ROAD FROM KYOTO-PART 1: WHERE ARE WE, WHERE ARE WE GOING, AND HOW DO WE GET THERE? WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1998 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee will be in order. Without objection, the Chair is given the authority to recess the Committee during roll call votes today. And without objection, all Members will be allowed to insert opening statements at the beginning of the record. Last fall, the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, asked me to lead the House delegation to the climate change talks in Kyoto, Japan, held in early December of last year. At the time I received the Speaker's invitation, I had formed some opinions on American participation in a climate change treaty, based in large part from the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment under the chairmanship of my able friend from California, Mr. Calvert. Nevertheless, I felt the responsibility entrusted to me by the Speaker obliged me to keep an open mind on the issue, and I withheld judgment on the treaty until after the negotiations were concluded. The Speaker asked the delegation to examine three questions: first, is the science sound; second, will the treaty work; and third, is the treaty fair? Granted, many more questions could have been asked, but these three seemed to get to the heart of a very complicated and contentious issue. It seems to me that all the hot air being expended on this issue may be a bigger threat to the environment than carbon dioxide. Without an unqualified "yes" answer to each of these questions, it is not clear to me that the Clinton Administration can hope to win the support of Congress and the American people. Yet that is exactly what the Clinton Administration is asking Congress and the American people to do to support a treaty that cannot meet the tests of sound science, efficacy, and fairness. First, is the science sound? No. Professor Bert Bolin, Chairman emeritus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the group of scientists that assesses and reviews the worldwide climate research-told the Kyoto negotiators that the science of climate (1) change has considerable uncertainties and that the climate system is only partly predictable. His repeated emphasis on the scientific uncertainties raised valid concerns about the maturity of the science underpinning the Kyoto Protocol. Even basic questions about the temperature record remain unanswered, and scientists are still grappling with the discrepancy between ground-based and satellite temperature records. In short, what we heard at Kyoto, and have heard subsequently, is that the Kyoto Protocol is based on immature and uncertain science. Second, will the treaty work? The answer to that is "no" as well. Because developing countries have not been required to assume binding emission reductions, the agreement will merely shift emissions from industrialized countries to developing countries. The end result will be that the United States will lose jobs and the environment will suffer because many of the countries exempted from the agreement also have lower air and water pollution standards. Scientists estimate that under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, the reduction in projected warming by the Year 2050 will be on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 degrees Celsius. That's not much bang for the buck. Also of great importance is the question of how the Kyoto Protocol would work in practice. If, as the old adage goes, "The devil is in the details," then the Kyoto pact is one very devilish treaty. Indeed, the very nature of the negotiating process, which operated through consensus, determined that the agreement would include only broad concepts. Basic questions concerning implementation, monitoring, emissions-credit trading, and enforcement still have not been addressed, and won't be addressed until the Buenos Aires round of talks to be held later this year. But seeing as the Administration backtracked on its stated policy during the Kyoto talks, I have little confidence that it will safeguard America's interests in these upcoming talks. In the meantime, how can the Administration expect Congress to acquiesce in putting American treasure and prestige behind a treaty silent on these fundamental issues? Finally, is the treaty fair? And the answer to that is "no" as well. The Kyoto Protocol only binds the United States and other developed countries to binding greenhouse gas reduction targets, while large polluters such as China, India, Mexico, Indonesia, and Brazil rejected any further role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. By placing the burden of emissions limits solely on the United States and the other developed countries, Americans will now be at a competitive disadvantage against foreign competition. Higher energy costs and cumbersome regulations will encourage American industries, agriculture, and jobs to move to those countries where the Protocol imposes no obligations and costs. Indeed, recognizing how untenable its handiwork is, the Administration has suggested that it may not submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification until it can bring the developing countries onboard. But from what I have seen, the developing countries are not in the least bit interested to enter into binding emissions reductions. In fact, once these countries become sanctuaries for energy-intensive industries, they will be even less likely to agree to emission limits. We all agree on the need to protect the environment and want to leave our children and grandchildren a better, cleaner, and more prosperous world. Advances in technology can provide that better, cleaner, and more prosperous world, however, advances in technology can not, and will not, be subject to the United Nations' schedule. And furthermore, we have to take great pains in the Congress to prevent a technological initiative from just throwing money at problems without bringing about any type of results. However, the result of the untenable U.N. Treaty brokered by the Administration, is certain to be slower American economic growth, drastically higher energy prices, and the loss of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of American jobs to overseas competitors and all for no environmental benefits. I believe that the Kyoto treaty is fundamentally flawed and will be overwhelmingly rejected by the American people and by the Congress when it is subjected to a full and open debate. And now I yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. Brown, for his opening statement. Mr. BROWN of California. