New Hampshire, North Carolina, New Jersey, Alabama, and perhaps others. When the race or color is involved, other States recognize the propriety of an exhibition of the child. A discussion of the subject will be found in 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), 885, 886, and notes, where the authorities are collected. The case of People v. White seems nearly on all fours, and, in our judgment, should rule this case.

Two points are made upon the order: (1) That it is uncertain, inasmuch as no definite amount is fixed; (2) that it subjects the defendant to imprisonment, not only until he shall furnish the bond required, but also until the further order of the court. In Cross v. People, 10 Mich. 24, the syllabus says that the order "should definitely point out and fix the liability of the defendant." This language is stronger than the opinion warrants, perhaps, especially as the order in that case did not fix any definite sum that the father should pay, and provided only that he should pay, with the assistance of the mother, a certain sum monthly, until the further order of the court. This was held void for uncertainty, and we do not discover that the decision rested upon the ground that the period that such payments were to continue was not fixed. In State v. Eichmiller, 35 Minn. 241, such an order was held to be valid, in view of the uncertainty of the length of time that the welfare of the child might require it, and the opportunity for the defendant to move the court to terminate the obligation. In Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Me. 171, such an order was sustained. What the statute may have been upon which the Minnesota case rests we are not advised, but that of Maine is much like our own, and contains no express authority for such a practice. An English case, Rex v. Thomas, 2 Shower, 129, supports a contrary rule, as do two early Connecticut cases,-Cheesborough v. Baldwin, 1 Root, 229, and Benedict v. Roberts, 2 Root, 496. See, also, 3 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 308. We are of the opinion that the better doctrine is that the order should be definite, and fix a limit to the liability, and that it should

not be left open for subsequent applications to the court. Such seems to be the spirit of the Cross Case, supra, and the best policy would seem to justify it. We also think that the order should not have permitted the restraint of the defendant after furnishing the required bond, and its approval. The cause will be remanded, with direction to the court to vacate the order, and enter one in conformity to these views,-a practice which seems warranted by the case of Cross v. People, supra.

The other Justices concurred.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT-See HOMESTEAD (3, 6, 7).

ABATEMENT-See PARTIES (1).

ACCESSION AND CONFUSION.

One who, with his wife's knowledge and consent, mingles his own funds with hers in a bank, with the understanding that the entire fund shall be treated as his, renders the entire fund subject to garnishment for his debt. McIntyre v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, 255.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

1. A barber insured against accidents by a policy providing that if the injuries, independent of all other causes, shall "immediately, continuously, and wholly disable and prevent the insured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation," the company will pay a specified indemnity during the continuance of such "total disablement,' is not prevented from recovering for an accident as for a total disablement because he goes to his place of business for several days after the accident, where he is practically unable to perform any work while there because of his injuries, and after a few days is forced to remain at home for several weeks. Hohn v. Inter-State Casualty Co., 80.

2. The term "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger," as used in an accident insurance policy exempting the insurer from liability for injuries caused by such exposure, means a conscious or intentional exposure, involving gross or wanton negligence on the part of the insured. Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 86.

3. One having regular clerical employment in a city, but whose home is upon a farm, where he spends his Sundays and one night in each week, the management of which is, in his absence, entirely in the hands of men hired by him for the purpose, is not a "farmer," within the terms of an accident insurance policy classing farming as a hazardous employment. Id.

4. Nor can it be said, as a matter of law, that the person so employed changes his occupation to farming by returning to his farm before the expiration of his contract with his city employers, on account of their disposing of their business, so as to limit his recovery upon the policy, for injuries received a week later from being tossed by a bull, to the amount of indemnity which the premium paid by him would have purchased at the rates fixed for the increased hazard, in

ACCIDENT INSURANCE—Continued.

accordance with a provision of the policy that such should be the effect of the insured's "engaging" in a more hazardous occupation than that under which he was insured. Id. See INSURANCE.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-See SETTLEMENT.

ACCOUNTING-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (2); EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2-4); TENANCY IN COMMON (3-6); TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1).

ACCOUNTS-See CHATTEL MORTGAGES (3, 4).

ACQUITTAL-See CRIMINAL LAW (3, 9).

ACTIONS-See ASSUMPSIT; CHATTEL MORTGAGES (5); ELECTION OF REMEDIES; EQUITY JURISDICTION (3); PARTIES.

ADMISSIONS-See SEDUCTION (3).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Possession by a vendee under a land contract is not adverse until he has either complied with its terms, or has in some way given notice to his vendor or the latter's assignees that he claims to hold in hostility thereto. Burke v. Douglass, 197. See EQUITY PLEADING (3).

ADVICE OF COUNSEL-See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (1, 2).
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE-See DEEDS (2, 3).

AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

ALIBI-See CRIMINAL LAW (2).

ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (1–3). ALIMONY-See DIVORCE; EQUITY PRACTICE (1-3); HOMESTEAD (8).

ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE-See CONTEMPT.

AMENDMENTS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (9-11); CORPORATIONS (5); EQUITY PRACTICE (2); JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (2).

ANIMALS-See LIVE-STOCK COMMISSION.

ANSWER-See EQUITY PRACTICE (6, 7).

ANTENUPTIAL PROMISE—See CONSIDERATION (5).

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. An objection to drain proceedings on the ground that the drain commissioner was an interested party will not be considered on appeal where it is not raised by any assignment of error. Roberts v. Smith, 5.