the record and files in said cause now in this office." tificate also contained the following: The cer "I further certify that, through an omission or error of the clerk, the order of the court entered on the 19th day of the term was never properly transcribed on the record of the proceedings of that term, but upon the 19th day the following order was entered by the clerk. Cause heard. Decree." Later the same clerk issued a certificate as follows: "State of Illinois, County of Macon. "I, John Allen, clerk of the circuit court and ex-officio recorder of deeds, in and for the county of Macon, state of Illinois, de hereby certify that as clerk of the circuit court I am the custodian of all the records and files thereof and as such clerk of the circuit court do certify the foregoing to be a true, perfect, and complete copy of what purports to be a decree in the case number 5243, where Hiram L. Douglas is complainant and Elizabeth Douglas is defendant, as same appears from the record and files in said cause now in this office in manner and form as herein described. The same is unsigned and never did bear the signature of the presiding judge and never was recorded or filed. About January 1st, 1908, I caused the said decree to be transcribed upon the records of the proceedings of the circuit court of Macon county, and the same is now transcribed at length in Book 49 at page 220 of the records of the proceedings of the circuit court of Macon county. I further certify that I caused the said decree to be transcribed but no order of court directing me to transcribe said decree was ever made or entered. The judge of the circuit court who heard the cause and the clerk who was at that time clerk of the circuit court are long since dead. "In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said circuit court at my office at Decatur, Illinois, this 17th day of February, A. D. 1908. "John Allen, "Clerk of the Circuit Court and Ex-Officio Recorder of Deeds." All these certificates were introduced in evidence, but the court refused to consider the last certificate above copied. It Opinion Per MOUNT, J. [53 Wash. is contended by the appellant that the decree of divorce was void, (1) because it was not entered or filed of record when it was rendered; (2) because the court had no jurisdiction of the appellant, and (3) because the decree was obtained by fraud. . Conceding that, under the statutes of Illinois, a decree is not effective until it is entered and recorded, and also that these certificates are competent to prove the facts, the certificate first issued shows such facts, for it says: "The foregoing is a true and perfect copy of a decree entered having been made from the records." It is true the certificates issued later contradict the earlier one, to the effect that the decree was recorded and filed, but the certificates taken together clearly show that this result was by omission or error of the clerk. The duty of the clerk was a clerical duty, and his neglect or omission did not, and could not, avoid the decree, which is clearly proven to have been made. The trial court was, therefore, justified in disregarding the later certificate and in considering that as done which ought to have been done. Appellant next contends that the courts of Illinois had no jurisdiction to grant the decree of divorce upon substituted service, because the matrimonial domicile of the parties remained in the state of Michigan with the wife, and therefore the Illinois decree is not entitled to full faith and credit in this state. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, is relied upon to support this doctrine. It is probably true that this court would not be bound by the Illinois judgment, but clearly the courts of this state, as a matter of comity, may recognize the Illinois, decree, under the rule of Haddock v. Haddock, supra. Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079. The record in this case shows that Mr. Douglas had been a resident of Illinois some three years prior to the time he brought his action for divorce, and under the law of that state the court had jurisdiction of the case in rem. The di vorce was granted more than forty years before this action was begun. It is true, the appellant testified that she did not know of the divorce until long after the death of Mr. Douglas, and only a few months prior to the bringing of this action. This statement, however, is contradicted by the daughter, who testified that she and her mother had discussed the fact of divorce many years ago. Under these circumstances the decree at this late date ought to import verity, especially where it is a valid decree where rendered. Appellant also insists that the decree was obtained by fraud, by reason of the fact that the action was brought against appellant under the name of Elizabeth Douglas, when her true name was Hannah Elizabeth Douglas and that the action was based upon abandonment by the wife, while the fact was that Mr. Douglas abandoned the appellant. The evidence shows, and the court found, that the appellant was commonly known by the name of Elizabeth Douglas. Service by that name was therefore sufficient. There was evidence offered in this case to show that Mr. Douglas was at fault and abandoned his wife. The evidence taken in the divorce case, which was preserved and certified in the record, shows the opposite. We are not inclined to disturb the judgment of the trial court upon this state of the evidence, especially where the judgment is of such long standing and where one of the parties to it is dead. We find no error in the record, and the order appealed from is therefore affirmed. ALL CONCUR. [No. 7357. Decided May 28, 1909.] WASHINGTON DREDGING & IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Respondents.1 Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurston county, Linn, J., entered November 30, 1907. Affirmed. Shepard & Flett, Thomas M. Vance, and Will H. Thompson, for appellant. G. E. de Steiguer et al., for respondents. See ante p. 346. PER CURIAM.-This action involves the same issues, judgment, and assignments of error as No. 7358, in which an opinion has been filed on this date, ante p. 346, 101 Pac. 884. On the authority of that opinion, the judgment is affirmed. [No. 7743. Decided June 28, 1909.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Plaintiff, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al., Respondents.2 Certiorari to review an order of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered October 7, 1908. Reversed. H. H. Field and Geo. W. Korte, for relator. PER CURIAM.-The question in this case is substantially identical with that submitted in the case of Chicago, Milwaukee etc. R. Co. v. Tacoma R. & P. Co., ante p. 682, 102 Pac. 778, and for the reasons therein stated the order sought to be reviewed is reversed, with instructions to enter a new order of condemnation in the form of the first order, omitting its fifth condition. 'Reported in 101 Pac. 885. 'Reported in 102 Pac. 780. INDEX. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL: Judgment of dismissal as bar to another action, see DIVORCE, 1, 2. Effect of election of remedy, see ELECTION OF KEMEDIES. Judgment as bar in another action, see JUDGMENT, 2, 6-9. ABSENCE: Presumption of death from, see DEATH. ABUTTING OWNERS: Assessments for expenses of public improvements, see MUNICIPAL ACCEPTANCE: Refusal to accept as waiver of objections to tender, see TENDER. ACCIDENT: Injuries to passenger or person on or near tracks, see CARRIERS, 6-10. Injuries to servant, see MASTER AND SERVANT. Injuries caused by defects or obstructions in streets or other public ACCOMPLICES: Testimony, see CRIMINAL LAW, 2. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION: Compromises by mutual concessions and agreements for settlement, ACTION: Review of error in consolidating actions as dependent on objection Right of assignee on assignment of contract, see ASSIGNMENTS. On negotiable instruments, see BILLS AND NOTES. Against carrier for loss of or injury to live stock, see CARRIERS, 3-5. Between members and corporation, see CORPORATIONS, 1-3. Against foreign corporations, see CORPORATIONS, 10, 11. Breach of covenants of warranty, see COVENANTS. Right of plaintiff to voluntary nonsuit, see DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT, |