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by commending you for holding this timely hearing, and also for your very capable leadership as the head of the Congressional delegation that observed the negotiations in Kyoto. Mr. Chairman, the Kyoto agreement may not be perfect, but it puts us on the right track. It commits the United States to a path of economic development that depends on the wise and efficient use of all of our energy resources. And it commits our industrialized nation partners to undertake similar aggressive, but realistic, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Kyoto agreement is the degree to which the U.S. negotiating team succeeded in bringing a very wary group of developed nations around to our way of thinking about the best way to deal with climate change. The U.S. approach, which was based on flexibility and market-driven mechanisms, was at odds with the command and control measures favored by the European Union. Our success means that we can unleash the innovation of the private sector to help us solve the climate change problem in a more efficient and less costly way than relying on cumbersome governmental edicts and bureaucracies. This success is largely due to the skill and diligence of the U.S. negotiating team, and I want to commend them for their excellent efforts. While it's appropriate for Congress to begin reviewing the Kyoto agreement, it is also important to keep in mind that it remains very much a work in progress. The agreement was reached very late in the conference, indeed, even after the conference was scheduled to end. As a consequence, many of the agreements are broad in nature and lacking in details, as you have pointed. There are a number of critical issues that need further resolution before we can really adequately assess the environmental and economic impacts of the provisions agreed to in Kyoto. I would urge my colleagues not to rush to a hasty judgement while the Administration continues over the coming months to negotiate these important details as you have indicated as a prelude to submitting the treaty to the Senate. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask unanimous consent to submit a portion of my statement in the record to save time Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. Mr. BROWN of California. I would like to just to point out that you have identified the most pressing problem in the agreement to date, and that is the lack of involvement by the underdeveloped world, including the large emitters and potential emitters such as China and others of that sort. I would point out that these nations came to the conference with the attitude that you in the industrial world made the mess, and now you're asking us to clean it up. And with almost a clear statement that you show us what you're going to do before we will begin to negotiate seriously. We did not show them what we're going to do until, as the Chairman indicated, the last minutes of the conference. And, therefore, they refused to make commitments that would establish what they will do. I think that they will be much more open to making those commitments now that we have established what the advanced nations will do. And I look forward to the success of the continuing negotiations as we proceed with them. And I was going to yield some time to one of my other colleague who is not here, but I will, instead, yield back the balance of my time. Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I thank the gentleman from California. [The prepared statements of Mr. Brown, Mr. Hall, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Doyle, and Ms. Jackson Lee follow:] Opening Statement The Road From Kyoto Mr. Chairman, let me start by commending you for holding this timely hearing and also for your capable leadership as the head of the Congressional delegation that observed the negotiations in Kyoto. Mr. Chairman, the Kyoto agreement may not be perfect, but it puts us on the right track. It commits the U.S. to a path of economic development that depends on the wise and efficient use of all of our energy resources. And it commits our industrialized nation partners to undertake similar aggressive, but realistic, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Kyoto agreement is the degree to which the U.S. negotiating team succeeded in bringing a very wary group of developed nations around to our way of thinking about the best way to deal with climate change. The U.S. approach, which was based on flexibility and market-driven mechanisms, was at odds with the "command and control" measures favored by the European Union. Our success means that we can unleash the innovation of the private sector to help us solve the climate change problem in a more efficient and less costly way than relying on cumbersome governmental edicts and bureaucracies. This success is largely due to the skill and diligence of the U.S. negotiating team, and I want to commend them for their excellent efforts. While it's appropriate for Congress to begin reviewing the Kyoto agreement, it's also important to keep in mind that it remains very much a "work in progress." The agreement was reached very late in the Conference, indeed, even after the Conference was scheduled to end. As a consequence, many of the agreements are broad in nature. There are a number of critical issues that need further resolution before we can really adequately assess the environmental and economic impacts of the provisions agreed to in Kyoto. I would urge my colleagues not to rush to a hasty judgement while the Administration continues over the coming months to negotiate these important details. Certainly one of the most controversial areas left unaddressed in the Kyoto agreements is the role of the developing countries. Prior to the Kyoto meeting, the President repeatedly stated that he would not commit the U.S. to |