Much has been done, but the task is so overwhelming-it is only a good beginning. There is so much more to do; assistance from the Federal government is the only answer. FUNDING PROBLEMS The fire crisis, with its staggering costs, comes at a most difficult time for Oakland. In the last six years, Oakland's level of expenditures has increased by more than half. "If Oakland does not make adjustments to its revenue collection or spending practices, it will follow the path of other cities, such as New York and Cleveland, that have had to stop paying employees' salaries and eliminate normal services." The above statement by the Oakland Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal sets forth the City's dilemma. The revenue budget to be presented to the City Conucil this month will be $9 million short of paying for next year's City operations. To point up the financial plight of the City, a projection of annual deficits was made by the Finance Office in February as follows: These figures are presented to indicate that Oakland is in no position to finance the substantial cost of eliminating the serious fire hazard. On May 15, Oakland taxpayers will vote on a $43 million dollar bond issue to eliminate earthquake hazards in the public schools. This election requires only a majority yes vote; hence, it is nearly certain of passage. Bond retirement plus a separate override tax will add a substantial amount to local tax bills of hill residents already hard pressed to finance tree removal on their property. Based on recent direct public costs and private contracts let by the City, Oakland's cost to abate the most immediate and crucial fire hazard conditions in the high priority areas of Oakland will exceed more than $24 million dollars. The cost to private property owners contracting for their own removal and cleanup work could be as much as double the City's cost. One City contract in an area recently let near houses and power lines ran $27,000 per acre. It is impossible at this time to estimate how much work the City will have to do on private property on a charge-back basis and how much will be done by the private owners on their own. In either case, the outlays will seriously overburden local, public, and private resources. Because of the unprecedented nature of the potential disaster and the need to move with dispatch, the City of Oakland overextended its meager resources with the hope that Federal funding will be forthcoming, as was the case in the disastrous hill fire of 1970. CONCLUSION The above comments have concentrated fire prevention steps. There are other added programs and costs as well. A stepped-up fire suppression plan with additions of manpower and equipment is under way. As land is cleared of thousands of dead trees, the problem of flood control and erosion must be met with reforestation and land management. Until the serious fire hazard is removed, a continuous and active civil defense disaster plan and mutual aid program will be in effect. During the past three months, concentrated efforts by city personnel and equipment, and by contractor supplied services, have only resulted in the removal of 15 percent of the hazardous trees. Lack of equipment and trained personnel as well as a limited number of contractors with the necessary expertise and bonding capacity has hindered the process. Local activities now being pushed to the limit are only chipping away at a herculean task. Mr. HILDEBRAND. Senator, for purposes of brevity, I am going to digress from my written statement and explain briefly the Inter Agency Advisory Committee. It is composed of members of each of the STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. HILDEBRAND, CHAIRMAN, INTERAGENCY Many hundred incidents occur in the United States each year, which earn themselves the title of "disaster." Sometimes the title is used only in a relative sense. As an example, a hospital of twenty-five beds has a disaster when they receive twenty-five additional emergency patients, but a hospital of five hundred beds would probably chalk it up to a busy day. Most of you are aware of the story of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse; famine rode the black horse, conquest the white horse, slaughter rode the red horse and death rode the pale horse. There was yet a fifth horseman, who remains relatively unknown-he was called reality. Reality always rode ahead of the other four, warning people of what was to come. Then after the other four passed through, he could only go back and look, saying "but I warned them." Let us then take a look at a potential disaster in the making. In December of 1972 we had an unprecedented freeze in the East Bay area. Eucalyptus trees, planted in the early part of the century, in an illfated attempt to start a lumbering industry, died in great numbers. The largest areas being in lands owned by the East Bay Regional Park District and the East Bay Municipal Water District, as well as large groves in the City of Oakland, though privately owned, the result of which Professor H. H. Biswell, of the School of Forestry and Conservation of the University of California, said in part, "I believe that some day, perhaps, in the not too distant future, we are going to have an extremely disastrous wildfire in the area. It could be the most disastrous wildfire that has ever struck California. Hundreds of people could perish." While I do not necessarily share Professor Biswell's prediction as to casualties, I do share his concern. The Oakland, Berkeley, Contra Costa County hill areas are, at best, hazardous, especially during the dry months of August, September and October. On some days, approximately ten during that period, when the wind blows from the east and the humidity drops, the area becomes critical. For the east wind then blows from the crest of the hills toward the residential areas of Oakland and