The covenant in an

a complete answer to the question. absolutely void instrument has no greater force than the instrument itself. A covenant in a deed which is void cannot be given life as an effectual conveyance by a decree of divorce. Phillips v. Stauch, 20 Mich. 369, 381; Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Sewing Machine Co., 41 Mich. 131; Hall v. Loomis, 63 Mich. 709; Alt v. Banholzer, 39 Minn. 511 (12 Am. St. Rep. 681); Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn. 299.

The defendant cites, to support his contention, Heaton v. Sawyer, 60 Vt. 495; In re Romero's Estate, 75 Cal. 379; Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78 (10 Am. St. Rep. 623); Wiggin v. Buzzell, 58 N. H. 329. In Heaton v. Sawyer the decree settled all the rights of the parties. The care of the children was given to the wife, and a certain sum was decreed to be paid by the husband to her in lieu of all her rights in the estate. The same remark applies to Wiggin v. Buzzell. In Prater v. Prater the wife had deserted her husband, eloped with another man, had taken up a permanent residence with him in another State, and had continued to live in adultery with him until her husband's death. In Re Romero's Estate it was held that a homestead cannot be set apart from the estate of a decedent to minors who are not the children of decedent either in fact or by adoption. These cases do not support the contention.

3. An attempt was made to show an abandonment of the homestead by Mrs. Louw. This is based upon two letters, dated, respectively, in August and September, 1880, which are claimed to have been written by her. The former purports to be signed "Sarah M. Louw." The other has no signature. These letters were written after she had been compelled to leave her husband and his home, and while proceedings for divorce were pending. Neither letter says a word about abandoning her right to the homestead. The first states that she will not go back to live with him, and that he can use the place to help himself with, and she will have what she took away. The

second letter says nothing whatever about her intentions. Giving these letters the broadest significance, they do not amount to an abandonment. She, soon after, filed her petition for alimony, and prosecuted her suit to a decree. But an abandonment by husband or wife does not validate a conveyance of a homestead without the other's signature. Belden v. Younger, 76 Iowa, 567; Bruner v. Bateman, 66 Iowa, 488.

4. Defendant insists that only the husband, widow, or children can take advantage of this homestead right, and maintain a suit to protect it; and that, since neither in this case disaffirmed the conveyance, the complainant has no standing. Complainant stands in the shoes of Mrs. Louw. She chose to have the property sold upon execution on a decree rendered in her favor. This act estopped her to set up her homestead right as against the purchaser at the sale and his grantees. Complainant is in possession under her, and as her grantee under the execution sale. He succeeded to her rights.

5. Defendant attacks the regularity of the execution sale, and sets up alleged jurisdictional defects. If complainant rested his rights upon this sale, it would be necessary to determine its validity. He, however, has shown title by adverse possession. Defendant insists that such title is not claimed by the bill, and that, therefore, complainant cannot recover on this ground, and cites Moran v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 367. The decision in that case was based upon the fact that complainant, after proofs were in, sought relief upon equities springing from estoppels in pais, which were not even referred to, either in the bill or the answer. The case, however, was remanded, with permission to complainant to amend his bill. In the present case complainant sets up the date of a sale, and the immediate taking of possession thereunder (which was more than 15 years before the commencement of the suit), the continuance of such possession, and states that he and his grantors have been in "actual, continuous, and uninterrupted possession" of the premises. An adverse

possession is therefore set up, and can be taken advantage

of under the prayer for general relief. The decree is affirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

PEOPLE, for use of SIMON, v. PACK.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIEN UPON JUDGMENT.

It is immaterial that an attorney, who claims a lien upon a judgment for his services, was styled upon the record as "of counsel" merely, where it appears that he actively assisted in the preparation for and conduct of the trial.

Error to Alpena; Kelley, J. Submitted January 6, 1898. Decided February 16, 1898.

Assumpsit by the people, for the use and benefit of Sigmund Simon and another, against Albert Pack and others, upon a sheriff's official bond. The case was settled and discontinued by stipulation. Thereafter, one of plaintiffs' attorneys having given notice of attorney's lien, the stipulation of discontinuance was stricken from the files, the case tried, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs for the amount of the lien. Both parties bring error. Affirmed.

