Question. Colonel Montgomery and Colonel Cook: up or down? Is circulation Circulation It Colonel Montgomery: Circulation at PS&S is up. had fallen for 15 months in a row (relative to the same month the previous year) when I arrived in September of 1986. Circulation has turned around, and has now risen for 16 of the last 19 months. was up 8% at the end of 1988 over December of 1986. A levelling off has been noted in the past few months, however, but appears due primarily to an increased abort rate on MAC flights that carry the paper to the Philippines and Okinawa, with a resultant loss in sales in those areas. MAC is used for those routes instead of commercial aircraft in order to save appropriated funds. Colonel Cook: Circulation has averaged 130,000 - 135,000 over the past three years. There have not been significant fluctuations in circulation figures during that period. Question. Colonel Montgomery and Colonel Cook: Are there plans to include color in the Stars and Stripes? Colonel Montgomery: PS&S uses color routinely on the front and back pages of the newspaper, in the color Sunday comics, and in the new Sunday magazine. The rebuilt press programmed for purchase this year will expand our color capability to other pages in the newspaper. Colonel Cook: We use spot color in Europe but presently do not have the capability to do four color work. We are currently in the procurement process for an offset four color deck to supplement our current printing press which is over 20 years old. We expect to have this capability after the lengthy building process necessary to erect a press of this type (which typically takes approximately 30 months following contract award). Question. Colonel Montgomery and Colonel Cook: Does career military officer training adequately prepare officers for the task of running a newspaper like the Stars and Stripes? Colonel Montgomery: Certain career patterns in the military would of course prepare one better than others, but the overall answer is 'yes'. A career officer having had command should have the leadership and management skills needed to run a multi-million dollar business. (The budget of an Air Force wing commander and the number of his personnel, for example, greatly exceed that of a Stripes Commander/Editor in Chief.) Although the Editor in Chief does not lay out copy or crop photos, he must have an excellent knowledge of writing and editing in order to oversee the paper. Public affairs experience or staff experience at the major command level should therefore be required. A thorough knowledge of the profession of arms and of the military readership is essential. Experience with overseas conditions and in dealing with foreign officials is also important. At least half a year with a major newspaper (as part of the Air Force program Working with Industry') would be an extremely beneficial addition to the officer's preparation once selected --and I have recommended this course of action to American Forces Information Service. Colonel Cook: The training I received as an officer prepared me for many of the responsibilities I hold in managing a large business and daily newspaper. I believe the officers selected for the position of Editor-in-Chief should also receive specialized "Training with Industry" at a reputable daily newspaper in the United States in order to become familiar with certain unique areas such as circulation, printing and composition, advertising newspaper management and to see first-hand how a modern daily newspaper selects news, edits it, displays it, and deals with day-to-day concerns of readers. A graduate or undergraduate degree in journalism and print media journalism experience should be mandatory prerequisites in my opinion. Business education and/or experience should be mandatory at either the Editor-in-Chief or Deputy Editorin-Chief level. Question. Colonel Montgomery and Colonel Cook: How often do you get into disputes with reporters over your handling of a story? Do you encourage openness among your reporters? Colonel Montgomery: Differences of opinion with reporters are relatively rare because I have little direct contact with them. Occasionally, there have been stories sent back to the bureaus for additional work to get both sides to an issue; this happened more often when I first arrived, but now occurs only once every few weeks. (The thoroughness of our reporting has improved.) Differences of opinion with other editors are less rare, but over 99% of the editorial decisions at the paper are made under civilian supervision. I and/or my Deputy do not get involved with the news selection process until the daily editorial staff meeting where a 'budget' of all the stories proposed for that day's 'live' pages is reviewed. Discussions of the stories are the purpose of the meeting, but changes to the budget are infrequent say, twice a week or less and not all the changes come from the military editors. - - Colonel Cook: I have many discussions with editors on story content and approach but relatively few directly with reporters. The discussions I do have are professional ones, not adversarial in nature. I believe European Stars and Stripes' reporters find me open to any reasonable suggestion for story ideas, treatment and focus, and I certainly encourage them to talk. Judging by the traffic in and out of my office, I believe they are in no way intimidated by dealing with an Army colonel on editorial matters. Question. Colonel Montgomery and Colonel Cook: The Stars and Stripes has a dual mission of providing for the free flow of news and providing command information. Does your dual mission place you in a no win situation? Colonel Montgomery: No. Although the requirement for an uncensored paper results in the publishing of so-called "bad" news for local commanders, problems do not arise when the news is reported accurately and the issues are presented fairly. Complaints from commanders are the exception, not the rule, and frankly are, more likely than not, well