Of child

See Roman Adoption.

"Adoption," properly considered, refers to the taking of minor children by persons who are strangers in blood, in contradistinction to "legitimation," where the blood relationship must exist. Allison v. Bryan, 97 Pac. 282, 283, 21 Okl. 557, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (citing Bouvier, Black, Anderson, and Rapalje).

"Adoption" is the taking of a stranger in the blood as one's own child. The proceeding of adoption and the relation established is personal to the foster parent and child, and though the statute gives to them all of the rights to be derived from the legal relation of parent and child, including the "right of inheritance through each other," an adopted child may not inherit through the foster parents from his collateral kin. Kettle v. Baxter, 100 N. Y. Supp. 529-531, 50 Misc. Rep. 428. Adoption was unknown to the common law. Long v. Dufur, 113 P. 59, 62, 58 Or. 162. But it was an incident of the civil law, and incorporated in the Code Napoleon. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S. W. 585, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775.

The word "adoption," as used in Civ. Code 1895, §§ 2372-2387, regulating benevolent institutions and relating to the placing of children at service, is to be construed in the sense in which it is used in those provisions of the law where one person adopts the child of another. In the case of a legal adoption there is a complete surrender for all time of the parental control to the adoptive parents. The word "adoption" in this act is to be construed so as to confer upon the person receiving the child no greater power over the child than the benevolent ir stitution itself had in the first instance, and that is, to retain the custody of the child until the time arrives when it shall be returned to its parents or to the court from which it was received. Kennedy v. Meara, 56 S. E. 243, 248, 127 Ga. 68, 9 Ann. Cas. 396.

Rev. Laws 1880, §§ 2536-2541, provide that, on an "adoption," the same rights, duties, and obligations and the same rights of inheritance shall exist "between the parties" as though the person adopted had been the legitimate child of the adoptive parent, except that the person so adopted shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adoptive parent. The word "adoption" by common acceptation establishes the relationship of parent and child with all the consequences of that relationship, including the right of inheritance from the adoptive parents, and such right extends to the issue of the adopted child, and where intestate, who died with out issue of his body, before marriage adopt ed complainant's mother as his daughter, and she died leaving complainant surviving

her, complainant was entitled to share in intestate's estate by representation to the same extent as if he had been the son of intestate's natural daughter. Batchelder v. Walworth, 82 Atl. 7, 9, 85 Vt. 322, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 849.

The Domestic Relations Law defines adult takes a minor into the relation of child "adoption" as the legal act whereby any and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent. A "voluntary adoption" is declared to be any other than that of an indigent child or one who is a public charge from an asylum or from a charitable institution, and, after providing the proceedings for voluntary adoption, declares that "thereafter" the parents of the minor are relieved from all parental duties, responsibilities for, and rights over such child, or his property by descent or succession, but the foster parent and the minor sustain the legal relation of parent and child with all the rights and duties of that relation, including the right of inheritance, and such right of inheritance extends to the heirs and next of kin of the minor, and such heirs and next of kin shall be the same as if the minor were the legitimate child of the adopting person, but as respects the passing and limitation over of real and personal property, dependent, by the provisions of any instrument, on the foster parent dying without heirs, the minor is not deemed the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the The statute then rights of remaindermen. proceeds to provide a procedure for the adoption of children from charitable institutions without containing any further provision as to the rights of children so adopted. Held, that a child previously adopted from a charitable institution, who under the saving clause in the Domestic Relations Law was entitled to all the rights of children similarly adopted thereunder, her adopted parents having no other children, was the sole next of kin of her foster father under the statute of distributions, and therefore was entitled to take under a deed of trust for the benefit of her foster father, remainder on his death to his children. United States Trust Co. of New York v. Hoyt, 135 N. Y. Supp. 849, 852, 150 App. Div. 621.

An indenture of apprenticeship, providing that it was the intent of the party of the first part to place, and of the second part to receive, the apprentice as an adopted child of the party of the second part, to

be maintained and treated with like care

as if he were the child of such party, did not constitute the child an "adopted" son of the master. In re Wallace's Estate, 66 Atl. 1098, 1099, 218 Pa. 39.

