LIBEL AND SLANDER-Continued.

an action for slander, were permitted to find that the words used imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity and the keeping of a house of ill fame. Loranger v. Loranger, 681.

4. Under a declaration for slander alleging that the words complained of were used in the presence and hearing of divers persons besides plaintiff, the plaintiff may establish publication by showing that one person other than the parties was present and heard the slanderous words. Id.

5. The testimony of such third person that he did not hear the defendant utter the alleged slanderous words is not conclusive of the question, if the evidence shows that he was in a position to have heard them; the jury being at liberty, his denial to the contrary notwithstanding, to find that he did hear the words. Id.

6. It is proper for the jury, in an action for slander, to consider the relations of the parties and the pecuniary standing of the defendant. Id. 682.

7. The court may properly require the jury to reconsider their verdict in an action for slander, if it does not conform to Act No. 216, Pub. Acts 1895, with reference to the separation of the items for injuries to feelings and other injuries. Id. LICENSE-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (1).

LIENS-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (4); BANKS AND Banking (1); EQUITY JURISDICTION (1); LOG-LIEN PROCEEDINGS; MECHANICS' LIENS; VENDOR AND PURCHASER (7); WILLS (1, 3).

LIFE INSURANCE.

1. A policy of insurance was made payable to the beneficiary, his executors, administrators, or assigns, in 60 days after due notice and proof of death of the assured. The assured, who was named in the policy as the beneficiary, assigned to his wife all rights thereunder, with a provision that, in case of her death before the policy should become "due," the proceeds should go to the heirs or assigns of the assured. Held, that the policy was not due, at the earliest, until 60 days after the death of the assured, and that, under the terms of the assignment, his heirs were entitled to the proceeds of the policy where the assignee died within such period. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greiner, 639.

2. The fact that a life-insurance company, in reply to a letter written on behalf of the wife of a policy-holder, apprising it of the latter's disappearance, suggesting the inadvisability of her continuing the payment of premiums, and inquiring whether, in case the policy should lapse, the insured could be reinstated upon his return, or would be obliged to apply anew, wrote advising the cancellation of the policy, and stating that, in the event of his return, it would do whatever was right in regard to a new policy, after which no further premiums were paid, will not, in the absence of fraud, entitle the wife to a reinstatement of the policy, where the husband died without having returned. Mosser v. Knights Templars, etc., Indemnity Co., 672.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1).
LIS PENDENS-See TENANCY IN COMMON (5).

LIVE-STOCK COMMISSION.

1. The state live-stock sanitary commission, by the terms of the
act under which it is organized (3 How. Stat. chap. 61a), has
the exclusive right to determine whether animals are so dis-
eased as to require their destruction, and to ascertain, for the
purpose of compensation to the owner, the value of animals
condemned; and its findings will not be reviewed by the
courts. Shipman v. State Live-Stock Sanitary Commission, 488.
2. In such case, the value of the animals in their diseased condi-
tion is the measure of the owner's right to compensation. Id.
3. If the commission condemns, as diseased, animals that are
sound, the State is not liable for the wrongful act; the
owner's remedy, if any, being against the members of the
commission. Id.

4. As to the effect of that provision of the act which authorizes
the destruction of sound animals because of their exposure to
contagious disease, quære. Id.

LOGGING CONTRACTS-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (1–3).
LOG-LIEN PROCEEDINGS.

The filing of a statement of lien is a condition precedent to
the right to maintain a suit by attachment under the log-
lien law. Eales v. Francis, 636.

LOST RECORDS-See EVIDENCE (6).

MALICE-See LIBEL AND SLANDER (1, 2).

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

1. The advice of counsel, given after a full statement of the
facts, to the effect that his client has a meritorious case, in
the absence of testimony impugning the good faith of the
latter, establishes probable cause for instituting suit, and
will defeat an action for malicious prosecution. Pawlowski
v. Jenks, 275.

