Mr. HUTTO. The subcommittee stands adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning when we will meet in room 2337. [Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene the following day, Thursday, February 23, 1988, in room 2337, at a time previously specified.] ARMY GUARD AND RESERVE READINESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 23, 1989. The_subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room 2337, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Earl Hutto (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. STATEMENT OF HON. EARL HUTTO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. HUTTO. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Readiness will please come to order. Today, the subcommittee will receive testimony from witnesses concerning the readiness of the Army National Guard and Reserve. Since these components are critical elements of the Army's "Total Force" concept their readiness, or lack of it, directly reflects the current state of how this concept is working. The "total force" policy was developed with the creation of the All Volunteer Force, and under this policy reservists, rather than draftees, became the initial and primary source of personnel to augment the active forces in military emergencies. Under this concept, the reserves are to be equal partners on and off the battlefield, and must be as ready as their active counterparts. The impact of this policy is reflected in the fact that the Guard and Reserves provide almost 50 percent of the Army's personnel strength. They comprise 36 percent of the Army's combat divisions and 57 percent of its armored cavalry regiments. These increased missions have also meant increased funding, with reserve component budgets rising to $20 billion in 1988 from $8 billion in 1980. Recent studies, however, have questioned whether the "Total Force" concept is viable, and, in fact, may be "Mission Impossible" for part-time soldiers. Several General Accounting Office studies have found the readiness of the Guard and Reserve to be inadequate, and called into question their capability to be effective components within the "Total Force" concept. This is a timely hearing because a number of proposals are surfacing that would push more missions into the reserve components. Several Members of Congress and the Department are studying the feasibility of deactivating Army divisions and giving the missions to the Guard and Reserves. It seems to me that these studies are assuming that the reserve components are presently capable of performing their current missions. I think today's testimony will show that the reserve components now have major problems in perform ing their assigned missions, and we should go slowly before assigning additional tasks to them. I would like now to ask Mr. Hefley for his statement, on behalf of Mr. Kasich, who could not be here with us at this time. Mr. Hefley. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KASICH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER (AS READ BY REPRESENTATIVE JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO) Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kasich is tied up in a budget hearing, so, if I might, I would like to submit his statement for the record. I would like to thank Chairman Hutto for the opportunity to address the important issue of Army National Guard and Reserve readiness and the role these forces will play in the Army's Total Force concept. I would also like to welcome Mr. Davis and the rest of the GAO panel, and Mr. Green and Mr. Duncan from the Department of Defense. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense will be faced with severe budgetary constraints over the next several years. I have heard estimates by the chairmen of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1994 5-Year Defense Plan may be as much as $400 billion underfunded. Given what has already happened to the defense budget since fiscal year 1986, I believe predictions of further cuts are only being realistic. Inevitably, there will be proposals to save funds by moving portions of the Army's active component into the Guard and Reserve. The question that faces us today is whether such a strategy is the right way to go, or whether the Guard and Reserve have already been burdened with so many missions that readiness is negatively affected. The GAO's recent studies on this issue have already questioned Army Guard and Reserve readiness and the capability of these units to be effective components of the total force. The GAO's opinion is shared by the CINCs. I recall that in a 1987 hearing of the Defense Policy Panel, General Crist, CINCCENT, and Admiral Hayes, CINCPAC, both stated very forcefully that one of their biggest war-fighting headaches was the lack of combat support and combat service support from the Guard and Reserve components. These problems are coming to our attention at the same time the budget ax is falling. The Department of Defense needs to issue better guidance on whether it is even feasible to continue to maintain 18 active Army divisions in the current budgetary climate if our reserve component is unable to sustain them. Mr. Chairman, I hope our witnesses today will be able to give us a better understanding of these problems, and more important, can suggest a course of action to this subcommittee. The budgetary situation means that trade-offs are going to have to be made. Our job is to make these trade-offs responsibly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Hefley. We are pleased to have with us from the General Accounting Office today Mr. Richard A. Davis, the Director of Army Issues, accompanied by Mr. Robert J. Lane, Assistant Director, Army Issues; Mr. Charles Bonanno, Assistant Director, Army Issues; and Mr. David Warren, Assistant Director, Manpower and Logistics Issues. Welcome. Mr. Davis, you may proceed as you see fit. STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, ARMY ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J. LANE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ARMY ISSUES; CHARLES BONANNO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ARMY ISSUES; DAVID WARREN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement I would like to have entered into the record, and, if you would, I would just like to summarize that. Mr. HUTTO. Without objection, your complete statement will be entered into the record, and we would appreciate your summarizing. Also I might say that we will continue in open session for a period of time, maybe 20, 30 minutes or so, and then we will probably go into closed session. Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. In coming years the Department of Defense will be faced with budget constraints. One of the alternatives that it will likely consider is reducing the size of the active forces. If the active forces are reduced, however, the question arises as to who will perform the mission previously performed by the active forces? Should the roles and missions of the reserve forces be increased to offset reductions in the active forces? Since 1980, in an attempt to hold down defense costs, the Department of Defense (DOD) has steadily increased the size of its reserves and the number of missions assigned to them. Between 1980 and 1988 the reserves increased by about 289,000 persons. As of fiscal year 1988, the reserves represented about 35 percent of the total force. This growth in reserve forces is likely to continue because they are less costly to maintain than active forces. Although it may be cost effective to increase the roles and missions of the reserves, a balance must be maintained between the costs-benefits and military effectiveness. The focus of my testimony will be on the difficulties that DOD faces concerning reserve components. A full understanding of these issues will allow leaders to make informed decisions regarding whether to increase the roles and missions of the Reserves. In the early 1970s, with the end of the draft and the beginning of the All Volunteer Force, DOD adopted the "total force" policy. This policy provides that reservists, rather than draftees, will be the initial and primary source of personnel to augment the active forces, particularly the early deploying forces, in a military emergency. According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, reserve components of the armed forces are to be equal partners to their active force counterparts in peacetime as well as wartime, and must be as ready as their active force counterparts. Over the past several years the quality, training and equipment of the reserves have improved significantly, and reserves are in |