Same-As legitimation

Under Civ. Code, arts. 200, 214, authorizing a natural father to legitimate his children by an act passed before a notary and witnesses, and declaring that any person may

Pure Food and Drug Act, § 7, provides that drugs shall be deemed "adulterated" when they differ from the standard of strength, quality, or purity as determined by the test prescribed in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary official at the time of investigation, and that no drug shall be deemed adulterated if the standard of strength, quality, or purity be plainly stated on the container, although the standard may differ from the test. Section 10 declares that any drug that is adulterated or misbranded and is being transported from one state to another for sale, or having been transported remains unsold, or in the original or unbroken packages, shall be liable to condemnation in any District Court of the United States and condemned. Held, that a drug is not "adulterated" so as to be subject to condemnation unless adulterated at the time of seizure. United States v. Five Boxes of Asafoetida, 181 Fed. 561, 562; Same v. Nine Boxes of Asafoetida, 181 Fed., 568. Food

The word "adulteration," in Comp. Laws, § 5007, declaring it unlawful to manufacture and sell maple syrup that is in any wise adulterated with common sugar or any other foreign substance, without labeling it in a certain way, means the mixture of any foreign substance, wholesome or unwholesome, with maple syrup. Pierre Viaus Maple Co. v. Dairy & Food Com'r, 117 N. W. 553, 554, 154 Mich. 73.

Sess. Laws 1903, p. 103, c. 82, § 6, prohibits the sale of adulterated food, and provides that food shall be deemed "adulterated" (4) if any substance has been mixed with it so as to lower or depreciate its quality or purity, or (5) if any inferior substance is wholly or partly substituted, or (7) if it is an imitation; but that an article shall not be deemed adulterated if it is a mixture of recognized food products and not an imitation, provided each package sold as a mixture is labeled with the name and percentages of the components. Article 1, § 13, provides that maple syrup shall be the unadulterated product of the pure sap from the maple tree, and the mixing of other substances with maple syrup or their substitution therefor shall be deemed adulteration. An information alleged that accused offered for sale a can of recognized food products, to wit, maple syrup and cane sugar mixed in certain proportions, the can being labeled "W. syrup, a blend of pure maple and rock candy syrup," but was not labeled a as mix

not charge an "adulteration" within section 13, or within section 6, and since the sale of unlabeled mixtures was not made unlawful by any statute unless they were adulterations, forbidden by section 6, which did not include unlabeled mixtures, the information did not allege an offense under the proviso of section 6. State v. Weeden, 100 Pac. 114, 115, 17 Wyo. 418.

Rev. Laws, c. 75, § 16, provides that no person shall sell any article of food which is "adulterated." Section 17 defines the term "food" to include all articles, simple, mixed, or compound, used in food or drink by man, and section 18 declares that food shall be deemed adulterated if any substance has been mixed with it, so as to reduce, depreciate, or injuriously affect its quality, strength, or purity, or if an inferior or cheaper substance has been substituted for it wholly or in part, or if it is an imitation of or sold under the name of another article, but that such provisions shall not apply to mixtures or compounds not injurious to health and which are recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if every package sold or offered for sale is distinctly labeled as a mixture or compound with the distinct name of each ingredient therein. Held, that blended maple sugar "part maple and part granulated," itself a well-known article in the trade as a commercial unit of food bought and sold as such, was neither an "adulterated food" nor an

"imitation" within the statute. Adams v. New England Maple Syrup Co., 97 N. E. 85, 87, 210 Mass. 475.

Sausage meat made from the meat of hams and select young pork prepared with spices and 2 to 10 per cent. cereals, to which water had been added, is not an adulterated that an article shall be deemed adulterated food within Comp. Laws, § 5012, declaring if it is an (subdivision 4) imitation of, or is sold under the name of, another article, or (subdivision 7) if it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health. Armour & Co. v. State Dairy and Food Com'r, 123 N. W. 580, 581, 159 Mich. 1.

Under Federal Food and Drugs Act, § 7, an article of food is "adulterated": First. If any substance has been mixed and packed with it so as to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength. Second. If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part for the article. Third. If any valuable constituent of the article has been wholly or in part abstracted. Fourth. If it be mixed, colored, powdered, coated, or stained in a manner whereby damage or inferiority is concealed. Fifth. If it contain any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious to health: Provided, that when in

