On March 14-15, 61 samples of ground and aerial fuels were collected in areas affected and unaffected by the freeze. The composite results were:

If we assume that the unaffected areas represent the normal prefreeze fuel condition for the area, the December freeze increased the fuel hazard by 75 percent.

On March 18, samples of crown fuels, similar to those you see here, were put through standard flammability tests by the Stanford Research Institute in cooperation with Forest Service research personnel. The freeze-affected samples were ignited by thermal pulses of two calories per square centimeter per second while fuels from the unaffected area required nearly 4 cal/cm2 sec. Flame heights from freezeaffected samples were 1.8 times as high as those from equal weights of fuels from the unaffected area.

Based on these results, we project that the fire hazard in the affected area is approximately three times normal, considering the increase in the amount, ignitability and combustion intensity of the freeze-killed fuels.

In order to predict the probable results of a threefold increase in fire hazard, we made studies of the weather and past fire history of the Alameda County area.

Eucalyptus was first introduced into Alameda County in 1856. By 1870 there were 170,000 trees planted in the county, mostly in the Hayward area.

The planting of Eucalyptus peaked in 1909, and the practice was essentially abandoned by 1914.

We studied the fire records beginning with 1865. This year was chosen on the basis that the oldest plantations were 9 years old and the Eucalyptus type could be considered a normal part of the Alameda forest fuel environment.

Since 1865 there have been four major fires in Alameda County:

On October 8, 1887, two fires started, one in Talomeres Canyon and one in Redwood Canyon, immediately behind Lake Chabot. By October 13, the two had merged and burned 13 square miles.

On July 11, 1897, a fire started immediately behind the University of California campus, which burned 3,000 acres the first day and was contained on July 13 at 7,000 acres.

On September 17, 1923, 640 homes were destroyed in "The Berkeley Fire," which is still listed in the National Fire Protection Association Annals of Famous Conflagrations.

On September 22, 1970, 250 acres burned near Fish Ranch Road with a loss of 36 buildings destroyed and 37 severely damaged.

With a normal large fire incidence of 4 fires in 107 years and a present hazard three times normal, one way to calculate the probability of a major fire in 1973 is 12 in 107, or about 11 percent.

It is notable that 3 of the 4 historic large fires burned in late September and early October under the influence of dry easterly winds. Analysis of 12 years of weather data from the Alameda Naval Air Station showed that there are, on the average 3.2 such days-dry with surface winds greater than 16 knots-in September and 1.7 such days in October.

I have seen other figures. They come from other stations and with other wind velocities.

If we knew the total fire incidence in the freeze-affected area, we could determine the probability of a fire starting during a day with high conflagration potential.

Unfortunately, the only data available were from the City of Oakland's Mountain Battalion, which protects 2,500 acres, only 600 of which are in the affected area.

But our best estimate is that normal fire incidence for the 3,000-acre special hazard area is 24 fires per year with half of these occurring from June 15 to October 15. Thus, there is a probability of slightly less than 1 in 10 of a fire occurring on any given day during the summer period. With five bad fire days per year, a potential conflagration start can be expected roughly every other year.

Since most fire departments are structured to suppress 90 to 95 percent of all potentially serious starts, one should expect a conflagration frequency of one every 20 to 40 years. This is consistent with Alameda County experience rate of 4 in 109 years. Considering a fire hazard three times normal, this approach gives a 1973 conflagration probability of 712 to 15 percent.

But so far this is merely mathematics. Do we have any previous experience in similar situations? Some, but not much.

The 1923 fire was said to have followed an identical freeze. But the National Fire Protection Association accounts suggest that the problem in 1923 was from broken trees and limbs resulting from a record snowfall the previous winter. No mention is made of standing dead trees.

I just saw, when I came into the hearing room, the Oakland Tribune account of that fire. It also mentioned broken trees rather than standing dead trees.

There was a similar, but less severe eucalyptus dieback following a severe freeze in 1932. No major fires resulted.

In 1961 there was an unusual hot spell in early June that resulted in heat kill of native foliage in central California. Although the cause was distinctly different than the present case, the results were identical standing brush and trees with attached dead leaves and small branches. I surveyed the affected area on June 26 and notified the State Forester that four areas presented particularly severe fire problems. Three of the four burned that summer and fall, with their fire behavior being essentially as predicted.

