(Pipeline Accident Report, Low-Pressure Natural Gas Distribution System, Burlington, Iowa, November 6, 1969)

504

DECEMBER 14, 1970.

BSTS-70-P-29 to 32

To Office of Pipeline Safety:

29. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation require in the minimum Federal Safety Standards that each gas utility establish a program for the prevention of construction-originated damage to its underground facilities. This program should contain provisions: (1) for education and general liaison with contractors and their machine operators; (2) for obtaining notices of construction work in close proximity to underground gas facilities; (3) to insure that gas facilities are marked or otherwise protected during such construction work; and (4) to followup and investigate accidents which do occur, to determine where the program failed and how it can be strengthened.

30. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation as part of its enforcement activity, study the regulator design, maintenance, and testing procedures of the utilities under its direct jurisdiction including municipal operations not regulated by States, to determine whether gas consumers will be properly protected against over-pressurization in the event of a malfunction of a primary regulator. This would include sampling observations to determine whether regulators are adjusted properly, maintained, and tested on a regular basis so that they will function correctly, and whether the control line is protected from damage.

31. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation conduct a study to determine what constitutes a safe maximum operating pressure for low-pressure distribution systems. Further, use the results of such study in formulating minimum Federal Safety Standards, so that the desired pressure and the correct functioning of monitoring regulators and other overpressure potection devices will be defined.

32. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation review the ability of the gas utilities under its direct jurisdiction to receive and process telephone calls during emergencies. Determine whether a minimum Federal Safety Standard is necessary.

Pipeline Special Study-Effects of Delay in Shutting Down Failed Pipeline Systems and Methods of Providing Rapid Shutdown)

FEBRUARY 12, 1971.

541

BSTS-71-P-1

To Office of Pipeline Safety:

1. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety conduct a study to develop standards for rapid shutdown of failed natural gas pipelines and work in conjunction with the Federal Railroad Administration to develop similar standards for liquid pipelines.

(Letter to Assistant Secretary of Transportation regarding gas pipeline accident in Farmington, W. Va., on October 29, 1970)

MARCH 15, 1971.

853

BSTS-71-P-3 to 5

To Department of Transportation:

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Department of Transportation take the necessary steps to determine whether there is a hazard within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Department review the overall problem of safety of pipelines in areas where mine subsidence exists.

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Department of Transportation issue regulations which will tend to prevent the occurrence of catastrophic accidents which result from the unauthorized operation of valves by persons other than utility company employees.

634

(Pipeline Accident Report, High Pressure Natural Gas, Pipeline, Mobil Oil Corp., Houston, Tex., September 9, 1969)

BSTS-71-P-7

To Office of Pipeline Safety:

OCTOBER 4, 1971.

7. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation take the following actions:

(a) Review the methods used by pipeline operators to protect existing transmission lines against accidental overpressuring upon the failure of pressure control equipment. This review should be made in conjunction with the States. If problem areas are detected, adequate regulatory action, including rulemaking, should be undertaken to assure protection against overpressuring.

8. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Department of Transportation take the following actions:

(b) Clarify the Federal regulations pertaining to the determination of maximum allowable operating pressure for existing pipelines so that the joint factor in use when the pipe was manufactured is utilized for current computations.

Senator HARTKE. Mr. Joseph C. Swidler, chairman of the New York State Public Service Commission and representative, also, of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners. With him will be Mr. George Bonner, director of the New York Public Service Commission's Gas Division; A. A. Mazzei, Jr., assistant counsel for the West Virginia Public Service Commission; and Mr. Paul Rodgers, NARUC general counsel.

Welcome back to Washington, Mr. Swidler.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH C. SWIDLER, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AND REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE BONNER, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION'S GAS DIVISION; A. A. MAZZEI, JR., ASSISTANT COUNSEL, WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; AND PAUL RODGERS, NARUC GENERAL COUNSEL

Mr. SWIDLER. Thank you, Senator.

In view of your introduction, Senator Hartke, I shall not further introduce the people at this table.

The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 provides for federally established minimum gas safety standards for interstate gas pipelines, for local gas transmission lines, and for distribution lines.

A State remains free to regulate the safety of gas distribution systems and local gas transmission lines, provided that the State adopts the Federal safety standards or imposes more rigorous standards and has the ability effectively to enforce its standards.

The act provides for Federal grants-in-aid to the States to support State safety regulation programs. The States are prohibited, however, from regulating the safety of interstate gas pipelines.

S. 1910 would accomplish two purposes; first, to improve the Federal grants-in-aid program for more effective State gas safety regulation and, second, to facilitate State safety regulation by allowing the States to use their judicial powers to impose injunctive and monetary sanctions whenever there is noncompliance with State gas safety codes. Both purposes are in the public interest and we urge enactment of S. 1910. I shall return to these issues in more detail later.

First, however, I must turn to another and more urgent matter which is not covered in any pending bill.

The New York Public Service Commission and the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners urge that Congress restore as soon as possible the States' authority to protect their citizens from the safety standards of interstate gas pipelines. I am appending as attachment I, and I would like to have made a part of the record of this hearing, the resolution adopted by the 82d NARUC Annual Convention on November 19, 1970, calling on Congress to amend the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 to make clear that Federal safety standards will not preempt the States from requiring higher standards of gas pipeline safety and, as attachment II, drafts of proposed amendments to achieve this vital purpose.

Let me speak first of the urgent need for State safety regulation of interstate gas pipelines. It is well exemplified by comparing some accidents which took place in the State of New York.

On October 15, 1971, Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., an interstate gas pipeline supplying New York and other States, suffered the failure of a relief valve in Schenectady, N.Y. Natural gas was vented into the atmosphere at high pressure for more than 30 minutes. The police evacuated residents from many homes in the area.