the preparation of food products for shipment, they are preserved by any external application applied in such manner that the preservative is necessarily removed mechanically, or by maceration in water, or otherwise, and directions for the removal of such preservative shall be printed on the covering or the package, the provisions of this act shall be construed as applying only when said products are ready for consumption. Sixth. If it consists in whole or in part of a filthy, decomposed, or putrid animal or vegetable substance, or any portion of an animal unfit for food, whether manufactured or not, or if it is the product of a diseased animal or one that has died otherwise than by slaughter." Savage v. Jones, 32 Sup. Ct. 715, 724, 225 U. S. 501, 56 L. Ed. 1182. Section 8 contains a proviso that food which does not contain any added or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed "adulterated," and if in the case of mixtures or compounds, known as articles of food by their own distinctive name, such name shall be accompanied on the same label or brand with a statement of the place where the article has been manufactured or produced, and in the case of articles labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that they are compounds and the word "compound," "imitation," or "blend," as the case may be, is plainly stated on the package in which it is offered for sale. Held, that where a substance sold under the name "Corno Horse and Mule Feed" was contained in a package branded: "Corno Horse and Mule Feed. Mixture of ground alfalfa, oats, corn, flax bran, oat and hominy feeds, made by the Corno Mills Company, East St. Louis, Illinois"-followed by a guaranteed analysis, such substance, being a compound and so de scribed on the package, was not adulterated, because it contained a quantity of oat hulls mixed and packed therewith in excess of the amount normally present in oat feed consisting of whole ground oats. United States v. One Car Load of Corno Horse and Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 453, 455.

Milk

and was in fact wholesome. People v. Koster, 106 N. Y. Supp. 793, 794, 121 App. Div. 852; People v. Abramson, 122 N. Y. Supp. 115, 117, 137 App. Div. 549.

Under Consol. Laws, c. 1, § 32, making it unlawful to sell or offer for sale "adulterated milk," which is defined by section 30 as "milk containing more than 88 per cent. of water or fluids, and containing less than 12 per cent. of milk solids," the state, in an action for the penalties for a sale of adulterated milk, makes out a prima facie case by the uncontradicted testimony of two of its agents that defendant delivered at a lunchroom milk containing 88.63 per cent. water and 11.37 per cent. solids. People v. McDermott Dairy Co., 122 N. Y. Supp. 294, 295.

Rev. St. 1909, § 640, provides that whoever shall sell or offer for sale any milk containing any foreign substance or preservative injurious to health, or shall sell or offer for sale any unclean, adulterated, or unwholesome milk, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that the word "adulterated" was used in the sense ordinarily given by lexicographers, to wit, the addition of foreign matter to change or improve the appearance or flavor of an article; and hence St. Louis City Ordinance No. 24,297, prohibiting the having in possession adulterated milk, with intent to sell, and providing that it shall be deemed adulterated if any substance is mixed with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its strength, quality, or purity, or if it is mixed or colored, so that inferiority is concealed, or if it is made to appear better than it really is, was not in conflict with section 640, on the theory that such section permitted the addition of coloring matter which was not harmful; and hence a conviction could properly be sustained under the ordinance for having in possession skim milk to which annatto had been added to make it appear richer in fat than it really was. City of St. Louis v. Jud, 139 S. W. 441, 442, 236 Mo. 1.

Rev. St. 1909, § 6595, provides that milk shall be deemed adulterated if it does not conform to the standard of strength, quality,

A dealer, who sold milk in cans after having taken from them about two quarts of cream and then filling the same with milk from other cans from which the same quantity of cream had been taken, sold "adulterated milk," within Agricultural Law (Laws 1893, c. 338) §§ 20, 22, defining "adulterated milk" as milk from which any part of the cream has been removed; and where he sold it as milk from which the cream had not been taken he was liable to the penalty Imposed, though the milk in other respects complied with the requirements of the law

culture. Held, that such section could not be construed to authorize the lowering of the quality of skimmed milk by the addition of water, provided that the proper per cent. of milk solids remained, so as to comply with the percentage required by the regulations of the federal agricultural department. St. Louis City Ordinance No. 24,297, providing that no person shall have in possession, with intent to sell, any adulterated milk, and that milk shall be deemed adulterated if any substance has been added to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its strength, quality, and purity, or if it has been mixed or colored in any manner to conceal damage or inferiority, etc., was not void for uncer

tainty, in that it failed to fix any standard or measure of strength, quality, or purity. City of St. Louis v. Kruempeler, 139 S. W. 446, 448, 235 Mo. 710.

