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6.

(b) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., was ordered, on April 6, 1971, to adopt appropriate safety procedures with regard to connection of gas service laterals for new customers. This directive. specifically required tamper-proof valves in all cases where the new service lateral is installed before the customer service begins.

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission issued the following orders:

(a) On February 19, 1971, against the UGI Corporation. As a result of an accident in Womelsdorf, Pennsylvania, the Commission ordered the Company to immediately engage the services of a qualified engineer or engineering firm to conduct a detailed study of the condition and service ability of the Company's facilities in Womelsdorf and to submit to the Commission a copy of the report of such engineer or engineering firm.

(b) On October 18, 1971, against the Philadelphia
Electric Company. As a result of the investigation
of an accident in West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania,
the Commission ordered the Company to permanently
abandon a section of the pipeline (approximately
3,000 feet in length) that had been involved in the
accident; and

(c) In a concurrent order, on October 18, 1971, the
Commission ordered that all gas utilities under the
Commission's jurisdiction: review the particulars of
all past recorded oxy-acetylene weld joint failures
to determine similarities in failure mechanism,
location, age or environment; survey and/or patrol
oxy-acetylene welded mains in each distribution
system to determine locations which possess factors
similar to those discovered in the above review;
determine the condition of welded joints at the
locations found in the survey or patrol to establish
which joints are possibly inadequate to withstand
the combined stresses at that location and take
appropriate corrective measures; and submit a report

of findings to the Commission. It further ordered
the Philadelphia Electric Company to conduct the
following research and investigation program for
prevention of failures in welded joints on its
oxy-acetylene welded steel pipelines: examine
previous recorded failures to determine similarities
in failure mechanism, age or environment; survey
pipeline system to determine locations which may
possess factors similar to those found in the
examination of records; using strain-gauge techniques,
measure static and dynamic stresses at points
located in the above survey; using a non-destructive
testing technique such as radiographic, determine
the condition of welded joints at the points located
in the survey mentioned; perform mechanical tests
on samples from selected radiographed joints to
correlate the results of non-destructive tests to
the strength of the material; using information
developed in the strain-gauge, non-destructive
testing and mechanical tests, determine the com-
binations of stresses necessary for failure to occur
in the piping; compare these failure stresses with
those existing in its pipe system and determine a
"performance factor" for the piping; and submit a
report of findings to the Commission no later than
November 1, 1972.

7. The Tennessee Public Service Commission, in conducting its inspections of intrastate gas operators under its safety jurisdiction, ascertained that a number of the operators failed to comply with the requirements of 49 CFR Section 192.227 relating to the qualifications of welders. Because the State lacked adequate provision for qualification of welders, the Public Service Commission arranged with Tennessee's Area Vocational Technical School System for the training and testing of qualified welders so that operators could fully comply with the safety standards.

Additionally, in order to assure compliance with reporting requirements of the Federal and State regulations, a number of States found it necessary to institute enforcement proceedings against certain gas pipeline operators in these States for failure to file an individual leak or annual report.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS

Significant problems that the Department faces in the administration of the gas pipeline safety program include these matters:

1. There is a continuing need for State agency safety jurisdiction over all intrastate gas facilities in each State. Additional progress toward this objective was accomplished through State legislation in 1971.

As of December 31, 1971, because of appropriate action in 39 States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 43 jurisdictions have adequate statutes on monetary sanctions. Only eight jurisdictions still need such legislation; and in a ninth, State enactment of legislation is under legal review.

Further, with more than 950 municipally-owned gas distribution systems in 35 States, in 1968 only ten States had statutes which vested safety jurisdiction over the municipal systems in a State agency. The Department had direct safety jurisdiction over more than 750 municipal gas distribution systems in 25 States. As a result of State legislative enactments since 1968, by year-end 1971 27 States have safety jurisdiction over some 675 municipal gas systems, and the Department's jurisdiction applies to about 275 such systems in only eight States.

2.

Following enactment of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the application of the Federal safety standards to LP gas systems that serve 10 or more customers, it became evident that in a number of States the State agency or official that has safety jurisdiction over LP gas does not have authority to assess civil penalties substantially the same as the related provisions of the Act; therefore, such State agency or official does not qualify for a certification under Section 5(a) of the Act. In 1972 the Department plans to review the jurisdictional and reporting requirements concerning LP gas systems and small natural gas systems.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Research and study projects sponsored during the year concluded work begun in earlier years and initiated new efforts to collect safety information of value in the Federal pipeline safety regulatory program. Data from such studies is being circulated to the public and to industry to advance the technology of pipeline safety. Funds totalling $90,000 were obligated during calendar year 1971, and some studies were supported by funds obligated in 1970 which continued into the year.

1. The Department renewed a contract to more fully develop a data system to process the leak and test failure reports received by the Office of Pipeline Safety. The initial aspects of this system became operational in 1971, and it is being developed to provide guidance to Government user groups, industry, and the public, and to assess the effectiveness of Federal and State pipeline safety regulations. Information from the data system has been made available to State agencies, industry, professional groups, the press, and the general public. Continuing development and refinement of this program is being directed so it will be more accessible and useful to all these groups to further improve pipeline safety.

2. A program contracted by the Department to determine the current state-of-the-art concerning corrosion of steel and iron pipelines was concluded during the year. A report presenting the results of an extensive literature survey, direct questionnaire, and personal contacts with authorities in the field was published by the Office of Pipeline Safety and is being made available to those who supplied data, and to other interested parties who request it.

3. Office of Pipeline Safety staff members are participating with the Department of the Interior in evaluation of the technical aspects of the Trans-Alaska pipeline. The design of the pipeline is unique; and because of the importance of its safety and its potential impact on the

6.

(b) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.,
was ordered, on April 6, 1971, to adopt appropriate
safety procedures with regard to connection of gas
service laterals for new customers. This directive
specifically required tamper-proof valves in all
cases where the new service lateral is installed
before the customer service begins.

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission issued the following orders:

(a) On February 19, 1971, against the UGI Corporation.
As a result of an accident in Womelsdorf, Pennsylvania,
the Commission ordered the Company to immediately
engage the services of a qualified engineer or
engineering firm to conduct a detailed study of the
condition and service ability of the Company's
facilities in Womelsdorf and to submit to the
Commission a copy of the report of such engineer or
engineering firm.

(b) On October 18, 1971, against the Philadelphia
Electric Company. As a result of the investigation
of an accident in West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania,
the Commission ordered the Company to permanently
abandon a section of the pipeline (approximately
3,000 feet in length) that had been involved in the
accident; and

(c) In a concurrent order, on October 18, 1971, the
Commission ordered that all gas utilities under the
Commission's jurisdiction: review the particulars of
all past recorded oxy-acetylene weld joint failures
to determine similarities in failure mechanism,
location, age or environment; survey and/or patrol
oxy-acetylene welded mains in each distribution
system to determine locations which possess factors
similar to those discovered in the above review;
determine the condition of welded joints at the
locations found in the survey or patrol to establish
which joints are possibly inadequate to withstand
the combined stresses at that location and take
appropriate corrective measures; and submit a report

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