received allocations totaling $500,000 for reimbursement of up to 50 percent of their cash expenditures made on their gas pipeline safety programs in 1971. Later in 1971, Congress appropriated an additional sum of $750,000 for the States' calendar year 1972 gas pipeline safety programs. Forty-one States requested and received allocations totaling this amount. The allocations will be applied toward reimbursement of each State's cash expenditures made in 1972 on its gas pipeline safety program.

Compliance activity and safety information dissemination were emphasized in 1971 to assure that the Federal safety standards obtained results. Additional safety standards will be issued to solve specific problems identified in the future, but the framework of the Federal pipeline safety standards is basically complete. With these safety standards as a foundation and utilizing the operators' inspection and maintenance plans submitted, the compliance program was initiated in 1971. OPS has added compliance personnel to the staff. Also, the Houston field office carried out 43 compliance actions during the year.

To assist operators in understanding the detailed requirements of the Federal safety standards and provide them useful technical and regulatory pipeline safety information the OPS initiated publication of a monthly Advisory Bulletin in September 1971. It is distributed to more than 4,000 addressees involved in pipeline safety activity. These include State agencies, industry, engineering/contractors, professional groups, the press, and the general public.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Safety and Consumer Affairs directs the Department's operational and regulatory pipeline safety programs. The Office of Pipeline Safety has been organized along the lines of the specific functions required by the Act and includes divisions for technical, state, industry, and regulatory functions. During 1971, a compliance officer

was assigned to the Director's staff to further strengthen this activity. The FY 72 staffing of the Office of Pipeline Safety provides for a total of 20 professional and 7 clerical personnel.

Many of the details of administering and coordinating the programs of the Office of Pipeline Safety in the States of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico have been carried forward by a pilot field office located in Houston, Texas. This pilot office has three staff positions at present. This facility has been utilized in monitoring the gas pipeline safety regulatory functions of all gas pipeline operators in Louisiana, since the State of Louisiana is not participating in the Department's pipeline safety program.

The dispersed nature of the pipeline industry indicates an important role for OPS field offices in carrying out the Federal/State safety programs. The Houston office is being utilized also to establish and evaluate procedures and compliance techniques for operating other field offices when they are established.

ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES

The compilation in Appendix 1 is based upon leak and failure reports received in the Office of Pipeline Safety for calendar year 1971. Totals represent the first full year summary prepared by the Department for gas pipeline systems. The reports upon which they were based are required under 49 CFR Part 191, Sections 191.9, 191.13 and 191.15 (Appendix 7) which became effective February 9, 1970. During 1971, there were 45 deaths, 391 injuries, and an estimated $2,632,170 in property damage resulting from the 1,287 individual gas pipeline failures reported to the Department.

During 1971, OPS staff engineers investigated or assisted State agency investigations of six distribution system failures in Miami Beach, Florida (January 4), Baltimore, Maryland (January 8), West Orange, New Jersey (January 10), Point Pleasant, New Jersey (January 14), West Conshohocken,

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Pennsylvania (January 27), and Lambertville, New Jersey (February 3). These were particular failures resulting in the loss of life, serious injuries, or which involved unusual technical aspects.

In the Miami Beach incident, there was one death and there were 33 injuries as the result of a gas explosion and fire in attached buildings. The cause of the accident was the opening of gas service meter shutoff valves by unauthorized person(s). To prevent such future occurrences, OPS has proposed new regulations for safety procedures for disconnected service lines and is presently evaluating public comments before issuance of additional safety standards.

In Baltimore, an explosion and fire resulted in four deaths, two injuries, three homes destroyed and two others damaged. No direct cause was determined from the investigation; however, a 4-inch main was found to be broken near one of the houses which had been destroyed.

In the West Orange incident, one person was hospitalized and a house was damaged as a result of an explosion and fire. Investigation revealed that a 6-inch cast iron lowpressure gas main had broken. Examination by the National Bureau of Standards for the Office of Pipeline Safety led to the conclusion that the pipe fractured because of an external load placed upon it which it could not withstand, and that deep corrosion pitting, not apparent to normal visual examination, was a contributing factor.

