egraph & Telephone Companies, §§ 107, 109; | for a new trial in which to prepare, serve, Croswell, Electricity, § 110; Randolph, Emi- and file the evidence, statement, etc. A findnent Domain, § 407; Dillon, Mun. Corp. [4th Ed.] 698a; Nicoll v. New York & New Jersey Tel. Co., 42 Atl. 583, 62 N. J. Law, 735, 72 Am. St. Rep. 666; Krueger v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 81 N. W. 1041, 106 Wis. 96, 50 L. R. A. 298; Bronson v. Albion Tel. Co., 93 N. W. 201, 67 Neb. 111, 60 L. R. A. 426, 2 Ann. Cas. 639). The establishment by a railway company of a system of wires and posts over its right of way is not the imposition of an "additional servitude," within the meaning of that term, authorizing an abutting owner to claim additional compensation. Railroad companies may devote the right of way which they have acquired to any use indispensable to or which will facilitate the fulfillment of the objects of their corporate existence, whether these uses be by grading, constructing of telegraph lines, or other incidental uses requisite for the convenient, safe, and successful conducting of their business and regular running of their trains. City of Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 36 South. 266, 271, 84 Miss. 268, 65 L. R. A. 561, 105 Am. St. Rep. 428. ing and decision having been filed August 30, 1905, on September 6th a written stipulation was made that either party might have 30 days "additional" time in which to give notice of intention to move for a new trial, and 90 days "additional" time in which to prepare, serve, and file affidavits, bills of exception, or statements in support of the motion. Appellant gave notice of motion for a new trial October 7th, and all the affidavits were filed January 3, 1906. Held, that appellant was entitled to 30 days in addition to the 4 days of the 10-day period not yet expired when the stipulation was made in which to serve notice of motion for a new trial, and that the 90 days stipulated for in which to file affidavits, bills of exception, or statements, etc., in support of the motion, began to run on the expiration of 10 days after the service of notice, and hence the affidavits were filed in time. Hill v. Ellinghouse, 93 Pac. 345, 347, 36 Mont. 440. ADDRESS See Last Known Address; Post Office Το To "address" means: "To direct, as words (to any one or any thing); to make, as a speech, petition, etc. (to any one, an audience). To direct speech to; to make a communication to, whether spoken or written; to apply to by words, as by a speech, petition, etc.; to speak to; to accost. direct in writing, as a letter; to superscribe, or to direct and transmit; as, he addressed a letter." Code 1904, § 3768, subd. 3, provides that courts and judges may issue attachments for contempt and punish them summarily where obscene, contemptuous, or insulting language is "addressed" to a judge for or in respect of any act, or proceeding had, or to be had, in such court, or like language used in his presence and in The operation by a corporation organized for the incorporation of street railway companies of interurban cars on streets of a city with its permission, for carriage of passengers, express, and light freight, is not an "additional servitude" on the streets, and abutting owners are not entitled to compensation therefor; but a street railway company operating on a city's street for the carriage of freight and passengers, interurban trains of three cars each 60 feet in length at a rate of 20 to 30 miles an hour, thereby rendering the use of the street dangerous and causing the house of an abutting owner 60 feet from the track to shake so as to cause the plastering and ceilings and the pictures on the walls to fall, is liable to the abutting owner for the special damages sustained, the operation of cars intended for his hearing for or in respect of such a manner constituting an "additional such act or proceeding. Held that, to render servitude." A steam railroad when run and one liable for contempt, the language, whethoperated over and along the public streets er spoken or written, must be specifically of a town or city is an "additional serv- addressed to the judge. Yoder v. Commonitude" upon such streets; but a street rail- wealth, 57 S. E. 581, 584, 107 Va. 823 (quotway does not constitute an "additional serv- ing and adopting the definition in Webster's itude" on the public streets. Kinsey v. Un- | Dict.). ion Traction Co., 81 N. E. 922, 927, 169 Ind. 563 (citing Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Scott, 74 Ind. 29; Eichels v. Evansville St. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261, 41 Am. Rep. 561; Terre Haute & S. E. R. Co. v. Rodel, 89 Ind. 128, 46 Am. Rep. 164; Chicago & C. Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whiting, H. & E. C. St. R. Co., 38 N. E. 604, 139 Ind. 297, 26 L. R. A. 337, 47 Am. St. Rep. 264). ADDITIONAL TIME Code Civ. Proc. § 1173 (Rev. Codes, 8 6796), allows 10 days after notice of motion ADEEMED ADEMPTION "Ademption" is the extinction or satisfaction of a legacy by some act of the testator which is equivalent to a revocation of the bequest or which indicates an intention to revoke. It may be accomplished by a gift to the legatee, or by such disposition of the subject of the bequest as to make the will impossible of the operation. The doctrine does not apply to a devise of realty. In re Brown's Estate, 117 N. W. 260, 262, | ject." In re Black's Estate, 72 Atl. 631, 632, 139 Iowa, 219. 