Wheat

The H. Company, at Kansas City, Mo., on April 3, 1909, contracted to sell to the W. Company at Ft. Worth, Tex., 5,000 bushels of No. 2 red wheat, according to the Missouri official state grades. On April 29, 1909, the H. Company ordered the operator of a public elevator where it stored its grain to ship to the W. Company in fulfillment of this contract No. 2 red wheat. The operator loaded and sent to the W. Company a car of wheat. After this wheat was loaded, the official inspector of the state of Missouri at Kansas City inspected, adjudged, and certified this wheat to be No. 2 red wheat. An invoice of it was forwarded to the W. Company dated May 3, 1909, showing that it was shipped under the contract of April 3, 1909, and subject to Kansas City weights and grades. The wheat arrived in Texas without change. The Texas inspector, the federal inspector, and other witnesses there found it to be, and it was, wheat of another and less valuable grade. None of the officers or em

ployés of the H. Company had any knowledge of this fact, or anything to do with the grading or shipping, except to order the operator of the public elevator to ship No. 2 red wheat. Held, the H. Company was not guilty of misbranding or of "adulterating" within the meaning of Pure Food Act, §§ 7, 8 (Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, 769. HallBaker Grain Co. v. United States, 198 Fed. 614, 615, 117 C. C. A. 318.

ADULTERY

See Guilty of Adultery; Incestuous Adultery; Live in Adultery; Living in State of Cohabitation and Adultery; Open and Notorious Adultery, "'Adultery' is sexual intercourse of one spouse with any other than the other spouse." People v. Salmon, 83 Pac. 42, 43, 148 Cal. 303, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1186, 113 Am. St. Rep. 268.

"Adultery" is voluntary sexual intercourse by a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife. Cartier v. United States, 148 Fed. 804, 807, 78 C. C. A. 494; People v. Silva, 97 Pac. 202, 203, 8 Cal. App. 349; Ex parte Cooper, 121 Pac. 318, 319, 162 Cal. 81; Ex parte Sullivan, 119 Pac. 526, 17 Cal. App. 278.

Sexual intercourse by a married man with a woman other than his wife is "adultery" within the meaning of the statute mak

ing it a misdemeanor. Bashford v. Wells, 96 Pac. 663, 664, 78 Kan. 295, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 16 Ann. Cas. 310.

As felony

See Felony.

Marriage of one party sufficient

"Adultery," as defined by the common law at the time of the colonization of the United States, is sexual connection between a man and a woman, one of whom is law

fully married to a third person; and the offense is the same whether the married person in the adulterous connection is a man State v. Holland, 145 S. W. or a woman.

522, 523, 162 Mo. App. 678.

The term "adultery" as used in the statutes means illicit intercourse between two persons of different sex, one of whom is married to another person. Rich v. State, 55 South. 1022, 1023, 1 Ala. App. 243. Sexual intercourse between two persons not husband and wife, either or both of whom are married, constitutes statutory "adultery." State v. Anderson, 118 N. W. 772, 774, 140 Iowa, 445. But under a statute defining "adultery" as the voluntary intercourse of a married person with a person other than accused's husband or wife, an unmarried man is incapable of committing the offense of living in a state of cohabitation and adultery. Ex parte Sullivan, 119 Pac. 526, 17 Cal. App. 278.

To constitute "adultery" under Act March 3, 1887, c. 397, § 31, 24 Stat. 635 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3636), by a married man, it is immaterial whether the woman United States v. Meywas married or not.

ers, 99 Pac. 336, 337, 14 N. M. 522.

Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 7230, defines "adultery" as "the sexual intercourse between a married person and one who is not such married person's husband or wife.”" Section 7231 provides that every person convicted of adultery shall be imprisoned not exceeding five years. Section 7238 provides that every man or woman, not being married to each other, lewdly and viciously associating and cohabiting together, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months. Defendant, an unmarried man, was living with the wife of another. Held, that defendant, though unmarried, was guilty of "adultery," and not only of the misdemeanor under section 7238, since it is clear from section 7230 that the Legislature intended to hold each of the offending parties under State v. Keith, section 7231 equally guilty. 92 Pac. 893, 894, 48 Wash. 77.

Other sexual offenses distinguished

In the absence of statute sexual intercourse on the part of an unmarried woman does not constitute "adultery" on her part, but amounts simply to fornication; and hence an unmarried woman cannot be guilty of an offense under a statute providing that every person who lives in adultery is guilty of a misdemeanor; Civ. Code, § 93, defining "adultery" as the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife. Ex parte Cooper, 121 Pac. 318, 319, 162 Cal. 81.