sense Turkish nationality implies the use of the Turkish language and nominal adherence to Islam, despite the existence of linguistic and religious minorities and nondiscrimination in legal requirements for citizenship. Occasionally the non-Moslem citizen is reminded of his separate identity by events such as the 1955 anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and the capital levy of World War II (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). While the Kurds, the largest Moslem minority, are peaceful and integrated, the lack of official recognition for their language, and the denial of their existence in government statistics illustrates the essence of Turkish nationalism (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Emigration is not a significant demographic factor. Those who do leave in search of work in Europe and elsewhere generally tend to return eventually to Turkey (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

The territorial boundaries of the nation were defined in the course of the War for Independence. The Anatolian peninsula and a section of Europe lying across the Straits comprise this homeland. No effort was made to regain or retain the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, Pan-Turanism or the concept of uniting the Turkish

peoples from China to Anatolia in one state was officially rejected. Once the national territory was internationally recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne, Kemal Atatürk launched a series of reforms and programs to implement his conception of the nation and state (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Atatürk was motivated by a vision of a modernized and westernized nation. Well-educated and secular in outlook, he sought to create a strong country open to innovation and not hampered by tradition as the Ottoman Empire had been in its long decline (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Atatürk considered the existing organization of Islam one of these constraining traditions, and also saw that westernization entailed the introduction of non-Moslem ideas that might conflict with Islamic traditions. Thus as Turkey became the first Moslem state to separate religion and government, he took care to destroy the formal Islamic institutions and to forestall any organized religious opposition to reforms.

By and large the educated elite collaborated in this effort of modernization, while the illiterate villagers accepted what they could not avoid, such as the prohibition of the fez, and ignored what they could, such as the new marriage laws. The intervening years have not significantly narrowed the differences of outlook between the well educated secular minority, and the less welleducated traditional majority.

The need to promote nationalism in the early years of the Republic led to official emphasis on the past achievements of the Turks as a people. Efforts to inspire national pride peaked in the 1930's with the various historical and linguistic theories, which stressed the Turkish historical contribution. For example, one theory held that Turkish was the mother language of many other languages of the world (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Since then, more moderate assessments of the country's heritage have been advanced.

Officially disavowed, Pan-Turanism and Turkism still claim adherents today, but their influence in Republican Turkey declined after 1943-44. Pan-Turanism developed in the 19th century as a proposed solution to the problems of the faltering Ottoman Empire. Its goal was the creation of a state encompassing the Turkish peoples living from Eastern Europe to China. PanTurkism, a related ideology, emphasizes Turkishness but its goals are less specific. It was an influential school of thought during the Young Turk period (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The early leaders of the Republic renounced any plans of foreign expansion. One consequence of this action was eased relations with the Soviet Union, which feared attempts to incite and detach its Turkish minority. Relations with Eastern European countries,

which also contained Turkish minorities, were also facilitated. Pan-Turkism, however, did enjoy some influence in the 1930's and the 1940's, when it came to reflect some of the racist theories of the Nazis. The German defeat and government action against adherents diminished its appeal. Nonetheless, there is widespread popular interest in Turks settled in various parts of the world. The Cyprus dispute with Greece also promotes the survival of Pan-Turkism, for popular sympathy lies with the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Both the educational system and compulsory military service are important institutions for the transmission of national ideals. Compulsory military service is particularly important because it removes men from their villages and exposes them to new persons and places. Military service often remains a treasured memory throughout the person's lifetime. Advances in communications, such as the expansion of the road system and the spread of the radio, also contribute to a sense of national identity (see ch. 16, Public Information).

Kemal Atatürk, architect of independence and victor at Gallipoli in World War I, is the preeminent national hero. A prominent element in Turkish nationalism is pride in past military victories. The most recent addition to this history was the distinguished contribution of Turkish troops in Korea (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT

The state is gradually assuming a social service role in addition to its other functions. While villagers had few contacts with the representatives of government before World War II, the state has since become less remote by virtue of the increased scope of its activities and improvements in communications.

