amended) empowers the board "to take and hold, by purchase, gift, devise, bequest, or otherwise, such franchises and real and personal property, either within or without the limits of said city, as may be needful or convenient for carrying out the intents and purposes of this act, and to sell and convey or lease the same whenever required by the interests of the city." The act further provides: "The property of the board, whether within or without the limits of the city of Detroit, shall be exempt from all taxes and assessments of every kind. No writ of attachment or writ of execution shall be levied upon the property of said board." Charter and Laws of Detroit (1893), chap. 21, § 1.

The counsel for respondent contend that this statute should be construed as exempting only such property of the board as is at the time convenient or necessary for direct use by the board. The argument is that, as taxation is the rule, and exemption the exception, a statute providing for an exemption should receive a strict construction. This is undoubtedly the correct rule. Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.), 204. Whether this strict rule should be applied in construing a statute exempting the property of a municipal corporation, we need not, in this case, determine, as we are of the opinion that the legislative intent is made clear by the language employed. The language creating the exemption is in itself broad enough to cover the property in question. The provision relating to exemption from taxation is immediately followed by the exemption of the property from legal process, indicating that the same class of property was in the mind of the legislature; and when it is considered that the board is in the same section given power to lease property owned by it, and that no limitation is placed upon the exemption, the conclusion is irresistible that the exemption is broad enough in terms to cover the property in question. The writ must issue.

The other Justices concurred.

OLD SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF BAY CITY v. ALPENA COUNTY SAVINGS BANK.1

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-LAND CONTRACT-FORFEITURE-WAIVER. The vendor in a land contract, by filing a bill to foreclose his vendor's lien, waives the benefit of a prior notice of forfeiture for default in payments given by him to the vendee.

Appeal from Alpena; Kelley, J. Submitted January 4, 1898. Decided January 18, 1898.

Bill by the Old Second National Bank of Bay City and Orrin Bump, trustee, against the Alpena County Savings Bank, Austin W. Mitchell, and John Millen, for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal. Reversed as to defendant bank.

C. L. Collins, for complainants.

J. D. Turnbull, for defendant bank.

HOOKER, J. On December 8, 1891, Austin W. Mitchell, being the owner in fee of the premises described in the bill of complaint, sold them, upon a written executory contract, to Mosher & Son and Alvin Maltby. Prior to their disposal of their interest, they paid upwards of $90,000 of the purchase price, besides interest. On October 11, 1895, Maltby and wife quitclaimed their interest in the premises to the Old Second National Bank, and on October 15, 1895, Mosher & Son assigned their interest to Bump, which appears to have been for the benefit of said bank; and it seems to be understood by counsel that these instruments amounted to an assignment by the vendees of their 'Rehearing denied February 16, 1898.

interest in the contract to the bank and Bump, which the learned circuit judge determined was to secure a then existing indebtedness against them of about $22,000, due to the bank. At this time there was about $8,000 remaining unpaid upon the contract, which would mature on January 2, 1896. This was not paid, and on February 3, 1896, Mitchell caused a notice to be served upon the bank. The following is a copy of the substance thereof:

"There having been default made in payment of the amount due under the land contract of date December 8, 1891, between Austin W. Mitchell, as first party, and Alfred Mosher & Son and Alvin Maltby, as second parties, you are hereby notified of the determination of said contract, and that all said second parties' rights therein are declared forfeited and void under the terms thereof. 66 AUSTIN W. MITCHELL.

"Dated Cadillac, Mich., February 3, 1896."

