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In September 1997, we reported that many federal agencies had duplicative
or overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism,1
including incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved the
creation of 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
(RAID) teams to assist local and state authorities in assessing the situation
surrounding a WMD emergency; advise these authorities regarding
appropriate actions; and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the
arrival of additional state and federal military assets. As requested, we
(1) obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials regarding the role
of RAID teams in response plans; (2) determined whether there are other
federal, state, or local government entities that can perform similar
functions to the RAID teams; and (3) evaluated the RAID teams' roles and
responsibilities and how the teams plan to meet these responsibilities.

'Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy
(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

2For purposes of this report, WMD are defined as biological, chemical, or radiological weapons.

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In September 1997, we reported that many federal agencies had duplicative
or overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism,1
including incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved the
creation of 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
(RAID) teams to assist local and state authorities in assessing the situation
surrounding a WMD emergency; advise these authorities regarding
appropriate actions; and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the
arrival of additional state and federal military assets. As requested, we
(1) obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials regarding the role
of RAID teams in response plans; (2) determined whether there are other
federal, state, or local government entities that can perform similar
functions to the RAID teams; and (3) evaluated the RAID teams' roles and
responsibilities and how the teams plan to meet these responsibilities.

1Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy
(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

2For purposes of this report, WMD are defined as biological, chemical, or radiological weapons.

Results in Brief

We have previously reported that the many and increasing number of participants and programs in the evolving terrorism area across the federal government pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. While DOD has defined the specific mission for the RAID teams, the plans for the teams and their implementation continue to evolve. We found that there are differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams and how they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass destruction. Army officials believe the teams can be a valuable asset to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the federal response plan. They also believe that the teams will be a critical and integral part of the state and local response to such weapons. Officials with the two agencies responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist incidents—the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency-do not see a role for the RAID teams in the federal response. Instead, they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal status, providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Officials in states without a RAID team do not see how the teams can benefit their states' response capabilities because of the time it takes the RAID teams to respond. However, one state official does see the RAID team bringing some expertise that could be useful. Officials in Pennsylvania, a state with a RAID team, plan not only to fully integrate its team into the state's weapons of mass destruction response plan, but also use it to respond to more common hazardous materials emergencies.

There are numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams. For example, there are over 600 local and state hazardous materials teams in the United States that daily have to assess and take appropriate actions in incidents involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. In addition, there are numerous military and federal civilian organizations that can help local incident commanders deal with weapons of mass destruction incidents by providing advice, technical experts, and equipment.

Our discussions with local, state, and federal officials and our analysis surfaced a number of concerns that could impact the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities. These concerns centered on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues.

These issues further point to the need for a more focused and coordinated approach to the U.S. response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction-an approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and focuses funding on the highest priority requirements. Because of the differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams, the numerous organizations that can perform similar functions, and the potential operational issues that could impact the teams, we are recommending that the appropriate federal agencies determine the need for the teams. If it is determined that the teams are needed, we further recommend that the RAID team concept be tested to determine how the teams can effectively perform their functions. If they are not needed, we recommend that they be inactivated. In light of differing views regarding a reassessment of the need for the RAID teams, Congress may wish to consider restricting the use of appropriated funds for any additional teams until the reassessment we recommended is complete. We have included a matter for congressional consideration in this report.

Background

Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized along a
lead agency concept. The Department of Justice, through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is responsible for crisis management of
domestic terrorist incidents and for pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting
the terrorists. State governments have primary responsibility for managing
the consequences of domestic disasters, including major terrorist
incidents; however, the federal government can support state and local
authorities if they lack the capabilities to respond adequately. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages this federal support
through a generic disaster contingency plan known as the Federal
Response Plan, which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and emergency
support functions of various federal agencies, including DOD, for
consequence management. The National Security Council's National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism,
created in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, oversees the
broad variety of relevant policies and programs, including such areas as
counter-terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for WMD.
According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and firearms
continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Many familiar with
industrial chemicals, such as officials from the FBI, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast Guard, and local hazardous materials
(HAZMAT) teams, believe that industrial chemicals may also be a weapon
of choice in terrorist attacks because they can be easily obtained and

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