the death of one of the other daughters under twentyone to a share of the residue by survivorship." Nor it seems can a mistake be corrected without some guide for ascertaining what would have been the testator's disposition had he known of the mistake. Thus where a woman by her will gave legacies to several persons after the death of her husband under a mistaken idea that he was entitled by settlement to the property during his life: the Lord Chancellor thought he could not correct the mistake, and give the legatees instant legacies; there being nothing to show that the testatrix would, have done so, if she had not mistaken her power.b If a man bequeaths a sum of money to a person, the 50g. Man and afterwards in the same instrument gives him vke another legacy of the same amount, the second is merely considered a repetition of the former; and Jem. Sg. only one sum can be recovered. If the gifts were of unequal amount the legatee was by the civil law entitled to both: and so in equity, where a second legacy was greater than the first, it was held accumulative. އ މތ. d When the same specific thing is given by two 25 testamentary instruments to the same person, it can be only a repetition. But when a sum of money is 202. Wat bequeathed by one instrument, and an equal, greater, or less sum is bequeathed to the same person by - a subsequent one; as one 1007. by the will, and ally 5 - sine & Sim. 138. Tweed de v. J. 10 for 453. Modes Jun 3 Bew. 450 Superforthen wood, id. N. Holford v. Wood, 4 Ves. 76. 201. Mellish v. Mellish, 4 Ves. 45. b Smith v. Maitland, 1 Ves. J. c Swinb. P. 7. S. 21. 2 Atk. 638. 1 Bro. 30. Greenwood v. Green another 1007. by the codicil; the latter legacy is presumed to be intended as accumulative." Lord Alvanley, admitting this general rule, said, he must always guard it with the circumstance that the two instruments bore different dates, and hoped the ecclesiastical court would not go on to prove papers without date. For where a man by his will gave legacies to his brother and two sisters, and upon the same paper under the will gave them in his own handwriting the same legacies; and it did not appear when this was written, but in the ecclesiastical court probate was granted of these two writings as a will and codicil: Lord Kenyon considered the probate conclusive to show they must be taken as distinct instruments, and consequently that the legatees, according to the general rule, were entitled to double legacies. This presumption that legacies by different instruments are accumulative is a very slight one, and small circumstances will raise an inference against it. If in two testamentary instruments the legacies are not given simpliciter, but the motive of the gift is expressed, and in both instruments the same motive is expressed, and the same sum is given; the Court considers these two coincidences as raising a presumption that the testator did not by the second a Swinb. P. 7. S. 21. 2 H. B. 219. Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Ch. Rep. 70. Newport . Kinaston, id. 110. Finch Ch: Ca. 294. Pit v. Pidgeon, 1 Ch. Ca. 301. Cliffe v. Gibbons, 2 Stra. 1324. Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Bro. 389. Hooley v. Hatton, id. N. 2 Dick. 461. Hodges v. Peacock, 3 Ves. 735. Hurst. v. Beach, 5 Mad. 351. Lnder Sut clifte 2 Jun 275 b 3 Ves. 294. His Lordship had previously (3 Ves. 160) made some strong observations on the habit of the spiritual court of granting probate of loose papers. Baillie v. Butterfield, 1 Cox, 392. But the probate of an instrument is not conclusive of its being testamentary. Pigott v. J'Anson, 1 Ed. 469. d2 Bro. 529. 3 Ves. 294. 5 id. 384. instrument mean a second gift, but only a repetition of the former one. Thus where all the sums given by the second instrument were different from those given by the first, except one, and that one was expressed to be for the same cause, viz. the legatee's trouble as executor: it was held that he was entitled only to one sum, while the rest of the legacies were accumulative. But the Court only raises this presumption of the second gift being a repetition, where the double coincidence occurs, of the same motive, and the same sum, in both instruments. It will not raise it, if in either instrument there be no motive, or a different motive expressed, although the sums be the same; nor, if the same motive be expressed in both instruments, and the sums be different. This reasoning however has no application to Huming lot cases where the second instrument affords intrinsic -testuck Bli evidence that it was intended by the testator in sub1.2. 475 Robby stitution of the first. Thus where a testatrix by will 95. a declared her intention to dispose of the residue of Puriwekeüb. Walther personal estate by a codicil or codicils, and Slate afterwards made four codicils, and the first and last Phit. 294. Jaly Bear of these were nearly alike, the legatees in each being Fm 2CM. mostly the same; some of them having the same North specific articles given to them by both codicils, but some of the pecuniary legatees had less, and some more given them by the last than by the first: Lord Hardwicke thought it manifest the testatrix intended to substitute one codicil in the place of the other; and held the legatees entitled only to the legacies under the last. So where a man by his will gave to 2 a e 5 Mad. 358. Benyon v. Benyon, 17 Ves. 34. 5 Mad. 359. 4 id. 267; and see 17 Ves. 41, 42. d D. St. Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 636; and see Jackson v. Jackson, 2 Cox, 35. Campbell v. E. Radnor, 1 Bro. 271. Coote v. Boyd, his wife his goods, plate, &c., together with 10007., in satisfaction of all her claims; and afterwards by a codicil, reciting that there was 10007. given her by his former will, did then give 1600l., and whatsoever was in his former will to his wife, and his former will to stand in full force notwithstanding the codicil: it was held that the wife only took the 16007. given by the codicil." & water les 9. Lord Thurlow observed, that the question, münche whether by giving two legacies, the testator did notiéste intend the legatee to take both, is a question of arten & Din presumption, donec probetur in contrarium; and would let in all sorts of evidence. But in a late case it was held that evidence is not admissible in the first instance to show that a testator meant to substitute a legacy in his codicil in the place of one in his will; for this would be to contradict the expressed effect of a written instrument: but where the circumstances are such as to raise a presumption against the accumulation, evidence, as in other cases, is admissible to repel this presumption." 2 Bro. 521. Moggridge v.Thackwell, 1 Ves. J. 464. 3 Bro. 517. James v. Semmens, 2 H. B. 213. Allen v. Callow, 3 Ves. 289 Barclay v. Wainwright, id. 462. Osborne v. D. Leeds, 5. Ves. 369. Currie v. Pye, 17 Ves. 462. Att. Gen. v. Harley, 4 Mad. 263. Gillespie v. Alexander, 2 Sim. & St. 145. Hemming v. Gurrey, id. 311. As to Foy v. Foy, с SECTION II. Of the Construction of certain Words most commonly used to describe the Property bequeathed. WORDS in general are to be taken according to their natural and common import, and to the sense, which usage has put upon them: and if words of art are used, they are to be construed according to the technical sense, unless upon the whole will it is plain they were not so intended.a For the law presumes every testator to know its rules; and the Court cannot reject words, having an obvious meaning, upon a suspicion, that the testator did not know what he meant. The same words also in different parts of a will are primâ facie to be taken to have the same meaning; but they may have a different construction even in the same sentence when applied to different matter. The word "estate" is genus generalissimum, and includes all things real and personal. A bequest, therefore, of all personal estate at W. will pass arrears of rent issuing out of lands there." "Goods" and "estate' mean the same thing, and are co-extensive; and "all goods," or "all goods and chattels" will pass all the personal estate,' including leases for years, cattle, corn, debts, and |