related to D. M. than the plaintiff's wife. The Court were of opinion that the claim could not be supported; because, if the word "name" was to be understood in its primary sense, the wife was not a person of that name; and if it was to be understood in a figurative sense, as denoting a house, family, or stock, then there was another person of that description, who was nearer of kin. But they forbore to intimate any opinion, as to the sense in which this word ought to be taken; and also upon a question much debated in the argument, namely, whether both parts of the description, that is, nearest of kin and name of B., must concur in the same individual; it not being necessary to decide either of those points." It seems sufficient if a legatee answers the description at the date of the will, although it is no longer. applicable to him at the death of the testator. As if one devise a thing to the wife of J.S., and before the devisor's death J.S. die, and she takes another husband, and is called by another name; this devise still remains good. Or if a testator give 107. to the parish where he lives, and afterwards removes his habitation to another parish, that in which he lived at the time of the will shall have the legacy. So it -is said a bequest to the testator's wife refers to that person who was his wife at the date of his will, and not to an after-taken wife, who may survive him.d And here we may add the case of the man devising, that if his wife, who was enceinte, should have a 'posthumous daughter," she was to have 500l.: the 66 daughter, though born in his lifetime, was held entitled to the legacy.* II. Legacies are sometimes given, not nominatim, but in general terms to a class of individuals; and a question often arises as to the persons intended to be comprised. We may observe, in the first place, that there may be some who come within the description, but who will nevertheless not be entitled, if from the context of the will there is reason to infer that the testator did not intend to include them. Thus where the produce of some stock was given amongst all and every the nephews and nieces that should be living, as well on the side of the testatrix's late husband, as her own, (to wit,) A. or her children, B. or his children, &c. the Master of the Rolls, after some consideration, thought he must consider the testatrix as having, by the enumeration made, described whom she meant by all the nephews and nieces; and consequently that a nephew, not named under the videlicet, could not take. And where also a man, amongst other legacies in his will, gave the interest of some stock to his son for life, with a power to dispose of part of it by will, and gave the remainder after his son's death to and amongst the several persons thereinbefore mentioned, to whom he had given legacies; and gave the residue of his estate unto and amongst the several legatees thereinbefore named, except his said son: the son was held excluded from a share in the remainder of the stock, upon the ground that it was not the intention of the testator to con • Jaggard v. Jaggard, Prec. Ch. 175. 1 Eecard v. Brooke, 2 Cox, 213. sider him as one of the persons" thereinbefore mentioned." The mere gift, however, for life to a person will not prevent his taking a vested interest in the remainder of the property as one of the class of persons to whom it is given after his death." It has been laid down, that if one possessed of a term of years devise it to J. S., and after his death that the heir of J.S. shall have it; in this case J. S. shall have so many years of the term as he shall live, and the heir of J. S., and the executor of that heir shall have the residue of the term. So where there was a bequest of all the testator's goods in C. house to the heir of J.D., the Court seemed to take it for granted that the property vested in the heir, But See, and went to his executors. But Lord Alvanley inMounny Bla clined to think that as a word of purchase " heirs" 384 feb must mean such person as the law points out to sucBew. 266. The Jeceed to personal property; or heirs quoad the property, that is next of kin. And in a case in which a Je B. man gave a legacy to A., and " failing him, by 163. Lowr decease before me, to his heirs ;" and A. died in the Smith. 20's. .34.c.testator's lifetime: it was held that the legacy be longed to the next of kin of A. There is no doubt, however, that the heir at law, properly and technically speaking, may take personal property bequeathed to him by that description; and so it was held in a case where the personal and real property were given to the testator's nearest heir at law; on the ground, that it would be contrary to the intention to divide the 399; 38. Nannock v. Horton, 7 Ves. 391. Touch. 446. Danvers r. E. Clarendon, Ver. 35; and see Pleydell v. Pleydell, 1 P.W. 748. 5 Ves. 403; and see Lowndes v. Stone, 4 Ves. 649. f Vaux v. Henderson, 1 Jac. & W. 388; but see Forster v.Sierra, 4 Vs.766. one species of property from the other. In some 231. The word "issue" may, and frequently does, mean Casteenchildren only; but if there is nothing to show that the testator used it in this confined sense, it has always, as a word of purchase, been considered as hunt 4 synonimous with "descendants," and whoever cancer. 450. Mash when make himself out a descendant of the person, to call 240 whose issue the bequest is made, has a right to be considered as persona designata in that bequest.i.13 m. Under a legacy therefore to the issue, or descendants $2. of any person, grandchildren, great grandchildren,157. &c. will be equally entitled with children. And a gift for the benefit of the issue of a woman will include children by any husband. Refchen 5 "Issue" is generally a word of limitation, and a karsonThe bequest to A. and to his issue vests absolutely in A. himself. But this use of the word will be easily, or suit qualified by other expressions. Thus where stock ca was given to A. and B. each one moiety, and to their Zal., gema issue, and if either died and left no issue, her share to go to the survivor; and A. died in the lifetime of the testatrix; it was held that her share did not vest r a Gwynne v. Muddock, 14 Ves. 488. › Loveday . Hopkins, Ambl. 273. 1 Jac. & W. 33. Crawford v. Trotter, 4 Mad. 361; and see Wilson v. Vansittart, Ambl. 562. So in marriage articles, 2 P.W. 342. 3 Ves. & B. 67. Sibley v. Perry. 7 Ves. 522. d Cook v. Cook, 2 Ver. 545. Wyth r. Blackman, 1 Ves. 196. Ambl. 555. Davenport v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. 257. s. in her absolutely so as to lapse, but that it went to her issue. So where all the real and personal property was given to the testator's wife for life, to be by her divided according to the best of her judgment and discretion among such of his children, and their issue, as should be surviving at the time of her decease; and one of the children died before her, leaving issue: it was held that the wife was authorized by the power to give a share to such issue; and that the word was not to be construed as a limitation, but as enumerating the persons among whom the widow was to dispose of the estate." In bequests to "relations" the Court, in order to set bounds to so indefinite a term, has confined it to such relations as would be entitled under the statute of distributions. Gifts to "all relations;" and "next relations," have received the same construction. So a bequest to each of the testator's relations by blood or marriage was confined to persons entitled, and those who had married persons entitled under the statute. The inconvenience of not so doing appeared in a case in which a testator gave 20,000l. to his executors, upon trust to distribute among such of his relations who should not appear to his executors to be worth each person more than 20007.; applications were in consequence made to the executors by 456 persons claiming shares in the 20,0007., |