complainants have failed to establish the case stated in their bill of complaint. The decree should be affirmed. GRANT, J., concurred with MOORE, J. BOSTWICK v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE. 1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-JURISDICTION IN REPLEVIN-LOCAL ACTS. 66 debt or dam An action of replevin is not brought to recover Where defendant, in an action instituted before a justice of the peace, does not raise a jurisdictional question until after appeal to the circuit court, he is not entitled to costs upon the dismissal on appeal. Mandamus by Noble Bostwick to compel William L. Carpenter, circuit judge of Wayne county, to dismiss an appeal. Submitted October 5, 1897. Writ granted December 21, 1897. Henry B. Graves, for relator. R. B. Wilkinson, for respondent. GRANT, J. The sole question involved is, Does Act No. 460 of the Local Acts of 1895 confer upon justices of the peace of the city of Detroit jurisdiction in replevin cases involving more than $100? Section 9 of the act is as follows: "Every justice of the peace elected in the said city of Detroit, and duly qualified according to law, shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the debt. or damages do not exceed the sum of $100, and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the debt or damages do not exceed the sum of $500, except as provided in section 6815 of Howell's Annotated Statutes of Michigan." An action of repievin is not brought to recover debt or damages, but to recover specific property unlawfully detained by the defendant. The language of the section above quoted is not applicable to an action of replevin. The act is silent as to this action, and the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace is therefore governed by the general statute. 2 How. Stat. § 6856. The affidavit alleged the property to be "worth $150 and not to exceed $500." It follows that the justice had no jurisdiction, and the circuit court should have dismissed the appeal taken by the plaintiff. The defendant did not raise the question before the justice, and not until the case was appealed to the circuit court. He is therefore not entitled to costs. The writ of mandamus will issue, directing the court below to dismiss the appeal, but without costs. The other Justices concurred. BRISTOL v. SUTTON. 1. CONTRACTS-TIME OF PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 2. SAME-ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS-IMPLIED PROMISE. In such case, the appropriation by C. of the benefits of the services, though rendered with the knowledge and approval of A., does not raise an implied promise on the part of A. to pay therefor. Error to Calhoun; Daboll, J., presiding. Submitted October 5, 1897. Decided December 21, 1897. Henry Bristol presented a claim against the estate of Smith H. Bristol, deceased, based upon a contract for services. The claim was disallowed by the commissioners, and claimant appealed to the circuit court. From a judgment there for claimant, Edward Sutton, the administrator of the estate, brings error. Reversed. T. E. Barkworth, for appellant. HOOKER, J. The plaintiff's claim against the estate of his uncle was allowed in the circuit court upon the showing that he was emancipated when about 15 years of age, and that he then left home, and that a little later, at his uncle's request, he agreed with him that he would return, and remain with and assist his father upon the father's farm until he should attain his majority, and that his uncle promised to pay him $1,000 if he should do so, and that the plaintiff carried out the agreement. It is admitted that this contract was within the statute of frauds, 115 365 s119 694 119 696 and it seems to be conceded that it would fall within the principle of Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369; Cadman v. Markle, 76 Mich. 448 (5 L. R. A. 707); Moore v. HorseNail Co., 76 Mich. 606; In re Williams' Estate, 106 Mich. 490; and the more recent case of Rhea v. Meyers' Estate, 111 Mich. 140,-had the services been "for the defendant" instead of another. It is said that, if it is true that the claimant was emancipated, he may have a cause of action against his father, who received the benefit of his services, but not against the uncle, who did not. The evidence shows that the services were rendered at the request of the uncle, and, but for the statute of frauds, the contract would have been a valid one, notwithstanding the fact that the work was to be done upon the farm of another. The law would not inquire whether, or in what manner, such services were of benefit to the uncle, but would treat the services as rendered "for the defendant," and compel him to pay for them, because he had promised to do so. But the promise was void, because not in writing, and, if a recovery is to be had, it must be upon a promise which is valid, either express or implied; and, as the only express promise is that mentioned, the case depends upon our ability to find an implied one to pay the value of the services rendered. It appears that the claimant went to work at the request of his uncle. If it can also be found that his uncle appropriated the benefits of his labor, the law will authorize the inference of a promise to pay the value of the services. The only evidence upon the subject is, in substance, that the claimant went home, and worked for his father, and that the uncle knew the fact, and from time to time expressed his approval of his course and conduct. If this can be called an appropriation of the benefit of the services rendered, the recovery can be sustained, as this question was left to the jury. In the case of Liddle v. Needham, 39 Mich. 147 (33 Am. Rep. 359), the plaintiff, Needham, promised to give to Liddle's son a deed of certain land, and, in considera |