223 Pa. 382. The term "ademption" describes the act by which testator pays to his legatee in his lifetime a legacy which by his will he had proposed to give him at his death, or denotes the act by which a specific legacy has become inoperative on account of testator having parted with the subject of it. The alteration in the character of the subject-matter of a specific legacy must be made or authorized by the testator himself after making his will, or it will not operate as an "ademption," and the intention of the testator, if reasonably clear, will largely govern. Rue v. Connell, 62 S. E. 306, 307, 148 N. C. 302. "Ademption" has to do with the subjectmatter of bequests and is entirely distinct from an implied revocation of the terms of a will. "Ademption" involves action upon the part of the testator; the doing of some act with regard to the subject-matter which interferes with the operation of the will; that is, he anticipates the gift there made by bestowing it during his lifetime upon the legatee or disposes of the subject-matter in some way which puts it out of the question to follow his directions as set forth in the will. While "implied revocation" is founded upon a presumed and neglected duty upon the part of the testator, or upon a change in his family relations. The reason A particular bequest, although unrevokwhich lies behind the doctrine as defined ed, may become practically inoperative, if both in the common law and in the statutes the testator, in his lifetime, gives to his legis that some obvious injustice may be pre-atee the specific thing which the will directs vented; that some moral duty, which has been overlooked, it is presumed, by the testator may be discharged. In re Jones' Estate, 60 Atl. 915, 923, 211 Pa. 364, 69 L. R. A. 940, 107 Am. St. Rep. 581, 3 Ann. Cas. 221. Advancement A person, who had executed an instrument binding his heirs and representatives to pay $60,000 to a seminary on specified conditions, executed a will reciting that he had promised to give $60,000 to the seminary, and declaring that if the same was not paid before his death it should be paid by his executors in cash or mortgage bonds. Thereafter he delivered $60,000 in bonds to the seminary, under the agreement that it would turn over to him for life the coupons thereon. This arrangement was made, at the suggestion of the seminary, to avoid possible litigation involving the validity of the will. Held, that the transaction was an "ademption" of the legacy to the seminary, within Ky. St. § 4840, providing that an advancement to any person shall be deemed a satisfaction of a bequest contained in a prior will. Louisville Trust Co. v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 147 S. W. 431, 433, 148 Ky. 711. Satisfaction distinguished to be given after his death, or if the testator so deals with property which is specifically bequeathed to a legatee that, upon his death, execution of his intention in respect to this legatee is impossible. In such case he is said to adeem his bequest, and the practical result necessarily involved in his act is spoken of as an "ademption" of the legacy. Where the law recognizes a power of implied revocation by acts of the testator similar to those which must result in ademption, there may be in some cases, no distincin Connecticut, where such implied revocation between ademption and revocation; but tion is forbidden by statute, the clauses of a will containing a bequest are not revoked but remains as the legal declaration of the by acts which may operate as an ademption, the execution after his death is impossible; and so, a present gift or part only of a testamentary bequest or a sale or conveyance to a third party of a part only of property specifically bequeathed does not prevent the execution of the testator's intention as to the remainder, and the ademption is not total but pro tanto. Jacobs v. Button, 65 Atl. 150, 152, 79 Conn. 360. testator's intention to be carried out unless ADEPS LANA ANHYDROUS A general legacy may be satisfied, As medicinal preparation, see Medicinal Of specific legacy "Ademption of a specific legacy' arises by the alienation or destruction of the ob See Inadequacy. "Adequate" means fully equal to requirements or occasions, commensurate; it does not mean average or graduation. Commonwealth v. Mathues, 59 Atl. 961, 981, 210 Pa. 372. ADEQUATE CAUSE "Adequate cause" for the provocation of passion resulting in homicide is such a cause as would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. An illegal arrest coupled with an assault is adequate cause for the provocation of passion reducing a killing to the grade of manslaughter. Earles v. State (Tex.) 94 S. W. 464, 467. It is not necessary that the anger or passion should be sudden. Gillespie v. State, 109 S. W. 158, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 167. "Adequate cause," as an element of manslaughter, is constituted by any fact, circumstance, or combination of facts and circumstances which actually produce in one's mind sudden passion, such