was raised, and the mandamus denied. The court below held that Mr. Canfield had a lien upon the judgment; and it was said by this court that the case was governed by Weeks v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 73 Mich. 256, and Carpenter v. Myers, 90 Mich. 210. The present case is ruled by those cases. Judgment affirmed. The other Justices concurred. MOSSER v. KNIGHTS TEMPLARS & MASONS' LIFE INDEMNITY CO. LIFE INSURANCE-LAPSED POLICY-REINSTATEMENT. The fact that a life-insurance company, in reply to a letter written on behalf of the wife of a policy-holder, apprising it of the latter's disappearance, suggesting the inadvisability of her continuing the payment of premiums, and inquiring whether, in case the policy should lapse, the insured could be reinstated upon his return, or would be obliged to apply anew, wrote advising the cancellation of the policy, and stating that, in the event of his return, it would do whatever was right in regard to a new policy, after which no further premiums were paid, will not, in the absence of fraud, entitle the wife to a reinstatement of the policy, where the husband died without having returned. Appeal from Wexford; Aldrich, J. Submitted January 6, 1898. Decided February 16, 1898. Bill by Sarah A. Mosser against the Knights Templars & Masons' Life Indemnity Company for the reinstatement of an insurance policy. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Reversed. Sawyer & Bishop (John W. McGrath, of counsel), for complainant. McIntyre & Wetmore, for defendant. HOOKER, J. This suit is based on a policy of insurance, and the complainant obtained a decree reinstating the policy. The defendant asserts that the policy was canceled nearly three years before the husband of the complainant died. The following correspondence will show the foundation for this claim: "CADILLAC, MICH., Oct. 26, 1893. "W. H. GRAY, Gen'l Mgr. K. T. & M. L. I. Co., 66 Chicago, Ill. Dear Sir and Bro.: On the 19th of August last, Bro. John G. Mosser, the holder of policy No. 8,160, made an assignment for benefit of creditors, and, for some unknown reason, left the country. All trace of him was lost at Niagara Falls, Aug. 22, when he took a Grand Trunk train for the West. His wife has paid his assessments in all his insurance companies since that time, but we do not think it advisable for her to continue paying until something further develops. We would like to know if, in case his policy lapses for nonpayment, can he be reinstated when he turns up, or would he be compelled to apply anew? It seems to us that, in the present uncertain state of affairs, Mrs. Mosser had better not risk any further payments, as they would be of no benefit to her. Let us hear from you. "Yours, etc., "J. R. BISHOP, H. P., "J. R. BISHOP, Esq., 66 Cadillac, Mich. "CHICAGO, Nov. 4, 1893 "Dear Sir: Yours received and noted. In reply, will say, when Mr. Mosser returns, we will do whatever is right, in the way of issuing a new policy; but, under the circumstances, I would not approve of the continuation of the old policy, since, should he die, it would not be known when or where he died, all of which would have to be in strict accordance with the provisions of the policy, and be furnished as information, in the event of death, to show he had not violated any of the terms of the policy while he was gone. The best thing to do would be to let the policy cancel, and, if he returns, we could consider him for a new policy, waiving the entrance 115 Mich.-43 fee on the proper papers being furnished. With best wishes, I am, "Yours respectfully, "W. H. GRAY, General Manager." We think it clear, from this record, that the complainant, acting under the advice of her friends, determined to, and did, allow the policy to be canceled. The defendant made no promise to do more than "to do what is right, upon an application for a new policy, in case of his return." There is not a suggestion of fraud or overreaching, nor is there anything that could constitute an estoppel. The solicitors for the complainant say that the complainant acted upon the advice of the defendant. This is doubtless true, in a sense; but it was advice sought by her, and conformed to the opinions of her own friends. We discover no just reason for compelling the payment of the policy, or any rule of law which would warrant it. The decree is reversed, and complainant's bill is dismissed, with costs of both courts. The other Justices concurred. BLITZ v. FIELDS. MECHANICS LIENS-SUBCONTRACTORS-NOTICE OF CLAIM-PAYMENT The failure of a subcontractor to serve upon the owner of the Appeal from Wayne; Hosmer, J. Submitted January 6, 1898. Decided February 16, 1898. Bill by Louis Blitz against Lorenzo D. Fields, impleaded with Michael Schuh, to enforce a mechanic's lien. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Moore & Moore, for complainant. James H. Pound, for defendant. Affirmed. LONG, J. On June 6, 1892, defendant Fields owned certain land in the city of Detroit, described in complainant's bill, and on that day entered into a contract with defendant Schuh for erecting a building thereon. In August following, complainant, as subcontractor, furnished to said Schuh labor and material to complete the house under the contract, to the amount of $118.43. Complainant's work began August 20th and terminated August 25th. It is claimed by complainant that, within 10 days after the completion of the work, he served on defendant Fields a detailed statement of the goods so sold. This is denied by defendant Fields. September 20th complainant October Defend filed in the register of deeds' office a lien upon the land in question. The next day he caused a copy of this lien to be served on defendant Fields, and on October 7th he filed in the register's office proof of this service. 8th the bill of complaint in this cause was filed. ant Schuh did not appear, and the bill was taken as confessed against him. Defendant Fields appeared and answered, claiming that he had paid the original con. tractor in full. On the hearing in open court, the foregoing facts appeared from the testimony, and it appeared that the defendant, almost immediately after the work was finished, paid the defendant Schuh the balance of -$200, which was then due him, without securing an affidavit from Schuh, as required by Act No. 179, Pub. Acts 1891, but paid it on the verbal assurance of one of Schuh's creditors that he (the creditor) would protect him (Fields) against any unpaid claims. It is the claim of counsel for defendant that the complainant did not serve upon the owner of the premises a detailed statement of the claim within 10 days after the material was furnished, as provided by section 1 of the act, and that, therefore, defendant might pay the contractor without becoming liable to material men and for labor; that the owner was informed by the contractor that the claim of complainant was paid; that the payment by the owner to the contractor was without notice of complainant's claim. It is further contended that the owner did not pay until after the work was completed, and when there was no reason why he should withhold payment. In other words, it is contended that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 of the act, the owner has the right to pay the contractor the full amount of the contract price, unless each material man shall, within 10 days after the sale of the material to the contractor, serve on the owner, etc., a fairly detailed statement of the goods so sold, etc. But it was held by this court in Smalley v. Ashland Brown-Stone Co., 114 Mich. 104, that this provision of section 1 of the act is for the protection of the |