The following provisions of the contract should be read in this connection:

"But in case the said parties of the second part, or their legal heirs, representatives, or assigns, shall fail to make the payments aforesaid, or any of them, or any part thereof, punctually, and upon the strict terms, and at the times and places above limited and provided, or shall fail to regularly and seasonably pay and discharge all said taxes and assessments that may hereafter become a lien upon said premises, or any portion thereof, or shall otherwise fail to keep, perform, and fulfill all or any of the promises, agreements, and covenants herein contained, to be kept and performed by the said parties of the second part, then the said party of the first part, or his representatives or assigns, shall have the right, upon 30 days' written notice to said second parties, to treat and consider this contract as abandoned and forfeited by the said parties of the second part; and the said parties of the second part shall forfeit and lose all right and claim under this contract, and be liable to the said party of the first part for damages, and shall thenceforth be deemed mere tenants of the said first party, holding over after expiration of their term, and may be removed from said premises, without notice to quit (which is hereby by said second parties expressly waived), in the same manner as is pro

vided by law for the removal of a tenant in such case. And it shall be lawful for the said party of the first part, at any time after the violation or nonfulfillment of any of the said agreements on the part of the said parties of the second part, to sell and convey the said land and premises, with the appurtenances, and the said party of the first part shall not be liable in law or equity, in any way or to any person, for damages in consequence of such sale, or to refund any part of the said purchase money or interest which shall have been paid under this contract, and all payments hereon which shall have matured and are due and unpaid at the time of such forfeiture shall not be affected by the same, but shall be paid to the said party of the first part as if no forfeiture had been made. And it is hereby expressly covenanted and agreed that time is and shall be deemed and taken as the very essence of this contract; and that, unless the same shall in all respects be complied with by the said parties of the second part, at the respective times and in the manner herein limited and declared, the said parties of the second part shall lose and be debarred from all rights, remedies, and actions, either in law or equity, upon and under this contract, at the option of the party of the first part."

About the same time (February 3, 1896), Mitchell's solicitor tendered a deed of the premises to the complainants, and demanded payment of an amount claimed to be due upon the contract. In the interview the liability of the bank was not denied, nor did complainants refuse payment. They did decline to pay at that time, upon the ground that they were entitled to further time, and claimed that under existing circumstances (whatever they may have been) the contract could not be forfeited, and that Mitchell's remedy was by bill in equity. In this Mitchell's counsel seems to have acquiesced, and a bill to foreclose the vendor's lien was filed about the middle of March, 1896. These complainants did not answer until December. Other defendants answered as late as July 1st, and a replication was filed as late as June 4, 1896. Counsel for the complainants asserts that they meditated allowing the case to go to decree, and taking care of their interests by payment, or submitting to sale, as might seem

best. Nothing appears to have been done in that case after July 1, 1896, and it is still pending.

We will now return to some transactions earlier in point of time than these last mentioned. Mosher & Son and Maltby became insolvent about October 15, 1895, and the defendant Alpena Savings Bank commenced an attachment against them, the lands described being attached. This was after the assignment of the contract to the complainants. Early in May, 1896, a quitclaim deed was given by Mitchell of his interest in this land to one O'Brien, a director of the Alpena Savings Bank, who then deeded to the bank, and on the 9th of May complainants' solicitor, who had heard a rumor of this, wrote, upon behalf of the complainants, to the defendant bank, stating their claim, and that they had heard this rumor, asking to be informed whether it was true, and offering to make an exhibit of complainants' proof, to show the priority of their claim over that of the defendant bank, and inviting correspondence with a view to an amicable adjustment of the matter. No answer was made to this, beyond an acknowledgment of its receipt. On or after January 2, 1897, the following letter was received by complainants' solicitor. Its statements do not appear to be disputed: "CADILLAC, MICH., Jan. 2, 1897.

"C. L. COLLINS, Esq.,

"Bay City, Mich.

"Dear Sir: Yours containing answer in Mosher case is at hand. If I failed to answer your former letter, I must ask your pardon. The neglect was unintentional. I referred the inquiry as to the status of the case at that time to Mr. Michael O'Brien, of Alpena, who purchased the Mitchell end of the Mosher contract in May or June last. His expectation was to file a bill of revivor or take other steps to install him in Mr. Mitchell's place in the pending suit, and I had supposed he had long ago done so. I today forward to him your copy of answer of Old Second National Bank, and suggest you write him for information regarding the case.

"Yours, etc.,

"E. E. HASKINS."