Page images
PDF
EPUB

establishes the qualifications for steel pipe used in gas pipeline facilities. The waiver was granted because the information and data supplied with the petition and presented in testimony at the public hearing showed that the pipe in question substantially meets the requirements of API 5LX 1967 edition for pipe of this size and grade. The OPS determined that this assured a level of safety equivalent to that of the specification listed in the Federal safety standards, that storage of the pipe was in accordance with acceptable practices to preserve the integrity of the pipe, and that use of the pipe would not derogate pipeline safety.

During 1971, the following waivers were granted by State regulatory commissions. The Office of Pipeline Safety has interposed no objection to these waivers:

1. A waiver was granted to Southern California Gas Company and to Pacific Lighting Service Company on

March 23, 1971, by the California Public Service Commission.

This waiver sought extensions of time to comply with the following:

(a) For Southern California Gas Company through
December 1971, to comply with Section 192.621(b).

(b) For Southern California Gas Company and for
Pacific Lighting Service Company through March
1971, to comply with Section 192.619 (a) (3).

(c) For Southern California Gas Company through
December 1971, to comply with Section 192.743 (c).

(d) For Southern California Gas Company through
March 1971, to comply with Section 192.195(a).

The waiver was granted since the extension would not change or alter any standard. Operators intended to comply with these regulations as rapidly as possible but at a rate that would not sacrifice the adequate performance of equally important operation and maintenance activities. Regular progress reports were required to be filed with the Commission.

2.

A waiver was granted to Pacific Gas and Electric Company on April 13, 1971, by the California Public Service Commission. This waiver was seeking the following extensions of time:

(a)

Through December 1971, to comply with,
Section 192.621(b).

Through July 1971, to comply with

Section 192.619 (a) (3).

(c) Through December 1971, to comply with
Section 192.743(c).

(d) Through December 1972, to comply with
Section 192.195(a).

The waiver was granted since the extension would not
change or alter any standard. The operator intended to
comply with these regulations as rapidly as possible
but at a rate that would not sacrifice the adequate
performance of equally important operation and maintenance
activities. Regular progress reports were required to
be filed with the Commission.

3. A waiver was granted to the Decatur Gas Department on
August 9, 1971, by the Alabama Public Service Commission.
This was a waiver to Section 192.625 for a 6-inch and
8-inch line transporting gas from the town border station
to the Monsanto Chemical Company. The waiver permits
Monsanto Chemical Company to obtain a non-odorized gas
supply, because the plant must have non-odorized gas for
its chemical process. Monsanto installed odorizers for
some sections of the plant, and only one line will remain
non-odorized. The Commission determined that the waiver
permitting a portion of the plant to be served with non-
odorized gas would not derogate public safety.

4. A waiver was granted to the Frederick Gas Company in November 1971, by the Maryland Public Service Commission. This waiver pertained to Section 192.177(a) (3) which stipulates that a gas bottle-type holder be buried. A waiver was granted from this regulation so that the holder could be installed temporarily above ground until January 1972. A condition to this waiver was that there be adequate separation of the installation from places of human habitation.

EVALUATION OF DEGREE OF OBSERVANCE OF APPLICABLE
SAFETY STANDARDS--COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES

The gas pipeline safety compliance program involves three major areas of activity: OPS monitoring of State agency performance; OPS compliance activities relating to interstate gas transmission operators and intrastate gas operators not under State agency safety jurisdiction; and State agency efforts to secure compliance by intrastate gas operators covered by certifications or agreements under Section 5 of the Act. In 1971, a compliance officer was added to the staff to direct the OPS activities, with particular attention to developing a formal compliance program and coordinating actions carried out with the Houston field office staff.

At the beginning of the year, OPS initiated compliance actions in two major areas, with respect to State agencies. First, it reviewed certifications submitted by State agencies for adequacy of information required under Section 5(a) of the Act. Secondly, it established target dates for State agency performance during the year. These target dates also served as an effective means toward achieving substantially uniform progress in safety program development among the States on a nationwide basis. Periodic reports received from the States on their progress in relation to the target dates served as a basis for measuring State agency capability and performance.

In addition, through on-site visits OPS monitored the safety programs of five State agencies. Four of these were conducted by the OPS field office in Houston, Texas, which also evaluated the safety activities of seven interstate gas transmission operators, and of 32 intrastate gas operators in Louisiana which are under direct OPS safety jurisdiction.

Although some of the States do not yet have adequate funds and staff capability to advance the compliance program on a mutually uniform and consistent basis,

summarized below are a number of enforcement actions taken during 1971:

1. Enforcement actions were initiated by the Florida Public Service Commission against 33 gas systems for violations of various provisions of the minimum safety standards in effect in Florida. Corrective actions were in turn taken by the systems, so that no assessments or penalties had to be invoked by the Commission to obtain corrective measures.

2. The Michigan Public Service Commission took seven compliance actions against operators for violations of various requirements in the Federal or State pipeline safety standards. The Commission assessed penalties against two of these operators for such violations.

3. The Missouri Public Service Commission, by informal enforcement actions, assessed penalties against two gas utilities. A fine of $300 was voluntarily paid by the Missouri Public Service Company (Kansas City, Missouri) because of the Company's alleged failure to notify the Commission "as soon as reasonably possible" of a gas explosion and fire October 16, 1971, in Chillicothe, Missouri. The Company notified the Commission on October 18, 1971. A fine of $200 was voluntarily paid by the Missouri Utilities Company (Cape Girardeau, Missouri) because of the Company's alleged failure (1) to operate or periodically inspect during the preceding year each transmission line valve that may be required during any emergency; and (2) to maintain and operate the Company's facilities in conformity with its inspection and maintenance plan.

4. The Nebraska Office of Fire Marshal issued a series of orders taking compliance actions against a number of gas operators in the State. Upon inspection of the gas facilities and records of such operators, the Office of Fire Marshal found that certain features did not comply with the applicable regulations.

5. The New York Public Service Commission took the following enforcement actions:

(a) Iroquois Gas Corporation was ordered, on
January 29, 1971, to immediately survey all of its
reported leaks (some 2,700 in number) and to repair
immediately all leaks classified as other than
non-hazardous.

6.

(b) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.,
was ordered, on April 6, 1971, to adopt appropriate
safety procedures with regard to connection of gas
service laterals for new customers. This directive.
specifically required tamper-proof valves in all
cases where the new service lateral is installed
before the customer service begins.

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission issued the following orders:

(a) On February 19, 1971, against the UGI Corporation.
As a result of an accident in Womelsdorf, Pennsylvania,
the Commission ordered the Company to immediately
engage the services of a qualified engineer or
engineering firm to conduct a detailed study of the
condition and service ability of the Company's
facilities in Womelsdorf and to submit to the
Commission a copy of the report of such engineer or
engineering firm.

(b) On October 18, 1971, against the Philadelphia
Electric Company. As a result of the investigation
of an accident in West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania,
the Commission ordered the Company to permanently
abandon a section of the pipeline (approximately
3,000 feet in length) that had been involved in the
accident; and

(c) In a concurrent order, on October 18, 1971, the
Commission ordered that all gas utilities under the
Commission's jurisdiction: review the particulars of
all past recorded oxy-acetylene weld joint failures
to determine similarities in failure mechanism,
location, age or environment; survey and/or patrol
oxy-acetylene welded mains in each distribution
system to determine locations which possess factors
similar to those discovered in the above review;
determine the condition of welded joints at the
locations found in the survey or patrol to establish
which joints are possibly inadequate to withstand
the combined stresses at that location and take
appropriate corrective measures; and submit a report

« PreviousContinue »