Berkeley. Fires starting on the eastern facing slopes of the hills will then burn over the ridges and down through the more luxuriant and dry fuels of the western facing slopes. The normal hazards have been compounded by three things. First, the above normal moisture of a wet winter, second, the additional fuels of the dead trees, and, third, the amount of publicity which will awaken a spark in a twisted mind. That spark from that twisted mind might well transmit itself to an actual flame tossed into the accumulated fuels, and it is then that we will be off and running. Carl C. Wilson, Asst. Director, Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, U.S. Forest Service, Berkeley, has said in part: "I am convinced that the fuel problem in the hills is critical and suggest that massive amounts of the dead fuels be removed from the hills before summer. If a fire should start in a west-facing canyon, a strong west wind, which is very common here, could drive the fire into the residential areas of Berkeley, Oakland or Orinda." THE HISTORY OF FIRE IN THE OAKLAND-BERKELEY HILLS Two major fires have swept down from the ridge line of the Oakland-Berkeley hills and caused major damage. Once on September 17, 1923, and again in 1970. What did the two fires have in common? Three things; the point in Contra Costa County where the fire started, wind direction and humidity. In the 1923 fire, the area of the built-up territory burned over was 130 acres. A total of 584 buildings were wholly destroyed and about 30 others seriously damaged. By far, the greater proportion were single-family dwellings, but among the number were 63 apartment and flat buildings, 13 fraternity, sorority and students' house clubs, 6 hotels and boarding houses, 4 studios and libraries, 2 schools, 1 fire station and 1 church. There were also 281 small structures of minor importance, such as detached private garages, stables and sheds, which were involved. Numerous buildings, not included in the previously noted figures, had some damage done to roofs due to flying brands. The total loss is roughly estimated at $10,000,000 and the insurance loss at $4,500,000. About 4,000 persons were rendered homeless. A grass fire, which originated about noon in Wild Cat Canyon at a point along the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's high-tension line, about three miles from the city, swept over the range of hills to the northeast of Berkeley and within two hours, was attacking houses within the city limits. As it came into the more closely-built part of the city, at about 2:20 p.m., it traveled by two paths, presenting a total front about 1,600 feet wide. Several houses on Keith Avenue and Tallac and Tamalpais Streets were quickly involved and were soon followed by others on Buena Vista Way. In the next 40 minutes, burning bands carried by the high wind had spread the fire over an area extending 1,400 feet with a maximum width of 2,400 feet. From this time on, although the fire traveled 2,800 feet further, the concentration of fire apparatus along the northwestern flank of the fire and open spaces to the southeast, steadily narrowed the path until it was only 800 feet wide when finally subdued. The Oakland fire of 1970 which destroyed thirty-nine homes, started on the Fish Ranch Road in Contra Costa County during weather and wind conditions approximating those of 1923. It swept down into Oakland with the wind behind it. In 1923, the fire was fought by twenty-eight companies, using equipment which does not match today's efficiency. The Oakland fire was fought by over one hundred mutual aid fire companies as well as those of the City of Oakland, some equipment being dispatched from as far away as Davis, California. It has been said that man learns from experience . . . but does he? What about solutions? There are two major solutions; reduce the fire hazard and protect and/or restore the environment. The ability to accomplish either is based directly on the amount of funding made available to do the job. Two separate efforts are being made to obtain funding in order to accomplish the objectives set by the advisory committee. The first is through federal disaster funds. To obtain the funds it is necessary that the affected jurisdictions (Cities and Counties) declare a State of Local Emergency. This has been done. The declaration is then sent to the Governor through the Office of Emergency Services, along with a request that he have the President declare the area a disaster area. If the President declares the area a disaster area, then federal funds become available to remove and correct the affects of the disaster. It permits cities and counties to expend public funds for debris removal from private property as well as public. The Governor has acted by appointing a task force to confirm statements of local officials and make a recommendation to him. He, in turn, will act upon their recommendation. It is felt by the Interagency Advisory Committee members that funding should be through the State Forester. Thus, only one governmental agency need be involved. The State Forester, with his expertise, knowledge and broad contract powers could bring about a more efficient solution to the problem facing the various jurisdictions. An Interagency Advisory Committee was established from an "Ad Hoc" committee to find solutions to the problem. It has four subcommittees, Fire Supression and Prevention, with Chiefs Menietti of Oakland, and Kearney of the Berkeley Fire Departments, as cochairmen; Funding, Jay VerLee of the Oakland Park Department, Chairman; Tree Disposal and Marketing, Bert Trubody of the Oakland Park Department, Chairman; Vegetative Management with Mr. Gary Tate of the East Bay Regional Park District and Douglas Hamilton of the Extension Service of the University of California as Cochairmen. The Fire Suppression and Prevention Subcommittee has