By good fortune only, there were no deaths, injuries or damage to property, but the incident could easily have triggered a major disaster. Explosive amounts of gas could have migrated undetected throughout the area because the gas was not odorized.

New York State's gas safety regulations require that the gas be odorized, but the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act makes our regulations inapplicable to interstate gas pipelines even where the lines run through cities. By contrast, the local gas distribution system in Schenectady, which parallels and crosses the interstate pipeline, is required by the State code to odorize its gas.

The Federal standards free interstate pipelines from the requirement to odorize their gas as of January 1, 1972, or when distribution. companies in the States served by the pipelines are fully equipped to odorize the gas, whichever comes first.

Although the office of pipeline safety is considering the matter further, Consolidated Gas has interpreted the Federal standard as relieving it from any obligation to odorize its gas because the distribution companies it serves in New York are fully equipped to odorize their own gas.

We previously appealed to Consolidated Gas to odorize the gas as a voluntary contribution to safety, but it refused.

On January 18, 1971 the New York State Public Service Commission wrote to the acting director of the office of pipeline safety asking for assistance. He reported to us Consolidated Gas' continued refusal to odorize.

OPS informally advised us, if we understand its views correctly, that the Federal code requires odorization only until January 1, 1972, or until all distribution systems in the State-not just those served by Consolidated Gas-can odorize their gas, whichever comes first. It happens that a small fraction of the gas in New York now depends on pipeline odorization, certain distribution companies not having sufficient equipment at present to odorize a portion of the gas they distribute.

On the basis of this technicality-we thought for the time being we had that jurisdiction-we again wrote OPS on April 16 asking that Consolidated Gas be directed to odorize. However, nothing has been done by either OPS or Consolidated Gas in this regard.

There was another potentially serious leak in the Albany area. This gas had been odorized by a different pipeline which transmitted the gas to Consolidated in an exchange. Here we were dealing with odorized gas. In this case the leak was detected immediately because the gas was odorized, and serious danger was avoided in contrast with the Schenectady incident where gas was not odorized and amounts were released into the atmosphere and could have migrated and could have exploded.

In still another instance a leak from a high pressure interstate gas pipeline was detected at a point where an interstate line crosses the New York State thruway near a highway service area. Had this gas not been voluntarily odorized the leak might easily have gone undetected and a serious accident might have ensued.

While I have emphasized the odorization issue, there are many other shortcomings in the Federal code which I shall mention later that may well lead to death and wide damage.

Natural gas is an extremely dangerous commodity if it is not handled with the greatest of care. If a catastrophe occurs in New York because the Federal minimum safety standards for interstate pipelines are less rigorous than the standards the State imposes on comparable local transmission lines, the blame for the catastrophe will rest squarely on the Federal Government.

Gas safety practices and regulations must take account of local conditions such as existing and potential population densities, construction and industrial activity, terrain, and soil conditions.

The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act recognizes the importance of local considerations. It allows the States to assert and enforce more rigorous safety standards than the Federal minimum standards for distribution systems and local transmission lines. Yet the act prohibits States from regulating the safety of interstate gas pipelines even though the interstate lines often operate at higher pressure, transmit much greater volumes of gas, are potentially far greater hazards, and often run through population centers and parallel or cross local distribution systems and transmission lines.

There is no justification for the distinction. If anything, the interstate pipelines offer the greater hazard because, as I said, they are typically under higher pressure and transmit greater volumes. The act

is wrong in this respect and should be amended to end this disabling and senseless prohibition.

Nationally uniform Federal minimum standards for interstate gas pipelines will be either inadequate in more populous States or-if appropriate there will be unduly rigorous and costly for more open territory.

I can conceive of a detailed Federal gas safety program that takes direct account of local considerations appropriate to each State and locality, but that is not the kind that we have nor is it the kind that we are likely to get.

That kind of Federal program, however, either would be massively duplicative of State programs, which are necessary to regulate distribution systems and local transmission lines in any event; or else that type of particularized Federal program would be almost entirely dependent on following the initiative of the States, in which case there seems to be no propriety in preempting the States. The Office of Pipeline Safety has chosen the first course, establishing a nationally uniform set of "minimum" standards for interstate gas pipeline safety that are not sufficient for many areas in New York and elsewhere, where more intensive safety precautions are necessary. These are called "minimum" standards because the interstate pipeline companies are free to exceed them in their discretion. Insofar as the States are concerned, they are maximum standards.

I have already referred to the failure of the Federal code to require odorization. Let me mention some other deficiencies in the Federal code.

For one thing, it does not set standards for certain gathering lines owned by interstate pipelines which we in New York could regulate if they were owned by others but may not regulate when they are owned by interstate pipeline companies.

The New York State code requires a 24-hour pressure test for new high-pressure lines and the repair of all leaks before operation. The Federal code requires only an 8-hour test for high-pressure lines and the repair of "hazardous leaks" before operation, a potentially lethal leniency in the Federal code.

For another example, the New York State code classifies a line which operates at a pressure of 125 pounds per square inch gage or more as a high-pressure transmission line while the Federal code uses a different standard of "hoop stress," where a line is characterized as high pressure only if it operates over a 20-percent hoop stress.

A line operating in New York City, known as the New York Facilities Line, which is owned by the three New York City distribution companies, operates at 275 pounds per square inch gage but at less than 20-percent hoop stress. Luckily for the residents of New York City the line is not an interstate pipeline and is subject to the safety jurisdiction of the New York State Public Service Commission.

If the line were sold to an interstate pipeline company it would be subject to the very meager Federal safety standards for low-pressure lines, less rigorous than the Federal code's own standard for many interstate pipelines operating in rural areas at pressures as low as 350 pounds.

Furthermore, the line would be free to discontinue odorization by January 1, 1972, if not sooner, under the Federal code, despite the