2. The complainant in a criminal prosecution cannot be held
liable for malicious prosecution, where, before the commence-
ment of the prosecution, he placed all the material facts in
the possession of his own and the prosecuting attorney, and
acted upon their advice. Wakely v. Johnson, 285.

3. A dismissal of a criminal charge because of the nonappear-
ance of the prosecuting attorney is not sufficient evidence of
want of probable cause, in an action for malicious prosecu-
tion against the person making the charge. Id.

4. In an action for malicious prosecution, there was evidence that
defendant aided in procuring the arrest of plaintiff upon a
charge of larceny for taking wood from land to which he knew
that she made a bona fide claim of title and possession; and
that, when plaintiff was discharged by the justice, defendant

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Continued.

said to her: "You beat me. I will take you before my jus-
tice, where you will be beaten." Held, sufficient evidence of
want of probable cause. Loranger v. Loranger, 682.

MANDAMUS.

1. Mandamus will lie to set aside a judgment by default which
was prematurely entered. Reid, Murdock & Co. v. Benzie
Circuit Judge, 418.

2. Where a subordinate body has been vested by the legislature
with the right to exercise its judgment, and with the power
to determine questions of fact, mandamus may lie to compel
the body to act, but will not lie to compel it to act in a par-
ticular way. Shipman v. State Live-Stock Sanitary Com-
mission, 488.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (7).

MARRIED WOMEN.

1. Plaintiff testified that defendant, a married woman, stated to
him that she was going to start a restaurant, and would have
a good deal of work for him to do; that she pointed out to
him certain articles, saying that she wanted them fixed, and
would let him know about the work; that some months later
the articles were brought to his shop, and repaired by him
under the direction of defendant's husband; that defend-
ant visited the shop, and expressed satisfaction with the way
the work was being done; that, when called upon to pay the
contract price, she did not deny the contract, but, on the
contrary, stated that she had left the money with her hus-
band to pay for the work; that he afterwards received from
defendant's husband a check signed by defendant to apply on
the account; and that defendant testified on a previous trial
that the property belonged to her, and that she had rented it
to her husband. Defendant denied the contract, and claimed
that the articles repaired belonged to her husband, and that
the check was drawn on his funds. Held, that plaintiff was
entitled to go to the jury upon his contention that defendant
had employed him to do the work upon articles which she
owned or claimed to own. Lempke v. Felcher, 37.

2. A married woman is not liable on a note given by her jointly
with her husband for the price of personal property purchased
by them jointly. Caldwell v. Jones, 129.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. In an action against the owner of a paper mill for injuries
resulting to an inexperienced employé 14 years of age from
having her hand caught between the rollers of a machine
about which she was employed, it was a question for the jury
whether the owner, in view of the plaintiff's youth and inex-
perience, was in duty bound to instruct her how to do her
work, or was justified in leaving her to learn the proper
method from observation and experience, inasmuch as it was
obvious that her hand would be injured if it should get
between the rollers. Allen v. Jakel, 484.

MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.

2. The law raises no presumption that a boy 17 years of age is
too young to manage properly a brake by which is controlled
the hoisting and lowering of passenger cages in a mine.
Walkowski v. Penokee & Gogebic Consolidated Mines, 629.

3. Whether an employer exercised due care to ascertain the
qualifications of a servant at the time of hiring him is for
the court to determine, where the testimony as to what took
place at such time is undisputed. Id.

4. Due care in the selection of employés is "such care as, in
view of the consequences that may result from negligence on
the part of employés, is fairly commensurate with the perils
or dangers likely to be encountered." Id.

5. Due care on the part of a mining company in employing a
boy 17 years old to manage a brake by which the hoisting and
lowering of passenger cages in the mine was controlled is
shown by the facts that the machinery was simple and easily
managed, and that the master mechanic, before employing the
boy, made inquiries of the boy's father, who was a practical
engineer, and was informed that the boy had had two years'
experience in managing the brake at another mine, where the
duties of the brakeman were more difficult, and that he was
capable of doing the work which the company required. Id.
6. When a master has exercised due care in the employment of a
servant, he may rely upon the presumption of competency
until he has notice or knowledge to the contrary. Id.