as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror, rendering him incapable of cool reflection. Burns v. State (Tex.) 145 S. W. 356, 362. An assault and battery causing pain or bloodshed constitutes "adequate cause." Bagley v. State (Tex.) 103 S. W. 874, 875. Where accused killed another under the immediate influence of passion arising in his mind from information given him by his wife to the effect that deceased had used insulting language to her, defendant believing and in good faith acting on the information, such information was to him an “adequate cause" reducing the crime to manslaughter, whether the insults had been in fact offered or not. Melton v. State, 83 S. W. 822, 824, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 451 (citing Jones v. State, 26 S. W. 1082, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 492, 47 Am. St. Rep. 46). ADEQUATE COMPENSATION See Just and Adequate Compensation. ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION See Valuable Consideration. An "adequate consideration" is one which must not be so disproportionate as to shock our sense of that morality and fair dealing that should always characterize transactions between man and man. Eaton v. Patterson (Ala.) 2 Stew. & P. 9, 19. $440 with interest had been paid, and the remainder deposited in court for the vendor, alleges adequate consideration within Civ. Code, § 3391, prohibiting specific performance against a party who has not received an adequate consideration for the contract. Boyd v. Warden, 124 Pac. 841, 843, 163 Cal. 155. Where a life insurance company, having foreclosed its lien as pledgee of a policy, and applied part of its surrender value to the payment of the debt for which the policy stood as security, sent the residue of such surrender value to the beneficiary and the insured by its check, which was never received by either, the policy was not surrendered to the company by the transaction "for a consideration adequate in the judgment of the holder," within Rev. St. 1899, § 7900, providing that where a policy shall be surrendered to the company for a consideration adequate in the judgment of the holder, the article of which that section is a part shall not be applicable. Burridge V. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 S. W. 560, 566, 211 Mo. 158. ADEQUATE CROSSING "By the term 'adequate crossing' is meant one equal to what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; fully sufficient; proportionate to the reasonable requirements. But an adequate crossing does not necessarily mean either an over or an under crossing; it may be either, and the landowner may designate the place."-Guinn v. Iowa & St. L. R. Co., 101 N. W. 94, 95, 125 Iowa, 301. ADEQUATE OR REASONABLE FACILITIES "The term 'adequate or reasonable facilities' is not in its nature capable of exact definition. It is a relative expression, and has to be considered as calling for such facilities as might be fairly demanded, regard being had, among other things, to the size of the place, the extent of the demand for transportation, the cost of furnishing the addition the question of convenience and cost." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 28 Sup. Ct. 121, 123, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. Ed. 230; The word "adequacy," as used in anal accommodations asked for, and to all othinstruction that the adequacy of the consid-er facts which would have a bearing upon eration was for the parties to consider at the time of making an agreement, and not for the court when it was sought to be enforced, evidently does not refer to the legal | Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Town of Witchsufficiency of the consideration, but to the inducements which operated on the minds of the parties in making the contract. Rosseau v. Rouss, 86 N. Y. Supp. 497, 502, 91 App. Div. 230. A complaint, in an action for specific performance of a contract to sell real estate, need not allege in hæc verba that the contract is supported by "adequate consideration," but an allegation that the value of the real estate at the time of the contract did not exceed $500, the consideration mentioned in the contract with interest, and that er, 106 Pac. 852, 25 Okl. 586; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Town of Norfolk, 107 Pac. 172, 176, 25 Okl. 325, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 159; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 110 Pac. 668, 26 Okl. 804, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1003; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. State, 111 Pac. 396, 399, 28 Okl. 372. ADEQUATE PROVOCATION "Legal,' 'lawful,' 'adequate,' and 'reasonable,' when used as adjectives qualifying 'provocation,' are synonymous, and, as a general rule, with few exceptions, it takes an assault or personal violence to constitute this provocation." State v. McKenzie, 76 S. W. 1015, 1019, 177 Mo. 699 (quoting with approval from State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830, 105 Mo. 204. ADEQUATE REMEDY See Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy; Speedy and Adequate Remedy. The adequate remedy at law which will deprive a court of equity jurisdiction must be one as certain, complete, prompt, and efficient to attain the ends of justice as that in equity. Monmouth Inv. Co. v. Means, 151 Fed. 159, 165, 80 C. C. A. 527; Keplinger v. Woolsey, 93 N. W. 1008, 1009, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 282 (citing and adopting Welton v. Dickson, 57 N. W. 559, 38 Neb. 767, 22 L. R. A. 496, 41 Am. St. Rep. 771; Bankers' Life Ins. Co. of Lincoln v. Robbins, 73 N. W. 269, 53 Neb. 44; Beach, Injunction, § 1016; Washburn, Easements & Servitudes, 747); Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 146 Fed. 8, 14, 76 C. C. A. 516, 8 Ann. Cas. 660; Mendenhall v. School Dist. No. 83 of Jewell County, 90 Pac. 773, 775, 76 Kan. 173; Brewster V. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 816, 72 C. C. A. 213 (citing Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U. S. [3 Pet.] 210, 215, 7 L. Ed. 655; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 9 Sup. Ct. 594, 130 U. S. 505, 514, 32 L. Ed. 1005; Gormley v. Clark, 10 Sup. Ct. 554, 134 U. S. 338, 349, 33 L. Ed. 909; Davis v. Wakelee, 15 Sup. Ct. 555, 156 U. S. 680, 688, 39 L. Ed. 578; Brown v. Arnold, 131 Fed. 723, 67 a. C. A. 125, 129; Williams v. Neely, 134 Fed. 1, 67 C. C. A. 171, 180, 69 L. R. A. 232; Big Six Development Co. v. Mitchell, 138 Fed. 279, 284, 70 C. C. A. 569, 1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 332); Williams v. Neely, 134 Fed. 1, 10, 67 C. C. A. 171, 69 L. R. A. 232 (citing Boyce v. Grundy, 28 U. S. [3 Pet.] 210, 215, 7 L. Ed. 655; Springfield Milling Co. v. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. 261, 265, 26 C. C. A. 389, 393); McMullen Lumber Co. v. Strother, 136 Fed. 295, 305, 69 C. C. A. 433; Hayois v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 71 Pac. 944, 946, 8 Ariz. 285. Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 294, providing for the disorganization of municipalities, and directing that a court shall "adjudicate" claims against the municipality, which shall be treated as denied, and that any citizer of the municipality at the time of dissolution may defend against any claim filed, or the court may in its discretion appoint some person for this purpose, it is the duty of the court to give notice affording the citizen a hearing before allowing such claims, for while the statute may not in terms require notice, the word "adjudicate" means a solemn and deliberate determination by judicial power of the rights of the parties, and so implies a notice and hearing, and an order allowing such claims on an ex parte hearing without notice is irregular and should be set aside. Nielsen v. Utah Nat. Bank of Ogden (Utah) 120 Pac. 211, 214. An "adequate remedy" is a full and complete one, accommodated to the wrong to be redressed, and it is not enough that there is some remedy at law, as that remedy must be as practical, efficient, and prompt as a remedy in equity. Sumner v. Staton, 65 S. E. 902, 905, 151 N. C. 198, 18 Ann. Cas. 802. The remedy by appeal or certiorari as to a void judgment is not "adequate" in the sense required to exclude relief by injunction. Worrall v. H. S. Chase & Co., 123 N. W. 338, 340, 144 Iowa, 665. A remedy hardly seems to be entitled to be termed "adequate" if at the time that it is applied the rights of the complainant have so suffered that there may be nothing of value left to him in the remedy. A suit for damages affords an “adequate remedy," in case of the failure of a railroad company to maintain a station at a certain point at which an individual has a right to have it maintained. Jacquelin v. Erie R. Co., 61 Atl. 18, 24, 69 N. J. Eq. 432. In case of the illegal undervaluation of other taxable property, the payment of the illegal portion of a tax assessed and the prosecution of an action at law to recover it back is neither as prompt nor complete a remedy as a suit to enjoin its collection. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, 173 Fed. 456, 469, 97 C. C. A. 1. An action at law against the vendor of the stock of a corporation for damages is not as adequate, nor is it as complete or efficient, as a suit in equity against the vendor and the corporation to rescind the sale, to recover the purchase price, and to relieve the complainant from liability to the corporation on account of the stock. Farwell V. Colonial Trust Co., 147 Fed. 480, 482, 78 C. C. A. 22 (citing Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U. S. [3 Pet.] 210, 215, 7 L. Ed. 655; Williams v. Neely, 134 Fed. 1, 10, 67 C. Ɑ A. 171, 180, 69 L. R. A. 232; Brown v. Arnold, 131 Fed. 723, 727, 67 C. C. A. 125, 129; Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co., 130 Fed. 246, 250; Springfield Milling Co. v. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. 