At Point Pleasant, explosions occurred in several houses and two houses were damaged by fires when a natural gas regulator malfunction caused high-pressure gas to enter into a low-pressure distribution system. Houses on several streets were affected. Investigation disclosed some pressure control equipment inadequacies, and the gas distribution firm has taken steps to bring operations in complete compliance with the Federal safety standards.

In the West Conshohocken incident, there were four fatalities and 52 injuries, including several firemen, as a result of gas explosions and fires. Fifteen houses were totally destroyed and 25 were damaged to varying degrees. The cause of this catastrophe was determined to be the result of a combination of a poor oxy-acetylene

girth weld and heavy impact loading on the pipe resulting from trucks going over a bump in the road near the location of the girth weld. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ordered the operator of the gas distribution system to abandon the use of the steel main having the questionable oxy-acetylene girth welds, and ordered all gas utilities under its jurisdiction to make a survey of their systems' oxy-acetylene girth welds and report to the Commission on their findings.

At Lambertville there were 8 deaths and 12 injuries as a result of gas explosions and fires. Two duplexes were destroyed. The Hunterdon County Prosecutor conducted a special grand jury hearing to investigate the incident and handed down a presentment on May 27, 1971. The New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners conducted a series of public hearings in their investigation of the incident and will issue a report of their findings. The source of the gas that caused the explosions and fires was determined to be a broken 4-inch cast iron valve near one of the houses.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) completed in 1971 its investigation of a 1969 natural gas pipeline accident. A synopsis of the investigation of the rupture of a Mobil Oil Corporation high pressure natural gas pipeline near Houston, Texas, on September 9, 1969, and a statement of probable cause appears in Appendix 2.

The Office of Pipeline Safety, the Railroad Commission of Texas, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the operator of the pipeline cooperated with the NTSB in the investigation. The cause of the rupture was apparent very early in the investigation; however, consideration of means to prevent similar ruptures in the future extended the investigation.

In the NTSB recommendation, two matters were cited for Office of Pipeline Safety action. In the first matter, the Office of Pipeline Safety plans to make a thorough study of the matter of protecting existing transmission lines against accidental overpressuring and to provisions for rapid shutdown. If the results warrant, OPS will initiate rulemaking action to assure protection against overpressuring of gas pipelines. In the second matter

cited, the Federal safety standards (Appendix 3), which became effective subsequent to the rupture, have clarified to some extent the determination of maximum allowable operating pressure for existing pipelines. Consideration is being given to rulemaking action to further clarify the proper joint factor to be used in maximum allowable operating pressure determinations for existing pipelines.

FEDERAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY STANDARDS

Until March 12, 1971, the interim Federal safety standards required by section 3 (a) of the Act were in effect with respect to design, installation, and testing of new gas pipelines. On that date, the new Federal safety standards (Appendix 3) which were effective throughout the year

for the operation, maintenance, and inspection of existing pipelines became effective also for the design, installation, and testing of new gas pipelines.

Three amendments to the Federal safety standards were issued during 1971. To complement the standards issued in August 1970, which did not include regulations on corrosion control, the Department established regulations on corrosion control in Subpart I (Appendix 4) on June 25, 1971. These comprehensive new standards, which contain requirements for control of corrosion on pipelines from external, internal or atmospheric environmental causes, became effective August 1, 1971. An amendment issued September 28, 1971, extended the time for completing confirmation or revision of the maximum allowable operating pressure for pipelines operating at more than 40 percent of specified minimum yield strength (Appendix 5). Certain safeguards were provided in requirements for comprehensive plans for completion of the work. Another amendment (Appendix 6), applicable to six States, continued until September 1, 1972, the requirements contained in the interim Federal standards for odorization of gas in transmission lines.

Regulations requiring the reporting of leaks and failures which occur on gas pipelines (Appendix 7) were in effect throughout 1971. An amendment (Appendix 8) notifying gas pipeline operators of a change in the telephone number for reporting of leaks became effective April 20, 1971.