Sloman & Groesbeck, for plaintiffs.

J. H. Cobb (Moore & Moore, of counsel), for defendants.

I. S. Canfield, in pro. per.

LONG, J. Plaintiffs, who were in May, 1893, doing business in Detroit, under the firm name of S. Simon &

Co., became joint mortgagees with the firm of Heavenrich Bros. in a mortgage given by Kositchek Bros., of Alpena. In June of the same year, the sheriff of Alpena county, through his deputy, attached the mortgaged property in an action brought by other creditors against the Kositcheks. Plaintiffs and Heavenrich Bros. brought separate actions of trover against the sheriff and the attaching creditors, in which plaintiffs recovered a judgment for $3,267. Plaintiffs, being unable to collect their judgment, brought this action in the Alpena circuit upon the sheriff's official bond. While this action was pending, the defendants paid to plaintiffs the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs, less $500, which was retained, notice having been given them by I. S. Canfield that he claimed an attorney's lien for the sum of $425 on such judgment and the judgment in the Heavenrich case. Thereupon plaintiffs assigned their judgment to Comstock, one of the defendants, who was a surety upon the said sheriff's bond. At the same time, plaintiffs, through Sloman, Groesbeck & Robinson, their Detroit attorneys, stipulated with defendants' attorney for the discontinuance of the suit; but no order of discontinuance was ever entered.

It appears that Mr. Canfield, an attorney residing at Alpena, had been employed in June, 1893, through Sloman & Duffie, for plaintiffs, to assist them in the litigation against the defendants in those lien suits. Canfield, as plaintiffs' attorney, had demanded the mortgaged property, and, being refused, commenced the trover suit, signing, under instructions, the writ by which such suit was commenced, "Sloman & Duffie, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Frank Emerick and I. S. Canfield, of counsel." Sloman & Duffie drew the declaration in said cause, signing and indorsing the same in like manner, and sent it to Canfield for filing and service. The notice of retainer and plea in both of said causes were directed to and served upon Canfield, who noticed the cases for trial, filed notes of issue with the clerk, opposed the application of defendants, looked up the testimony for plaintiffs by their re

quest, talked with their witnesses, and secured their attendance, consulted with and attended the trial with plaintiffs, and actively assisted them. On motion of Canfield, judgment was entered in plaintiffs' favor in those suits. He also taxed the costs, took out an execution upon said judgment, and looked after the same, and caused its return. The judgment not being collected from the sheriff, Canfield, at the request of the aforesaid attorneys, commenced the action upon the sheriff's official bond to enforce its collection, prepared the declaration, noticed the same for trial, opposed in court a motion made by defendants for a continuance, and did all of the work incident to the preparation thereof for trial, all of which was performed for and at the request of said plaintiffs, through their attorneys. After defendants paid plaintiffs, and the stipulation discontinuing suit had been filed, Canfield, to preserve his attorney's lien, obtained an order striking said stipulation from the files, and reinstating the case for trial; and in March, 1897, the case was tried at the circuit, and verdict and judgment entered for $217.50, being the amount of Canfield's lien, in favor of the plaintiffs, from which both of said parties to the original suit have appealed. Mr. Canfield tried the case for plaintiffs, and Sloman & Groesbeck appeared for the plaintiffs, and J. H. Cobb for defendants.

We are satisfied that the court was not in error in instructing the jury that Mr. Canfield was employed as attorney and counsel in the suits in question. The court left it for the jury to determine what those services were worth. The only question which we need discuss is whether Mr. Canfield, as plaintiffs' attorney, has a lien for his services upon the judgment obtained by the plaintiffs against the defendants. The contention of counsel for plaintiffs seems to be that Mr. Canfield, being merely counsel in the case, had no lien upon the judgment. A similar case was before this court at the October term, 1896, in a mandamus proceeding. Heavenrich v. Alpena Circuit Judge, 111 Mich. 163. There the same question