We have had some experience with fire in herbicide treated vegetation, again a physically similar situation to the Berkeley Hills.

We are familiar with, and have been in correspondence with Australian foresters and fire researchers. They know of no comparable situation in Australia but have supplied valuable data on fire behavior in eucalyptus forests under various weather conditions.

On April 16, the Forest Service was requested by the Office of Emergency Preparedness to give its opinion on the seriousness of the eucalyptus fire problem, and on the State's proposed measures to alleviate it. We told the OEP that if the fuels remained in their existing condition:

(1) That there was a better than 50-50 chance that there would be at least one fire involving a half dozen to a dozen homes sometime during the summer.

(2) That such a fire was highly unlikely to occur before the middle of June or 1st of July.

(3) That the chances of a single fire involving 100 or more homes during 1973 was between 5 and 10 percent, and that if such a conflagration should occur, it would probably be in September or October.

(4) That the Forest Service agreed that the fire hazard abatement actions recommended in the Governor's 10 point program, as we understood them, were logical and necessary; and that those actions, if successfully carried out, would do as much as could reasonably be expected to reduce the Alameda County forest fire hazard to its prefreeze condition.

This concludes my prepared testimony. I will be glad to answer any questions.

Thank you.

Mr. TRENT. Thank you, Mr. Chandler.

[The complete statements of Mr. Trent and Mr. Chandler follow:]

STATEMENT OF DARRELL M. TRENT, ACTING DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee.

Since the occurrence last December of the freeze which damaged eucalyptus stands in the San Francisco East Bay area, Mr. Robert C. Stevens, Director of OEP Region 9, whose office is in San Francisco, has been monitoring the situation in association with the California Office of Emergency Services and the U.S. Forest Service. Mr. Stevens has followed closely the State and local investigation of the potential fire hazard created by the freeze to determine the appropriate courses of action to alleviate the situation.

In response to Governor Reagan's April 14 request for a major disaster declaration for Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, OEP surveyed the damage caused by the freeze and evaluated the imminence of the fire threat.

Our investigations did not reveal sufficient damage to warrant the declaration of a major disaster. Although a large number of eucalyptus trees have been killed, the loss of these trees does not in itself constitute a catastrophe that would justify a major disaster declaration under the authorities of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Public Law 91-606.

Since Governor Reagan had specifically requested that long-term, low-interest loans be made available to homeowners for the removal of dead trees and flammable debris, my staff contacted the Small Business Administration and the Farmers Home Administration to determine whether such loans could be made available for that purpose. We were advised that existing authorities do not permit this action.

In evaluating the applicability of Section 221, Pre-disaster Assistance, of PL 91-606 to this case, I directed the U.S. Forest Service to investigate the potential fire hazard. The results of their investigation were then evaluated to determine the possibility of a major conflagration occurring in the East San Francisco

Bay area, and, if it did occur, what damages could be anticipated. They were also requested to consider whether the situation constituted an imminent threat to life or property.

I would like at this time to ask Mr. Craig Chandler, Acting Director of Emergency Operations and Director of Forest Fire and Atmospheric Sciences Research, U.S. Forest Service, to present a technical evaluation of the fire potential.

REPORT BY MR, CRAIG C. CHANDLER, ACTING DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Based on the technical information provided by the Forest Service and our evaluation of the protective measures recommended by the California State Committee on Freeze Problems, I concluded that a major disaster was not imminent in this case. At this time I would like to offer for the record a copy of a report prepared by the California State Committee on Freeze Problems which differs in some respects from the Interim Report of the Intra-agency Advisory Committee prepared by its Chairman, Mr. W. H. Hildebrand, and published on April 10, 1973. This report, prepared by Mr. John H. Hastings, Deputy State Forester, Division of Forestry, California Department of Conservation, states in its Recommendations and Proposed Courses of Action, and I quote:

"A high fire hazard exists in the area; however, it is the judgment of this team that a true state of emergency and disaster does not exist. Although the fuel hazard has increased about 50 percent because of the changed situation in the dead eucalyptus stands, in comparison with the situation as it existed last year, and in comparison with similar high fire hazard conditions in similar areas of California where life and property are exposed to the hazards of wildland fires, this area cannot be declared a disaster. It is the judgment of this team that the problem can be reduced to the degree of hazard which existed last year, and be further improved by a combination of efforts of private citizens, local and state government, The following recommendations and courses of action are proposed to reduce this hazard."