founded. (Mistakes in the newspaper business are not acceptable, but they are not unusual.) - The "no-win" situation confronting an EIC arriving at PS&S to face an already entrenched opposition from civil servants is his inability to make the personnel changes he could make in either an all-military organization or in a normal civilian newsroom. This frustration mounts when his actions are carefully and selectively removed from their proper context, reported under the protection of anonymity, and then investigated by a group that effectively denies him the opportunity to tell his side of the story. Colonel Cook: I have never felt our dual mission places me in a "no-win" situation. I have recommended a number of procedural changes to be included in DoD Instruction 5120.4 and the U.S. Europe Command equivalent directive. These recommendations are to clear up any misunderstandings that may have developed over the years. My job is very challenging but it is certainly not a "no-win" situation, and I am proud of the newspaper and the way we cover the news. Question. Mr. Brackett: Is it your experience that Stars and Stripes reporters are treated differently from other journalists by the commanders? Does stonewalling occur? Mr. Brackett: Yes, in my opinion Pacific Stars and Stripes reporters are frequently treated differently from other journalists. Commanders' public affairs officers tend to view PS&S journalists as part of a military chain of command which they can and do seek to influence for their own purposes. The most common method of exerting influence is to complain to the PS&S commander/editor in chief and/or the unified command about stories or news queries which they find negative or sensitive to their commands. These complaints are then vigorously inquired into by senior management with a resultant "chill effect" on the reporters in question. It has been my personal experience that only a fraction of the complaints lodged by PAOS prove to be justified or partially justified. In the case of honest mistakes, there is very little understanding by PAOS and senior management that daily journalism is an intensely human business; that errors will and do occur. Further, PAOs are not encouraged to lodge their complaints at the bureau chief or senior editor level, but to take them to the highest levels of management at PS&S. Complaints about PS&S stories should be directed to the appropriate bureau or editorial desk level where they can be properly evaluated and effective measures taken. This is seldom done. At PS&S, reportorial errors sometimes have been inflated beyond their true significance in order to achieve other purposes. A classic example of this point is the New Jersey battleship story misquote that occurred in 1986. At a press conference at Misawa Air Base, in northern Japan, a young military reporter thought he heard a U.S. Navy admiral confirm Japanese media reports that the battleship New Jersey would make a port call in Japan. The admiral in fact had not confirmed the port call. Compounding this mistake was the fact that the reporter, the PS&S Misawa bureau chief, had tape recorded the admiral's remarks. In reviewing the tape as he wrote the story, the reporter failed to detect his error. This was a garden variety mistake for young reporters learning their craft. At the time, PS&S editorial was under a unified command imposed prior restraint order not to print anything about the visit of the battleship to Japan. This was the only time the newspaper had been placed under such a prior restraint - a procedure unknown to U.S. journalism since news blackouts are generally understood to be unconstitutional and PS&S senior editors were not properly advised about the restraint or how to execute it. We were not told that the restraint order was given because the information was classified. The Japanese and U.S. media regularly aired the battleship's impending visit and we had carried several stories listing the battleship's other port calls in Asia. Besides, the fact that a ship intends to make a port call at a given location is not normally classified per se. Classification usually occurs only when the port call location and the dates of the visit are linked together. Then too, PS&S had already printed a story on April 26, 1986 announcing the ships visit and accurately giving the month of the visit, August 1986. This information was a pickup from the Japanese news media. The Misawa story did not appear on page one, but on page 16, well into the back of the paper's news section. Nor did the misquote lead the story. It came in the penultimate paragraph and was only a partial remark included in a larger statement. To any experienced editor or PAO, this placement by the reporter, demonstrates conclusively the value he placed on this particular bit of information and underscores the honesty of the mistake made. Had the mistake been willful, either on the part of the reporter or the editors who handled the story, it is logical to assume this information would have been given greater placement prominence. It is common journalistic practice to place less significant information near the end of a story to make editorial cuts, if needed, easier for desk editors. Also, and this is important to note, the reporter did not give the date of the battleship's visit, he simply said "soon. " It is evident from the above that accusations that the paper printed classified information in this episode are little more than self-serving nonsense. Certainly at the time of the aggressive complaining by the PAOs about the story, no one was charging that classified information had been printed. The complaint was strictly that we had broken the illicit prior restraint order imposed by the Pacific Command PAO. The story it was little more than a rather dull press conference report was passed into print by both the local reporting editors and those on the news desk. This occurred because the editors had not been properly informed by the military