those of the Ninety-second Illinois. Wagner's followed immediately from the north side of the river.

Thus, in three weeks, Rosecrans had repeated his Tullahoma campaign on a greater scale, through a well-nigh barren country, crowded with military obstacles of the most formidable character, and compelled the enemy to evacuate its mountain stronghold. This, too, had been accomplished with a total loss of less than 100 men, most of this occurring in the cavalry operations, and mainly in Minty's command.

Upon leaving Chattanooga, Polk's and Hill's Corps marched. by Rossville and Lee and Gordon's Mill to La Fayette, reaching the latter point on the 8th. Walker's and Buckner's Corps withdrew from Tyner's Station and points on the river above it, by way of Graysville, toward La Fayette, while the forces at Hiwassee and Chickamauga Station moved by way of Ringgold. Cleburne's Division was thrown forward into the gaps of Pigeon Mountain. Gen. Bragg had not moved his headquarters beyond Lee and Gordon's, and on the night of the 9th he issued orders for an advance of Hindman's and Cleburne's Divisions to begin at midnight against the head of Gen. Thomas' column, which had reached Davis' Cross-roads from Stevens' Gap.

CHAPTER III.

BRAGG IN MCLEMORE'S COVE-ROSECRANS' CONCENTRATION.

The generalship of Bragg in withdrawing from Chattanooga was speedily developed. The strategy of Rosecrans had compelled the abandonment of the city, but the method of executing it gave promise of serious work for the Union forces. With his main body at La Fayette, and his right behind the point of Pigeon Mountain, a few miles south of Lee and Gordon's Mill, Bragg looked out through Blue Bird, Dug, and Catlett's Gaps directly upon the head of Rosecrans' center column, then descending Lookout at Stevens' Gap. It was twenty miles to Crittenden's Corps at Rossville, while McCook's Corps, in the vicinity of Alpine and Summerville, was altogether beyond supporting distance. Crook's Cavalry Division with this column had pushed to within three miles of La Fayette. As has been heretofore noted, the positions of the only roads, or rather trails, over Lookout, practicable for an army, compelled this separation of the several corps while crossing.

At midnight of September 9th, Bragg ordered Hindman's Division, then at Lee and Gordon's Mill, to march at daylight to Davis' Cross-roads, at the intersection of the road from La Fayette through Dug Gap to Stevens' Gap. Gen. Hill was at the same time ordered to send Cleburne's Division, then in the gaps in front of La Fayette, to make a junction with Hindman at the cross-roads, and both were to attack the troops of Gen. Thomas, then advancing from Stevens' Gap.

Had these orders been promptly and vigorously executed, Negley's Division would have been met at that point, and in

all probability overwhelmed, since his nearest support, Baird's Division, only succeeded after a very hard day's work in reaching the foot of the mountain at 10 P. M. of the Ioth.

But Hill sent word that the gaps had been so obstructed by felled timbers that they could not be cleared in less than twenty-four hours. Bragg then, at 10 o'clock of September 10th, ordered Buckner's Corps of two divisions to follow Hindman and attack with him. Hindman, however, halted his command at Morgan's, three miles north of Davis' Cross Roads, and Buckner joined him there on the afternoon of the 10th, the united column being in the immediate vicinity of Negley, who was isolated. To hasten the attack on the Union center, Gen. Bragg moved his headquarters to La Fayette, reaching there in person at midnight of the 10th, and at once directing Walker's Corps to join Cleburne's Division at Dug Gap and unite in the attack. At daylight of the 11th, Bragg himself proceeded to Cleburne's position. The day was spent till the middle of the afternoon in listening for Hindman's expected attack. Meantime, at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 11th, Gen. Baird's Division had joined Negley's at the cross-roads. Repeated orders from Bragg to Hindman's column to move forward did not secure an attack until the middle of the afternoon. Gen. Hindman was awaiting co-operation from Gen. Hill, and deemed the force reported in front of him too strong for his column. Under the skillful assistance of Gen. Baird, and the sagacious dispositions of Gen. Negley, their divisions were extricated after sharp fighting, and withdrew to the base of Lookout. The speedy arrival of Brannan's and Reynolds' Divisions rendered the Union center secure.

Gen. Bragg, deeply disappointed at the failure of his projected attack upon the Union center, turned promptly toward Crittenden's Corps, the Union left. Polk's and Walker's Corps were withdrawn to La Fayette, and moved immediately toward Lee and Gordon's Mill. At this time, Critten

den's Corps was divided, one division having been sent to Ringgold. On the evening of September 12th, Polk was directed to attack Crittenden at daylight of the 13th. At midnight of the 12th, Polk dispatched that he had taken a strong defensive position, and asked for reinforcements. He was informed that his force exceeded the enemy's, and again ordered to attack at daylight. In addition, he was notified that Buckner's Corps would early be moved within supporting distance. Promptly on the 13th, Gen. Bragg rode to the front, to find that no attack had been made on Crittenten, and that the latter had united his forces, recrossed the Chickamauga, and taken a strong position at Lee and Gordon's Mill. This result caused another keen disappointment to Gen. Bragg, but reinforcements having arrived from Mississippi and Virginia, he promptly decided to move down the Chickamauga to points well below Crittenden's position, cross the river, interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, and attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's. This latter corps was then the left of Rosecrans, and Bragg's plan was to drive it back upon the Union center, which was still in McLemore's Cove in front of Stevens' Gap, and force the Union army into the mountains.

When Gen. Rosecrans discovered, September 11th, that the Confederate rear guard had not moved south of Lee and Gordon's, and that Bragg's left was firmly established near that point, he saw that the latter was concentrating for battle. He therefore abandoned his offensive movements against Bragg which had been in progress upon the theory that he was retreating to Rome, and began most active work to concentrate his own army between Bragg and Chattanooga. he declared in his official report, it had become a matter of life and death to accomplish this. On this day, September 11th, when the supreme effort of his campaign began, he received a telegram from Gen. Halleck at Washington saying that it was there reported that a portion of Bragg's army was reinforcing Lee, and that it was important to ascertain the

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