"No service of notice or papers in the ordinary proceedings in a cause shall be necessary to be made on a defendant who has not appeared therein, and given notice to the plaintiff's attorney of his intention to defend the suit, except where the defendant is returned imprisoned for want of bail," etc. The contention of counsel for the petitioner is that under this new rule he was entitled in advance to notice of the intention to issue the writ of garnishment, and all future proceedings in garnishment, and that such proceedings are only ancillary to the principal proceedings, and are proceedings in the principal cause, within the meaning of Rule 35. The rule can have no such construction. It is not Rule 35 that settles the practice as to service of notice of proceedings and papers in a cause. Other rules provide for that. Rule 35 defines the practice in a single case, namely, when a party has appeared, but has not pleaded. The rule does not undertake to define the practice, but to modify the common-law practice in certain particulars. The practice is well stated in 1 Burrill, Prac. 345: "It is a general rule that each of the parties to an action is constantly entitled to due notice of the proceedings of the other; and, if the notice be omitted, the proceedings may be set aside as irregular. The only exception to this rule is in the case where a defendant has not appeared in the action (unless he be returned 'imprisoned for want of bail'). In the most general view of the subject, notices are to the effect that certain proceedings either have already taken place or will take place on some future day designated. Of the former description are notices of bail, of the entry of common rules, and of other similar formal proceedings which are required by the standing rules of practice, and of which, therefore, it is not necessary for the opposite party to be previously apprised. Of the latter description, which may be termed prospective notices,' are notices of trial, of motion, and of other similar proceedings, on which the opposite party has a right to be heard before the full benefit of the notice can be obtained." It was not the intent of Rule 35 to compel the giving of notices in advance in any case where, under the old rules. of practice, it was not necessary to apprise the opposite party in advance of the proceedings about to be taken. If the interpretation for which petitioner contends were to be given to the rule, then a writ of attachment issued in a cause in continuation of suit would be of no validity unless notice were given in advance to a defendant who had either appeared or had served notice of retainer. So with the issuing of the writ of garnishment. In such case the very advantage sought by the writ would possibly be of no avail, as a disposition could be made of the fund or property before service could be had. Garnishment proceedings are but auxiliary to the principal suit. It has never been the practice in this State to give the principal defendant notice of the steps taken in the garnishment proceedings. The court below was not in error in denying the motion. The writ is denied. The other Justices concurred. SERVISS v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF DETROIT. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PRIVATE PLATS-CONFORMITY TO GEN- Section 304 of the Detroit charter, making it the duty of the Certiorari to Wayne; Carpenter, J. Submitted November 3, 1897. Decided November 17, 1897. 115 63 s72NW1117 e132 478 132 479 Mandamus by Clark A. Serviss and others to compel the board of public works of the city of Detroit to approve a plat of lands. From an order denying the writ, relators bring certiorari. Affirmed. Walker & Spalding, for relators. C. D. Joslyn, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The relators were denied mandamus to compel the respondent to approve a plat of certain lands in the city of Detroit, which was refused by the respondent because portions of the lands platted covered premises which would be within the limits of a public street if said street should be extended according to the plan adopted by the board under section 304 of the city charter. A copy of the provision relied on will be found in the case of Van Husan v. Heames, 91 Mich. 519. That case was before this court twice, upon different plats. The first raised the identical question in this case, and, while unreported, the record shows the following memorandum: "Denied, * * * because relator, under the statute, cannot plat lots within the line of proposed streets. Relative to dedication of streets and alleys not passed upon." The order of the circuit court is affirmed. PEOPLE v. MAGUIRE. INSANE PERSONS-COMMITMENT TO ASYLUM-APPEAL. Where, pending an appeal from an order committing one accused of crime to the asylum for the dangerous and criminal insane, the respondent is discharged from the asylum, and the criminal case against him nolle prossed, the appeal will be dismissed without a determination of the questions raised. Error to Calhoun; Smith, J. Submitted November 4, 1897. Decided November 17, 1897. Eugene Maguire was adjudged insane, and committed to the asylum for the dangerous and criminal insane at Ionia, from which order he appeals. Appeal dismissed. Mains & Cavanagh, for appellant. Andrew W. Lockton, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. PER CURIAM. On April 27, 1897, the respondent was arrested upon the charge of willfully and maliciously setting fire to and burning the county jail of Calhoun county. He waived examination before the justice, was held for trial to the circuit court, and in default of bail was committed. On April 8th of the same year, his son filed a petition in the probate court, alleging the insanity of his father, and praying that he be adjudged insane, and confined in the asylum at Kalamazoo. According to the brief of his counsel, he was then confined in the county jail, under a conviction as a disorderly person. A hearing upon that petition was fixed for May 3d. Physicians certified to his insanity, but those proceedings were abandoned. June 11th the prosecuting attorney presented a petition to the circuit court, setting up these 115 MICH.-5. proceedings and the arrest of respondent, and the pendency of the criminal cause against him, attached the affidavits of the physicians, and prayed that a determination be had as to his alleged insanity by the circuit judge, in accordance with the statute. A hearing was had, and the respondent adjudged insane, and committed to the asylum for the dangerous and criminal insane. He has appealed from that decision to this court, alleging irregularities in the proceedings, and attacking the constitutionality of Act No. 119, Pub. Acts 1895. It is conceded by counsel that the respondent has been discharged from the asylum, and the criminal case against him nolle prossed. He is therefore in the full enjoyment of his liberty. He can gain nothing by reversal, for there is nothing to try if the case is reversed. An order releasing him would be a nullity, as he has been already released. There is no good purpose to be subserved by a determination of the case. The appeal is therefore dismissed. PEOPLE v. THIELMAN. HOLIDAYS-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-ILLEGAL SALE-Statutes. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 185, Pub. Acts 1893, the statute as to legal holidays (1 How. Stat. § 1591) provided that, in case any of the holidays should fall upon a Sunday, then the Monday following should be considered as the said holiday. By the amendatory act of 1893 it was provided that, whenever certain specified holidays (including the 4th day of July) should fall upon Sunday, the Monday following should be deemed a public holiday "for all or any of the purposes aforesaid." Respondent, who was convicted under an information charging him with keeping his saloon open "on Monday, the 5th day of July, 1897, a legal holiday," ap * * * pealed, contending that the selling of liquor was not a purpose |