261, 26 C. C. A. 389). The privilege, of one whose real property is levied upon under an execution against another, to make a motion in the case in which the execution was issued to release the property from such levy, does not afford him such an "adequate remedy at law" as to cut off any right he would otherwise have to maintain injunction against the sale of the property. Gale Mfg. Co. v. Sleeper, 79 Pac. 648, 70 Kan. 806. The remedy at law by motion to quash or recall an execution is not necessarily exclusive of a suit to restrain the enforcement of an execution, and to compel the satisfaction of a judgment, as the term “adequate remedy at law" does not mean that injunction shall be denied where there is a remedy Under a marine policy insuring a dredge, and providing that it was warranted confined to the use and navigation, of the waters of New Haven Harbor and "adjacent inland waters," and declaring that any deviation beyond the limits shall avoid the policy, the use of the dredge in an inland water adjacent to Bridgeport Harbor, 17 miles from New Haven Harbor, was a deviation. Kirk v. Home Ins. Co., 86 N. Y. Supp. 980, 981, 92 App. Div. 26. Code, § 810, provides that the resolution of necessity of a public improvement shall state "whether abutting property will be assessed and what adjacent property is proposed to be assessed therefor." Section 823 gives the owner opportunity to oppose the assessment proceedings. A resolution of necessity provided that "the cost of constructing said sewer to be assessed against property abutting thereon and against adjacent property in accordance with the law governing the same." Held, that the word "adjacent," as used in section 810, was indefinite, the word ordinarily meaning to lie near, close, or contiguous, and even in its strictest meaning no more than lying near, close, or contiguous, but not actually touching, that it did not mean "adjoining" or "abutting," and hence that the resolution failed to sufficiently inform property owners of the lands that would be included in the district for assessment; the other code provisions being merely supplemental to that section, and in no way conflicting with its requirements. Dunker v. City of Des Moines (Iowa) 136 N. W. 536, 537. As abutting or contiguous In Rev. St. c. 20, § 8, as amended by Pub. Laws 1907, c. 60, granting authority for the taking of "adjacent" land to enlarge a private cemetery, the word "adjacent" should be construed, in its primary meaning of "adjoining" or "contiguous," and not extended to land nearby, but not adjoining. Clark v. Coburn, 78 Atl. 1107, 108 Me. 26, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 167. As The word "adjacent" means contiguous, adjoining, lying close at hand, near. used in Act March 3, 1875, granting to certain railroad companies the right of way through the public lands to the extent of 100 feet on each side of the central line of the road, with the right to take materials for its construction from the public lands adjacent to the line of the road, it does not include lands which are 20 miles distant from the right of way, but it does include lands within 2 miles. United States v. St. Anthony R. Co., 24 Sup. Ct. 333, 335, 338, 192 U. S. 524, 48 L. Ed. 548. Superior City. Charter (Laws 1891, c. 124) § 119, provides that, before work shall be ordered done on a street in whole or in part at the expense of the abutting or adjacent realty, the board of public works shall determine the benefits and damages which will accrue to each parcel of such realty, the entire cost of the contemplated improvement, and the amount that should be assessed to each parcel as benefits accruing thereto by such contemplated improvements. Held, that such law contemplates improvements of streets beneficial to parcels of realty abutting on or adjacent thereto, such improvements being in front of such parcels, at the expense in whole or in part thereof, the word "abutting" and "adjacent" not being used synonymously, in the absence of anything appearing clearly to the contrary in the law, the word "abutting" meaning a parcel having a street and lot line in common, while the word "adjacent" is used to characterize a parcel not in part bounded by a street line. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 130 N. W. 246, 248, 145 Wis. 288. The expression "adjacent" does not at all times mean abutting, but it is usually synonymous with abutting, adjoining, and bordering. In re Bridge Bonds, Ratliff Tp., Johnston County, 128 Pac. 681, 682, 35 Okl. 192 (citing Wormley v. Board of Sup'rs of Wright County, 78 N. W. 824, 108 Iowa, 232). Adjoining and contiguous distinguished That which is "adjacent" may be separated by some intervening object; that which is "adjoining" much touch in some part, while that which is "contiguous" must touch entirely on one side. Baxter v. York Realty Co., 112 N. Y. Supp. 455, 456, 128 App. Div. 79 (quoting and adopting the definition in Crabb's English Synonyms). Sp. Laws 1907, p. 564, § 7, authorizing the acquisition by purchase or condemnation proceedings of such additional lands as may be deemed necessary, "adjoining or adjacent" to the capitol building site, located between designated streets, contemplates that it may be necessary to require various parcels of land within the boundaries, and the purchase or taking of one parcel within the boundaries does not exhaust the power, but other parcels may be acquired, though the word "adjoining," in its etymological sense, means touching or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near or adjacent, and though the word "adjacent" means lying near, neighboring. State v. Angus, 75 Atl. 623, 624, 83 Conn. 137. As in neighborhood of The word "adjacent" does not include a town 300 miles away; such word being used in connection with a vaudeville service con |