Political liberalization after 1946 brought with it a political voice for the people. In the first free elections, those of 1950, the Democrat Party swept to victory over the Republican People's Party, which had provided national leadership since the founding of the Republic. The multiparty system offered an outlet for dissatisfactions concerning many aspects of Turkish life. For example, businessmen sought more leeway for personal initiative and many Turks wanted restrictions on religious practices relaxed. In power the Democrat Party did loosen economic controls and proved sympathetic to the needs of the rural villagers. As economic problems such as inflation developed in the mid-1950's and criticism of the government mounted, the Democrat Party began to curtail such liberties as freedom of the press and used its governmental powers against its political opponents. These actions and

an insufficient response to economic needs alienated many intellectuals and urban elements. Rural areas, however, were largely unaffected by disaffection, for liberty of the press and similar rights had little meaning for the villagers, who knew that, despite the inflation, they were more prosperous than ever before.

Disaffection with the Democrat Party rule led to public demonstrations in the cities and the military coup of May 27, 1960. The military ousted the Democrat Party in the name of democracy, the nation, and the constitution. Democrat Party leaders were tried and the party apparatus dismantled. The coup was unopposed, but its leaders found themselves confronted by demands for a return to civilian government and the persistence of proDemocrat sympathies in rural areas. Those coup leaders who wanted to prolong military rule were ousted from the ruling committee and a relatively fast and smooth return to democratic government was engineered (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics).

A new constitution was drafted (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Its approval by 61.5 percent of the votes cast (49.8 percent of the electorate) was one indication that the principles of the May Revolution were not uniformly popular. Criticism of the coup was muted by the law for Preventive Measures of March 1962. This legislation established penalties for criticism of the 1960 Revolution or praise of either the ousted government or preKemalist regimes. The memory of the 1960 military intervention is still quite fresh, especially for leaders of the Justice Party, which replaced the dissolved Democrat Party.

In general the people acquiesce in the actions of the government, which they tend to conceive of in a military manner. Political changes since World War II have, however, modified the situation. First, contacts with government officials have become more common in the past 20 years. Second, the political parties and their wooing of the electorate offers a means to influence the operation of the bureaucratic machinery. In the rural areas partisan affiliations are strongly influenced by kinship and village ties, but the villager is now aware that he can use his vote to affect his future.

At present the Justice Party governs, having won a majority in the 1965 elections. Any dissatisfaction is more likely to be found within the elites clustered in the cities than among the villagers -an understandable outcome of intraelite competition for power (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Groups counted among the elite include intellectuals, such as professors and professionals, military officers, bureaucrats, middle-class businessmen, and politicians with local roots. The leadership of the country is drawn from these groups.

ISLAM AND POLITICS

Although the modifications of the religious reforms were made more than 15 years ago, religion continues to be a political issue if measured by the number of words either spoken or written on the subject (see ch. 11, Religion). It is the secular elite that keeps the issue alive, in part through fear of an attack on the secularism of the state and in part because it lends itself to political contention. The persistence of the discussion reflects the divisions between rural and urban areas and the competition within the elite for political power and popular influence.

Many of the Turks who fought in the War for Independence regarded that conflict as a holy war against the infidel invaders. After the conclusion of the conflict these same people were not opposed to the abolition of the Caliphate, an office discredited by collaboration with foreigners and acceptance of the Treaty of Sèvres. Further changes initiated by Kemal Atatürk did not meet with the same approval, but he had sufficient power to silence his opponents and implement his programs aimed at nationalism, modernization, and Westernization (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Many of the Kemalist reforms affected the place of Islam in the society and the state (see ch. 11, Religion). Even changes which were not specifically religious had their religious dimension. For example, the substitution of the Latin alphabet for the Arabic script had wide implications. Not only were the new letters better adapted to Turkish sounds and considered easier to teach, but the reform made Arabic Moslem neighbors more remote and the Ottoman past less accessible. It was a step which brought closer together Turkey and the West. Finally, the Arabic script, in the minds of many villagers and religious leaders, was holy while the new alphabet was profane. To them, education was by definition religious education and its desired object the teaching of the Koran.

The Kemalist reforms were fully carried out in the cities, where they were adopted by the elite and where the government exercised close control, but their immediate impact declined as one moved to the more remote areas of Anatolia. In the first 20 years of the Republic the bulk of the villages remained more or less closed units in which people lived according to tradition. Islam was the most important and pervasive element in this tradition. Piety won the respect of one's neighbors and hocas (religious leaders) were admired (see ch. 11, Religion). Subsequently, new influences have entered the villages and communication with urban areas increased, but the place of Islam in the countryside remains substantially unchanged.

When the villager acquired a political voice, he expressed his desire to see religious restrictions relaxed. Therefore, religious