recommended establishment of fuel breaks and has established priority areas. Some work is being done at this time. They have reviewed and updated mutual aid plans and are attempting to establish a weather condition warning system so that during periods when weather conditions are such as those in 1923 and 1970, additional precautions may be taken by the various jurisdictions. Fire fighting agencies are urging citizens to clean up their property and reduce hazards. The subcommittee is on record recognizing the increased hazard and recommending its correction by removal of fuel both on the trees and ground. The purpose of the Tree Disposal and Marketing Subcommittee is to find a method for the disposal of material which has been collected. It would be waste ful to merely dump the collected trees and slash without making some effort to utilize the material. As a result of the subcommittee's effort, some trees have been made available to the Corps of Engineers, Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard, and the Port of Oakland for pilings and fenders, Fibreboard Company of Antioch will take 1500 tons a week for pulp and others are making some proposals. Japanese outlets are being contacted. However, unless funds are available, the individual property owner will be required to remove the debris from his own property. In many cases, the cost of removal will exceed the value of the property. Should funding become available or the effort now being made show to be effective, the removal and disposal becomes monumental. No dump sites are available and burning would be in violation of air pollution requirements. The report of the Vegetative Management Subcommittee states "There is no question about trees being dead where the bark is split, loose and the underneath areas are brown and have a fermentation odor. Whether or not any particular tree or grove of trees is dead is of secondary importance from the standpoint of wildfire. We find no alternative to immediate and drastic action including the removal of all trees and other fuels from selected areas. We find all other considerations to be secondary. Aesthetics, protection of rare species and recreational areas must be given every consideration." We feel there are no more than ninety days left (June 1) to complete the necessary tree removal. Most of the qualified people and equipment will no longer be available and the risks of accidental fire is great after this period. There are certain areas which, because of the degree of freeze damage and topography, pose an especially severe threat to the East Bay. Should a fire ignite in these areas during the high risk period, an uncontrollable wildfire will almost certainly spread into the metropolitan area. It is the opinion of the committee that these areas are special problems to be considered independently of the need for construction of fuel breaks. The purpose of fuel breaks is to stop or slow a fire by breaking continuity of fuels. Actual dimensions and extent of these breaks are dictated by fuel type and topography. Specific locations will be determined by consultation with professionals in wildland fire control. Areas adjacent to developed private land is to receive similar consideration. The critical areas and fuel breaks are independent and equally important elements in the reduction of fire hazard. The magnitude of the job requires the use of professional personnel. This may be done by individual contract or by contracting with a single firm specializing in projects of this type. Most of the work must be done by trained and experienced personnel because of the inherent danger and special knowledge required. The job is too big for resources within the public agencies concerned. Regarding the wishes of volunteer help, it would be welcome under supervision where poison oak and other risks are minimal as determined by public agencies involved. Plans for specific vegetative management are being developed under a longterm program to take advantage of the unique opportunity fuel management presents-overlooks, wildlife habitat, enhanced recreation and re-establishment of native vegetation. Dr. Willard Harvey, Wattenburg has said "The danger of a major holocaust, a fire storm, in the Oakland-Berkeley hills in the near future is every bit as serious as certain experts have recently predicted. I spent twelve years in the Plumas National Forest in the logging and construction business, and I helped fight more than a dozen major forest fires. I have never seen such a concentration of highly combustible material in such a dangerous place as the windswept hill behind Oakland and Berkeley which are now covered with densely spaced, dead eucalyptus trees and enormous quantities of combustible material on the ground. Anyone who drives or walks through this area could not help but be frightened by what most certainly must happen unless there are immediate steps taken to clear the critical areas in this region within the next two or three months at the very most." City of Oakland: Loss/expenditures/allocations 530 acres at $15,000: 400 acres private, 130 acres public-- Expended to date__. $7, 630, 000 311, 000 1, 000, 000 4, 800, 000 1, 339, 000 6, 139, 000 55, 000 473,000 1, 360, 000 1, 000, 000 2, 360, 000 375,000 1, 000, 000 15,000 696, 000 10, 000 10, 000 750,000 17,000 21, 300 600, 000 0 1,000 1, 000, 000 100, 000 250,000 19, 175, 000 2,775, 300 883,000 1 Figures should be considered within 15% of accuracy of a very conservative estimate. Loss figure was based on cost of felling trees and cleaning up ground fuels. WILLIAM HILDEBRAND, CITY OF EL CERRITO FIRE DEPARTMENT, El Cerrito, Calif., May 3, 1973. Assistant Director, Office of Emergency Services, DEAR SIR: In regards to your letter of April 16th, the following is a brief résumé of the City of El Cerrito's Action to date to resolve the Eucalyptus Tree Fire Hazard. |