7. An employé may frequently use machinery in a negligent
manner, but if such negligent use leaves no trace behind it,
which it is the duty of the master upon inspection to see, no
presumption of knowledge on the part of the master arises.
Id. 630.

8. The fact that an employé, after operating machinery cor-
rectly for several months, forgot on one occasion, and turned
a brake the wrong way, thereby causing injury to a fellow-
servant, has no tendency to show incompetency. Id.

9. Evidence that the fellow-servants of an employé, in the reten-
tion of whom the master is alleged to have been negligent, had
talked among themselves that he did his work improperly, is
not admissible to prove general reputation for incompetency.
Id.

10 Evidence that the person in charge of the brake by which
was controlled the hoisting and lowering of the passenger
cages in a mine was in the habit of lowering the cages at too
great speed is not admissible upon the question of his incom-
petency in an action for injuries caused by his turning the
brake the wrong way and letting the cage fall. Id.
MECHANICS' LIENS.

The failure of a subcontractor to serve upon the owner of the
premises a detailed statement of his claim for material with-
in 10 days after the same was furnished, as provided by
section 1 of the lien law of 1891 (Act No. 179, Pub. Acts
1891), would not relieve the owner from liability therefor,

MECHANICS' LIENS-Continued.

where he paid to the contractor the full contract price with-
out requiring of him the sworn statement as to the claims
of sub-contractors, laborers, and material men, provided for
by section 4 of the act. Blitz v. Fields, 675.

MENTAL INCOMPETENCY—See APPEAL and Error (2); Deeds
(6); WILLS (8); WITNESSES (8).

MERGER OF OFFENSES-See CONSPIRACY (1).

MINES AND MINING-See MASTER AND SERVANT (2, 5, 10).
MISJOINDER-See PARTIES (1).

MISUSER OF FRANCHISES-See EQUITY JURISDICTION (2).
MORTGAGES.

1. It seems that a guarantor of payment of bonds secured by a
mortgage is not a necessary party to a suit to foreclose the
mortgage. Owen v. Potter, 556.

2. A mortgagor's petition for a resale of the premises, which were
bid in by the mortgagee upon foreclosure, will be denied,
notwithstanding the latter promised to redeed to the mort-
gagor upon payment being made within a specified time
after sale, or to give still further time for redemption on
payment of a specified sum, where it appears that the mort-
gagor made no offer of payment within the period limited,
nor requested further time, but talked and acted as though he
had abandoned his purpose to redeem, in reliance upon which
the mortgagee paid prior incumbrances and taxes upon the
land, and went to a considerable expenditure of money, time,
and trouble. Stebbins v. Heath, 661.

See APPEAL AND ERROR (5); CORPORATIONS (1, 2); DEEDS (4);
DURESS (1); FIXTURES (3); HOMESTEAD (1, 5, 8); PRINCIPAL
AND SURETY (5); STREET RAILWAYS (2); TENANCY IN COM-
MON (1, 5); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (2).

MOTIVE-See EVIDENCE (3).

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. Section 304 of the Detroit charter, making it the duty of the
board of public works to prepare a general plan of laying out
into streets and alleys all unplatted lands within the city
limits, and providing that no private plan shall be permitted
which does not conform thereto, justifies the board in refus-
ing to approve a private plat, where portions of the lands
platted therein would be within the limits of a public street
if such street should be extended according to the general
plan. Serviss v. Board of Public Works of Detroit, 63.

2. A municipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of its
board of health, in consequence of which one who had been
exposed to smallpox was received into a boarding house, occa-
sioning loss and damage to the proprietor. Gilboy v. City of
Detroit, 121.