Office of the Ombudsman at the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 606, a Bill to Provide Additional Authority to the Office of Ombudsman of the Environmental Protection Agency, June 25, 2002U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004 - 129 pages |
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action Administrator Whitman Advocate Ombuds Appendix authority budget budsman Chairman citizens Classical Ombuds cleanup Coeur d'Alene committee complaints concerns confidentiality Congress decision entity environment Environmental Protection Agency EPA National Ombudsman EPA Office EPA Ombudsman EPA's established Federal agencies files groundwater hazardous waste Hazardous Waste Ombudsman hearing Idaho IG Act impartial independence Inspector General Act involved issues jurisdiction Kittinger's landfill legislation Marjol ment Nadler National Ombudsman function National Ombudsman's office Office of Inspector Office of Ombudsman ombuds offices ombuds's Ombudsman Association Ombudsman investigations Overland Park plaintiff problems PRPs questions radioactive contaminants Reauthorization recommendations regional ombudsmen remedy Robert Martin role samples Senator CARPER Senator Clinton Senator CRAPO Senator SPECTER Shattuck Shortz Silver Valley staff standards subpoena Superfund Tarpon Springs testimony testing Thank TINSLEY tion transfer U.S. SENATOR USOA World Trade Center Zanetti
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Page 56 - policies for activities designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs. Id. at § 2(2). Pursuant to the act, the Inspector General can "conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of such establishment.
Page 56 - carry out these broad responsibilities, the Inspector General has extensive authority, including authority "to make such investigations . . . relating to the administration of the programs and operations of the . . . [EPA] as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General, necessary or desirable.
Page 72 - The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) investigates, exposes, and seeks to remedy systemic abuses of power, mismanagement, and subservience by the Federal Government to powerful special interests. Founded in 1981, POGO is a politically independent, nonprofit watchdog that strives to promote a government that is accountable to the citizenry.
Page 56 - As explained above, OIG has extensive authority to "conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations
Page 11 - The Federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt, but they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the Agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated.
Page 61 - and the US Ombudsman Association. We also looked at four Federal agencies whose ombudsmen deal with inquiries from the public: the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug
Page 96 - be removed from office only by the President," and that the "President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress.
Page 78 - Chairman, Committtee on Environment and Public Works, US Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the American Bar Association ("ABA") and
Page 70 - When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted." Stark v. Wickard. 321 US 288,
Page 86 - appointment by the legislative body or appointment by the executive with confirmation by the designated proportion of the legislative body, preferably more than a majority of the legislative body, such as two thirds; (4) independence of the ombudsman through a long term, not less than