ANSWER: The Naval Reserve has participated fully and meaningfully in the Navy programming and budgeting decision making processes. The Deputy Director of Naval Reserve and the Director of Naval Reserve are assigned to the Program Development Review Committee and Program Review Committee, respectively, through which Navy programs for both the regular and Reserve components are developed. These are flag-level decision-making bodies, as is the CNO Executive Board, or CEB, forum in which we also participate whenever Reserve issues are under consideration. Through these formal coordination, review and decision-making bodies, the Naval Reserve is afforded a full opportunity to participate in program development. The same is true in the budgeting arena in which the Commander, Naval Reserve Force, as a major claimant within the Navy, is a full and active participant in the development and execution of budgets for support of the Naval Reserve. As a result of the above, the Naval Reserve has had the fullest opportunity for continued meaningful involvement in the Department of the Navy decision making and budget process. SHIP REPAIR AND AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE QUESTION: The subcommittee has been somewhat concerned about the steady growth in the Navy and Marine Corps depot maintenance backlogs in recent years and the fact that they are projected to continue to grow in FY 1990 and 1991. Has the growth in these backlogs created any significant problems for the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve readiness or in their ability to fulfill their missions? ANSWER: There is no backlog in the ships maintenance program. Executable aircraft depot maintenance backlogs for the Naval Reserve were first projected to begin in FY 1989. Executable backlog for FY 1990 is currently projected at $31.6 million and $43.1 million in FY 1991. The impact of this backlog is that aircraft will not be available for readiness training while awaiting rework or receipt of modifications necessary to make the aircraft compatable with the active inventory. The backlog will likely result in some deterioration of readiness training, and is a matter of vital importance. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES O&M BUDGET REVIEW HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 14, 1989. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Earl Hutto (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. STATEMENT OF HON. EARL HUTTO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. HUTTO. The Subcommittee on Readiness will come to order. This morning, the subcommittee will continue its hearings on the Readiness budget of the Department of Defense, and, at this time, we will move to a subject that has come under a great deal of congressional oversight during the last few years. Special Operations Forces are, I believe, a critical element of our overall defense strategy. The former chairman of this subcommittee, Dan Daniel of Virginia, also strongly believed in Special Operations Forces; so much so, that he was the original author of legislation that established a separate unified Special Operations Command and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I share Dan Daniel's interest and enthusiasm and will carry on to see that his initial efforts are implemented and that we succeed in providing the Special Operations Forces with all that is necessary to achieve the goals that Congress has set. To bring everyone up to date, let me summarize where I believe we are at this point. In the last Congress, there was legislation enacted that clarified the functions of the Commander of the Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) and to clearly assign to the CINCSOC the responsibility for_preparing and executing budget proposals for Special Operations Forces. Subsequent to this legislation, several Members of both bodies of Congress expressed concern that the Department of Defense may have misinterpreted that legislation, and, in fact, we had a hearing at the end of last year to ascertain just where the Department was on this issue. I am happy to report that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on January 24, 1989, instructed all military departments to fully implement Major Force Program 11 and that CINCSOC was to prepare and begin total execution of this program by fiscal year 1992. Today, I believe that it would be useful for the subcommittee to hear from our witnesses on how they view this implementation. We all recognize that the task CINCSOC has been assigned is new and altogether unique for a unified commander; however, it is my intention to watch the process and to see it through. If there are problems, we want to hear of them. We would also like to hear on how the operations and maintenance budgets for the Special Operations Forces are doing. Everyone would agree that during the past few years and for a few years to come, O&M budgets have been and will be severely strained. We would like to know what effect this budget tightening will have on training, ammunition, spare parts, and other associated SOF operations and equipment will be. Mr. Kasich, our Ranking Minority Member, is not here at this time. But along with being the Ranking Member of this full Subcommittee on Readiness, John was the Ranking Member of the Special Operations Panel in past years. This year we have agreed to oversee the Special Operations Forces from the full subcommittee. The other Members of the subcommittee and I have benefited greatly from his expertise and enthusiasm and look forward to his able assistance as we proceed, and I would at this point ask that his statement be placed into the record. PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. Kasich, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, RANKING MINORITY Member, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE I would like to thank Chairman Hutto for his remarks, and I want to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Russ and Major General Porter, who will review for us the fiscal year 1990 Operations and Maintenance request for the Special Operations Forces. I would also like to express my personal satisfaction at Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft's directive of January 24th regarding the full implementation of Major Force Program 11. This is the sort of result that the late Dan Daniel worked so hard to see achieved. There had been much contention between Congress and DOD over the interpretation of our Special Forces legislation; I am happy to see that those problems have been resolved. World events continue to confirm the fact that low intensity conflict is the major form of conflict we face in the current security environment. That means welltrained Special Operations Forces are crucial to our national security needs. However, we have seen in recent hearings how the constrained budget situation has impacted of the services' readiness goals. Special Operations Forces are even more de pendent on their O&M budgets than the services are for maintaining a high degree of readiness. This subcommittee must ensure that Special Operations Forces receive the resources they need. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HUTTO. We are very pleased to have with us this morning Mr. John Russ, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) from the Department of Defense, and Maj. Gen. William J. Porter, United States Air Forces, the Director of Resources, for the Special Operations Command for the Department of Defense. Gentlemen, we are very pleased that you are here with us this morning. Mr. Russ, you may proceed as you see fit. STATEMENT OF JOHN M. RUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESOURCES), OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT) Mr. Russ. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement and with your permission, I will just have it placed in the record and then I can move on to sort of an overview. Mr. HUTTO. Without objection, that will be done. Your entire statement will be placed in the record. Mr. Russ. Thank you, sir. I think there are three areas that have merit for me to touch on this morning before we get into questioning. Those three areas are basically these: What is the overview of the budget that is now before you and that budget, of course, is Mr. Reagan's submission. It is being looked at now for modification within the building. The second point is to discuss what we've been doing over the last year to execute those dollars that have already been approved. Last, I know there's considerable interest regarding implementation of the clarified legislation that you spoke to just a moment ago. So I would like to move into those three areas and then, of course, give a particular expanse into the readiness portion of the President's budget for MFP-11. Basically, if you compare our budget from fiscal year 1988-1989, you will see a significant increase-it's over a 40 percent increase. As my statement indicates, this is the first symbol and indication that we have stepped up to many of the SOF initiatives that I know you, sir, and others, have been emphasizing for so many years. So if you look at the 1989 program that was approved, it came in at $2.8 billion in the President's Budget and was actually increased after close scrutiny. You'll see that the budget for fiscal year 1989 is at $3.2 billion. This 40 percent increase is being continued into the 1990 program, and you will see that it's basically a flat program at $3.2 billion in the first of the 2 biennial years for which we are now asking authorization and appropriation. In real terms, you will see that it actually represents about a 3.3 percent negative growth rate. These 2 years (1990 and 1991), and the 1989 budget that's been approved last year and, of course, the prior year programs, are essentially the watershed years for MFP-11. As you then will look into 1991-and those of your staff will have looked into the outyears-you notice we then go into a decline situation because of the fact that most of the aircraft programs which drive the overall shape of the funding profile for MFP-11 start coming in behind us as we fulfill our SOF initiatives. The 1991 program in an absolute term relationship to 1990 is actually an 18-percent real growth downturn. The budget will then decline continually into the mid-1990s until we reach about the 1993-1994 period when we again will see an increase. That increase is due to two major causes-again, in the investment area. You will see an increase as we move into the procurement of the CV-22A program following the Marine Corps program. The second portion of it is-and it doesn't show up and hit you too hard-is that you will see an increase in some of the naval platform programs currently in development. So that is the general shape of the curve. The key point is, though, if you look at the watershed years of 1989 and 1990, you will see we are only over slightly 1 percent of the DOD budget request. So there's been a lot of attention on this 1 percent-it still is 1 percent. Then we move, as we look into the decline years, in the neighborhood of about eight-tenths of a percentage point, assuming that we do get the 1990 program that we now have before you essentially intact following your deliberations. The readiness portion of the program has had about a 35 percent increase. It is the area that you're most interested in here today. This 35-percent increase you'll see in two areas. Basically, you'll see it in the Air Force programs, as well as in the Navy programs. The Navy program in particular has been of major concern to us, and the 1989 additional moneys that we received helped us in the near-term problems. You were asking for particular points on what this is doing in the field. I'll let General Porter answer some of that, but from a funding standpoint alone, the Navy Gulf operations had to get well-the dollars that were being spent there. In 1988, we had about a $5.5 million program. In 1989, we expect at the year's end to be at about $2.5 million. So we're cutting that in half. There are, of course, no funds targeted at this point within the O&M accounts for any operations in 1990-1991. It's policy not to budget for those types of situations. But for the additional amounts of money that we did receive, we are now in the neighborhood of $100 million a year, we did receive a surge of funding-$35 million for naval operations. Those dollars went to get-well type activities: preparing craft, particularly the patrol boat coastals that were being used in Gulf operations. So out of that $35 million, for instance, $11 million went there. Related consumables of the SEALS add about another $10 million; the remaining going into maintenance equipment for about a $7 million amount, and, of course, travel for associated operations making up the additional amounts. If you will look across the spectrum of the next 5 years for O&M as a whole, what you're going to see is some moderate force structure increases; with end strengths going up accordingly. One of the areas that we have paid particular attention to are the SEAL units. We are moving toward a 60-platoon force structure there. This was one of the topics that received a lot of attention this past summer. I am told, and General Porter may want to elaborate, that the funding in 1989 is being executed well regarding the get well operations from the activities of last year. Deferred maintenance is now being brought up-we're going into necessary overhaul programs, and so forth. We have been concerned now about several things in the 1989 program which we are currently executing. The plus-up that I've been referring to of the $286 million, we received a few surprises |