In reaching my decision, I considered this report together with all other information available to me. I also considered the fact that the eucalyptus stands constituted a fire hazard even before the December 1972 freeze. Admittedly, the hazard was increased by the freeze; but the potentially hazardous situation was not the result of a single occurrence or a sudden drastic change of events.

Based on all these facts and circumstances, I concluded that the necessary fire prevention measures do not exceed local and State capabilities and that a recommendation of a major disaster to the President was not warranted in this instance.

STATEMENT OF CRAIG C. CHANDLER, ACTING DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FOREST SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify on S. 1697. Since overall natural disaster responsibilities within the Executive Branch are assigned to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Department of Agriculture defers to OEP on the need for this legislation.

The Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, acts as technical advisor to the Office of Emergency Preparedness on all requests for Federal assistance under Public Law 91-606 involving forestry matters. As Director of Emergency Operations for the Forest Service, I am responsible for conducting investigations of facts material to such requests and for transmitting the findings of such investigations to the Director of OEP.

In the case of the 1972-73 eucalyptus frost kill in California, the Forest Service interest and investigations began in early January 1973. We became involved early because our Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station is located in Berkeley, California, and scientists there have been working on the silviculture of eucalyptus for many years. Since January, we have maintained an interest in the situation and have conducted studies, both on our own, and in cooperation with the local and State governments, and with scientists from the University of California and the Stanford Research Institute.

With specific regard to the fire hazard, the Forest Service undertook the following actions:

Between February 9 and February 28, plant physiologists took stem cuttings from several hundred eucalyptus trees in the affected area. They determined that between 65 percent and 95 percent, depending on location, were dead from the root collar up, and could not be expected to resprout at crown level during the 1973 growing season.

Aerial photographs using color and color-infrared techniques were taken on February 15. The total acreage with severely affected crown canopy was determined to be 2,745 acres falling within the following jurisdictional boundaries: 1500 East Bay Regional Parks.

600 City of Oakland.

260 University of California.

255 East Bay Municipal Utilities District.

80 City of El Cerito.

50 City of Berkeley.

On March 14-15, sixty-one samples of ground and aerial fuels were collected in areas affected and unaffected by the freeze. The composite results were:

If we assume that the unaffected areas represent the normal pre-freeze fuel condition for the area, the December freeze increased the fuel hazard by 75 percent.

On March 18, samples of crown fuels were put through standard flammability tests by the Stanford Research Institute in cooperation with Forest Service Research personnel. The freeze-affected samples were ignited by thermal pulses of two calories per square centimeter per second while fuels from the unaffected area required nearly 4 cal/cm2 sec. Flame heights from freeze-affected samples were 1.8 times as high as those from equal weights of fuels from the unaffected

area.

Based on these results we project that the fire hazard in the affected area is approximately three times normal considering the increase in the amount, ignitability and combustion intensity of the freeze-killed fuels.

In order to predict the probable results of a threefold increase in fire hazard, we made studies of the weather and past fire history of the Alameda County area. Eucalyptus was first introduced into Alameda County in 1856. By 1870 there were 170,000 trees planted in the county, mostly in the Hayward area. The planting of Eucalyptus peaked in 1909, and the practice was essentially abandoned by 1914.

We studied the fire records beginning with 1865. This year was chosen on the basis that the oldest plantations were 9 years old and the Eucalyptus type could be considered a normal part of the Alameda forest fuel environment. Since 1865 there have been four major fires in Alameda County:

On October 8, 1887, two fires started, one in Talomeres Canyon and one in Redwood Canyon immediately behind Lake Chabot. By October 13, the two had merged and burned 13 square miles.

On July 11, 1897, a fire started immediately behind the University of California campus which burned 3,000 acres the first day and was contained on July 13 at 7,000 acres.

On September 17, 1923, six hundred forty homes were destroyed in "The Berkeley Fire," which is still listed in the National Fire Protection Association Annals of Famous Conflagrations.

On September 22, 1970, two hundred fifty acres burned near Fish Ranch Road with a loss of 36 buildings destroyed and 37 severely damaged.

With a normal large fire incidence of 4 fires in 107 years and a present hazard three times normal, one way to calculate the probability of a major fire in 1973 is 12 in 107 or about 11 percent.