officers at PS&S about the order or how to effect it (the deputy commander, Lt. Col. Kelley, and the deputy editor in chief, Lt. Cmdr. Griffin, had responsibility for implementing the order). For example, before this incident, I was not informed by anyone that a prior restraint order was in effect and I was then the acting managing editor of the newspaper. This is valid proof of how poorly the restraint order was promulgated to the editorial staff by senior management. I spoke to several editors about the restraint order, asking them for their understanding of what we were being told to do. Each gave me a different answer, none of them correct as it developed. There was so much confusion on this point that I finally approached Lt. Col. Kelley, learned the details and typed a formal directive to the editorial staff spelling out the New Jersey policy. I have a copy of this directive if you would care to read it. I believe management did not put the policy in writing earlier because they knew it was a direct violation of the DoD charter and therefore did not want a written record. The prior restraint order certainly was not effected according to the DoD charter. The results of this very honest mistake by a young reporter came almost as fast as the inflation of the error by the complaining PAOs. I was ordered to give the reporter a written warning. Colonel Stevenson was reluctant to have me do this, in large measure I think because he fully realized that the PAO complaints were not about the misquote, but rather deliberate sniping at him and his stewardship of PS&S by certain PAOs who wanted him removed. Stevenson tried very hard to operate an honest newspaper and not tamper with the news. In my judgment that is the main reason he was fired. The Misawa news bureau was ordered closed and has not been reopened despite the fact that we have 15,000 servicemen and dependents stationed there, their activities largely unreported on by this newspaper. The reporter was not allowed to report on major stories after this incident because, as Lt. Col. Kelley told me, "PACOM and the Navy don't like him. ་ Despite a very promising military career, this young reporter decided to separate from the Army because of the treatment he had received from Stripes senior management and the command PAOs. To my knowledge, the misquote of the admiral was the only mistake he made as a Stripes reporter. It is certainly true that this error would have been handled different had there been no PAOS involved. At any comparable newspaper in the U.S. the matter probably would not have gone above the level of city editor (a middle manager). Stonewalling? YES! Emphatically YES! This is another major difference between PS&S reporters and other external media. It has been a recurring problem during the five years I've worked here. I have a file, a very current file, replete with complaints from bureau chiefs and reporters about inordinate delay in responding to valid news queries from PAOS. Rather than provide you with lengthy examples, I think it would be far more enlightening if you spoke to the reporters themselves, both those now working for PS&S and those who have left the paper. It is hard to get them to stop talking once they begin relating their difficult experiences in trying to gather news from PAOS. This newspaper is not nearly aggressive enough in defending its field reporters from petty complaining and stonewalling by PAOs. Senior management, in my view, is too interested in maintaining good relations with the local commanders and PAOs to protect the recognized interests of its readers to know the facts, fully and promptly. I do not think this attitude of subservience to the commands will end until a qualified civilian editor heads the newspaper. To expect a military officer to confront the command PAOS and demand proper treatment is unrealistic. It is also enlightening to observe management's reaction to complaints about Stripes reporters from PAOS and complaints by reporters about PAOS, especially stonewalling PAOS. Complaints by PAOs receive prompt attention by the highest levels of management reporters and bureau chiefs have been required to produce notebooks, tape recordings and to explain their every action in writing or in person and sometimes both. But complaints by the reporters about PAOs are treated considerably different. They are passed up the chain of command where they are either glibly explained away or not explained at all but simply noted. Reporters are expected to "understand" the problems PAOS have in dealing with the "cumbersome" military bureaucracy or to accept facile rationalizations for delays that are so obviously wrong as to be apparent to anyone. Only when PAOs are caught in the most awkward, compromising positions can reporters expect realistic action. This newspaper's relationship with both PAOS and commands is unhealthy and forced. It is not the sort of relationship that any honest, independent U.S. newspaper would seek to have with any part of its reader constituency. Question. by Commanders? Mr. Brackett: Are the Editors-in-Chief influenced In Mr. Brackett: Yes, commanders, beginning with the Pacific Commander and reaching down through his major commanders in the Pacific and Asia, are the most important influencing factor on the EICS. It would be very instructive to ask Colonel Richard Stevenson if he thinks commanders and their PAOs have influence over EICs. my opinion, commanders and PAOS have sufficient clout to have any EIC removed who does not toe the editorial line they lay down. As long as an officer heads up PS&S and as long as PS&S remains under the operational control of the unified command it will remain that way. Anyone who argues differently either does not understand the military command system or is being deliberately misleading and evasive. It should also be noted that the unified command writes the performance report of the EIC and endorses the performance reports of other officers assigned to PS&S. |