the annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report provided to Congress on February 13, 1989.

Reserve Component Command and Control

Question: Would the Reserve Forces have better results if there was a direct line of command from the Chief of Staff to the Reserve components? Wouldn't this be more in line with the Air Force and the intent of Public Law 90-168 (Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967)?

Mr. Duncan: In his December 1988 letter to the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee expressed his concern about the Army Reserve's separate and distinct chains of command control. As a result, the Secretary of the Army ordered an Army Reserve Command and Control Study, the results of which are due in late summer.

I have formed no personal opinion on this issue yet, but I am anxious to see the results of the study. The Services have sufficiently different needs that we should be reluctant to impose the Naval Reserve or Air Force Reserve chain of command on the Army merely for purposes of uniformity, but it is obvious that much more is being asked of the Army Reserve today, than was the case when the present structure was adopted.

Question: One colonel expressed his view of the Reserve component as: "For the most part, they will never be as ready as the Active force and we should not expect them to be since they only train a fraction of the time as the Active troops. We should continue to upgrade them and make them as good as they can be within their finite limits because, if we ever need them, they are better than draftees with no training." What is your view of this opinion?

Mr. Duncan: It is absurd for someone to cite a single, unnamed officer's opinion on an issue this complex as evidence of anything. Certainly, I do not share his views. It is obvious that National Guard and Reserve are infinitely better than draftees. Currently, our Reserve components are more ready than ever before in the peacetime history of the country. Every day of the year National Guardsmen and Reservists are successfully performing important missions somewhere in the world. In direct competitions involving teams from the Active and Reserve components, the Reserve component participants hold their own and often win. The Reserve component units, which perform in exercises like Red Flag and REFORGER, train at the National Training Center or train overseas, and they continually receive high grades from their Active evaluators.

The Reserve components have historically been considered particularly strong in aviation and maintenance skills. An Army National Guard AH-64 battalion recently was formed and it successfully completed Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) ong before it was expected.

Although each year the training time difference between Active and Reserve forces is large, there are certain factors in the Reserve component environment that help reduce this time-disparity impact. These key members of units tend to remain in the unit for years and provide continuity not normally found in Active units. These key members usually spend much more than 39 days training. For example, according to a study in the Army National Guard, the average officer is paid for the equivalent of more than 70 training days each year. Enlisted members average almost 50 paid training days. In addition, many officers and enlisted members donate time to help improve unit performance. The result is that a significant amount of training, above and beyond the required 39 days of unit training, often is overlooked.

Question:

Reserve Component Missions

Has the Army made a mistake in allocating a significant number of missions to the Reserve Component that require an early deployment date, even when these same units are not properly trained or equipped?

Mr. Duncan: It is the clear policy of the Department of Defense to give resources first to early deploying units. There has been uneven implementation of that policy by the Army. It is a fact still, that certain later deploying combat units (which happen to be Active units) are more ready than certain early deploying support units (which are often Reserve units). We have taken steps to correct this problem.

Question: The example of the Navy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf certainly raises questions about having a large percentage of a particular operational capability in the Reserves, but it also raises questions about the viability of the Total Force concept. In your opinion, why weren't the Reserves used to man those ships and should the Department be reviewing those capabilities that are primarily in the Reserves for transfer back to the Active force?

Mr. Duncan: I agree that the Services should be reluctant to assign certain missions exclusively to the Reserve forces, especially critically important missions that may require immediate response on very short notice. I do not agree that the minesweeper issue raises serious questions about the wisdom of the Total Force Policy. That Policy seeks the most effective integration of Active and Reserve forces, using the strengths of each. It assumes that Reserve forces will constitute the primary augmentation for Active forces in circumstances of conflict. Certainly, Reservists must be ready for immediate mobilization, but it is the Navy's view that the circumstances of the minesweeper issue were unique in that the secrecy of the mission (when it was commenced) prevented an involuntary callup, and the urgency of the mission restricted the Navy's ability to contact Reserve volunteers.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEFENSE-WIDE O&M ACCOUNTS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 1989.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Earl Hutto (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. EARL HUTTO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. HUTTO. The Subcommittee on Readiness will please come to order.

Today the subcommittee will receive testimony presenting the overview of the defense-wide O&M accounts. Mr. John A. Flinn, Director of the Office of Operations, Office of the Department of Defense, will present the testimony. He is also accompanied by Lt. Gen. Charles McCausland, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency; Mr. Hector Nevarez, Director of Dependents Support Policy; and Dr. Bart Lagomarsino for the DOD Dependent Schools. This meeting today is particularly important because it puts the entire readiness or operations and maintenance account into perspective. For fiscal year 1990 the budget level is $91.8 billion and in fiscal year 1991 $95.5 billion.

There are some increases and program growth. However, there are some serious concerns when you look at what happens to this account in terms of the 5-year plan. Serious reductions are projected, and we will begin to see shortfalls in the next budget year.

Recently there have been articles appearing in newspapers which call for cutting readiness. This subcommittee must be alert to any efforts that reduce readiness-related funding.

I hope that as you present your testimony today that you inform the subcommittee of the major or macro decisions which affected the formulation of the fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1991 budget. We want to know what the orders of priority are. You need to identify where program growth occurs and where reductions take place and explain why.

The Defense Logistics Agency was invited because it experienced the largest decline in program growth of any defense agency. On the other hand, the DOD Dependent Schools experienced the largest increase.

The subcommittee has a number of new members, Mr. Flinn, so I would ask that you spend a few minutes explaining how the budget process works and how the O&M portion is pulled together.

You should also explain your programs and define such terms as price growth and program growth so that all are understood. Because Mr. Kasich is not able to be with us at this moment, Mr. Machtley will present Mr. Kasich's his statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD K. MACHTLEY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND

Mr. MACHTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your remarks. I want to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Flinn of the DOD Comptroller Office; Lieutenant General McCausland, and our new Director of DLA; Mr. Navarez, Director for the Dependent Support Policy; and Dr. Lagomarsino representing the Department of Defense Dependent Schools.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this morning's hearing gives this subcommittee, and particularly its new members, an overview of why the readiness account is important. While I understand there are final figures pending the detailed budget submission of the new administration, it already appears that there are reductions in some areas of readiness.

In particular, the training and operational tempos may be experiencing funding shortfalls. If the O&M account must take additional reductions in order to conform to the new administration's revised budget, we may see the beginning of a decline in the combat readiness of our Armed Services.

In the past, the O&M account has taken some fairly substantial reductions even when there was general agreement that readiness was "sacrosanct". Recently, however, there have been statements in the press to the effect that readiness spending should be the first to be reduced. If this subcommittee is to make the case for readiness to Congress, our witnesses must give us a thorough understanding of why readiness matters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.